JUDGMENT - G.D. KAMAT, J.:---This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree made in First Civil Appeal No. 49/B/80 partly confirming the judgment and decree made in Civil Suit No. 14/79 on 22nd September, 1980. The respondents sued the present appellant for his eviction from a portion of the property known as "Nomoxim a Morodo" situated at Curti, Ponda. The suit was decreed as prayed for on the ground that the appellant's lease had been properly terminated by a Notice dated 31st December, 1973 under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 2. Having regard to the points argued presently in this appeal we will point out the short facts leading to the institution of the suit. By an agreement dated 22nd March, 1968 the respondents granted on lease to the appellant a part of their property admeasuring 1000 sq. metres for the purposes of installation of their machinery for crushing basalt stones. The lease agreement permitted the appellant to set up some shelters and huts of temporary nature to enable the appellant to carry on the crushing business. One of the stipulation in the lease agreement was that the lease would be for a period of three years expiring on 21st March, 1971. By a fresh agreement the lease was renewed for a further period of three years ending on 21st March, 1974. By a notice dated 31st December, 1973 the respondents put an end to this lease saying that the appellant should remove all his machinery and material and other object including barracks by the expiry date as the respondents did not intend to renew the contract any further. As the appellant neglected and failed to clear off the property let out, the respondents instituted a suit on 22nd April, 1974 for possession of the property and for mesne profits. 3. Mr. Usgaoncar, learned Counsel for the appellant, has contended that the impugned judgment and decree made by the learned Single Judge dated 17th September, 1984 is liable to be set aside on two principal grounds. The first one is that if the crushing of the basalt stones is held to be a manufacturing process then the respondents were required to give a notice of six months in advance terminating the lease by virtue of the provision to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first one is that if the crushing of the basalt stones is held to be a manufacturing process then the respondents were required to give a notice of six months in advance terminating the lease by virtue of the provision to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to him the learned Judge has fallen in error in holding that the business of crushing basalt stones is not involving a manufacturing process. Secondly the notice given by the respondents dated 31st December, 1973 was sufficient in that there was in reality no termination of the lease having regard to its contents. He therefore urged that the suit ought to have been dismissed for want of proper notice. 4. Relying upon the authorities of (Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 425 ; (Rajasthan Umrao Lal v. Heera Mal)2, reported in A.I.R. 1973 Raj. 337 and on considering the ordinary meaning of the word "manufactured" which defines it to be an action or process of making articles or material by the application of physical labour or mechanical power and on application of the ratio of the authority of the Supreme Court reported in (P.C. Ceriyan v. Mst. Barfi Devi)3, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. page 86 the learned Single Judge held that there is no complete transformation from the component i.e. basalt and the process involved being merely crushing a big chunk into smaller pieces that process cannot be termed as a manufacturing process or that the metal so converted is a manufactured product. He therefore negatived the contention of the appellant that the lease created was for manufacturing purposes. 5. Mr. Usgaoncar, learned Counsel for the appellant points out that inasmuch as a big sized rock or basalt or literate stone is crushed into smaller pieces the original rock loses its identity and it is those pieces that are sold in the market and they way the appellant was carrying on the business by manufacturing process. In support of his case he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (Idandas v. Anant Ramchandra Phadke)4, reported in A.I.R. 1982 S.C., page 127. 6. In support of his case he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (Idandas v. Anant Ramchandra Phadke)4, reported in A.I.R. 1982 S.C., page 127. 6. Insofar as this case is concerned the question arose whether the flour mill converting wheat into flour was a manufacturing process and therefore whether a six months prior notice was required under the T.P. Act to determine the lease. The Supreme Court answered that once the wheat is converted into flour there is complete transformation of wheat and as otherwise the wheat is not an item consumable by human beings, whereas the end product is meant for human consumption the process involved at the flour mill was that of manufacturer and therefore the lease was held to be a lease for manufacturing purposes. 7. Mr. Usgaoncar, relying upon para 10 of that authority urges that three tests have been laid down to determine whether or not there is "manufacturing process" involved in a given cases. It is true that three tests are : (1) that it must be proved that a certain commodity was produced; (2) that the process of production must involve either labour or machinery; and (3) that the end product which comes into existence after the manufacturing process is complete, should have a different name and should be put to a different use. In other words, the commodity should be so transformed so as to lose its original character. Mr. Usgaoncar however agrees that what would be attracted to the present case is the third test. There is no much difficulty so far as what the third test lays down. But then we must see that in the present case a big boulder is crushed to various smaller sizes what is ordinarily known as, metal which is used in construction activity. A big boulder is only reduced to smaller pieces and the only change is in the size and not in the matter or the material. Except there is no change and no transformation so as to change its original identity. We are therefore unable to interfere with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. A big boulder is only reduced to smaller pieces and the only change is in the size and not in the matter or the material. Except there is no change and no transformation so as to change its original identity. We are therefore unable to interfere with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Once it is held that there is not change of identity or separate identity coming into existence so far as the end product is concerned, the process of crushing basalt cannot be held to be a manufacturing process and we fully agree with the learned Single Judge. This being the position it is clear that the appellant's lease is not for manufacturing purposes and therefore the question of respondents were required to give a notice six months in advance terminating the lease of the appellant does not arise. 8. Mr. Usgaoncar next submitted that the notice dated 31-12-73 given by the respondents cannot be held to be a valid notice terminating the lease in view of its contents. In fact this point was argued before the learned Single Judge who while answering the point in paragraph 19 of the impugned judgment has extracted a passage from the said notice which could be usefully extracted in our judgment also. It is to this effect :--- "In terms of the same agreement you have to remove all machinery and material and other objects including the barracks till that date 22-3-74, without fail since my client does not intend to renew the same contract, as otherwise it is seen from the same agreement signed by two parties on 22-3-71." 9. According to Mr. Usgaoncar the passage extracted above does not in clear terms terminate the lease of the appellant and therefore in the absence of clear cut termination of the lease the suit could not have been decreed. He urged that in fact there was no intention to terminate the lease on the part of the respondents. The learned Single Judge on construing the above passage liberally held that the respondents made their intention clear that they would not renew the contract any further and further called upon the appellant to remove all machinery and material and other objects by 22-3-74 and therefore the communication dated 31-12-73 was a notice of termination given well in advance in compliance of T.P. Act. 10. 10. We are however not persuaded to accept what is being contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant. Inasmuch as a clear intention had been made in the said notice indicating that the appellant would not renew the lease, and the appellant was required to remove all machinery and other objects from the suit property it is clear that the lease of the appellant was duly terminated. It is an admitted position that this notice was given more than two months prior to the expiry of the lease which was to expire on 21st March, 1974. For all these reasons we are unable to depart from the view taken by the learned Single Judge. No case has been made out by the appellant in this appeal to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree. 11. The appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----