BHAGAWATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ application was moved by the petitioner company against a show cause notice dated 27th March, 1987 issued by Shri N. K. Bajpai, Director, Directorate of Anti Evasion (Central Excise) New Delhi, whereby the petitioner company was, inter alia, directed to show cause why Central Excise Duty to the extent of Rs. 803. 75 crores which was allegedly short paid by the petitioner company should not be demanded under the provisions of S. 11a of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 read with R. 9 (2) of the Central Excise Rules. ( 2 ) THE facts, in short, relevant for the purpose of determination of the questions raised in this case are as follows :- The petitioner company is engaged in manufacturing of cigarettes having its registered office at Calcutta and have five factories situated at Bombay, Bangalore, Saharanpur Munger and Calcutta respectively. The petitioner company sells cigarette manufactured by it through wholeseller, secondary wholesellers and retailers. The petitioner company also had been getting their brands of cigarettes manufactured on job basis from other tobacco companies which are mentioned in the show cause notice. Prior to lst March, 1983 the cigarettes were liable to excise duty under item 4 II (2) of the first schedule of the said Act and were liable to excise duty under Chap. 24 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The valuation of the excisable goods for the purpose of charging the excise duty was made in accordance with the provisions of S. 4 of the said Act. The said Tariff Act as prescribed under the said item was as follows : Date Basic Duty Addl. Duty Spl. Excise Duty 1-3-83 Rs. 440/- per thousand or 300% Rs. 160/- per thousand or 100% ad. val. Plus Rs. 12/- thousand whichever is higher 1-3-84 Rs. 440/- per thousand or 300% ad. val. plus Rs. 20/- per thousand whichever is higher Nil Nil Rs. 260/- per thousand or 175% ad. val. plus Rs. 12/- per thousand whichever is higher 25-3-85 -do- 2-9-85 -do- -do- 10% of basic -do- Nil ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the Central Government, in exercise of its power under R. 8 of the Central Excise Rules, issued Notifications from time to time granting exemption and providing for a lower and concessional rate of excise duty on cigarettes than ordinarily prescribed under the Act. Prior to 1st March, 1983 the amount of duty was required to be determined with reference to the wholesale cash price of the exercisable goods determined in accordance with the principles laid down under S. 4 of the said Act. After 1st March, 1983 by a Notification dated 27-2-86 issued under R. 8 of the Central Excise Rules, the rates of duty for cigarettes were related to various specific slab rates for which different rates of cigarettes were placed depending upon the retail price of package of cigarette, in other words, the rate of excise duty was made specific for different values depending upon the retail price of the cigarettes and that the duty was levied according to the rates prescribed. For the purpose of determination of the amount of excise duty payable under the Notifications issued under R. 8 of the said Rules, the Central Government from time to time issued Notifications changing the rates. It is not necessary to set out the said rates which were amended from time to time but only for the purpose of this writ application the rate introduced by the Notification dated 2-9-85 is mentioned for the purpose of understanding the case made out in the show cause notice and the case made by the parties before this Court which is as follows : (1)Rate (2)Cigarettes (being cigarettes packed in packages) of which the adjusted sale price per one thousand - (i) does not exceed rupees sixty forty-two rupees per one thousand; (ii) exceeds rupees sixty but does not exceed rupees one hundred and seventy one hundred and twenty five rupees per one thousand. (iii) exceeds rupees one hundred and seventy but does not exceed rupees three hundred two hundred and twenty five rupees per one thousand; The said Notification, inter alia, provided certain definitions which are necessary to be set out in this connection : (a) 'adjusted sale price', in relation to each cigarette contained in a package of cigarettes, means the unit price arrived at by dividing the sale price of such package by the number of cigarettes in such package ; (b) 'cigarettes packed in packages', means cigarettes which are packed for retail sale, in packages which (a) contain 10 or 20 cigarettes, and (b) bear a declaration specifying the maximum sale price thereof as the amount specified in the declaration, plus local taxes only. (c) 'sale price' in relation to a package of cigarettes means the maximum price (exclusive of local taxes only) at which such packages to be sold in accordance with the declaration made on such package. " ( 4 ) IN the show cause notice it was alleged that the excise duty was short paid by the petitioner company inasmuch as the petitioner deliberately paid duty at a lesser rate on the basis of declaration and printing incorrect price on the packages of cigarettes, and it is stated that on proper interpretation of the said Notification the petitioner Company was required to declare and state on the package of cigarette the maximum retail price or in other words, the price at which the said cigarettes are intended to be sold by the petitioner company. The petitioner company, it is alleged, printed a price as the sale price on packages of cigarettes knowing fully well that the same was not the price at which it is to be sold in the market by the retailer and on the basis of such wilful misstatement with regard to the sale price printed on the packages of cigarettes the petitioner took the advantage of the lower rate of duty, whereas the petitioner company at the same time fixed another price as the 'effective price' which was circulated through unsigned blind notes, circulars and instructions to the wholesellers and retailers and thereby controlling the prices prevailing in the market which was admittedly higher than the 'sale price' printed on the cigarettes. In the show cause notice the period for which the show cause notice was issued was from lst March, 1983 to 27th Feb. , 1987 and it was alleged that during this period the petitioner company declared and/or printed a sale price which was not the proper price and/or the maximum retail price, but deliberately printed a lower price and paid lesser duty on the basis of such lower price printe d on the packages of cigarettes and thereby deliberately evaded Rs. 803. 75 crore on account of excise duty. 803. 75 crore on account of excise duty. ( 5 ) THE show cause notice was issued after the respondents had seized large number of documents and records on the basis of searches conducted in various offices of the petitioner company situated at different parts of India and on examination of the seized documents, and records as well as the statements obtained during such search and scizure, from various persons including top officials of the petitioner company wherein it was admitted that the printed sale price was in some cases below the effective price, viz. the price at which the petitioner company intended the same to be sold in the market. It also transpired from the seized documents and records, particularly from various charges on which reliance was placed by the respondents in the affidavit-in-opposition, that the sale price printed in the packages of cigarettes were far below the effective price and that the petitioner company was controlling the margin of profit of the whole sale dealers, secondary wholesale dealers and retailers to suit the convenience and design of the petitioner company. The petitioner company, it is alleged, had chosen to communicate such margin of profit in a clandestine manner drastically reducing the margin available to wholesale dealers, retailers immediately after the budgetary changes made, in the year 1983 while increased their sale price and the sale realisation. It also transpired from the seized documents that by this pricing strategy process, the margin left for the retailers was reduced to only 10 paise per one thousand cigarettes and that it was stated that it was practically impossible on the part of any retailer to sell 1000 sticks of cigarettes at a total margin of profit of 10 paise only. The "effective price" that was introduced by the petitioner company was the price at which the retailers would sell and as a matter of fact sold the goods at such effective prices in the market. It is stated that the petitioner company fixed one price for the purpose of levy and collection of duty only and fixed another price for the purpose of selling the same in the market and that by this process it is stated that there had been large scale evasion of excise duty to the extent indicated above. It is stated that the petitioner company fixed one price for the purpose of levy and collection of duty only and fixed another price for the purpose of selling the same in the market and that by this process it is stated that there had been large scale evasion of excise duty to the extent indicated above. From the various exhibits filed before this Court it is clearly evident that the effective price that was fixed for selling the goods in the market was higher than the maximum sale price printed on the package of cigarettes in most of the cases. It would be sufficient if only one such example is highlighted which it necessary for the purpose of understanding the main ground for challenge of the show cause notice before this Court. In one case the petitioner company printed Rs. 1. 70 paise on the packages of a particular brand of cigarettes as sale price and according to the slab rate of duty prescribed in this behalf the petitioner company paid Re. 125/- per thousand and that by issuing circulars/blind notes/secret instructions, the petitioner company fixed another price as 'effective price' for the self same commodity at Rs. 2/-, and if the effective price of Rs. 2/- per packet was taken to be the maximum retail price as per the notifications, in that event the petitioner company had to pay excise duty at the slab rate of Rs. 225/- per thousand cigarettes. From this example it will be evident that the difference between the printed price and the effective price had the effect of changing the slab rate altogether and according to the revenue it was the duty cast upon the petitioner to pay excise duty on the basis of the effective price and by not paying the same on that basis, the petitioner had evaded large amount of Central Excise Duty by wilful misstatement. But according to the petitioner the sale price that was printed on the packages of cigarettes was made strictly in accordance with the provisions of the said notification, inasmuch as, the petitioner had no statutory obligation and/or duty to print a sale price at which the goods must be sold in the market. But according to the petitioner the sale price that was printed on the packages of cigarettes was made strictly in accordance with the provisions of the said notification, inasmuch as, the petitioner had no statutory obligation and/or duty to print a sale price at which the goods must be sold in the market. The petitioner had no manner of control over the retail price and the petitioner company could not be made liable for selling the cigarette at a price higher than the printed price in the market. It is stated that the revenue did not raise any objection to the pricing method adopted by the petitioner and when the rules were changed requiring the petitioner company to get the price list approved, the revenue also approved the price list as it is, submitted by the petitioner company. This state of affairs continued until the search and seizure were made by the revenue whereupon certain papers and documents were obtained and on the basis of the examination of the same the impugned show cause notice was issued against the petitioner company on the allegation that the petitioner company by adopting a pricing strategy, fixing one price for the purpose of payment of excise and the other for the purpose of sale in the market and the marketing strategy was also fully controlled by the petitioner. This show cause notice by which the petitioner was called upon to pay the deficit excise duty paid by the petitioner during this period to the extent of Rs. 804. 75 crores. ( 6 ) MR. Nariman, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner made the following submissions in support of the writ application : (a) That the respondents have acted illegally and without jurisdiction in issuing the impugned show cause notice dated 27th March, 1987, inasmuch as, there was no short levy and/or short payment of excise duty on the part of the petitioner company and in any event there was no misstatement and/or misrepresentation made by the petitioner company in the matter of printing the sale price on the packages of cigarette for the purpose of payment of excise duty. (b) That on the basis of rules of interpretation contemporanea exposition (contemporary exposition) the respondents had no jurisdiction to attribute a different meaning to the definition of the words 'sale price' after a lapse of so many years and to claim that the prices were not correctly declared and that for not correctly declaring the sale price there had been evasion of excise duty. (c) On a true interpretation of the provision of S. 11a read with the provisions of Ss. 35a, 35ee of the said Act the impugned notice is liable to be set aside inasmuch as, the power under Section 11a of the said Act could not be invoked in a case where payments have already been made on the basis of the price list and the latter was finally concluded and that the provisions of S. 11a of the said Act would only be invoked as a machinery provision in aid of the powers conferred on the appellate and revisional jurisdiction under Ss. 35a and 35ee of the said Act. (d) That the notification No. 215/86 - Central Excise New Delhi dated 27-3-86 was ultra vires the provision of the Act and did not and could not confer any power upon the respondent No. 3 -- Sri N. K. Bajpayee to exercise the powers of the collector under proviso to sub-s. (1) of Section 11a of the said Act and as such the impugned show cause notice issued by Sri N. K. Bajpai, respondent No. 3 is, on the face of it, was illegal and without jurisdiction. (e) That the respondent No. 3 had disqualified himself to act as an adjudicator in the matter, inasmuch as, after the search and seizure he had made certain prejudicial statements in the press and that under the reward rules the respondent No. 3 and the officers working under him were entitled to a reward thereby created an interest in favour of the respondent No. 3 did his department and further the entire search and seizure through out the country was made under the supervision and control of the respondent No. 3 who had occasion to know the affairs of the petitioners company not only from the materials recovered from the search and seizure but also from other sources including the Intelligence Report and as such on the ground of bias and 'personal interest' the respondent No. 3 should not be allowed to act as an adjudicator in the matter. ( 7 ) A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the Revenue as to the maintainability of the writ application against the show cause notice and that such a preliminary objection has to be disposed of before I can proceed on to the merits of the case. Ordinarily a writ petition is not maintainable against a show cause notice inasmuch as, when a show cause notice is issued, the party gets an opportunity to place his case before the authority concerned and there are elaborate procedures by way of an appeal and/or revision against such order passed in such proceeding. But when a case is made out that the show cause notice was issued without jurisdiction and without the authority of law or that the show cause notice on the basis of the admitted facts is not maintainable in law, the writ petition would be maintainable and the writ court can undertake a limited scrutiny on the points raised in the petition to find out whether there was any jurisdictional error and/or any legal infirmity in the proceeding. In the instant case it is a1leged that the show cause notice was issued on the basis of an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the notification in the question which was issued under Rule 8 of the said Rules and in law there had been no misstatement or misrepresentation regarding the sale price and there had been no evasion of excise duty. It was alleged that on the basis of the admitted facts, this point could be decided. In the writ petition it was alleged that the respondent No. 3 had no jurisdiction to act as a Collector on the strength of the notification No. 215/86 dated 27-3-86 and also alleged bias against the respondent No. 3, who had issued the show cause notice and who would be acting as an adjudicator in the matter. These questions raised in the petition, in my view could be appropriately decided in the present writ application. Of course, the question whether there had been evasion of duty in the facts and circumstances of the case is a mixed question of law and fact and that at this stage, the writ Court cannot go into the questions of fact far less disputed questions of fact. But if the writ Court can decide the question on the basis of the admitted facts, in that event, the writ petition could be held to be maintainable. If it appears to the writ Court that the proceeding suffers from a legal infirmity which goes into the root of the case and is not curable during the proceeding, in my view, the party cannot be directed to submit to the jurisdiction of the authority concerned and to undergo the proceeding which would ultimately fail. Considering the fact and circumstances of the case, I overrule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Revenue because of the nature of the allegations and points raised in the writ application, which will be dealt with hereunder : ( 8 ) SUBMISSION on point (a) : In support of the contention that the show cause notice issued without any authority of law or jurisdiction, Mr. Nariman, the learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner made the following submissions; Under the notification in question which was issued under R. 8 of the said Rules the only requirement was on the part of the petitioner to print a sale price on each package of cigarette. There was no indication in the definition that it must be the actual sale price or the maximum retail price. There was no indication in the definition that it must be the actual sale price or the maximum retail price. Reference was also made to the actual 'sale price', under the Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Act, 1976 and the rules framed thereunder (hereinafter referred to as the Packaged Commodities Rules) where certain guidelines are provided for fixing the maximum retail price and that in this particular case it is alleged that the petitioner company had no obligation or duty to print the maximum retail sale price or the actual market price at which the goods are likely to be sold in the market. The only requirement to print a sale price was solely for the purpose of payment of excise duty on the basis of such sale price printed thereon. The legislature did not provide any guideline for fixing of the sale price and/or any machinery for having supervision over such fixation of sale price nor the legislature provide any provision for reviewing and/or revising the sale price so fixed. The petitioner's case is that whatever price that is printed on the package of cigarette was finally binding and conclusive on the parties which could not be reopened or questioned at a later stage. The petitioner company on coming to know that the cigarettes manufactured by the petitioner company were sold at 10% above the printed price, started making representations before the revenue drawing their attention to this aspect of the matter, to which the revenue did not take any exception but on the contrary the revenue sought for suggestions from the petitioner company and ultimately with effect from 1-4-87 the duty is being levied on the basis of the length of the cigarettes and not on the basis of the sale price of such cigarettes to avoid the controversy. The petitioner company alleged that the petitioner acted in the matter bona fide and paid duty on the basis of the declared price as per the schedule of rates provided in this behalf. As the revenue did not take any exception in the matter and as such according to the petitioner it must be deemed that the revenue who was responsible for administering the law accepted this position. Under the Packaged Commodity Rules there is a provision for prosecution for selling the commodities at price higher than the printed price. As the revenue did not take any exception in the matter and as such according to the petitioner it must be deemed that the revenue who was responsible for administering the law accepted this position. Under the Packaged Commodity Rules there is a provision for prosecution for selling the commodities at price higher than the printed price. In this case, the petitioner sold the cigarettes at a price below the printed price to the wholeseller and the wholesale dealer and the secondary wholesellers also sold the cigarettes to the retailers at a price less than the printed price. The petitioner company it was stated was not concerned at what price the retailers would sell the same in the market. It is stated that if the retailer sells the cigarettes at a price higher than the printed price in that event such retailers were liable for prosecution under the Packaged Commodity Rules. Under the Package Commodity Rules there was no obligation upon the petitioner company to print a sale price at which the same was liable to be sold by the retailers. ( 9 ) THE petitioner's case is that the fact that the cigarettes were sold in the market higher than the printed price was also known to the revenue. It was evident from the fact that before the Public Accounts Committee (1985-86) the Member (Budget) stated in evidence that -"it is leviable on the goods. It is the basis for classification of the goods for determining the duty payable. The formula would depend upon the amount which the Government would like to realise by way of excise duty. What we are interested is to collect a certain amount of duty from a particular industry. The rate of duty is accordingly fixed. Ad valorem duty is based on the value of the goods. Specific rate is directly related to the produce. So, it was decided that we could adopt a formula linked to printed retail price for classification of the goods for deciding the amount of duty that this particular commodity should bear. Even at that time we were conscious of the fact that there could be an over charging of the prices by the retailers. So, it was decided that we could adopt a formula linked to printed retail price for classification of the goods for deciding the amount of duty that this particular commodity should bear. Even at that time we were conscious of the fact that there could be an over charging of the prices by the retailers. But according to Packaged Commodities Rules, the retailer were bound to sell the goods at that particular price ; and if the prices were more there was a legal provision for taking action against the retailers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the notification was amended which required that, before printing the sale price, the petitioner had to get the price list approved by the revenue and as a matter of fact such sale prices as printed on the package of cigarettes was approved as it is, without taking any exception in spite of the fact that the revenue was all along aware that the cigarettes manufactured by the petitioner company were sold at a price 10% higher than the printed price. According to the petitioner on a true and proper construction of the term 'sale price' in the notification in question it must be held that it must not be the maximum price at which the said package may be sold in the market. The words "may be" according to Mr. Nariman indicates that it is more directory and not mandatory. If it was the intention of the legislature that it must be sold and not may be sold, in that event the legislature should have used such expression in the notification in clear words. By any stretch of imagination, the words "may be sold" in accordance with the declaration made on such packets cannot be held to mean that the commodity must be sold on the basis of the declaration so made by the petitioner company. If the intention of the legislature was that the "sale price" must be the price at which the commodity must be sold in the market or capable of being sold in the market, in that event the legislature should have used the expression "maximum retail price' or such other terms which might indicate that it must be the actual market price. According to Mr. According to Mr. Nariman, the Packaged Commodity Rules provided two different expression for "sale price", in S. 2 (s) of the Packaged Commodity Rules, one in Cl. (i) and another in Cl. (ii) and that the said two independent definitions disclosed standards and/or guideline to be followed differently, whereas the impugned notification did not provide any guideline and in the absence of the use of the words 'maximum sale price' without providing any definition therefor it must be held that the impugned notification only required the printing of a sale price which need not be the retail price or the maximum sale price or the actual sale price at which the goods in question are sold and/or intended to be sold and/or capable of being sold. The definition of the sale price accordingly to Mr. Nariman was nothing but a recommendatory price and not the market price. It is stated that the interpretation sought to be given by the revenue at this stage was nothing but an afterthought only for the purpose of saddling the petitioner company with some huge liabilities which was unwarranted under the law. ( 11 ) IT was further contended by Mr. Nariman that Section 11a of the said Act could only be invoked where short levy or short payment of duty could be ascertained and/or determined on the basis of some mistake committed by the parties on record. But provision of Section 11a could not be invoked alleging that there had been short levy and/or short payment of duty on the basis of some interpretation of the notification in question given in a manner which is contrary to the long standing practice and understanding which was accepted by the revenue. It was stated that the Revenue was fully conscious and aware of the sale price which was fixed by the petitioner for the purpose of payment of excise duty and was continuously administering the law on the basis that whatever price that is printed by the petitioner was made upon duty compliance with the law. Section 11 A of the said Act did not contemplate a proceeding for recovery on the basis of review of the whole situation and/or mere change of the opinion after the lapse of so many years. Section 11 A of the said Act did not contemplate a proceeding for recovery on the basis of review of the whole situation and/or mere change of the opinion after the lapse of so many years. It is stated that in a fiscal statute unless the words are clear, such a proceeding which is unwarranted in law could not be initiated by exercise of any inherent power. ( 12 ) ON the question of interpretation of the fiscal notification Mr. Nariman relied on a case of the Supreme Court in Hansraj Gordhandas v. H. H. Dave, reported in AIR 1970 SC 755 where the Supreme Court observed that it is well established that in a taxing statute there is no rule for any intendment. The entire matter is to be governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the taxpayer is entitled to get any benefit on the basis of the plain term of the expression, it could not be denied its benefit by resorting to any supposed intention of the Exempting Authority. ( 13 ) RELIANCE was also placed in the decision of this Court in case of M/s. Mangla Brothers v. Collector of Customs, reported in AIR 1985 Cal 122 in which A. K. Sengupta, J. of this Court held that with the change of the officer there could not be any change of the opinion as that will amount to review of the order which the Custom Authority had not been conferred under the Customs Act. In this case goods were cleared under S. 47 of the Customs Act and thereafter the successor-in-office sought to review the same and contended that the goods were not liable to be cleared and in that context it was held that in the absence of power conferred to review an earlier order, the successor-in-office was bound by the earlier view. ( 14 ) REFERENCE was also made to the several other decisions of several other Tribunals which is not necessary to set out inasmuch as this principle is well established that a notification has to be construed on the basis of the plain language used and in the absence of express power conferred by law, there is no inherent power of review of a statutory order by the successor-in-office on the basis of the change of opinion and cannot ignore the decision already taken by the predecessor-in-office. ( 15 ) MR. Naranarayan Gooptu, Advocate General of State of West Bengal, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, Union of India, submitted that the requirement of the notification was clear, precise and unambiguous. The notification defined the term 'sale price' which is an independent definition and the meaning is so clear that it does not require exercise of any skill or requires any extraneous aid for its interpretation. It was the statutory duty and/or the obligation on the part of the petitioner company to declare the maximum sale price of the packages of cigarettee. Mr. Advocate General submitted that on true and proper construction of the definition provided in the said notification, it was crystal clear that the petitioner had to declare the sale price correctly inasmuch as, on the basis of such sale price, duty was leviable and collected but it appeared that the petitioner had committed fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of fact by deliberating a printing price at a lower figure than really what was the maximum retail sale price thereof resulting in short levy and short payment of duty and under such circumstances, action could be taken straightway under S. 11a of the said Act against the petitioner company. It was further stated that under the exemption notification the petitioner had no liberty to declare any price as the sale price for the purpose of payment of duty. The maximum price thus printed, may be of recommendatory nature but such a price must be fixed bona fide and the same must be capable of being sold in the market at that price. But in this case the petitioner deliberately printed a lower price on the packages as the sale price for declaring the same to the exercise authority to avail of a lower rate of excise duty and at the same time fixed another price as the 'effective price' which was the market price and which was higher than the printed price, this according to Mr. Advocate General, amounts to fraud on the revenue and such a case is covered by provision of S. 11a of the said Act. Advocate General, amounts to fraud on the revenue and such a case is covered by provision of S. 11a of the said Act. It was further submitted that the overcharging of price by the retailers, if any, over the printed price has nothing to do with the exercise law, inasmuch as, it is only concerned with the manufacture and the manufacturer in the instant case was under the statutory obligation of duty to fix and declare a maximum sale price on the packages. Such an act should be bona fide and should not be allowed to be done with an intention to evade the payment of lawful excise duty. ( 16 ) IT was further submitted that when the prices are mentioned on the packages of cigarette, in that event the retailers are bound to sell the same at or below that price, otherwise it would be punishable under the Packaged Commodities Rule. When prices are fixed by a manufacturer, the manufacturer is wholly aware that under the existing law, namely, under the Packaged Commodities Rule, a price has to be fixed in such a manner ' so that the same may be sold or capable of being sold by the retailer in the ordinary course of trade or business. But in the instant case, the petitioner fixed up a price in such a manner, that only 10 paise margin of profit was left for the retailers for one thousand sticks of cigarettes, which is nothing but an impossibility and no reasonable man with ordinary prudence could think that a retailer could sell one thousand pieces of cigarettes at a profit of 10 Paise only. It is further submitted by Mr. Advocate General that the seized records and documents clearly exhibited that the petitioner company was fixing one price on the packages for the purpose of payment of the excise duty at a lower rate and simultaneously fixing another price as 'effective price' at which the retailers could sell the same at the market. From this, it is evident that the petitioner company was manouvring the whole affair in such a manner that the petitioner company had to pay lesser amount of excise duty could earn huge amount of profits by squeezing the margin of profits of the whole-sellers and retailers and allowing the retailers to sell at a price higher than the printed price by fixing the effective price. Mr. Advocate General submitted that the petitioner company could not be made liable in cases where the retailers sell the goods at a price higher than the printed price of their own and if it can be shown that the petitioner company had no hand in this Matter. But in the instant case the petitioner was controlling the retail market price by issuing of circulars/blind notes/secret instructions and that this was done with a mala fide motive and it would be evident from the fact that these blind notes, circulars/directions which were issued mostly unsigned and in some cases directed to the addressee that such notes should be destroyed after looking into it and this aspect of the matter became clear after recovery of the documents and papers on seizure. It is stated that this is a case where the company was conducting this affair in a clandestine manner and whole purpose was to cause loss to the revenue in a cool and calculated manner. Mr. Advocate General also pointed out that from the seized documents and records, it also appeared that the management decided to go on making representations periodically in a ritualistic manner complaining about the sale of the petitioner's cigarettes 10% above the printed price by the retailers and this fact, according to Mr. Advocate General, clearly indicated and established beyond doubt that the petitioner company was fully aware that what was done by the petitioner company by way of fixing the effective price over and above the sale price was illegal and unlawful. The petitioner company understood that the 'effective price' should have been the real sale price and should have been reflected on the package of cigarette for the purpose of payment of excise duty. It is further submitted that the manouvring tactics was adopted by the petitioner company solely for the purpose of diverting the attention of the revenue, so that the revenue could not suspect that petitioner had any role in the matter of selling the cigarettes at a higher price in the market. Mr. It is further submitted that the manouvring tactics was adopted by the petitioner company solely for the purpose of diverting the attention of the revenue, so that the revenue could not suspect that petitioner had any role in the matter of selling the cigarettes at a higher price in the market. Mr. Advocate General submitted that this court should not interfere in a case like this, where fraud had been committed by the petitioner on the revenue in a sophisticated manner, which is required to be gone into in details by the adjudicating authority where the petitioner company will get every opportunity to place their defence and the adjudicating authority had to take decision on the basis of the materials, documents and the records and upon hearing the petitioner and further if the decision ultimately goes against the petitioner the petitioner company had the liberty to file an appeal and/or revision and anything done in the matter would be open to further judicial review by the High Court or the Supreme Court. ( 17 ) MR. A. K. Ganguly, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2 Central Board of Excise and Customs submitted that the notification in question did not create any difficulty and/or ambiguity in the matter for ascertaining what was the duty cast upon the petitioner company in order to avail of the concessional rate of duty under the notification in question. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the definition 'sale price' should be read along with the definition of the word 'cigarette packed in packages' and stated that if the said two definitions are read together, it makes abundantly clear, that, in order to avail of the concessional rate of duty, the petitioner had to mention in the packages of cigarette the maximum retail sale price and inasmuch as in the definition of the words'cigarette packed in packages', it is provided that for the purpose of the notification, the cigarettes are packed for retail sale and must bear a declaration specifying the maximum sale price and the definition of the word 'sale price' had to be read in the context of cigarettes packed in packages. Mr. Ganguly submitted that there could not be any other possible interpretation of the word 'sale price'. Mr. Mr. Ganguly submitted that there could not be any other possible interpretation of the word 'sale price'. Mr. Ganguly submitted that it does not require any skill or extraordinary knowledge to understand the plain and the simple meaning of the words 'sale price' which means that the petitioner had to state the maximum retail sale price, in other words, the maximum price at which the retailer can sell in the market. The expression 'may be sold' in accordance with the declaration made on such package as appearing in the definition of the 'sale price', implies that the manufacturer is duty bound to print the retail price of the packages of which every retailer is enjoined under the law to sell the same to the consumers. It was submitted by Mr. Ganguly that no manufacturer under the scheme of the said exemption of notification, can be allowed to say that it would be proper compliance with the notification by merely printing a price which is not the retail sale price. It is further submitted by Mr. Ganguly that it was not, open to the petitioner to declare a price which according to the petitioner is not the retail sale price. The exemption of notification prescribed the requirements to be observed in order to avail the benefits thereunder and that in order to get benefit of such notification, the petitioner was required to declare the maximum retail sale price which it is stated admittedly had not been done and on the contrary, it was stated by Mr. Ganguly that the petitioner did not in fact print the maximum retail price but printed a price according to their choice which is not permissible at all. Mr. Ganguly stated that on plain reading of the notification in question if it is clear that the petitioner was under a statutory duty to state the maximum retail sale price, in that event, the petitioner was guilty of wilful misstatement and suppression of material facts and the petitioner is guilty of not paying payment of proper duty and consequently the petitioner is liable to make good the loss caused to the revenue by such wilful misstatement contrary to the law. The petitioner it is stated, had no fundamental right to carry on business of intoxication like cigarette. The petitioner it is stated, had no fundamental right to carry on business of intoxication like cigarette. The petitioners are granted only a privilege to do such a business on certain terms and conditions and strict payment of excise duty at the prescribed rate which is one of such conditions which the petitioner must comply. It is further submitted that the law recognised that the actual retail sale price of the Packaged Commodities to be one which every manufacturer is duty bound to print in accordance with R. 2 (s) read with Rr. 3, 4 and 6 of the Standard of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977. Mr. Ganguly in support of this contention that exemptions of notification are to be construed in a manner which would ensure to the benefit of the revenue unlike the provision relating levy of tax, reference was made to the following case laws : (a) Commr. of Income-tax v. R. V. Naidu AIR 1956 SC 522 at p. 525, (b) Nizam's Religious Endowment v. CIT, AIR 1966 SC 1007 at para 5, (c) Controller of Estate Duty v. Venugopala, AIR 1977 SC 121 .