JUDGMENT Gulab C. Gupta, J. 1. This is plaintiff's appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 26-2-1982 passed by Shri M.M. Baurey, IV Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 9-B of 1981. 2. The respondent No.1 had borrowed a sum of Rs. 29,000/- from the appellant bank for purchasing a four wheeler matador pickup van. It may be noticed that the said respondent held a motor driving licence and presumably wanted to start his own business. The agreement about the aforesaid loan contained a clause for payment of interest at the rate of 5% above the bank rate with a minimum of 11% per annum with quarterly rest. From the statement of account (Ex. P.13), it appears that the said respondent paid instalments up to 1975, though somewhat irregulary and failed to pay thereafter. From their statement, it would appear that he had paid about Rs.12,000/- in various instalments. However, since the amount remained uncleared, the appellant-bank filed the present suit for recovery of Rs. 50,425/- as balance due to them. This amount included the interest as per the contract and was accompanied by further prayer of grant of interest at 14% per annum. The learned trial Judge, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the entire claim including the claim of interest at 14% with quarterly rest. However, while awarding interest from the date of the suit till realisation, the learned Judge awarded the same at the rate of 5% per annum. According to the learned trial Judge, the officers of the bank were negligent in not taking any effective step towards recovery of the loan in question. The appellants are satisfied with decree of their claim up to date of the suit, but have preferred this appeal challenging the grant of interest pendente lite. 3. The respondent No.1 could not be served notice of this appeal in spite of several efforts, as his present address, was not furnished by the appellant. However, at the instance of the learned counsel for the appellant, the service of notice was effected by affixure at the place of birth of this respondent. The original guarantor, who was joined as respondent No.2, unfortunately died during the pendency of the appeal and hence his legal representatives have been brought on record. 4. However, at the instance of the learned counsel for the appellant, the service of notice was effected by affixure at the place of birth of this respondent. The original guarantor, who was joined as respondent No.2, unfortunately died during the pendency of the appeal and hence his legal representatives have been brought on record. 4. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that because of section 49 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, all directions given by the said bank are binding upon the appellant-bank, which include direction regarding interest referring to Ss.20 & 21 of the Banking Regulations Act, the learned counsel pointed out the obligations of the appellant bank to obey the directives of the Reserve Bank of India on every matter including the rate of interest. It is, therefore, submitted that since the rate of interest charged by the bank is controlled by the Reserve Bank of India under the statutory power, the Court exercising its powers under section 34 Code of Civil Procedure cannot award anything less than the contracted rate of interest. According to the learned counsel, grant of interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of the suit till realisation amounts to Court granting loan on a lesser rate of interest than statutorily mandated. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned-judgment and decree should be modified by awarding interest pendente lite at 14% per annum with quarterly rest. 5. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, as a pure question of law, must be rejected. Section 49 of the Reserve Bank of India Act read with sections 20 & 21 of Banking Regulations Act only determines the relationship between the Reserve Bank of India and the appellant-Bank and nothing more. These provisions neither take away the jurisdiction of the Court under section 34 CPC nor do they govern directly the relationship between the appellant and the respondents. Indeed, the relationship between the parties is governed by agreement, which provides for payment of interest. None of the aforesaid statutory provisions take away jurisdiction of the Court under section 34 CPC. Indeed, the amendment of this action by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 takes into consideration the transactions between banks, like the appellant and yet keeps the power of the Court intact. None of the aforesaid statutory provisions take away jurisdiction of the Court under section 34 CPC. Indeed, the amendment of this action by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 takes into consideration the transactions between banks, like the appellant and yet keeps the power of the Court intact. The section, as it is, entitles the Civil Court to grant interest at a rate exceeding six percent per annum, but not exceeding contractual rate of interest, in these cases where the liability has arisen out of a commercial transaction. It may be recalled that before the amendment of this provision, the Courts could not have awarded interest from the date of the suit till realisation at a rate more than 6% per annum. In case, the intention of the Legislature was to take away the jurisdiction of the Court in cases of commercial transactions between a banking company and their clients, the provision would have been differently worded. Since this provision, in spite of the amendment, vestes discretion in the Court, it will have to be given effect to. Its implied repeal as sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 6. It is now generally accepted that interest from the date of the suit is awardable under section 34 of the CPC is in the nature of damages intended to compensate the creditor for being kept out of the money due to him under the decree. The award of interest under this section is entirely within the discretion of the Court. State of M.P. and others v. M/s Nathabhai Desaibhai Patel AIR 1972 SC 1545 , Mahabir Prasad Rungta v. Durga Datta AIR 1961 SC 990 . This discretion is not excluded even by a stipulation in the agreement to the contrary or by absence of any term to pay interest in the contract. Interest from the date of the decree till realisation of money is awardable even if the plaintiff is held not entitled to any interest prior to the date of the suit. In spite of it, the discretion is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised on sound judicial principles so as to advance the cause of justice. Interest from the date of the decree till realisation of money is awardable even if the plaintiff is held not entitled to any interest prior to the date of the suit. In spite of it, the discretion is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised on sound judicial principles so as to advance the cause of justice. It is also well settled that in case the discretion has been exercised on sound judicial principles, an appellate Court will not interfere with the same in appeal, Lala Hakim Rai v. Lala Ganga Ram AIR 1942 PC 61. Award of higher rate of interest up to the date of the suit has been accepted as a good ground for awarding lower rate of interest from the date of the suit till realisation, Gajadhar Marwari and others v. Baidyanath Mandal and others AIR 1950 Pat. 379 and Mohanlal v. Jankram S.A. No. 120 of 1972; dt. 24-11-1977. In spite of it, it may be conceded that the Court dealing with the matter is bound to give reasons for awarding any particular interest from the date of the suit. Absence of any reason would make the award arbitrary. The facts of the case may, therefore, be examined to ascertain if the Court has exercised its discretion in accordance with law. 7. Krishnarao (P.W.1) is the only witness examined by the appellant in support of its case. He was at the relevant time working as a Clerk in the appellant-bank. According to his sworn testimony, the rate of interest on the date of grant of loan was 6 % and, therefore, the bank was entitled to charge a minimum of 11 % per annum with quarterly rest. The witness has also stated that from 1-4-1974. the bank rate was increased to 7% and from 23-7-1974 to 9% per annum. He has, however, not produced any document to justify acceptance of this statement. If the Reserve Bank of India had fixed the rate of interest that must have been done by issuing a circular or order in that behalf. There is no reason why a copy of the 'said order had not been produced. Then, there is no evidence whatsoever above the quarterly rest. Under the circumstances, it is clear that entire interest claimed by the appellant is not supported by any statutory authority or direction. There is no reason why a copy of the 'said order had not been produced. Then, there is no evidence whatsoever above the quarterly rest. Under the circumstances, it is clear that entire interest claimed by the appellant is not supported by any statutory authority or direction. It is rather unfortunate that the learned trial Judge has not looked into the matter from this angle and has awarded the interest as claimed. Interest at the rate of 14% with quarterly rest would work out to about 18% which, in the context of the respondent No.1 being a person of weaker section and the loan being intended to promote employment would be on a higher side. It is even doubtful if the liability incurred by the respondent No.1 was in relation to a commercial transaction. However, it is not necessary to examine this question finally in this appeal or cross objection challenging this part of the award. Suffice it to say that the appellant bank has got higher rate of interest for the period up to the suit. Since the higher rate of interest up to the date of the suit can be taken to be a factor for fixing the rate of interest from the date of the suit till realisation, this Court would be bound to take the same into consideration while judging the appellant's case for modification of the decree. 8. In Central Bank of India Kutch v. M/s. P.R. Garments Industries Pvt. Ltd. Surendranagar and others AIR 1986 Guj. 113 a Division Bench of the Gujrat High Court has observed that in commercial transactions by public financial institutions, the contractual rate of interest should be the rule and departure a rare exception. The judgment takes into consideration, the proviso to section 34 CPC and gives it its normally accepted meaning and connotation. While applying the aforesaid provision, to facts of the case the Court made aforesaid observations. The reasoning of the Court appears to be that the Bank would not have advanced commercial loan at any lesser rate of interest and the party committing default should not be granted any more benefit. The reasoning of this case can, however, have no application in the instant case, not only because of the type of loan, but also because of quarterly rest already decreed. The reasoning of this case can, however, have no application in the instant case, not only because of the type of loan, but also because of quarterly rest already decreed. In the said case, the defendant was a private limited company and had been granted credit facilities coupled with over-draft facility. The Company was engaged in running a cotton mill. A registered company running a cotton mill cannot be equated with an unemployed driver belonging to the weaker section of society, who by grant of the facility is sought to be brought above the poverty line. The respondent No.1 was not only unemployed, but also inexperienced in any business and, therefore, the obligation of the appellant bank to deal with him little more charitably cannot be ruled out. Under the circumstances, the observations of Gujrat High Court cannot be accepted as general law of the land. In Karnataka State Financial Corporation, Bangalore v. Shri Nithyananda Bhavan and another AIR 1982 Kar. 179 the matter was examined by Division Bench of the said Court only to bold that the Court should take into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The possession of adequate property by the borrower and that he did not suffer in business were taken to be two relevant consideration for granting 11 % of interest. The following passage from this judgment being relevant is reproduced herewith for ready reference :- "While awarding higher rate of interest, the Court must have regard to among others, the object sought to be served by the loan transaction, and the condition of the business of the person whether the person has suffered a heavy loss or whether his business is otherwise affected or crippled and such other cause, if any, for committing default in repaying the loan. The Court would be justified in awarding only 6 per cent interest if the person who has taken the loan has suffered beyond redemption. If, on the other band, the person who has taken the loan is deliberately not repaying or intentionally withhold - the payments so that he could continue to make use of loan at the concessional rate as against the higher Bank rate, the Court would be justified in awarding interest exceeding 6 per cent up to the contract rate or if there is no contractual rate, at the prevailing Bank rate. In every case, the Court has to apply its judicial sympathy and must "act fairly" on the long settled principle governing the exercise of discretion." There are two important factors, which militate against the claim of the appellant in the instant appeal, namely. (1) the respondent No.1 has lost his business and has ultimately landed in jail indicating that the entire amount will have to be paid not by him but by the respondent No.2 and his legal representatives. Not only that this respondent has no property of his own, but no effort was even made by the appellant bank to trace him out for service of notice of this appeal on him and (ii) the entire sum will have to be paid by the legal representatives of respondent No.2, the original guarantor. As far as guarantor was concerned, it was not shown to be a commercial transaction for him and, therefore, the proviso to section 34 would not apply in his case. To award any amount higher than 6 percent per annum would require a finding that liability of the guarantor pas arisen out of a commercial transaction between him and the appellant bank. It is difficult to establish that furnishing guarantee was a part of the business of respondent No. 2. Then, even the original respondent No.2 is dead and his legal representatives will have to share the burden without even knowing the respondent No.1. These facts in the opinion of the Court sufficiently justify accepting the impugned decree. 9. The appeal fails and is dismissed, with costs Counsel fee as per schedule.