Judgment :- 1. A Sub Inspector of Police who claims to have reaped several laurels to his credit (12 money rewards and 7 good service entries for meritorious service) has approached this Court with a prayer to quash an order by which his increments for two years nave been withheld with cumulative effect. That order (Ext. P2) has been passed by the DIG (Central Range). The appeal filed before the Director General of Police did not yield any favourable result. Hence the Sub Inspector filed this Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 2. While the petitioner was Sub Inspector of Peramangalam Police Station, a bailable warrant of arrest was issued by a Judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class for the arrest of one Sukumaran who was involved in a bailable offence. The Circle Inspector of Police, Trichur (Rural) tried to arrest that person on the strength of the said warrant, but failed in that endeavour. In the meanwhile, Sukumaran approached the Sessions Court, Trichur, with an application for an order of anticipatory bail, in which the said Circle Inspector was made one of the respondents. The application was dismissed by the Sessions Judge on 19-3-1985 as the Public Prosecutor informed that Sukumaran was wanted only in connection with the above bailable warrant. On the same day, the petitioner went to Sukumaran's residence to arrest him. While the petitioner was in the house of Sukumaran, the Circle Inspector also came there, and at his sight Sukumaran made his escape good from the house. The Circle Inspector took serious note of it and turned against the petitioner. The Circle Inspector alleged that the petitioner helped Sukumaran to slip away from his residence. As the allegation was denied, the Dy. S. P., Trichur conducted an enquiry into the allegation. In the enquiry the petitioner was found cot guilty of the allegation and a report was filed accordingly. But the third respondent (DIG) did not agree with the finding of the enquiry officer for certain reasons. Thereupon the DIG ordered that the increments of the petitioner be withheld with cumulative effect for a period of two years. That order is Ext. P2. 3. Ext. P2 is challenged mainly on two grounds. The first is that the third respondent should have given the petitioner an opportunity of hearing before arriving at a totally different finding from that of the enquiry officer. That order is Ext. P2. 3. Ext. P2 is challenged mainly on two grounds. The first is that the third respondent should have given the petitioner an opportunity of hearing before arriving at a totally different finding from that of the enquiry officer. The further contention on that ground is that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to explain atleast after DIG came to certain findings which are contrary to the enquiry officer's findings, and before imposing a penalty on the strength of those new findings. Hence it is urged that principles of natural justice have been violated in passing Ext. P2. The second is that the reasoning of the third respondent for dissenting from the findings of the enquiry officer is per se perverse and unreasonable and no reasonable man would have adopted those reasons to reach a totally different conclusion. 4. The learned Government Pleader, in answer to the first point referred me to some of the rules in the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 (for short'the Rules'). As per the Rules, opportunity must be given to the affected person if a major penalty is proposed to be imposed on the person concerned. The procedure is laid down in R.17, in cases where any major penalty is proposed to be imposed. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no such provision in the Rules for affording an opportunity to the affected person when the proposal is to impose only a minor punishment. Punishment of withholding of increments is mentioned in R.15(g) of the Rules. It cannot be said that such a penalty can be imposed without giving any opportunity to the person concerned. R.12 deals with the summary procedure when punishment specified in R.15(g) is proposed. But the contention is that it is only in R.17(1)(b) that a provision is made for issuing a notice to show cause, even after the conclusion of the enquiry. That rule pertains to the imposition of certain major penalties. It is true that there is no such specific provision for giving an opportunity to explain after the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings, is cases where the proposal is to impose a penalty like the one imposed in this case. Absence of such a specific rule does not provide a carte blanche for dispensing with the rules of natural justice. It is true that there is no such specific provision for giving an opportunity to explain after the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings, is cases where the proposal is to impose a penalty like the one imposed in this case. Absence of such a specific rule does not provide a carte blanche for dispensing with the rules of natural justice. The position may perhaps be different when the statute disallows such opportunity. But mere absence of any provision in the Rules for providing such an opportunity is different from a positive statutory direction to proceed in a different way. The question therefore is, can it be said that since there is no specific rule to afford the affected person an opportunity of hearing, there will be no infringement of principles of natural justice? Had the findings of the enquiry officer been adverse to the delinquent officer, perhaps the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a penalty without giving a further opportunity to the affected person. But when the enquiry officer's findings are favourable to the petitioner a dissent from such findings should have been made only after giving the affected person an opportunity. Principles of natural justice cannot be given a go-bye even for making administrative orders. The requirements of natural justice in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of each case. The extent and application of the principles of natural justice cannot be limited to any rigid formula (vide Chandra Dhawan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore and another (AIR 1970 SC 2042); State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer etc. (AIR 1977 SC 1627)). 5. Duty to act fairly in administrative exercises demands compliance with the principles of natural justice. When the executive action is subjected to judicial review, such action will normally be tested on the touchstone of principles of natural justice. It has now become an elementary principle of law, well settled as a result of several decisions of the Supreme Court that no order involving adverse consequences can be passed against any person without giving him an opportunity to be heard before passing of such an order. "The audi alteram partem rule which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is one of the basic principles of natural justice" (Bhagwati, J- as he then was - in National Textile Worker's Union etc. "The audi alteram partem rule which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is one of the basic principles of natural justice" (Bhagwati, J- as he then was - in National Textile Worker's Union etc. v. P.R. Ramakrishnan and others (AIR 1983 SC 75). Merely because an opportunity is expressly provided in R.17 of the Rules, it cannot be inferred that the principle of audi alteram partem is excluded by the Rules when lesser penalties are imposed. (Vide S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others (AIR 1981 SC 136)). 6. When the third respondent DIG did not agree with the findings of the enquiry officer, he may have his own reasons to take a different stand. But when the differed stand was proposed to be used against the petitioner which affects his civil rights, he should have been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why such reasons should not be adopted. As the DIG has taken a decision contrary to the enquiry findings without affording an opportunity to the petitioner, Ext. P2 is bad in law. In the above view, it is unnecessary to consider the second point canvassed by the counsel, namely, that the reasoning of the third respondent mentioned in Ext. P2 is perverse. In the result I quash Ext. P2. It open to the third respondent to proceed further, if the findings of the enquiry officer are not acceptable to him. Issue photo copy on usual terms.