D. B. AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) JANTA Kendriya Upbhokta Sabakari Bhandar Limited, deoria, (hereinafter referred to as the bhandar) is a Central Co-operative society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. The Bhandar has a branch unit at Padrauna district Deoria wherein there used to be sale made of cloth and general merchandise goods. One Panchanand Tewari was appointed Salesman Incharge, Padrauna Branch by the Bhandar on January 24, 1967. Ram Prasad Misra (respondent) was Assistant Salesman. During september 2 to September 11, 1975, Panchanand Tewari was on leave. On the night of September 11/12, 1975, he was found dead at the railway track, adrauna. A railway employee made report to the police in the early hours of the 12th, whereupon inquest took place and the shop located at Padrauna was placed under the police lock. Between September 24 to 30, 1975, inventory was prepared of the stock and the cash etc. inside the premises upon the lock being opened on the 25th. First information report was lodged by the Secretary, bhandar at police-station Padrauna on November 24, 1975. The shortage allegedly noticed was as under : (i) goods : Rs. 1,99,779. 44 ; (ii) cash : Rs. 203. 61 ; (iii) dead-stock : rs. 109. 86. ( 2 ) PANCHANAND Tewari deceased had advances to his credit from the bhandar in the amount of Rs. 5,516. 88. The Bhandar laid claim for being reimbursed due to the shortage afore-mentioned as also the recovery of the advances. The claim was preferred by the Bhandar accordingly to the Registrar co-operative Societies against Smt. Indra Dei (widow of Panchanand Tewari); phulena Tewari and two others (brothers of Panchanand Tewari ). The Assistant salesman, namely, Ram Prasad Misra was also arrayed pro-forma. The reference was under Section 70 (1) (c) of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. This was passed over to the. Additional Registrar as Arbitrator, who gave his award dated December 21, 1976. Against the award there were three appeals filed under Section 98 (1) (h) of the Act to the Tribunal-one of these being by smt. Indra Dei; the other by Ram Prasad Misra and the third by the Bhandar itself. These appeals were decided jointly by the Tribunal on August 18, 1977. Aggrieved Smt. Indra Dei has approached this Court by filing Writpetition no. Indra Dei; the other by Ram Prasad Misra and the third by the Bhandar itself. These appeals were decided jointly by the Tribunal on August 18, 1977. Aggrieved Smt. Indra Dei has approached this Court by filing Writpetition no. 4254 of 1977; the other petition has been brought by the three brothers of Panchanand Tewari deceased. Both were heard together giving rise, as they do, to common questions. ( 3 ) UNDER the award the Arbitrator came to the finding that the liability of panchanand Tewari could extend only upto the amount of the security furnished by him and, therefore, a sum of Rs. 14,986. 88 could be realised by the Bhandar from his widow Smt. Indira Dvi on the death of Panchanand Tewari. Ram prasad Misra, the Assistant Salesman, was found liable to the extent of Rs 8,371. 06 only. Phulena Tewari and others-the brothers of Panchanand Tewari, were exonerated from all liability. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal has recorded its findings, in brief, as under : (I) in capacity as the Salesman Incharge, Padrauna Branch Panchanand tewari was responsible for the receipt of goods from the Bhandar from time to time ; for keeping the stock safe ; in respect to the shortage in stock, if any for sale of goods and deposite of income with the Bhandar from time to time ; for following the directions of the Bhandar given from time to time ; (II) the stock was under the custody of Panchanand Tewari, who also had the keys of the shop with him ; on his proceeding on leave on 2nd September, 1975, the keys were retained by him; it is not correct that he handed over the same to the Secretary, Bhandar ; (III) keeping in view the audit report dated June 30, 1975, the progress report submitted by Panchanand Tewari dated July 1, 1975, and the inventory, which was prepared following his death, the shortage was to the extent specified above, which is inclusive of the advances made to the deceased came to Rs. 2,05,609. 79 only ; (IV) the shop remained closed during the period of September 2 to september 11, 1975, due to Panchanand lewari being on leave during this period the keys were retained by him except on 10th September 1975. The Assistant Salesman brought to the shop and placed therein the goods to the value of Rs. 8,371. 2,05,609. 79 only ; (IV) the shop remained closed during the period of September 2 to september 11, 1975, due to Panchanand lewari being on leave during this period the keys were retained by him except on 10th September 1975. The Assistant Salesman brought to the shop and placed therein the goods to the value of Rs. 8,371. 06 in the immediate presence of Panchanand Tewari and these goods were found intact when the look was opened on 25th September, 1975, for the inventory being drawn. ( 5 ) IN the opinion of the Tribunal the appellate authority, the Arbitrator bad erred in exonerating the three brothers of Pancbanand Tewari ; they were, it is observed, equally liable together with the widow, but Ram Prasad Misra respondent the Assistant Salesman could not be held liable. In the result the appeals filed by the Bhandar and Ram Prasad Misra were allowed while the appeal made by the widow of the deceased was dismissed. The claim of the bhandar has been decreed for a sum of Rs. 20,5,609. 79 against Smt. Indra dei and the three brothers of the deceased to the extent to which they are possessed of the deceaseds assets. ( 6 ) THE question arose whether consequent upon the death of Panchanand tewari the liability arising due to alleged misappropriation on bis part may be pursued against bis assets in the hands of bis heirs. At common law the general rule was that death of either party extinguished any existing cause of action in tort by one against the other. This was due, in part, to the historical connection of the action of trespass, from which much of the law of tort is derived, with the criminal law and in part to the reference often made to the maxim "actio per sonalis moritur cum persona", i. e. , personal action dies with the person. Anextreme application of this maxim led to the curious doctrine that at common law causing the death of a human being gave rise to no civil liability. Actions in contract generally escaped the rule, and so too did those in which property had been appropriated by a deceased person and added to his own estate. (Winfield and Jolowioz on Tort, XII Edn. p. 657 ; Law of Torts : D. D. Basu, ix Edn. p. 69 ). Actions in contract generally escaped the rule, and so too did those in which property had been appropriated by a deceased person and added to his own estate. (Winfield and Jolowioz on Tort, XII Edn. p. 657 ; Law of Torts : D. D. Basu, ix Edn. p. 69 ). In its application the maxim was considered unfair and even barbarous especially when applied to a case where the injured party was denied redress because wrong doer died. It was treated as unjust and uncertain. The remedy was provided bv enacting the Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provision)act, 1934, which provided generally for the survival of causes of action in tort. In view of this enactment all causes of actions vested in a person survived for the benefit of his estate except causes of action for defamation or suicide which abate on the death of such person. The said maxim is inapplicable in this country, except to the exent it has been adopted in the statutes. The exceptions to the non-applicability of the maxim are contained in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 306 provides as follows :" 306. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators except causes of action for defamation, assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or the personal injuries not causing the death of the party ; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. " ( 7 ) THE second part of Section 306 puts a limitation on the survival of the right to sue or defend or recognise and apply the said maxim only an action for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions, where after the death of the party, the reliefs brought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. The expression "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" appearing in this section has been the subject-matter of judicial interpretation in various cases. In Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Limited v. Hansraj, [air 1935 Alld. The expression "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" appearing in this section has been the subject-matter of judicial interpretation in various cases. In Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Limited v. Hansraj, [air 1935 Alld. 995 (DB)] it was held that personal injury is intended to mean injury to the person as distinguished from injury to property. Defamation, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, hurt may all indirectly cause financial loss or financial expenditure, but they are in the main injuries which are personal in that they directly give rise to mental or physical suffering or inconvenience. Pecuniary loss caused through deception, it was pointed out, is not injury of that nature and hence liability for such loss survives after the death of the person liable. [see also Krishna Behari Sen v. Corporation of calcutta, 31 Cal. 993 ; Executive Director of Usha Sewing Machines Works ltd. V. Smt. Sujata Roy, [ air 1986 Cal. 224 (DB)]. In Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Chaudhary, [ air 1967 SC 1124 ] it was observed that the maxim aforementioned operates in a limited class of actions ex-delicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party and in other actions where, after the death of the party, the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. The question arose recently before the Supreme Court in Melepurath sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, [ (1986) 1 SCC 118 ], where in reference to Section 306 of the Succession Act, 1925, it was laid down that this speaks only of executors and administrators no doubt but on principle the same position must necessarily prevail in the case of other legal representative, for such legal representatives cannot in law be in better or worse position than executors and administrators and what applies to executors and administrators will apply to other legal representative also. It is thus clear that where the cause of action is founded on alleged misappropriation of property in cash or in kind that would not be a case of inflicting personal injury by the wrong doer and in terms of Section 306 Succession Act, 1925, the cause of action would in such a case survive the death of the wrong doer. ( 8 ) IN so far as the decree passed by the Tribunal against Phulena Tewari and the other brothers of Panchanand Tewari is concerned, the finding recorded is clearly incapable of being sustained. The Tribunal argues that in terms of section 70 (1) (c) of the Act there may be reference made of the dispute, inter alia, between the Society and the heir or legal representative of any deceased employee of the Society and hence the brothers of the deceased, though not his heirs, would be considered equally liable. This proceeds upon a mistaken notion. There is no doubt a dispute raised by the Bhandar the Society against certain legal representatives of the deceased, namely, the brothers. That may mean only that this is a kind of dispute open to be referred to arbitration under section 70 (1), but as to whether the brothers of the deceased are rendered liable in respect of the misappropriation, if any, made by the deceased is a different question depending on the substantive law on the subject. It is not a case where the Bhandar claims to be chasing any identifiable goods or property in the hands of Phulena Tewari and the other two brothers of the deceased. The claim made is for reimbursement of the loss alleged to have been caused to the bhandar due to the misappropriation of goods. The liability on that account would be of the heir of the deceased to the extent of the assets of the deceased in her hands, the brothers certainly are not the heirs of Panchanand Tewari under the personal law governing the parties the deceased having admittedly left the widow and also a minor daughter. The Tribunal observes that there is some property held jointly with his brothers. May be but even that would not make these brothers liable to any extent. In so tar as the share held by the deceased is concerned, the person inheriting the same upon his death may to that extent be liable of course. ( 9 ) IN regard to the liability against Smt. Indra Dei determined by the tribunal to the extent of the assets of the deceased in her hands, there may be no reasonable exception taken in our opinion. ( 9 ) IN regard to the liability against Smt. Indra Dei determined by the tribunal to the extent of the assets of the deceased in her hands, there may be no reasonable exception taken in our opinion. The Tribunal has open an elaborate assessment of the relevant aspects, reached the conclusion with respect to the shortage existing and noticed soon after the death of Panchanand Tewari. In this connection the Tribunal has adverted to the admissions contained in the pleadings and also drawn reasonable inference from the documentary evidence placed befor it. The duty chart bear out the nature of duty and responsibility entrusted to Panchanand Tewari in capcity as the salesman Incharge ; the shop remained during the relevant period under his lock and key ; the keys were retained by him even while he was on casual leave during 2nd to 11th September, 1975. For the Bhandar it was said that he committed suicide. The petitioners asserted that this was a case of homicide. Be that as it may, it is not an issue in these proceedings. The audit report dated June 30, 1975, referred to by the tribunal, reveals the position of the stock/cash as it then existed ; the progress report dated July 1, 1975, submitted by the deceased under his hand is further affirmatory of the same. Soon after the report of the death of Panchanand tewari, the police lock was placed on 12th September, 1975 which came to be removed only on the 25th September, followed by the preparation of inventory. The list prepared showed the amount of goods and cash etc. found in existeace. There are findings of fact arrived by the Tribunal on perusal of relevant material. The view taken by the Arbitrator that the liability of Panchanand tewari or his heir for that matter could not extend beyond the security amount furnished by him was clearly untenable. The security demanded was as part of the conditions of employment of the salesman implying thereby that in the event of a loss or damages caused to the Bhandar, it would remain open to the employer to proceed against the security for reimbursement to the extent the security was available. The security demanded was as part of the conditions of employment of the salesman implying thereby that in the event of a loss or damages caused to the Bhandar, it would remain open to the employer to proceed against the security for reimbursement to the extent the security was available. This cannot be construed to mean that in the event of loss or damage caused being in excess of the security emount, the employer is precluded from seeking reimbursement against other assets of the person liable. The appeal is in continuation of the proceedings initiated before the Arbitrator the Arbitrator did not come to a different finding with respect to the quantum of the misappropriation or the loss resulting to the Bhandar ; the apportionment of the liability made by him was no doubt different and the Tribuaal was competent to readjust in accordance with law. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners argued that the Tribunal erred in taking additional evidence on record at the appellate stage without the ingredient of Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code being satisfied. We have examined this submission but found no merit therein. The appeal under Section 98 (1) (h)of the Act is both on facts and law. The interim orders, which the Tribunal made in the course of hearing of the appeals before it on the relevant dates, speak for themselves. These are to be found reproduced in the counter affidavit placed before us on behalf of Bhandar. It appears copies of certain documents had been placed on record before the Arbitrator and some documents were filed in original. When the appeals came up for hearing the Tribunal felt the necessity of looking into the original of all the documents relevant. On June 2, 1977, the Tribunal accordingly passed the order :"parties with their L. C. heard in part, at this stage it appears necessary to get original documents on record. So let the appellant file all papers maintained (paper No. 101-94) or arbitration file in Court in a week. The parties shall be free to inspect the same and araue the case on 29-6-1977. " ( 11 ) DOCUMENTS were thereupon produced before the Tribunal which asked the counsel for the appellants if they admitted the same. So let the appellant file all papers maintained (paper No. 101-94) or arbitration file in Court in a week. The parties shall be free to inspect the same and araue the case on 29-6-1977. " ( 11 ) DOCUMENTS were thereupon produced before the Tribunal which asked the counsel for the appellants if they admitted the same. Since these were not admitted, the Tribunal fixed 6th August, 1977, on 29th June, 1977, for final hearing specifying that on that date the parties might lead evidence to prove and rebut the documents. On 6th August, 1977, it was given out that no oral evidence was to be adduced and that the documents in original were before the arbitrator as well and did not stand in need of formal proof. The Tribunal may not in the situation be said to have erred in proceeding on the footing of the material which was relevant and had been there before the Arbitrator as well. For arriving at a satisfactory conclusion, the Tribunal was not unjustified in requiring the original to be produced before it. ( 12 ) THE petitioners learned counsel submitted also that there did not arise a dispute within the meaning of Section 70 (1) (c) for reference to arbitration. He cited in support the decision in Dinkar Wasudeo Joshi v. Registrar, Co-operative Society Bombay, [air 1946 Bom. 346 (Division bench)]. We find no merit in this argument. In the context of arbitrator, a dispute implies on assertion of a right by one party and a repudiation thereof by another. The repudiation by the other party may be either express or implied ; it may be by words or by conduct. [nandram Hanutram v. Raghunath and Sons Ltd. , AIR 1954 Cal. 245 ]. Upon the death of Panchanand Tewari laid claim to reimbursement of substantial amount ; the petitioners, it is manifest, refuted that the deceased was guilty of any wrongful act and also that no liability could be fastened upon them on his death. It was not a mere failure to pay, but plain refusal of any liability. The petitioners have not filed the application which Bhandar made for reference to arbitration ; that will have shown whether there was no demand or claim made and a repudiation thereof at the other end ; indeed there is no such pleading of the petitioners before us. The petitioners have not filed the application which Bhandar made for reference to arbitration ; that will have shown whether there was no demand or claim made and a repudiation thereof at the other end ; indeed there is no such pleading of the petitioners before us. In the Bombay case there was a mere resolution of the Society We respectfully agree with the observation that the word dispute cannot be altogether divorced "from the connotation of a claim or demand or a question at issue, and that it cannot be said to be the same thing as a cause of action on the mere incurring of a liability. " Foundation is not laid, however, in the present to exclude the dispute from the purview of Section 70 (1) (c) of the Act arising as it did between the Bhandar (the Society) on the one hand and those claiming through the past employee on the other hand touching the business or the management of the former. ( 13 ) IN the light of the discussion made above the petition brought by phulena Tewari and others the brothers of the deceased succeeds while the other petition brought by the deceaseds widow is liable to fall. ( 14 ) ACCORDINGLY writ petition No. 4008 of 1977 is allowed. The order made by the Tribunal dated 18th August, 1977, in so far as it extends the liability for recovery against the petitioners in this petition shall stand set aside. ( 15 ) W. P. No. 4254 of 1977 is dismissed. ( 16 ) IN the circumstances there will be DO order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.