ORDER K.M. Natarajan, J. 1. C.M.P. No. 16797 of 1987 is filed by the respondents in A.S. No. 650 of 1986 of this Court, to vacate the stay granted in C.M.P. No. 9242 of 1986 in A.S. No 650 of 1986. C.M.P. No. 16798 of 1987 is for stay of execution of the decree in Q.S. No. 110 of 1982 on the file of the Sub-Court, Villupuram, pending disposal of the said appeal. 2. In C.M.P. No. 16797 of 1987, the main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that this court passed a conditional order on 10.12.1986 making the interim stay already granted absolute on condition of the appellants, who are the respondents herein, paying a sum of Rs. 23,000/-to the credit of O.S. No. 88 of 1984, on the file of the Sub Court, Villupuram, within eight weeks from the date of the order and furnishing security to the tune of Rs. 23,000 within ten weeks from the date of the order and in default in complying with any one of the said directions the stay granted shall stand automatically vacated. Though the appellants have paid the amount within the time, they have not complied with the order in respect of filing of the bond for a sum of Rs. 23,000 in stamp papers of proper value, but only filed a draft bond in a plain paper on 5.2.1987 and the said filing of the draft bond would not amount to compliance of the condition stipulated by this Court. Hence the stay is to be vacated. 3. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants have complied with the order passed by this court. They have furnished security and the same has been registered on 14.10.1987. It has also been duly accepted by the court below. The allegations stated contra are all false. It was also stated in the subsequent affidavit that the appellants, who are the respondents in this application, have filed only the draft security bond written on white plain paper on 9.2.1987 and thereafter the Court ordered 'notice' and directed to test the sufficiency of the security and that the fair bond engrossed on stamp paper was filed in Court on 22.10.87. 4. 4. It is seen from the various documents produced before this Court that the respondents herein, who are the appellants, filed a petition in E.A. No. 71 of 1987 under Section 151 C.P.C. on 9.2.1987 praying to accept the security furnished by the first defendant in pursuance of the conditional order passed by this court in C.M.P. No. 9246 of 1986. The court below ordered 'notice' with draft security and test on 16.3.1987. Thereafter the properties were tested and found competent. The respondents therein, who are the petitioners herein, filed a counter. After hearing both parties, orders were reserved. Thereafter the appellants were directed to produce encumbrance certificate by 30.7.1987, in the order dated 22.7.1987. Accordingly encumbrance certificate was produced on 12.8.1987 after time was extended. Thereafter the draft security was accepted and time was granted for producing the fair bond. The fair bond was registered and filed into court on 22.10.1987. It was accepted and the petition was closed on 30.10.1987. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. K.S. Gurumurthy, relied on the decision reported in Murugayya Pillai v. Seethalakshmi Ammal, wherein Ganapatia Pillai, J., held as follows: The object of a Court in directing a party to furnish security in immovable property as a condition of its order is to assure the other party to the dispute or the decree-holder that the benefit of the order in his favour of the decree amount would be eventually paid or would be more easily recoverable. This object could be achieved only if a properly enforceable security bond duly engrossed on stamp paper and registered according to law is put into Court within the time specified. It may be that mere non-registration of the bond within the time fixed by court may not be a fatal objection if the bond otherwise duly engrossed on stamp paper is filed in time as in such cases the Court can have the document compulsorily registered. But merely putting into Court a draft security bond on unstamped paper on the last day fixed for furnishing security cannot be tantamount to compliance with the order of the Court as the obligor could not be deemed to have done what was required of him as the Court would have still to look to him for furnishing of a valid security. The requirement of engrossing the security bond on a stamp paper is not a mere technicality. The requirement of engrossing the security bond on a stamp paper is not a mere technicality. The principles governing the giving of security under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act will equally apply to cases of giving security in pursuance of orders of Court under the Code of Civil procedure. Relying on the abovesaid decision, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that unless the draft security bond engrossed on stamp papers was filed into Court, it cannot be said that it was a proper compliance. According to him, in the instant case, admittedly, no such draft security bond engrossed on stamp paper was filed within the time, but only a draft security bond in plain paper was filed. Even though subsequently it was accepted and a fair bond was produced, it would not be a proper compliance and as such, the stay is to be vacated. 6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents (appellants) would submit that in the instant case long before the expiry of the period fixed in the conditional order of stay passed by this Court, the draft security bond was filled along with the other documents. It was contended that unless the same is approved, the question of filing the fair bond would not arise; likewise the filing of the bond engrossed on stamp papers. In the instant case, the court below, after filing the draft security bond, ordered 'test' and also 'notice' to the petitioners herein and thereafter found that the property offered for security is sufficient and the bond is in order, and subsequently directed the appellants to produce encumbrance certificate and also the fair bond. Accordingly the fair bond was registered and produced into court and it was accepted. The learned Counsel for the respondents (appellants) produced a xerox copy of the fair bond dated 14.10.1987. The learned Counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the decision reported in Rajamma v. Venkaiah (1949)2 M.L.J. 13 wherein Mack, J, held: When stay is ordered by the appellate Court, on security being furnished within a particular period what the Court contemplates is the tender of security within that time. The learned Counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the decision reported in Rajamma v. Venkaiah (1949)2 M.L.J. 13 wherein Mack, J, held: When stay is ordered by the appellate Court, on security being furnished within a particular period what the Court contemplates is the tender of security within that time. It would be manifestly inequitable if for no fault of his, a petitioner obtaining such stay is penalised by time being taken for objections to a draft security bond and finding himself in the position of not being able to file a fair security bond within the time prescribed". (1946)2 M.L.J. 217 : A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 70 (Ganapathi Naicker v. Govindarajulu Naidu) (1941)2 M.L.J. 291 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 29 (Rengasami Nadar v. Pichaimani Nadar) followed: The above decisions were also referred to in the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Murugayya's Case (1958)1 M.L.J. 330 wherein Ganapathia Pillai, J observed: On an examination of these decisions, I find that the question as now presented before me did not arise for decision. The argument in all these cases was that, if the draft bond put into Court was eventually found to be sufficient but this was done after the expiry of the time fixed by the appellate Court for furnishing security there was no proper compliance with the order directing security of immovable property to be given. The question whether the filing of a draft bond on plain paper was itself sufficient compliance with the order must however to be deemed to have been only impliedly decided. In fact, Yahya Ali, J expressly leaves this question open. I therefore feel that, in the absence of a Bench decision on this point, 1 am free to examine the question in its fundamentals. It is only in that view, the learned Judge considered the facts of that case and upheld the order of the Court below and came to the conclusion that it is not a proper compliance. It is to be noted that, as rightly observed by Mack, J. within the time prescribed by the order of the appellate Court, the party can only tender a draft security bond for acceptance and only on its acceptance, the question of filing the fair bond engrossed on stamp paper would arise. It is submitted that no draft security bond engrossed on stamp paper would be filed. It is submitted that no draft security bond engrossed on stamp paper would be filed. Merely because the Court took time for testing the property and hearing the objections, the party should not be penalised if the time expired in the meantime. Only if the Court directed the party to produce fair bond duly engrossed on stamp paper and registered and only if the party did not produce the bond, the party is not entitled to order of stay as there is no proper compliance. It is not possible for the party to produce the fair security bond on stamp papers within the time unless it is accepted by the Court after holding necessary enquiry. I am in respectful agreement with Mack, J, who has taken the consistent view already expressed by this Court. The decision rendered by Ganapathia Pillai, J, in (1958)1 M.L.J. 330 is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the instant case, it is submitted that within about ten days i.e., prior to the expiry of the time, the respondents (appellants) filed a draft security bond, with a petition to accept the security bond. The Court ordered 'notice' within the time and also directed the 'test' of the property. Finally the Court directed the appellants to produce the fair security bond only in the month of August and thereafter the bond was registered and produced within the time granted by Court. The Court also accepted the same. As such, it cannot be said that the appellants have not complied with the second direction given in the stay order. Hence, I see no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and accordingly, the petition to vacate the stay is liable to be dismissed. 7. As regards C.M.P. No. 16798 of 1987 for stay of execution of the decree in O.S. No. 110 of 1982 on the file of the Sub Court, Villupuram, on the ground that the said decree is a cross decree obtained by the appellants against the respondents (Petitioners in this application) and that in view of the stay granted in O.S. No. 88 of 1984, the said decree could not be executed and that the petitioners are entitled to adjustment or set off of the liability towards the mortgage deed which has ripened into the decree in O.S. No. 110 of 1982. It is brought to my notice that the petitioners have already filed E.A. No. 76 of 1987 for the same relief. The said application was dismissed by the lower Court. As against that order C.R.P. No. 3504 of 1987 (Krishna Gounder and 3 Ors. v. V. Sitarama Chettiar), was filed before this Court and this Court dismissed the C.R.P. even at the admission stage on 17.9.1987. In view of the above order, which has become final, it is not open to the respondents (Petitioners herein) to once again ask for stay of execution of the decree obtained by the first appellant in O.S. No. 110 of 1982. As such, the stay application is liable to be dismissed. 8. In the result, both the applications fail and stand dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.