ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh, J.- 1. Unprecedented it is in the annals of our Election Law. The question indeed is, whether Section 116 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for short, the 'Act', can, and does, resolve the controversy. 2. First, a brief resume of facts precipitating the issue whose Sui generis character made impossible accelerated hearing on the question. On 17-4-1985, the petitioner filed the instant election petition calling in question election of respondent No.1, Gangaram Bandil who had been declared elected on 9th March, 1985 from No. 16, 'Lashkar East' constituency of the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh. In the course of hearing of the election petition, several witnesses were examined by the petitioner in support of her case, inter alia, that the said respondent as also others as his agents and workers were guilty of corrupt practices of which the most objecti0nable one being publishing and distributing a scandalous hand-bill maligning the petitioner, her mother and her husband and impairing thereby her election prospects. She closed her evidence on 19-1-198; and thereupon, steps were taken by the said respondent by filing his list of witnesses on 30-1-1987 to contest the case set up by the petitioner in pleadings as also in evidence. Let it be mentioned at this stage that though other unsuccessful candidates were also impleaded, except Dharti Pakad Madanlal, arrayed as respondent No.3, others did not appear and did not oppose the petition. Indeed, third respondent also did not oppose the petition and supported, to some extent petitioner's case. He appeared on several dates and though he cross-examined some of the election-petitioner's witnesses and also the first respondent, he did that to support merely his own case raising challenge to the election symbol of the election petitioner. On 6-2-1987, first respondent Gangaram Bandil examined himself and his cross-examination by the third respondent was also completed on the same date. However, election-petitioner’s counsel continued cross-examination of the first respondent on several dates. On 9-2-1987, on the prayer of third respondent, he was allowed to file his list of witnesses on or before 2nd March, 1987, but that list never came. On 28-4-1987, cross-examination of respondent No.1 was completed and he was discharged and for evidence of his other witnesses, the case was adjourned to 1st July, 1987. On 9-2-1987, on the prayer of third respondent, he was allowed to file his list of witnesses on or before 2nd March, 1987, but that list never came. On 28-4-1987, cross-examination of respondent No.1 was completed and he was discharged and for evidence of his other witnesses, the case was adjourned to 1st July, 1987. On that date, his counsel informed the Court that first respondent Gangaram Bandil had expired on 2nd June, 1987. 3. The new Chapter in the case opened on 6-7-1987 when the question was considered as to whether the election petition had abated because counsel for the election-petitioner had submitted on the preceding date that the position was otherwise. However, I took the view that the provision of Section 116 of the Act are to be complied with and ordered accordingly notice to be published in the Official Gazette in terms of the provisions of Section 116 calling upon persons legally entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent to make necessary application in that regard in accordance with the statutory provision. On 3-9-1987, it was noted that the notice ordered, was published in Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra on 21st of August, 1987. 4. When the matter next came before me on 14-9-1987, it was noted that on 4-9-1987, one Baijnath of Argade-ki-Gali, Lohiya Bazar, Lashkar, Gwalior, had filed an application submitting that he was elector of the concerned constituency and praying for leave to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent to oppose the election petition. However, the applicant was not present. He was not represented also by counsel to press the application. Shri Dubey, appearing for the election-petitioner submitted that the application was time barred, while third respondent submitted that the applicant be heard and that it was not time-barred. I took the tentative view on that date itself, namely, 14-9-1987, that the application was time-barred, but I directed still that S. P. C. be issued to the said applicant Baijnath as the question of abatement was not finally disposed of so that he could appear on the next date to submit his say in the matter. 5. However, the said applicant Baijnath did not appear and till to day pursuant to the notice published under Section 116, no substitution could be or has been, made in place of deceased respondent. 5. However, the said applicant Baijnath did not appear and till to day pursuant to the notice published under Section 116, no substitution could be or has been, made in place of deceased respondent. True, the formality remains to be completed in regard to Baijnath's application by confirming the view I took that the application was time-barred. Indeed, I had held that the application being filed beyond 14 days of the publication of the' notice in the Official Gazette. it was time-barred. This view, I took in the context of the provision of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, while computing the said period of 14 days, prescribed under Section 116 of the Act. The last day for filing application pursuant to the notice dated 20-8-1987 expired on the 3rd of September, 1987. The application being filed on 4th September 1987, was accordingly evidently time-barred. That apart excepting filing the application the said applicant Baijnath did not appear in the case on any date and did not take any step in the matter of his substitution in place of the deceased respondent. 6. Two more lateral questions still remain to be decided, but one of them only may be considered and decided first at this stage. On 26-9-1987, on behalf of the election-petitioner, an application was filed contesting validity of the Gazette Notification made under Section 116 of the Act and praying that another "proper and sufficient notice" in terms of Section 116 be published in the Official Gazette as also in some local newspaper. On that, petitioner's counsel as also respondent No.3 were heard on different dates and finally, by order passed on 19-10-1987, the prayer was rejected after holding that there was no necessity for re-publication of the notice in the Official Gazette and publication in the newspaper Was not contemplated (sick) of the election-petitioner that the said Gazette Notification dated 20-8-1987 was not "published" in Gwalior, or for that matter, in the concerned constituency. It was election-petitioner's contention that the relevant part of the Gazette Was printed at Bhopal and remained published there or may be elsewhere in the State, but not in Gwalior as that part was not received anywhere in Gwalior. On materials placed before me, I found that the relevant Gazette had been received in several public libraries at Gwalior and Indeed, even in the Library of this Court too. On materials placed before me, I found that the relevant Gazette had been received in several public libraries at Gwalior and Indeed, even in the Library of this Court too. On the challenge to the contents of the notice, the view which I took in the order passed on 14-10-1987, I reiterate once again. True, in the notice, it was, inter alia, provided as follows: "Whereas since there is no other respondent who is appearing in the said petition, the event of the death of above said Respondent No.1 as aforesaid is hereby notified. Any person legally entitled to be substituted in the election petition in place of the said deceased Respondent No.1 Shri Gangaram Bandil (who might have been petitioner) is called upon by this notice to make necessary application for substitution in the place of deceased respondent No.1 to this Court within 14 days of the publication". Counsel contended that the notice was invalid because it said that there was no other respondent "appearing" in the said petition though third respondent had appeared. Another ground of challenge was to the use of the language "Any person legally entitled to be substituted" which, counsel contended, was superfluous as section 116 did not contemplate, in terms, such language being mentioned in the notice. I have no doubt that the object of the notice is spelt out in the relevant provision itself and it is the appropriate stage to quote now the key provision around which revolves the controversy to be resolved in this case: "116. Abatement of substitution on death of respondent. - If before the conclusion of the trial of an election petition, the sole respondent dies or gives notice that he does not intend to oppose the petition or any of the respondent dies or gives such notice and there is no other respondent who is opposing the petition, the High Court shall cause notice of such event to be published in Official Gazette, and thereupon any person who might have been a petitioner may, within fourteen days of such publication, apply to be substituted in place of such respondent to oppose the petition and shall be entitled to continue the proceedings upon such terms as the High Court may think fit." 7. The focus of the legislative intent of the provision, in my opinion, has to be read in the expression "cause notice of .such event to be published in the Official Gazette". That event (death/withdrawal) itself is mentioned in the provision aforequoted to make the object clear that if any person who could apply for being substituted in place of the deceased respondent, he could do so within the prescribed period. If the different incidents of the legal entitlement are not expressly notified by mentioning therein that the applicant could only be a "person who might have been a petitioner" or that he could be substituted only "to oppose the petition", such an omission, in my opinion, would not invalidate the notice. That apart, according to me, the fact that instead of the word "opposing", the word "appearing" being printed in the notice, would also not take it invalid. The factum of death of the respondent being published and the prescribed time being also published, those interested to apply for substitution would have no reason to complain of insufficiency of the notice. As to legal entitlement, the use of the words "any person legally entitled to be substituted" should suffice because the other expressions used in section 116, namely, "who might have been a petitioner" and "to oppose the petition" are equally technical. I had taken the view which [reiterate that the notice published having the widest ambit, the change in situation the trial of the election petition was made known in the clearest possible language with intention to give fullest opportunity to interested persons to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent. These are my additional reasons to confirm the order which I had passed finally on 19-(0-1987 rejecting election-petitioner's aforesaid application, namely, I.A. No. XVII. If I have to say anything more, I add that proceedings in an election petition must be dealt at all stages with due despatch and proceedings are not meant to be staggered at any stage merely for the purpose of completing some formality which is not contemplated, such as publication of the notice under Section 116 either in a newspaper or even in the Official Gazette for a second time in a Dew form with greater details. 8. In so far as the core of the controversy is concerned, petitioner's counsel Shri P. L. Dubey, has made a two-fold submission. 8. In so far as the core of the controversy is concerned, petitioner's counsel Shri P. L. Dubey, has made a two-fold submission. Firstly, abatement of an election petition is contemplated only under Section 112 of the Act and in the Instant case, that provision, on its face, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case as the case is not one of "death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of the several petitioners". Secondly, there is a duty on the "High Court" hearing the election petition to conclude trial thereof and to pass final order in terms of section 98 of the Act and if necessary also under section 99 thereof in any other circumstance which is not covered either by Section 109 or 112 and, indeed, in doing so, the High Court will be well advised to apply, if necessary, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as envisaged under Section 87 of the Act. It is counsel's submission that although no "substitution" has taken place in the instant election petition in terms of the provisions of Section 116, trial can be concluded by having resort to the provisions of Order 9 and 17, C. P. C. Very pointedly and precisely indeed, the sum and substance of counsel's submission is that on the evidence which is already on record, namely, the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the evidence only of the respondent, the election petition may be disposed of. It is not necessary to examine the other 25 witnesses cited by the respondent who have remained unexamined and indeed, it is also not necessary to hear arguments on the evidence in reply to those to be advanced by the election petitioner on the merit of her case. 9. However, I am of the view that the Act is a self-contained Code and this position is so well-established in law that it would be a futile exercise to buttress this with the aid of authorities. I am of the view accordingly, that the case is covered by Section 116 of the Act, and as such, it is not possible to continue this trial further as no substitution in terms of the said provision could be, or has been, made in this case. I am of the view accordingly, that the case is covered by Section 116 of the Act, and as such, it is not possible to continue this trial further as no substitution in terms of the said provision could be, or has been, made in this case. What I could not accept is that Section 116 does not envisage abatement of an election petition even on the happening of the contingencies mentioned therein and that a trial of the election petition, even when the sole respondent dies, has to continue in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. True it is that in so many words, except. in the heading of the Section, the word "abatement" is not to be read, but on that ground itself, it is difficult to accept counsel's submission that the case of abatement of election petition is contemplated only under Section 112 and there can be no abatement of election petition when the sole respondent dies. I have no doubt that ambiguity in the language of Section 116 can be cleared having resort to both, external and internal, aid of the Rules of statutory interpretation. First, let the provision be interpreted on its own language. In doin so, it would be manifestly clear that the key to interpretation of the provision is provided by the expression "shall be entitled to continue the proceedings upon such terms as the High Court may think fit" which must be construed as the governing clause of the provision. Although what happens when the sole respondent dies or gives notice that he does not intend to oppose the petition or any of the respondent dies or gives such notice" is not mentioned indicating that the election petition abates, what steps is required to be taken in such a case is still mentioned: Indeed only when "there is no other respondent who is opposing the petition", it would be necessary for the High Court to cause "notice of such event" (death/withdrawal) to be published in the Official Gazette because in such a case only substitution becomes necessary. 10-A. Wharton's Law Lexicon speaks of the "plea ill abatement" meaning thereby that "a defence by which a defendant showed cause to the Court why he should not be sued or if sued, not in the form adopted by the plaintiff and praying that the action might abate, i.e. cease". 10-A. Wharton's Law Lexicon speaks of the "plea ill abatement" meaning thereby that "a defence by which a defendant showed cause to the Court why he should not be sued or if sued, not in the form adopted by the plaintiff and praying that the action might abate, i.e. cease". It also speaks of "abatement of litigation" and says that by marriage, death or bankruptcy of any of the parties, a cause does not become abated if the cause of action survives. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 1, the meaning of the terms "abate" and "abatement" are discussed. When an action in law "ceases, comes to an end prematurely, or terminates", it is said to be a case of abatement. By indicating the contingency when the action survives in the case of an election petition, the provision makes clear also when the action abates. When and how respondent can be substituted and who is the person who can be substituted on the happening of anyone of the contingencies mentioned are indicated and it is made clear also that if a substitution does not take place, it would not be possible "to continue the proceedings" meaning thereby that the proceedings would terminate prematurely. It is also clearly indicated that substitution cannot be automatic and the right of substitution is limited, such as, to person who must established that he "might have been a petitioner" (indeed as provided under Section 81 of the Act) and that he would be "opposing the petition". 11. The legislative intent which Section 116 inheres must be related to the object and proper lodgment and trial of an election petition. The several provisions of Part VI of the Act which deal with "Disputes Regarding Election leave no room for any doubt that the legislature intended to ensure purity of the election process having due regard to the objects of the Act itself. The long title of the Act spells its object saying that it is meant to provide for conduct of election to the House of Parliament and to the House or houses of Legislature of different States and, among others, for matters relating to "corrupt practices and other offences as or in connection with such election and the decision of doubts and dispute arising out of or in connection with such election". Of the several chapters comprising part VI, Part III and IV deal respectively with such subjects as "Trial Election Petitions" and "withdrawal and Abatement of an Election petition". What is necessary to be stressed indeed is that Chapter IV must be considered as conclusive of the subject of "withdrawal and abatement of Election Petitions" within the self-contained Code of the Act. While Section 109, 110 and 111 deal with withdrawal of election petition by the sole or anyone of the election petitioners, Section 112 deals with the case of abatement of an election petition on the death of the sole or anyone of the survivors of the several election petitioners. In the case of a respondent, however, the contingencies of death and withdrawal, on the other hand, have been dealt with differently, in the composite provision, which is Section 116. 11-A. The scheme of the Chapter as also the heading of Section116 makes the aforesaid stated position very clear. However, it is now well-established that though heading prefaced to a chapter or to Section cannot control the plain words of the statute, they may still provide the key to explain any ambiguity and resolve doubt as to interpretation of any provision. (See Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 , K. M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 196t SC 11, Indian Aluminium Co. v. Kerala State Electricity Board, 1975 (2) SCC 414 . It is also a well-recognised canon of interpretation that any statutory provision should be so construed as to impute to the Legislature a reasonable view and object that the provision is not meant to produce absurd or impossible results. Two well-known maxims manifest that such indeed is the position universally accepted in law-Lax non cogit ad impossibilia and Ut res magis valeat quam percat. Reading, therefore, the provision of Section 116 in its context and setting with reference to its object and purport, I have no doubt that the word "abatement" mentioned in the heading of the Section makes it clear that the case of abatement of an election petition in the event of contingencies mentioned therein is envisaged thereunder. Merely because in the body of Section 116 the word "abate" is not used expressly, according to me, is not indicative of the legislative intent that abatement of an election petition is not contemplated therein. Merely because in the body of Section 116 the word "abate" is not used expressly, according to me, is not indicative of the legislative intent that abatement of an election petition is not contemplated therein. Even without the words "abate" and "abatement" the legislative intent of Section 116 is clear. However, it may be mentioned in this connection that when meaning of a provision is in doubt, even addition of a word to clear the doubt is not impermissible albeit, as would fitin with the object and purpose of the provision. (See- B. 1. G. Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh, AIR 1959 SC 1331 , Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 1678 . Indeed, the position in law is also well-established that semantics of the legislative provisions must bend to sub-serve legislative goals and if the object of the provision is ascertainable, then it is to be so construed as to make it workable by removing ambiguity that may make its construction doubtfree (See-Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., 1977 (I) SCC 155 , K. Ranganatha Reddiar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 SC 520 , C. I. T. v. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 . 12. Let me turn now to the decisions cited by Shri Dubey to established validity of his contentions. Strong reliance is placed by learned counsel on an English decision in the Case of County of Tipperary which was decided under the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 of those countries and is published in Vol. III of the Reports of the Decisions of Judges for the Trial of Election Petitions in England and Ireland. During the trial of the election petition, the returned candidate impleaded as respondent therein having died an unsuccessful candidate in that election presented a second petition challenging the election of the deceased on the ground that the deceased wa disqualified under the law from contesting the election and his nomination paper was wrongly accepted and prayed that he be declared as duly elected from the constituency in question. Certain observations which appear in the opinions delivered by the learned Judges in that case are relied on to which, no exception can be taken. Certain observations which appear in the opinions delivered by the learned Judges in that case are relied on to which, no exception can be taken. It was held that the proceeding in that case was not of an ordinary nature against dead man; it Was the assertion of right in rem, a right to set aside undue return and that, in no sense, it fell withi the meaning of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona. What, however, to be noted importantly is that the right to such an action was expressly reserved under Section 38 of the relevant enactment and indeed, the provision thereof is in pari materia with that of Section 116 of the Act. Accordingly, in that case, the second petition being in the nature of substitution made pursuant to the right reserved under Section 38 of the enactment in question, the facts of that case cannot be said to be parallel in any sense to those of the case in hand. 13. Indeed, in Indian jurisprudence also, the position which is well established is that in an election petition "the contest is really between the constituency on one side and the person or persons complained of on the other" and indeed it has also been noted that "the law relating to abatements and withdrawal (of an election petition) is exhaustively dealt with in the Act itself and no reliance can be placed on the provisions of C. P. C. (See Sheodan Singh v. Mohan Lal Gautam, AIR 1969 SC 1024 . Indeed, the fact that an election petition, when filed, continues for the benefit of the whole constituency as held by their Lordships in Basappa's case, AIR 1958 SC 698 is projected in the provision of withdrawal and abatement to be read in Chapter VI of the Act. Is it for this reason that in all cases and in all eventualities and contingencies envisaged under Sections 109 to 112 and 116, the person entitled to be substituted in the event of death or withdrawal is a person who, in all cases, must be such "who might have been a petitioner" and indeed, in Section 81, "any elector" of a constituency is enabled to present an election petition. l3-A Counsel has relied on a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Gujrat High Court in the case of M. M. Suthar v. D. S. Desai, 54 ELR 110 to draw a parallel between the facts and circumstances of that case and the instant case and on that basis to submit that recourse be had to the provisions of Orders 9 and 17, CPC. Let it be noted immediately in this connection that on the election-petitioner failing to prosecute his application, a notice \Vas in that case, published in the local newspaper and Official Gazette and pursuant thereto, on application being filed for substitution, that Was allowed. However, the substituted petitioner also did not prosecute the petition and aso did not make any application for withdrawal of the election petition. At that stage, another applicant appeared for permission to take the place of the substituted petitioner. In those circumstances, taking resort to the provisions of Orders 9 and 17, C. P. C., the Court dismissed the election petition "for want of prosecution" and also, dismissed the application filed by the third applicant. It was held that in those circumstances, principles embodied in sections 108, 109, 110 and 116 being inapplicable and there being no specific provision to deal with the situation, procedure prescribed under the C. P. C. could be followed in virtue of the provisions contained in Section 87(1) of the Act. 13-B. I do not think if counsel's reliance on Jagan Nath, AIR 1954 SC 210 would be of any relevance indeed because in that case itself, it was stated to be a "sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of law." True, their Lordships also observed that "though an election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with, essentials of that law is also to safeguard the purity of the election process and to see that people do not get elect\:d by flagrant breaches of that law or by cerrupt practices". In that case, following the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10, the Election Tribunal had permitted candidate not impleaded, to be made party to the petition and that order was upheld. Sangram Singh's case, AIR 1955 SC 425 is also pressed in service. In that case, following the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10, the Election Tribunal had permitted candidate not impleaded, to be made party to the petition and that order was upheld. Sangram Singh's case, AIR 1955 SC 425 is also pressed in service. In that case, the Election Tribunal, following the provisions of Order 17 Rule 2, read with Order 9 Rule 6 (1) (a), C. P. C., in the exercise of its discretion thereunder did not allow one of the respondents to take part in the election proceedings taking the view that it had no jurisdiction to set aside its earlier order directing ex parte hearing. Their Lordships were required essentially to interpret the provisions of Order 9 Rule 6 (1) (a), C. P. C. and expressed the view that the provisions did not contemplate any "order" and also construed Order 17 Rule 2 in that context to observe that a judicial exercise of discretion was contemplated thereunder. Indeed, what bear emphasis are relevant observations of their Lordships; "our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceeding that affects their lives and property should not continue in their absence". I am also of the view that the decision of a ed Single Judge of Madras High Court in the case of A. Srinivasan v. The Election Tribunal, 11 ELR 278 does not advance the matter to petitioner's benefit. In that case, it was merely held that it was duty of the Tribunal to investigate and record findings on corrupt practices alleged against the respondents, but it was also held that analogy of civil suit is not wholly applicable as electors are also interested parties. 14. However, there are certain observations in the case of P. Nalla Thampy, AIR 1984 SC 135 which supports the view I have taken. In para 11, their Lordships have observed, referring to the holding in Basappa's case (supra) that though in the election petition once filed, becomes a dispute in which the whole constituency is interested, the Act still makes provisions to meet certain eventualities in the course of the trial as may be read in Chapter IV of Part VI. In para 11, their Lordships have observed, referring to the holding in Basappa's case (supra) that though in the election petition once filed, becomes a dispute in which the whole constituency is interested, the Act still makes provisions to meet certain eventualities in the course of the trial as may be read in Chapter IV of Part VI. Two situations of withdrawal and abatement of election petition are covered by the statute and it is further observed that "Sections 109 and 110 deal with withdrawal of election petitions, and sections 112 and 116 deal with the eventuality of death and non-substitution leading to abatement", (Emphasis added). True, in that case, it was held that an election petition would be liable to be dismissed for default in situations covered by Order' 9 or Order 17, C. P. C., but it was further held that provisions of Order 9 Rule 9, C. P. C. could be invoked for restoration of an application and indeed, only at the instance of the election-petitioner and not by any respondent. 15. In my view, the holding aforesaid in the case of P. Nalla Thampy (supra) fully exposes the fallacy underlying the contention pressed by Shri Dubey. In this context, it may be noted that Section 87(1) of the Act contemplates that though "every election petition shall be tried by High Court as -nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under C. P. C. to the trial of suits" it is not envisaged further that the provision embraces any legal fiction also by which the scope of applicability can be enlarged to meet situations not strictly covered by any provision of C. P. C. I wonder, therefore, how, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the provisions of order 17 Rules 2 and 3, C. P. C. can at all be invoked. In both cases, the default of the "parties dealt with" is of a party who is alive and not dead. True, under Rule 2, the trial Court is authorised to "dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX o. make such other order as it thinks fit". This can be obviously done when any of the parties being alive and not dead, fails to appear on a date to which hearing of the suit is adjourned. This can be obviously done when any of the parties being alive and not dead, fails to appear on a date to which hearing of the suit is adjourned. However, reference may yet be made to the Explanation appended to that Rule which says, "where the evidence or a substantial portion of evidence of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on any date to which hearing of the suit is adjourned, the Court may in its discretion proceed with the case as if such party were present". This provision shows two things. It speaks of a living party and it also speaks of discretion to be exercised under certain conditions such as where substantial portion of evidence of any party has already been recorded. 16. In the instant case, it can neither be said that the deceased respondent is alive so that Order 17 Rule 2 can be invoked, nor it can be said that "substantial portion" of his evidence has already been recorded because he died before he could examine any of the 25 witnesses that he had cited to prove his case. True it is that he had examined himself, but it cannot be said that his evidence only was "substantial" nor that he had sufficient opportunity to disprove the charge of corrupt practice made against him. indeed, if Rules 2 and 3 of Order 17 are not invokable, then there can be no question of looking at the provisions of Order 9. Suffice it, however, to say that if the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13, C. P. C. cannot be invoked factually and practically, then there can be no scope for application of any of the provisions of Order 9. In the instant case, first respondent, the returned candidate, having died, even if proceedings are continued in his absence invoking the provisions of Order 17 Rule 2 and Order 9 Rule 11, C. P. C. against any order passed thereunder, no proceeding can be taken under Rule 13 of Order 9, C. P. C. because of the death of the said respondent. 17. Indeed, law is well-settled that nature of trial in the election petition is quasi-criminal and not civil and standard of proof is the same as in a criminal trial. 17. Indeed, law is well-settled that nature of trial in the election petition is quasi-criminal and not civil and standard of proof is the same as in a criminal trial. (See Devi Prasad, 1969 (3) SCC 595 , Mahant Shreo Nath, 1970 (3) SCC 647 , Manphul Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2158 , Rahim Khan, AIR 1975 SC 290 , Bir Chandra Barman, AIR 1976 SC 603 , Amolak Chand, AIR 1977 SC 813 . Thus, respondent charged with corrupt practice is required to be afforded adequate and reasonable opportunity to meet the charge and in the instant case, his death deprived him of that opportunity and the trial cannot, therefore, be concluded in absentia against him to establish the charge without his being in a position to avail the opportunity. That an election petition cannot ordinarily be disposed of ex parte in such case is also apparent from the position envisaged under Section 116 itself. Indeed, in the requirement that there shall always be such a respondent who is "opposing the petition". Obviously, the requirement of substitution under Section 116 arises when the surviving respondents already on record are not "opposing the petition". However, even when substitution is made in terms of Section 116, because the High Court may impose "terms" for continuation of the proceedings thereafter, it is possible to conceive of a case when despite substitution, trial may not proceed in certain circumstances or beyond certain stage. When it is not possible for the substituted respondent to "oppose the petition" in the sense that he is able to take steps and produce evidence to disprove the charge of corrupt practice alleged by the election-petitioner, then further trial of the charge would be obviously futile exercise. In such a case, the High Court may allow the proceedings to continue on "such terms" that in the event of substituted respondent failing to adduce rebuttal evidence to disprove the charge of corrupt practice, the petition shall stand abated. However, this position does not arise in this case as there has neither been any substitution, nor the only surviving respondent, namely, respondent No.3 had opposed the petition by siding with the deceased respondent. As earlier alluded, be has rather made a common cause with the election-petitioner joining hands with her to support the charge of corrupt practice levelled by her against the deceased respondent. 18. As earlier alluded, be has rather made a common cause with the election-petitioner joining hands with her to support the charge of corrupt practice levelled by her against the deceased respondent. 18. Stage is now set to dispose of the surviving lateral issue projected in I. A. No. XVIII of 1987 which was filed on 9-11-1987 by the election petitioner during the course of hearing on the question of substitution. She made a prayer in terms of Section 99 of the Act read with Section 151 C.P.C. for proceeding against certain persons mentioned in para 10-A of the petition to determine the allegation of corrupt practice made by the election-petitioner against those persons. Consideration thereon was reserved though arguments were heard and finally concluded in this matter on 4-12-1987. I have no hesitation to hold that the prayer is misconceived because Section 99 contemplates a consequential order which can be made when "at the conclusion of the trial", the election is disposed of and the Court makes an order declaring the election of the returned candidate void on the ground of his having committed corrupt practice as envisaged under Section 100 (1) (b) of the Act. There is high authority for the proposition that during the pendency of trial except those who are indicated in Section 82 of the Act. others cannot be impleaded. Indeed, in Jyoti Basu's case, AIR 1982 SC 983 it was categorically held by their Lordships that "where at the concluding of the trial of an election petition, after evidence has been given, the Court finds that there is sufficient material to hold a person guilty of corrupt practice, the Court may then issue notice to him to show cause under Section 99 and proceed with further action". In K. V. Rao v. B. N. Reddi, AIR 1969 SC 872 it was held that Section 99 does not apply to a person who is not a necessary party and that though powers thereunder can be used against an agent guilty of commission of any corrupt practice with the consent of candidate, the occasion for use of the power would arise when an order is made under Section 98. 19. 19. True it is, in the instant case, at para 10-A of the election petition are named certain persons who are said to have committed corrupt practice with the consent of the election-petitioner, but the question is that the charge of corrupt practice against the petitioner himself could not be tried and, therefore, no order could be rendered in terms of Section 98 to give an occasion for issuing notice to those persons to show cause in the matter of taking action against them. That apart, the liability of those persons being obviously vicarious, in their capacity of acting as agent of the deceased respondent, it would not be possible to try charge against them separately. Whether they acted with the consent of the deceased respondent was a fact on which the said respondent had a right to be heard, but that is not possible now. The case of Devi Prasad (Supra) was a case, like the instant case, of publication of prejudicial document and the question of onus of proof of that corrupt practice came up before their Lordships for consideration. It was held that proceeding involving proof of corrupt practice of the concerned persons who were agents of returned candidate being of a quasi-criminal nature, satisfactory evidence to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt was necessary. 20. However, I may also refer in this context to Amolak Chand's case (supra) because in the instant case also, one of the grounds of challenge of the election is non-compliance with the provisions of the Act and Rules concerning declaration of indentity of publisher of the prejudicial document referred earlier in this order. It was submitted by Shri Dubey that atleast the petition survives to the extent of trial of that ground of challenge. But, I have no doubt that even that ground cannot be tried in the absence atleast of a substituted respondent. Because opposition from the constituency by substituted respondent is contemplated under Section 116 in the course of trial of the election petition, it is thereby contemplated that there should be opportunity available to adduce rebuttal evidence to counter proof adduced by election petitioner in support of any ground. Absence of proof that the leaf-let was published on the date alleged by establishing the identity of publisher Was held insufficient in Amolak Clzand (supra) to bring home the charge of corrupt practice in that regard. Absence of proof that the leaf-let was published on the date alleged by establishing the identity of publisher Was held insufficient in Amolak Clzand (supra) to bring home the charge of corrupt practice in that regard. In the instant case, evidently on the respondent's side, no opportunity can be, or could be, availed to adduce any evidence in respect to that ground because, as earlier alluded, the deceased respondent could not examine any witness in support of his case except himself. The prayer made as per I. A. XVIII must, therefore, be considered misconceived and the application is accordingly rejected. 21. For all the foregoing reasons, I have no hesitation to hold that the election petition has abated on the death of the deceased respondent as there is no surviving respondent who is opposing the petition" and no substitution in place of the deceased respondent could be, or has been, made as contemplated under Section 116 of the Act. I have also no hesitation to hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the case being fully covered by the provisions of Section 116 of the Act, resort to any provisions of C. P. C. is not permissible. That apart the trial of the charge of corrupt practice of the deceased respondent, in the instant case, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot even be proceeded in accordance with the provisions of Order 17, Rule 2 read with Order 9, Rule 6 (1) (a). C. P. C., for reasons earlier alluded. 22. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed on abatement. No order as to costs. 23. Let the substance of the decision herein made be communicated forthwith to the Election Commission of India, New Delhi and also the Speaker of the State Legi lative Assembly, Bhopal. Let authenticated copy of this order be also sent to the Election Commission of India, New Delhi in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Act. 24. Because substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case on the interpretation of Section 116 of the Representation of the people Act, 1951, acting suo motu, I grant certificate under Article 134-A read with Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution to the election-petitioner for preferring appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court.