JUDGMENT R.R. Misra, J. 1. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, has got certain residential accommodation meant for its teachers and staff. The Executive Council of the University has framed certain regulations in regard to the allotment of houses. These allotments are made to the teachers and staff of the University strictly in accordance with their seniority. Regulation 12 framed by the Executive Council provides that a person who has ceased to be an employee of the University by retirement shall vacate the residential accommodation allotted to him within three months of his ceasing to be in the employment of the University. The plaintiff-appellant ceased to be in the employment of the University from 30th November 1982. Accordingly under the aforesaid regulation the plaintiff was obliged to vacate the accommodation in question by the end of February 1983 and he was also informed of the same vide letter dated 7th January 1984 from the Estate Officer of the University. The plaintiff was also informed that in case of failure, he shall become "unauthorised occupant " of the accommodation in question with effect from 1st March 1983. The plaintiff, however, did not vacate the said accommodation. This led to the filing of a petition u/Sec. 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act) by the University before the Estate Officer. The said Estate Officer accordingly issued a notice dated 23rd May 1984 u/Sec. 4 of the Act to the plaintiff. In reply, the plaintiff admitted that he should have vacated the house in question more than a year back under the rules of the University but he prayed that he may be permitted to occupy the said premises till first week of August 1984. Accordingly, the Estate Officer fixed 7th August 1984 as the date of hearing of the aforesaid case which was numbered as Case No. 50 of 1984. The plaintiff still did not vacate the said premises and sought for extension of time to vacate till the end of September 1984. This request was also accepted and the plaintiff was permitted to occupy the premises till 30th September 1984. Since the plaintiff again still did not vacate the premises, the Estate Officer, after considering the entire facts of the case and hearing both the parties, passed the order dated 19th October 1984 for eviction of the plaintiff. This request was also accepted and the plaintiff was permitted to occupy the premises till 30th September 1984. Since the plaintiff again still did not vacate the premises, the Estate Officer, after considering the entire facts of the case and hearing both the parties, passed the order dated 19th October 1984 for eviction of the plaintiff. No appeal as provided for under Section 9 of the Act was filed by the plaintiff against the aforesaid order of the Estate Officer and the said order became final. However, the plaintiff filed an application dated 13th December 1984 before the Vice-Chancellor of the University and requested him to permit him to continue in the said house for another three months. During this period the plaintiff filed a suit (numbered as Original Suit No. 554 of 1984) in the court of Civil Judge, Aligarh and also prayed for an interim injunction. Ultimately on 21st January 1987 the application for interim injunction was rejected by the Civil Judge, Aligarh. The present F.A.F.O. has been filed by the plaintiff appellant against the aforesaid order dated 21st January 1987. 2. On 27th February 1987 at the joint request of the learned counsel for the parties the case was directed to be listed for final hearing on 11th March 1987. Accordingly, I have heard learned counsel for the parties on the merits of the appeal itself. The sole contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the impugned order of eviction has been passed by a person who had total lack of jurisdiction to do so inasmuch as he could not be appointed as an Estate Officer under Section 3 of the Act. Elaborating his submission the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that aforesaid Abdul Majid Siddiqui was not an officer of the University as contemplated by the provisions of the Section 16 (4) of the Aligarh Muslim University Act. Let me first deal with this contention. Section 16 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred to as the University Act of 1920) lays down as follows :- Section 16. Let me first deal with this contention. Section 16 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred to as the University Act of 1920) lays down as follows :- Section 16. Officers of the University- The following shall be officers of the University : (1) The Chancellor, (2) The Pro-Chancellor, (3) The Vice-Chancellor, (3A) The Pro-Vice Chancellor, if any, (3B) The Honorary Treasurer, (3C) The Registrar, (3D) The Finance Officer, (3E) The Deans of the Faculties, and (4) Such other officers as may be declared by the Statutes to be officers of the University. 3. Statute 7 of the Statutes of the University framed under Section 28 (1) of the University Act states that every Dean of a Faculty shall be appointed by the Executive Council from amongst the Professors in the Faculty......Sub-Clause (1) of Statute 8 states that each Department shall have a Chairman who shall be a Professor. Statute 13 lays down that a Librarian shall be a whole time officer of the University. 4. In the present case, the appellant has failed to show whether Sri Abdul Majid Siddiqui, Professor of Chemistry, has or has not been declared by the Statutes to be an officer of the University. For the plea that the aforesaid Estate Officer was not an officer of the University under the Aligarh Muslim University Act, then in view of the provisions of the aforesaid University Act, extracted by me above, that was a question of fact to be investigated by the Authority concerned and for the purpose of this type of plea of total absence of jurisdiction it ought to have been taken before the Estate Officer concerned. Admittedly no such plea affecting the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer was ever taken in any of the applications moved by the appellant before him. The appellant has in this Court also neither averred nor argued that there has been any failure of justice on account of the same or the merits of the case has been affected thereby. Therefore, this plea cannot now either be allowed to be taken or gone into by the High Court. The relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1971 read as follows :- Section-2 Definition-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (b) " estate officer " means an officer appointed as such by the Central Government under Section 3. Therefore, this plea cannot now either be allowed to be taken or gone into by the High Court. The relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1971 read as follows :- Section-2 Definition-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (b) " estate officer " means an officer appointed as such by the Central Government under Section 3. Section-3 : Appointment of estate Officer-The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette- (a) appoint such persons being gazetted officers of Government or Officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority, as it thinks fit to be estate officers for the purposes of this Act, (emphasis supplied). Under the aforesaid Act an University is statutory authority. 5. To my mini the appellant, while interpreting the definition of ' Estate Officer ' and the powers of the Central Government to appoint such an ' Estate Officer ' cannot refer to the provisions of the Aligarh Muslim University Act for finding out, as the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant is, as to whether the Estate Officer appointed in the present case, could be termed as an officer under the Aligarh Muslim University Act. This is so for the simple reason that, in my judgment, the provisions of the Aligarh Muslim University Act and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 are not in pari materia and cannot be referred to or relied upon to interpret the word " officers of equivalent rank of the statutory Authority " (here the University) used under Section 3 (a) of the said Act of 1971. Statutes are said to be in " pari materia " when they relate of the same person or thing or to the same class of person or things. 6. The preamble to the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 states that the object of the Act is to incorporate a teaching and residential Muslim University at Aligarh. The obvious object of the Act is to lay down provisions with regard to a teaching in a residential University. The object of Act of 1971 is to provide for the eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public premises including those of an University. The question where assistance can be derived from another enactment depends entirely on the purposes of the statutes. In M/s. Shah and Co. The object of Act of 1971 is to provide for the eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public premises including those of an University. The question where assistance can be derived from another enactment depends entirely on the purposes of the statutes. In M/s. Shah and Co. Bombay v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1877 at page 1883 it has been held by the Supreme Court that Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 are not in pari materia as they do not deal with the same class of persons or things. In that case a perusal of various provisions clearly showed that the Rent Act deals, substantially, with the relationship of landlord and tenant in the matter of eviction, payment of rent, increase of rent under certain circumstances. While the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 was passed to provide for the requisition of land, for the continuance of requisition of land and for certain other purposes. The various provisions, in the Requisition Act, related to the circumstances under which requisition of land can be made for a public purpose and the procedure to be adopted for the same as well as the payment of compensation. In the present case the aforesaid University Act and the Act of 1971 deal with objects totally different from each other. There is absolutely no similarity between the two enactments and it cannot be held that the aforesaid two Acts relate to the same class of persons or things. In my opinion the scope of two enactments viz Act of 1971 and the Aligarh Muslim University Act are entirely different and the Act of 1971 has definitely more extended scope for construing the words "officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority" and is designed to secure the objective of eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises. This object in the Act of 1971 is wholly foreign to the Aligarh Muslim University Act which was enacted for imparting education Therefore, in my judgment neither the aforementioned two Acts can be construed to be in pari materia nor the aforementioned words used in the Act of 1971 can be either referred to or have any relation with the Aligarh Muslim University Act. Therefore, in my opinion in the present case for interpreting the powers of Central Government to appoint an Estate Officer under Section 3 (a) of Act of 1971, any reference to the provisions of the Aligarh Muslim University Act is wholly out of place and is not warranted by law. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the said Professor of the University could not be appointed as Estate Officer under the Act of 1971 has, therefore, no force. The appellant himself has filed as Annexure I to the affidavit dated 23-1-1987 of Bazhur Rehman Khan, son of the appellant, a copy of the Notification of the official gazette dated 15-11-1982 issued by the Ministry of Education appointing Sri Abdul Majid Siddiqui, Professor of Chemistry, Aligarh Muslim University to be a " Estate Officer " under clause (a) of Section 3 of the aforesaid Act. What is to be examined now is as to whether appointment of Sri Abdul Majid Siddiqui, Professor of Chemistry, is in accordance with Section 3 of the Act of 1971. 7. It is well known rule of interpretation of statutes to construe word in an Act with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. This rule of law is generally known as the “ejusdem generis” rule. This rule was enunciated by Lord Campbell in R. v. Edmundson, (1859) 28 LJMC 213 (215) thus : "Where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified " 8. It is generally held that the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps (See Salmond's Jurisprudence 11th Edition page 153). IT is however made clear that “ejusdem generis” is merely a rule of construction and not a rule of law. In accordance with this rule of construction, the general words following particular words will not include anything of a class superior to that to which particular words belong but of things of the same category or genus. In my judgment the expression " or officers of equivalent rank of the Statutory Authority " are of the same category as the words " gazetted officers of the Government " which precede the same and have to be red “ejusdem generis” to the said words. In my judgment the expression " or officers of equivalent rank of the Statutory Authority " are of the same category as the words " gazetted officers of the Government " which precede the same and have to be red “ejusdem generis” to the said words. Further from a perusal of the provisions of clause (a) of Section 3 of the aforesaid Act, 1971 as extracted above, it is clear that the Central Government may appoint a person under that Act who shall be of equivalent rank of the Gazetted Officer of the Government for that purpose. The words used under clause (a) " as it thinks fit " is indicative of the fact that this decision as to which person of the University shall be treated by the Central Government to be equivalent rank of a Gazetted Officer of the Government it is the subjective satisfaction of the Central Government alone which is relevant. Any other interpretation will make the said words ' as it thinks fit ' redundant. It is settled law that statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. For this proposition reference can be usefully made of the observations made to the same effect in paragraph 33 by the Supreme Court in its recent judgment in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless Company, (1987) 1 SCC 424 . 9. So read along with other provisions of the Act of 1971 and having regard to the subjective satisfaction of the Central Government that such officer is a person of equivalent rank to that of a Gazetted Officer of Government, I, therefore, hold that the appointment of Sri Abdul Majid Siddiqui as aforesaid as an Estate Officer under the provisions of the Act, 1971 was in accordance with law and was valid. In this view of the matter I do not propose to examine the various authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant for the proposition that where there is a total lack of jurisdiction the impugned order of eviction could not be passed. 10. Before parting with the case I must take note of the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the Aligarh Muslim University in which he has sought to support the impugned order also on the ground mentioned below. 10. Before parting with the case I must take note of the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the Aligarh Muslim University in which he has sought to support the impugned order also on the ground mentioned below. Section 10 of the Act 1971 lays down as under :- "Finality of orders-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by an estate officer or appellate officer under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act." Since in the present case no appeal was preferred against the order passed by the Estate Officer the said order had become final and cannot be called in question in any original suit and no injunction can be granted by any court in respect thereof, If such is the legislative mandate, in my opinion, after the aforesaid order of eviction passed by the Estate. Officer has been allowed to become final by the appellant, it is no longer open to the appellant to call in question the aforesaid order, in any original suit and no injunction application is maintainable in respect thereof. In this view of the matter also the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be gone into either by the court below or by this Court. Hence in my opinion, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the trial court refusing injunction to the appellant. 11. In the result the appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The interim order dated 24-1-1987 is hereby vacated.