KULKARNI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition by the complainant against the order dated 14-3-86 passed by the Sessions judge, Shimoga, in S. C. 21/84 refusing to interfere with the order dated 26-3-84 passed by the chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga in C. C. 57/82. On a private complaint filed by the petitioner on 24-4-82, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, as can be seen from the order sheet dated 27-4-82, recorded the sworn statements of the complainant and his one witness and ordered the registration of the case and issued process against the accused persons for the offences under sections 395, 354 and 323 read with Section 149. P. C. That order issuing process was challenged by the accused persons in criminal revision petition No. 343/82. This Court set aside the said order issuing the process on the ground that the Court without taking cognizance initially had proceeded to record the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses, and sent back the case to the Court of C. J. M. , Shimoga for disposal according to law. After the case was sent back, the Chief Judicial Magistrate again recorded the sworn statements of the complainant and his one witness and issued process for the offences under Sections 395, 354 and 323 read with Section 149. P. C. Ultimately the proceedings dragged on in the Court of the Chief judicial Magistrate. He, by his order dated 26-3-1984, committed the case to the Court of sessions. After the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, the complainant filed an application in the Sessions Court to quash the commitment and to remand the matter to the magistrate for enabling him to examine all the witnesses. This application was rejected by the sessions Judge. Hence this revision. ( 2 ) A question arose before this Court in NAGANA GOUDA v. KAMALAXI, ILR1986 KAR 1229 as to whether in cases exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, it was incumbent on the complainant to examine himself and all his witnesses. This application was rejected by the sessions Judge. Hence this revision. ( 2 ) A question arose before this Court in NAGANA GOUDA v. KAMALAXI, ILR1986 KAR 1229 as to whether in cases exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, it was incumbent on the complainant to examine himself and all his witnesses. In the said case Kudoor, J. held: "the opening expression in Sub-section (2) "in an enquiry under Sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath" shows positively that Sub-section (2) shall come into play only in a case where the Magistrate decides to hold an enquiry under sub-section (1) In this view of the matter, the proviso to Sub-section (2) shall be govern an enquiry stipulated under Sub-section (1) and it cannot be said that this proviso controls Section 200 of the Code. It is not obligatory for the Magistrate to invariably take recourse to the proviso to Subsection (2) where the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. Certainly he is empowered to deal with the case where the offence complained of is triable by the Court of Session by adopting the procedure laid down under Section 200 and take appropriate decision as required under Section 203 or under Subsection (1) of Section 204 of the code. " It is further held as to illustrate that in a given case if the offence complained of is exclusively triable by the Court of Session and on examining the complainant and his witnesses on dath as required under section 200 of the Code if the Magistrate were to come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground to proceed with or that there is sufficient ground for proceeding certainly he could decide the matter as required under Section 203 or Sub-section (1) of Section 204 of the code as the case may be. It cannot be said that in a case where the offence complained of is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. " in Nagana Gouda's case, ILR1986 KAR 1229 , Kudoor, J. has referred to RAMANATHA v. STATE AND ORS. It cannot be said that in a case where the offence complained of is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. " in Nagana Gouda's case, ILR1986 KAR 1229 , Kudoor, J. has referred to RAMANATHA v. STATE AND ORS. , ILR 1984 (2) KAR 1054, wherein it was held: "a plain reading of Section 202 shows that the law vests with the Magistrate taking cognizance of a complaint, a discretion in the matter of taking recourse to Section 202. This is clear from the words 'may if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process and either enquire into the case himself. . . . . . . . . or' found in Sub-section (1) of Section 202. Subsection (2) of Section 202 comes into play only when the Magistrate decides to proceed under Sub-section (1) of that Section. The proviso to Sub-section (2) controlling as it does that sub-section, cannot be viewed as if it controls even section 200. Re: The construction placed by various Courts in Section 202 of the Code I am inclined to follow the views of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kamala Bhargav. As stated above, at para 12, the Magistrate has a discretion in the matter of himself holding an enquiry under Section 202. " KUDOOR, J. on the said Naganagouda's case, ILR1986 KAR 1229 has said in page 1238. After holding that the proviso to Sub-section (2) controlling as it does that sub-section cannot be viewed. as if it controls even Section 200, the learned Judge proceeded to observe in para 15 as: "true it is also observed in Kamala Bhargavi Amma 'that as in the matter of any discretionary jurisdiction vested in a Court it would not be proper to lay down any hard and fast Rule as to when such discretion is to be exercised; nor is it possible or feasible. ' But at the same time would not this Court be failing in its duty if it does not, atleast, broadly, indicate how subordinate courts while dealing with situations like these may have to proceed so that parties are not put to hardship or harassment? Given the same set of facts or confronted with similar situations can they act differently, though exercising their discretionary powers? Given the same set of facts or confronted with similar situations can they act differently, though exercising their discretionary powers? I feel, that it is in the ends of justice desirable that this Court should impress upon the Trial Courts dealing with private complaints involving offences exclusively triable by Courts of Sessions the feasibility of examining all the witnesses, taking recourse to the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 202 of the Code, before taking a decision in the matter under Section 203 or 204 thereof. " therefore, this Court, on two occasions, has held that where the offence complained of is triable by Court of Session, the Magistrate need not invariably take recourse to the proviso to sub-section (2) as he is certainly empowered to deal with the case by adopting the procedure laid down under Section 200 and take appropriate decision as required under Section 203 or under subsection (1) of Section 204 of the Code. ( 3 ) HOWEVER, in a later case - ABDUL KHADER v. MOHAMMED FAIZUDDIN, ILR1987 KAR 832 , Patil, J. while dealing with this question has held: "in a case instituted on a private complaint, where the offences alleged are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, it is not only not permissible for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police as provided under Section 156 (3), or Section 202 but it is also obligatory on him to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath as provided under proviso to Subsection (2) of Section 202 Cr. P. C. before issuing process under Section 204. The magistrate has also no jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses in such a case to reach any conclusion if the offences disclosed are triable by the Magistrate. That is exclusively the function of the Sessions Judge. After issue of process, the only judicial function that the magistrate is called upon to do is one indicated in Section 208 Cr. P. C. . That is exclusively the function of the Sessions Judge. After issue of process, the only judicial function that the magistrate is called upon to do is one indicated in Section 208 Cr. P. C. . e. , to furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of -- (i) statements recorded under Section 200 or Section 202, of all persons examined by the Magistrate; (ii) the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under Section 161 or Section 164; and (iii) any documents produced before the magistrate on which the prosecution proposed to rely: provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any such document is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing the accused with a copy thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in court. Thereafter commit the case to the Court of Sessions and it is for the Sessions Judge to appreciate the evidence so recorded by the Magistrate and to find out whether any such case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions is or is not made out. In the absence of evidence of all the witnesses, it would also be not possible to the Sessions Judge to appreciate the contentions urged before him. Therefore, failure on the part of the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to file the list of witnesses and examine all such witnesses sought to be examined not only tantamounts of violation of provisions of Section 202, but it is also prejudicial to the case of the accused. " In short, Patil, J held that in the case of offences exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to examine the complainant and all his witnesses without fail before the Court reaches the stage where it considers whether the process should be issued or not. No reference has been made in the said Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 to the Judgment reported in Ramanatha v. State, ILR 1984 (2) KAR 1054, or to the Judgment reported in Nagana Gouda v. Kamalaxi, ILR1986 KAR 1229. No reference has been made in the said Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 to the Judgment reported in Ramanatha v. State, ILR 1984 (2) KAR 1054, or to the Judgment reported in Nagana Gouda v. Kamalaxi, ILR1986 KAR 1229. ( 4 ) SUPREME Court in ANTULAY v. R. S. NAYAK, AIR 1984 SC 719 has laid down as: "upon a complaint being received and the Court records the verification, it is open to the Court to apply its mind to the facts disclosed and to judicially determine whether process should or should not be issued. It is not a condition precedent to issue of process that the Court of necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202 or direct investigation as therein contemplated. The power to take cognizance without holding inquiry or directing investigation is implicit in Section 202 when it says that the Magistrate may 'if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer. . . . . . . . . . . for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. ' Therefore, the matter is left to the judicial discretion of the Court whether on examining the complainant and the witnesses if any as contemplated by Section 200 to issue process or to postpone the issue of process. This discretion which the Court enjoys cannot be circumscribed or denied by making it mandatory upon the Court either to hold the enquiry or direct investigation. Such an approach would be contrary to the statutory provision. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that by entertaining a private complaint, the purpose of speedy trial would be thwarted or that a pre-process safeguard would be denied. " Therefore, the said Supreme Court case has made it absolutely clear that the Magistrate has got jurisdiction either to proceed under Section 200 or under Section 202 Cr. P. C. No reference has been made in Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 to the said supreme Court case, AIR 1984 SC 719. The principle laid down in Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 runs contrary to the one laid down in Antulay's case by the Supreme Court. P. C. No reference has been made in Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 to the said supreme Court case, AIR 1984 SC 719. The principle laid down in Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 runs contrary to the one laid down in Antulay's case by the Supreme Court. The principles laid down in Ramanath's case, ILR 1984 (2) KAR 1054 and naganagouda's case, ILR1986 KAR 1229 are in conformity with the principle laid down in Antulay's case, AIR 1984 SC 719. Therefore, under these circumstances, the ruling laid down by this Court in Abdul Khader's case, ILR1987 KAR 832 cannot be considered to be good law in view of the said Supreme Court decision and the two decisions of this Court above referred to. ( 5 ) THE Magistrate, in this case, has chosen to proceed under Section 200 of Cr. P. C. only. He has recorded the sworn statements of complainant and one witness. On reading the sworn statements of complainant and his witness, the Chief Judicial Magistrate held that there were sufficient grounds to proceed with the case and has accordingly issued the process. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be said to be erroneous at all. Therefore, the question of quashing the committal of the case does not arise in this case at all. ( 6 ) IT is for the Sessions Judge to consider, on the material available to him, as to whether the material is sufficient to frame a charge or not. ( 7 ) THE complainant had filed an application before the Sessions Court to permit him to examine some more witnesses. The Sessions Judge has rightly rejected that application. The Sessions judge should dispose of the case on top priority basis as the case has been hanging fire since 1982. ( 8 ) IN the result, the criminal petition is dismissed.