SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) HEARD counsel for the petitioners and 2nd respondent, Union, at the stage of preliminary hearing. ( 2 ) PETITIONER challenges the order of reference issued by the State Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 (referred as 'the Act' hereinafter ). The relevant extract of the order of reference (Annexure-A) reads as follows:-"1 (A) : Whether the Management of M/s. Bangalore Baptist Hospital, Bellary road, Hebbal, Bangalore-24 is justified. (a) in proposing to retrench the following 8 workmen w. e. f. 15-11-1987 by their letter 9-5-1987 addressed individually ? xx xx (names omitted) (b) in terminating the services of the following 12 workmen with effect from the dates mentioned against them stating that this termination is after their probationary period is over. xx xx (names omitted) (c) In proposing to close down the following departments and retrenching the workmen concerned and by getting the same work done through contract basis ? 1. Canteen 2. Dietary 3. Security 4. Splint shop (d) in terminating the services of the following Gardenerd w. e. f. 31-3-1987 xx xx (names omitted) "if not, to what relief (s) are the concerned workmen entitled?" ( 3 ) ACCORDING to Sri K. G. Raghavan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order of reference assumes as a fact that the five departments are proposed to be closed down and consequently the workmen named in the order of reference were to be retrenchment. The retrenched proposed was the result of the decision to close down those departments. The validity of this closure is not in question and if so, the consequential retrenchment also cannot be questioned by the workmen. The learned counsel argued that, the closure of an establishment or a part of it is an exclusive managerial function which cannot be challenged by the workmen. In view of these factors, it was contended that, the dispute referred is not an 'industrial dispute' at all and hence, the order of reference was liable to be struck down. ( 4 ) THE 2nd respondent has filed its statement of objections. Sri V. C. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contended that this court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction at this stage, since, it is open for the petitioner to raise this as a jurisdictional question before the Labour Court. ( 4 ) THE 2nd respondent has filed its statement of objections. Sri V. C. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contended that this court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction at this stage, since, it is open for the petitioner to raise this as a jurisdictional question before the Labour Court. The learned counsel also contended that closure of an establishment or a part of it cannot be said to be outside the purview of 'industrial dispute'. Here, the management was actually not closing down the departments in question; but intends to entrust these works on contract. It was further urged that, the alleged economy measure proposed by the management is, not such a measure at all as a fact and even otherwise, there was no need to retrench the services of the workmen in question, having regard to the nature of the business of the management. ( 5 ) IT is unnecessary for me to examine the merits of the contentions. The primary question before me, is, whether, this Court should entertain this writ petition, at this stage, at all? ( 6 ) IN order to sustain his contention, that the impugned order of reference is not an industrial dispute is Sri Raghavan placed before me a few decisions: in INDIAN METAL and metallurgical CORPORATION v industrial TRIBUNAL, MADRAS (AIR 1953 Madras 98), a Division Bench of madras High Court held, at para-15,--"apart from this constitutional aspect, we are also inclined to hold that the question whether an employer could or could not close down a business permanently or temporarily falls outside the purview of the Industrial Dispute Act. No doubt the term 'industrial dispute' has been very widely defined in Section 2 (k) of the Act; but it appears to be clear to us that such definition of an 'industrial dispute' and the Act taken as a whole assume the continued existence of an industry. The Act does deal with lock-outs and strikes, but Mr. Bhashyam conceded that there has been no lock-out in this case, and he made the concession rightly. In the case of a lock-out, the industry as such is not closed down even temporarily; only particular workers are refused work. Closing down a business even temporarily is distinct and different from a lock-out, just as the discontinuance from service of an employee is not the same thing as a strike. In the case of a lock-out, the industry as such is not closed down even temporarily; only particular workers are refused work. Closing down a business even temporarily is distinct and different from a lock-out, just as the discontinuance from service of an employee is not the same thing as a strike. While therefore the Industrial Tribunal has got the jurisdiction to adjudicate Tribunal has got the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question whether a particular lock-out was justified or not; it cannot decide the question whether an employer can close down his business temporarily for an indefinite period or permanently. There cannot be dispute strictly so-called between an employer and an employee as regards the continuance, of the business itself. This question was completely outside the Industrial Disputes Act, and we hold that the reference by the government was without jurisdiction and consequently the award was bad. Earlier, the Madras High Court held that it was a part of one's fundamental right to carry on any trade or industry and this right comprehends within it, a similar right to close down the business or industry. The learned counsel also referred to the Excel ware case ( AIR 1979 SC 25 ), wherein supreme Court stuck down Section 25-C of the Act, on the ground that the said provision invaded the fundamental right of a person to close down the industry. However, it should be noted the observation of the supreme Court at page 38,- "the law may provide to deter the reckless, unfair, unjust or mala fide closures". Thereafter, in the context of the provision involved therein, supreme Court held the provision in question was unreasonable. In the case before me, having regard to the pleadings in this writ petition, the respective contentions seems to go beyond the question of simple closure of an industry as a whole; (however, this remark shall not be taken as a conclusion against the petitioner while deciding any of the points that may be raised before the labour Court.) Hence these two decisions do not help Sri Raghavan at this stage. Similar is the fate of the principle relied upon by the learned counsel from M/s indian HUME PIPE CO. LTD v THEIR workmen ( AIR 1968 SC 1002 ). This decision, as also, the decision in Excel Wears case refers to PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS ltd. Similar is the fate of the principle relied upon by the learned counsel from M/s indian HUME PIPE CO. LTD v THEIR workmen ( AIR 1968 SC 1002 ). This decision, as also, the decision in Excel Wears case refers to PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS ltd. v PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS mazdoor UNION ( AIR 1957 SC 95 ) and the observations their in were quoted;"". . . . . . . WHERE the business has been closed and it is either admitted or found that the closure is real bona fide, any dispute arising with reference thereto would, as held in K. M. Padmanabha ayyar v State of Madras (B) (supra), fall outside the purview of the Industrial disputes Act. And that will a fortiori be so, if a dispute arises - if one such can be conceived - after the closure of the business between the quondam employer and employees". ( 7 ) IT was argued that 'bona fide' in the above quotation does not refer to the motive behind the closure but to the fact of the closure, as observed in Indian Hume Pipe co. 's case and hence, the petitioner has, as a fact closed down the five departments in question and the motive for such closure being irrelevant, consequences flowing out of such closure, resulting in the retrenchment, will be outside the scope of an industrial dispute. As observed by me above, the points of reference involve other questions; they seem to be interlinked to each other. Further, applicability of Chapter V-B (Section 25-K to 25-S) has to be gone into in the light of the cotention raised by the second respondent. For the same reason, I think, the decision in POTTARY MAZOOR panchayat v THE PERFECT pottery CO. LTD ( AIR 1979 SC 1356 ) is distinguishable. ( 8 ) SRI Narasimhan brought to my notice the decision in E. I. D. PARRY (INDIA) ltd v STATE OF TAMILNADU ( AIR 1985 SC 753 ), wherein inter alia; the justifiability of the proposal of the petitioner company to close down the manufacturing activities of the sugar factory was the subject matter of reference, and the Industrial tribunal held this point against the management. The decision of the Tribunal was affirmed by the Supreme Court. From this, the learned counsel inferred that the justifiability of closure cannot always be outside the scope of reference. The decision of the Tribunal was affirmed by the Supreme Court. From this, the learned counsel inferred that the justifiability of closure cannot always be outside the scope of reference. ( 9 ) IT is also not necessary for me to decide as to the exact amplitude of the questions referred for the disposal of this writ petition. Any observation may effect the rights of one or the other party. Therefore, the contention of Sri Raghavan, that the factum of closure and its validity are not the subject of reference, in the light of the decision of supreme Court in DELHI CLOTH and general MILLS CO. LTD v THE workmen ( AIR 1967 SC 469 ), need not be considered. The learned counsel argued that the scope of reference cannot be enlarged by the Labour Court and that its jurisdiction is confined to the actual reference. It is premature to decide this question as it will arise only after the decision of the Labour Court. ( 10 ) THE Industrial Tribunals and Labour courts are constituted and vested with jurisdiction to decide and solve industrial disputes. Primarily, it is for those bodies constituted under the Act to decide the questions referred to them. Before embarking upon an enquiry on the merits of the dispute, circumstances may warrant decision on the jurisdictional fact, as to whether, the order of reference is actually an order referring an 'industrial dispute' contemplated by the Act. Such an issue may have to be decided as a preliminary issue, if facts are not in dispute or the said issue can be decided independently of the merits of the case. However, facts of a particular case may not permit or enable such an issue to be decided, de hors the merits of the case. In such an event, the Industrial Tribunal or labour Court may have to decide the points of reference and the question whether they involve 'industrial dispute', simultaneously. ( 11 ) NORMALLY, this Court would not entertain the challenge to the order of reference, on the ground that reference does not involve industrial dispute. There may be rare cases, when this Court may be in a position to decide this question on the basis of the admitted facts and having regard to the particular circumstances. In such a situation, write jurisdiction may be extended at the initial stage. There may be rare cases, when this Court may be in a position to decide this question on the basis of the admitted facts and having regard to the particular circumstances. In such a situation, write jurisdiction may be extended at the initial stage. The power of Labour court and Industrial Tribunal are wide, having jurisdiction is not, only to decide the existing rights and liabilities, but also create fresh obligations. The scope to interfere with the employer's rights and privileges is quite wide. The content of an industrial dispute has been expanding. It will be unwise for the high Court to interrupt the proceedings at the initial stage of reference. The normal rule is to allow the Tribunals duly constituted for a specific purpose by the law, to proceed with its enquiries, unless, on the face of it, a particular enquiry does not fall within the scope of its powers. ( 12 ) IN MANAGEMENT OF EXPRESS newspapers (PVT) LTD, MADRAS v the WORKERS and OTHERS ( AIR 1963 sc 569 ), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect. Some of the relevant passages are extracted below:-"the true legal position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the appellant's petition even at the initial stage of the proceedings proposed to be taken before the Industrial tribunal, is not in dispute. If the action taken by the appellant is not a lockout but is a closure, bona fide and genuine , the dispute which the respondents may raise in respect of such a closure is not an industrial dispute at all. On the other hand, if, in fact and in substance, it is a lockout, but the said action has adopted the disguise of a closure, and a dispute is raised in respect of such an action, it would be an industrial dispute which industrial adjudication is competent to deal with. The appellant contends that what it has done is a closure and so, the dispute in respect of it cannot be validly referred for adjudication by an industrial tribunal. There is no doubt that in law the appellant is entitled to move the High court even at the initial stage and seek to satisfy it that the dispute is not an industrial dispute and so, the Industrial tribunal has no jurisdiction to embark upon the proposed enquiry". There is no doubt that in law the appellant is entitled to move the High court even at the initial stage and seek to satisfy it that the dispute is not an industrial dispute and so, the Industrial tribunal has no jurisdiction to embark upon the proposed enquiry". "there is also no doubt that the proceedings before the Industrial tribunal are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and in respect of them a write of certorari can issue in a proper case. If the Industrial Tribunal proceeds to assume jurisdiction over a non-industrial dispute, that can be successfully challenged before the High Court by a petition for an appropriate writ, and the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ in that behalf cannot be questioned. ""it is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial Tribunal, at the very commencement the Industrial tribunal will have to examine as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not, and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the Industrial tribunal may take as to whether the action taken by the appellant is a closure or a lockout. . . . . "". . . . . . It is well known that Industrial courts are familiar with the nature of the problem raised by the preliminary issue between the parties in the present writ proceedings. In fact, Industrial Tribunals have been specially established in order to deal with industrial disputes in different places. That is one consideration which is relevant. The other consideration which is equally material is that a question of this complicated character cannot be satisfactorily dealt with merely on affidavits. The theoretical distinction between a closure and a lockout is well settled. . . . . "". . . . . Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to deal with these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision of such a preliminary issue brought before a High court in its writ jurisdiction. . . . . . . . "". . . . . Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to deal with these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision of such a preliminary issue brought before a High court in its writ jurisdiction. . . . " ( 13 ) IN D. P. MAHESHWARI v DELHI administration ( AIR 1984 SC 153 ), supreme Court held that the High Courts should not stop proceedings before a tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by the High Courts. Even after the tribunal decides the preliminary issue, supreme Court held that, courts should not interfere, till the Tribunal decide all other issues. ( 14 ) PRELIMINARY issue arises on entertaining the reference by the Tribunal or the Labour Court. Necessary facts have been placed before the Tribunal or the labour Court on such a preliminary issue and therefore, the High Court will be in a position to examine the finding by the tribunal/labour Court. Even then, the supreme Court held it premature exercise of the Court's power under Article 226 to interfere with such a finding and scuttle the further proceedings before the Industrial tribunal or Labour Court. I am of the considered view, that the reasoning of the supreme Court in the said case, equally applies to the case on hand. Supreme Court observed, at p. 154,-". . . . There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Nor should High courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stiffed by all manner of preliminary objections and journelyigs up and down. It is also worth while remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals writ Petition rejected. at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues". ( 15 ) IN the light of these observations of the Supreme Court in the last two cases referred above, I am of the view that, challenge to a reference of an Industrial dispute immediately on such a reference should not be ordinarily entertained by the high Court under Article 226 of the constitution. ( 16 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the write petition is rejected. --- *** --- .