ORDER S.R. RAJASEKHARA MURTHY, J. The petitioner, a public limited company and a dealer registered under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act ("the Act"), has challenged the order of seizure made by the respondent under section 28(3) of the Act. The respondent, an officer of the Commercial Tax Department attached to its Intelligence Wing at Bangalore, as stated in the order which is impugned in this writ petition, on information that the petitioner was effecting "stock transfers" of goods, namely, silk fabrics to its various show-rooms outside the State of Karnataka, and was thus avoiding payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act (C.S.T. Act), visited the office-cum-mill premises of the petitioner at Bangalore on 13th March 1987. After entering the premises of the petitioner, the respondent called upon the Financial Accountant of M/s. Binny Mills Ltd., the petitioner-company, to make available the relevant books of account and other records relating to transactions described in the assessee's account books as stock transfers, for his inspection. On a preliminary inspection of the relevant documents which revealed that the petitioner was regularly supplying consignments of silk fabrics to its show-rooms at New Delhi and other places which were actually meant to be supplied to its customers outside the State, the respondent proceeded to make an order under section 28(3) of the Act seizing the documents referred to in the order (exhibits A1 to A5 and B1). Before making this order of seizure the respondent scrutinised the transactions, styled as stock transfers with reference to two invoices which bore out that the consignments were meant for supply to M/s. K. L. M. Airlines, New Delhi, and in another instance for being supplied to Royal Nepal Airlines, Kathmandu. This facts was disclosed by the indents placed by the two airlines referred to above, which were found in the records. A copy of the seizure order was also served on Sri Sounder Rajan, Financial Accountant of M/s. Binny Limited. This order of seizure is challenged by the petitioner on several grounds. This facts was disclosed by the indents placed by the two airlines referred to above, which were found in the records. A copy of the seizure order was also served on Sri Sounder Rajan, Financial Accountant of M/s. Binny Limited. This order of seizure is challenged by the petitioner on several grounds. Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended : (i) that the seizure order which is made to appear as having been done after inspection of the books of accounts, etc., is in fact, and in reality, a search and seizure conducted by the respondent; (ii) that the said seizure is liable to be quashed in view of the several decisions of this Court rendered in similar cases, for violation of the requirements of sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and (iii) it is also prayed, as a consequence, that the seizure order be quashed, and all the books of accounts, etc., seized from the petitioner's premises, returned forthwith. The respondent has filed statement of objections justifying the order of seizure made under section 28(3) of the Act. It is the case of the department that the seizure was made after inspecting the records of the petitioner relating to transactions of stock transfers and that the said order was made strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is stated further in the statement of objections that the respondent had in his possession definite information that the petitioner was effecting inter-State sales under the guise of stock transfers, that therefore the department had suspected large-scale evasion of Central sales tax and that the order of seizure was made as a result of inspection of the relevant records and not after search of the petitioner's premises. This is the assertion made on oath by the respondent in his statement of objections. The respondent is an officer of the Commercial Tax Department attached to its Intelligence Wing at Bangalore. It is his case that on credible information about the evasion of tax by the petitioner, he visited the premises and inspected the documents which were produced by the petitioner and thereafter seized the same after recording the reasons for the seizure. The respondent is an officer of the Commercial Tax Department attached to its Intelligence Wing at Bangalore. It is his case that on credible information about the evasion of tax by the petitioner, he visited the premises and inspected the documents which were produced by the petitioner and thereafter seized the same after recording the reasons for the seizure. It is the case of the respondent that he is empowered and authorised under the Act to enter and inspect any office, shop or any other place of business, etc., for the purpose of verification and checking books of accounts, etc., with reference to transactions of a registered dealer under the Act. It is also set out in the statement of objections that the seizure was made after being satisfied that the petitioner-assessee was effecting inter-State sales exigible to Central sales tax and evaded the tax under the guise of stock transfers. It is only after an inspection of the documents relating to the said transactions, that all the relevant records produced by the petitioner were seized. The seizure, thus effected, it is argued, was well within his powers conferred by the Act on the respondent and does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference by this Court. On the other hand, it is argued by the petitioner that the seizure was nothing but a search and seizure and the said search was conducted violating the procedure and safeguards which are required to be observed before any seizure could be effected and the plea that it is a case of inspection and not search, should be rejected. On the other hand, it is argued by the petitioner that the seizure was nothing but a search and seizure and the said search was conducted violating the procedure and safeguards which are required to be observed before any seizure could be effected and the plea that it is a case of inspection and not search, should be rejected. Under the scheme of section 28 of the Act, various methods of securing books and information about the business of a dealer are provided, they are : (i) Section 28(1) of the Act empowers any officer authorised by the State Government to require any dealer to produce books of accounts, etc., and to furnish information about his business by issue of a notice in the prescribed form; (ii) under section 28(2)(i), all accounts and registers maintained by dealers in the course of their business, shall be open to inspection by officers authorised in this behalf; and (iii) under clause (ii) of section 28(2) of the Act, any such officer shall have power to enter and search any office, shop, or any other place of business for the purpose of inspection referred to in clause (i). If, on an inspection or on search, it becomes necessary and the officer has reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade payment of tax due under the Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, seize such account books, registers, etc., and give the dealer a receipt for the same as provided under section 28(3) of the Act. It can be seen from the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 28 that two types of power are conferred on the authorised officer, viz., (i) The officer may enter for inspection of a dealer's premises and make an order of seizure for the reasons to be recorded; and (ii) he may, after entering the premises of a dealer, search and seize for the reasons to be recorded. An order of seizure effected under any of these two cases is to be made as required under section 28(3) of the Act. But, in case of residential accommodation such officer has to be armed with a search warrant issued by the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area. An order of seizure effected under any of these two cases is to be made as required under section 28(3) of the Act. But, in case of residential accommodation such officer has to be armed with a search warrant issued by the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area. The proviso also imposes further restrictions and safeguards in cases of all seizures, in that, in requirement of the provisions of sections 100 and 165 of the Code are required to be observed. Therefore, in a given case on the basis of the allegations made and the record of the proceedings of search and the order of seizure made under section 28(3) of the Act, the court has to be satisfied whether the seizure made under section 28(3) of the Act is one made as a result of inspection and verification or was made as a result of search and inspection. These special powers conferred on an officer of the department are meant to be exercised with due care and caution, in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. Such powers are not meant to be exercised in a routine manner without there being sufficient reasons for invoking the said powers whether it be for inspection or for seizure. The actions of the officer under any of these provisions, would be subject to judicial review if any breach or contravention or excessive exercise is alleged. No doubt, under sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Act, any dealer may be called upon by the concerned officer to produce before him, any document or other books of accounts, etc., and to furnish any information relating to his business for the purpose of proceedings under the Act. This is the normal procedure to be adopted in cases where the concerned assessing officer is to determine the total and taxable turnover of a dealer under the Act. It is to be noted that this power is also available to be exercised by any officer attached to the Intelligence Wing of the Department in all cases of investigation. On the arguments advanced on both sides and the pleadings, the question that arises for decision in the present case is : Whether the seizure order made by the respondent under section 28(3) of Act, was one made after inspection or after search of the petitioner's business premises ? On the arguments advanced on both sides and the pleadings, the question that arises for decision in the present case is : Whether the seizure order made by the respondent under section 28(3) of Act, was one made after inspection or after search of the petitioner's business premises ? Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the assessee, has, on the basis of certain observations made by their Lordships in Harikisandas' case [1971] 27 STC 434 (Mys), at page 437, challenged the order of seizure made in the present case. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the facts in the case of Harikisandas Gulabdas & Sons [1971] 27 STC 434 (Mys) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. That was a case of a raid of the business premises of the petitioner therein, followed by search and seizure conducted with the sole object of unearthing suspected suppression of turnover and evasion of tax. The relevant portion relied upon by the learned counsel is reproduced below : "The second respondent is an officer in the intelligence branch of the department who of course has been specially empowered to perform the functions under the Act. But he had never called upon the petitioner, as required under sub-section (1) of section 28, to produce before him the accounts and other documents or to furnish any information relating to sales or purchases of its business. If his intention was to inspect and verify the accounts of the petitioner, he would have called for the required accounts and other registers. He did not even inform the petitioner that he would be visiting its premises. He gave a surprise visit along with his staff, and there he searched and seized some accounts and other documents without following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. If his intention was only to verify the accounts, it was unnecessary for him to go to the premises of the petitioner. He gave a surprise visit along with his staff, and there he searched and seized some accounts and other documents without following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. If his intention was only to verify the accounts, it was unnecessary for him to go to the premises of the petitioner. We have no doubt that he went and searched the business premises of the petitioner and illegally seized the accounts and other documents, but made it appear that they were voluntarily give to him." The further question that is necessary to be examined is whether these observations made by the Division Bench at page 437 apply even to cases of genuine inspection and the compliance with the issue of notice under section 28(1) of the Act, or intimation of the proposed visit for inspection, before visiting the premises of a dealer, is mandatory. What then, is the purpose in providing for power to inspect if it is to be preceded by a notice under section 28(1) of the Act or intimation about the visit to be given to the dealer? Inspection, as understood in ordinary usage is an inspection without notice or a surprise inspection, if such an inspection is called for in a particular case. The term "inspection" is derived from the Latin word "inspicere", which means, to look into; also means, close or careful scrutiny, according to Corpus Juris Secundum (see at page 744). As observed by the Supreme Court in R. S. Jhaver's case [1967] 20 STC 453, a power of seizure need not necessarily imply a power of search, for there may be seizure on production or on inspection. "Search" is used in contradistinction with "inspection" and implies an exploratory examination or probing into or seeking out something which is hidden, concealed, suspected and not open, exposed or demonstrated [see Gianchand v. State of Punjab (1962) 1 SLR 364]. "Search" has received interpretation by this Court in G. M. Agadi & Brothers v. Commercial Tax Officer, Belgaum [1973] 32 STC 243. This Court quashed the search and seizure of the petitioner's business premises in that case on the ground that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not complied with by the search officer. "Search" has received interpretation by this Court in G. M. Agadi & Brothers v. Commercial Tax Officer, Belgaum [1973] 32 STC 243. This Court quashed the search and seizure of the petitioner's business premises in that case on the ground that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not complied with by the search officer. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced below (see page 244 - 32 STC) : "The short question for decision is whether the account books and documents seized as per annexure A was on a search of the petitioner's premises or was it merely after inspection of the said premises. If the said account books had been seized merely after inspection of the premises as contended on behalf of the respondent, there is no illegality attached to the seizure; but if the seizure was made on search of the petitioner's premises, as admittedly, the provisions of sections 103(2) and 165(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not complied with, the seizure would be illegal and the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. The question for decision, therefore, turns on our decision as to whether the petitioner's premises were searched or the respondent merely inspected the premises. The meaning of the words 'search', according to Webster's New International Dictionary (Vol. I - Second Edition), is to subject to a thorough inspection for an article or articles presumably concealed. The Corpus Juris Secundum (79 CJS 775) gives a neat definition of the word 'search' and it is useful to set out the same : 'The term "search" as applied to searches and seizures, is an examination of a man's house or other buildings or premises, or of his person, with a view to discovery of contraband or illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some crime or offence with which he is charged. As used in this connection, the term implies some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or constructive, much or little. As used in this connection, the term implies some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and that the object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been said that ordinarily searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that the mere looking at that which is open to view is not a "search"'." The court further observed : "All searches are inspections, but all inspections are not searches. A search is a thorough inspection of a man's house, building or premises or of his person, with the object of discovering some material which would furnish evidence of guilt for some offence with which he is charged. It implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. If the object sought for is always in plain sight, then there is no search. If the private account books had been kept in the counter openly at all times and they could have been found on inspection at any time of the day, then the seizure of such account books cannot be said to have been made after a search." The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the provisions of inspection, search and seizure contained in section 41 and 45 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act in Krishna Chettiar v. State of Madras [1968] 21 STC 258. Dealing with the power of inspection vis-a-vis power to search, under the Madras Act, his Lordship Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was), observed as follows : "Now it is quite true that if the Code of Criminal Procedure governed the search, then as required under section 165, which is applicable, the reasons for the search have to be recorded in writing before the search is carried out. But this condition does not obtain when the officer only wishes to inspect the accounts, registers or other documents under the first and the second sub-sections of section 41. But this condition does not obtain when the officer only wishes to inspect the accounts, registers or other documents under the first and the second sub-sections of section 41. There is no requirement of recording of reasons at that stage, because all that the officer has to do is to go and ask the dealer to produce his accounts books for his inspection." It is useful to reproduce the observations and analysis of the provisions of section 41(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act made by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver [1967] 20 STC 453; section 41(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act corresponds to section 28(2) in the Karnataka Act. "Clearly sub-section (2) provides for three things, namely - (i) all accounts, registers, records and other documents maintained by a dealer in the course of his business shall be open to inspection at all reasonable times, (ii) the goods in the possession of the dealer shall also be open to inspection, and (iii) the dealer's offices, shops, godowns, vessels or vehicles shall also be open to inspection. There is no doubt that there are no specific words in sub-section (2) giving power of search. But if we read the three powers conferred by sub-section (2) it should not be difficult to hold that search is included therein. It will be seen that sub-section (2) differs from sub-section (1) in one respect. In sub-section (1) the dealer is required to produce his accounts, etc., and to furnish other information relating to his business and it is left to the dealer to produce what accounts he may say he has. The legislature was however cognizant of the fact that a dealer may not produce all accounts or furnish all information even though required to do so under sub-section (1). Therefore, sub-section (2) provides that all accounts, etc., of the dealer shall be open to inspection. It also provides that the dealer's offices, shops, godowns, vessels or vehicles shall be open to inspection. It is true that generally speaking a power to inspect does not necessarily give power to search. Therefore, sub-section (2) provides that all accounts, etc., of the dealer shall be open to inspection. It also provides that the dealer's offices, shops, godowns, vessels or vehicles shall be open to inspection. It is true that generally speaking a power to inspect does not necessarily give power to search. But where, as in this case, the power has been given to inspect not merely accounts, registers, records and other documents maintained by a dealer but also to inspect his offices, shops, godowns, vessels or vehicles, it follows that the empowered officer would have the right to enter the offices, etc., for purposes of inspection. Naturally his inspection will be for purposes of the Act, i.e., for the purposes of seeing that there is no evasion of tax. If therefore during his inspection of offices, etc., the empowered officer finds any accounts, registers, records or other documents in the shop, those accounts, etc., will also be open to inspection. Reading therefore these two provisions together, it is clear that the empowered officer has the right to enter the offices, etc., and to inspect them, and if on such inspection he finds accounts, etc., he has also the power to inspect them and to see if they relate to the business. These two powers taken together, in our opinion, mean that the empowered officer has the power to search the office, etc., and inspect accounts, etc., found therein. Though therefore the word 'search' has not been used in sub-section (2) these two powers of entering the offices, etc., for inspection and of inspecting every kind of account maintained by a dealer with respect to his business together amount to giving the officer concerned the powers to enter and search the offices, etc., and if he finds any account in the offices, shops, etc., to inspect them. Otherwise we can see no sense in the legislature giving power to the empowered officer to enter the offices, etc., for the purpose of inspection as the officer concerned would only do so for the purpose of finding out all accounts, etc., maintained by the dealer and if necessary to inspect them for the purposes of the Act. Otherwise we can see no sense in the legislature giving power to the empowered officer to enter the offices, etc., for the purpose of inspection as the officer concerned would only do so for the purpose of finding out all accounts, etc., maintained by the dealer and if necessary to inspect them for the purposes of the Act. We cannot therefore agree with the High Court that there is no power of search whatsoever in sub-section (2) because the sub-section in terms doses not provide for search." The decision of the Patna High Court reported in [1974] 34 STC 9 (Jib Narain Sao v. State of Bihar) cited by the learned High Court Government Pleader requires to be noted and applied to the facts of this case. That was also a case of inspection and seizure under section 37(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, which corresponds to section 28(3) of the Karnataka Act. Their Lordships, after a detailed reference of the relevant provisions of the Act in the matter of inspection, search and seizure by the commercial tax authorities, upheld the seizure made in the course of inspection. They have observed that, no reason need be recorded before any inspection is made and it could be done on a mere suspicion about the attempt by the dealer to evade tax. It was a case of surprise inspection by the departmental official which was done in accordance with the programme drawn up by the department. The observations of their Lordships, made at page 15 of the judgment ([1974] 34 STC 9) (Jib Narain Sao v. State of Bihar) is worth noting : "The first requirement for the exercise of the power is that the authority must have reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of any tax. Coming in possession of reason to suspect may be assumed to be the subjective act of the authority, but it becomes objective and justiciable when we come to the second requirement for the exercise of the power and that is the recording of reasons in writing." The object of vesting power of inspection on an officer of the department, and for this purpose to enter any premises of a dealer, is for detecting suppression of turnover and evasion of tax. The element of surprise inspection if it is called for in a given case and where the officer has reason to believe that the dealer may not produce all books of accounts when called upon to do so, would be lost and the object of conferment of such powers on officers of the department defeated, if the dealer is given notice to produce such documents or is given advance intimation about the inspection. That this power is conferred under the statute both to the officer assessing a particular dealer and an officer attached to the Intelligence Wing of the Department, cannot be disputed. In the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court as to the power of inspection under the Madras General Sales Tax Act in Krishna Chettiar's case [1968] 21 STC 258 (SC) and in R. S. Jhaver's case [1967] 20 STC 453 (SC), it is my considered view, after very careful study of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Harikisandas' case [1971] 27 STC 434, the observations made by the Division Bench in the said case as to the issue of notice under section 28(1) of the Act even when an officer of the Intelligence Wing of the Department embarks upon inspection of the books of accounts of a dealer, is only an obiter and should be confined to the facts of the said case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a series of decisions of this Court wherein this Court held, that the seizure followed by search, if it is done in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, should be quashed as illegal. The decisions cited are : (1) [1978] 41 STC 296 - Kangale and Company v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.) II, Northern Zone, Belgaum; (2) [1978] 41 STC 298 - S. Y. Modagekar & Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.), Northern Zone, Belgaum; (3) [1980] 45 STC 488 - S. P. Parasmal and Co. The decisions cited are : (1) [1978] 41 STC 296 - Kangale and Company v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.) II, Northern Zone, Belgaum; (2) [1978] 41 STC 298 - S. Y. Modagekar & Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.), Northern Zone, Belgaum; (3) [1980] 45 STC 488 - S. P. Parasmal and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.) III, South Zone, Bangalore-9; (4) [1980] 45 STC 490 - Neminath Brothers v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.) IV, Belgaum; (5) W.P. No. 9462 of 1978 - Shree Durga Distillery v. Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (Int.), Mangalore; (6) W.P. No. 8745 of 1978 - T. N. Habeeb & Sons; (7) W.P. No. 5869 of 1980 - Jain Book Manufacturers, Hubli v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.), Hubli. It is true that this Court has held on the facts of those cases that the seizures done under the guise of inspection should be quashed if that was done without conforming to and in violation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. These decisions, therefore, are distinguishable on the special facts brought out in the order of seizure in this case. One other contention raised by Sri Srinivasan is that before invoking the power of seizure it presupposes that such a seizure can be effected only if the officer suspects that any tax, fee or other amount is due from him under the Act. The argument is that since no assessment was made against the petitioner in this case and no amount is said to be due, no seizure could be effected within the meaning of the provisions of section 28(3) of the Act. This argument has to be rejected outright. The term "due" which occurs in section 28(3) of the Act should be understood as the tax which the petitioner is liable to pay under the Act and cannot be restricted to and understood as the sum which is determined to be due only after an assessment is made under the Act. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the officer who visited the petitioner's business premises, had definite information about the modus operandi adopted by the petitioner relating to certain transactions described in its books as branch transfers, and thus systematically evaded payment of tax. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the officer who visited the petitioner's business premises, had definite information about the modus operandi adopted by the petitioner relating to certain transactions described in its books as branch transfers, and thus systematically evaded payment of tax. The concerned file which is produced before me discloses that the respondent was specifically directed by the DCCT (Int.) to visit the petitioner's premises to verify the correctness of the transactions relating to the branch transfers. It is also borne out from the order that the officer called upon the Financial Accountant to produce before him for inspection of the relevant documents and books relating to stock transfers only. The list of documents seized after the search and inspection also relate to such transactions, as is seen from the reasons recorded by the respondent before making the seizure. The question that, therefore, arises on these facts is, whether the order of seizure passed under section 28(3) of the Act by the respondent is a valid order made in a bona fide exercise of his powers conferred under section 28(2) read with sub-section (3) of the Act. I have carefully considered the facts, arguments and the decisions referred by both sides. On the facts set out by the respondent in his order of seizure and the statement of objections, which I accept, I am of the view that the order of seizure impugned in this writ petition is an order which was made after an inspection and not one made after a search and does not suffer from any illegality. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.