Judgment U.P.Singh, J. 1. An order of suspension passed by the General Manager cum-Chief Engineer, South Bihar and Chotanagpur Area Electrical Board, Ranchi, (Respondent No. 2) contained in Annexure-4 has been challenged by the petitioner. 2. In accordance with the order of suspension, the petitioner, who was an accountant, Rural Electrification Division, Ranchi, was placed under suspension as per Clause 30 of the Bihar State Electricity Boards Certified Standing Order for his gross misconduct as defined in Clause 29-B of the said Certified Standing Order with immediate effect. It was stated that the departmental proceeding is also being started against him separately and that during the period of his suspension, he will draw the subsistence allowance as admissible under Clause 30 of the Boards Certified Standing Order. 3. Clause 29-B of the Certified Standing Order defines misconduct and enumerate the following acts inter alia: 29. (b)(d):Taking abetting or given bribes or any illegal gratification whatsoever. The allegation against the petitioner was that he was caught red handed taking bride. 4 Clause 30 of the said Certified Standing Order provides disciplinary action against workman other than casual. Subject to the provisions of these Standing Orders, no order of dismissal, stoppage of promotion or withholding of increment whether accummulative or otherwise, reduction of rank and other punishment mentioned above shall be made against a workman unless the following procedure is gone through, but the appointing authority may in its discretion, if it consider immediate suspension necessary, suspend a workman pending enquiry into allegations made against him. However, a workman convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude can be removed from service only after going through the prescribed procedure. 5. The petitioner was arrested on 27-11-1984 in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 11 of 1984 and was taken into custody. He was granted bail on 2-1-1985. 6. Earlier, the petitioner had challenged the order of suspension passed by the Electrical Superintending Engineer and the said writ application being CWJC No. 298 of 1985 (R) was allowed by this Court on the ground that the said order of suspension bad not been passed by a competent authority. While passing the said order this Court observed that the competent authority had liberty to reconsider the matter and if necessary to pass order of suspension afresh in accordance with law. With this observation and direction, the said writ application was disposed of. 7. While passing the said order this Court observed that the competent authority had liberty to reconsider the matter and if necessary to pass order of suspension afresh in accordance with law. With this observation and direction, the said writ application was disposed of. 7. Thereafter the petitioner made representation for joining his duties. He was not allowed to join his duties. Thereafter on 15th May, 1985, the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, being the competent authority passed the order of suspension, dated 15th May, 1985 contained in Annexure-4 which has been challenged by this petitioner. 8. The sole contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in absence of initiation of a departmental proceeding against the petitioner and service of any chargesheet upon the petitioner, the order of suspension in purported exercise of power under Clause 30 of the Boards Certified Standing Order was without jurisdiction and that it was not passed by the competent authority. 9. In the counter-affidavit, the allegation has been refuted by clear averments that the Secretary had not recommended for suspending the petitioner rather respondent No. 2 applied his own mind in suspending the petitioner taking into account the grave nature of misconduct committed by the petitioner. Respondent No. 5 was in current charte of respondent No. 2 and he was clothed with all powers of respondent No. 2 and, as such, he was fully competent to pass the impugned order. It has not been shown by the petitioner as to how respondent No. 2 was not competent to pass the impugned order of suspension. In view of the categoric assertion made in the counter-affidavit by respondent No. 4, it has to be held that respondent No. 2 being appointing authority had full power and jurisdiction to pass the impugned order of suspension. 10. From a bare perusal of the impugned order of suspension, the clear stipulation therein is that the departmental proceedings being started separately. In accordance with the direction of this Court the competent authority was given liberty to pass a fresh order of suspension and as such the allegation of mala fide has been categorically refused in the counter-affidavit. 10. From a bare perusal of the impugned order of suspension, the clear stipulation therein is that the departmental proceedings being started separately. In accordance with the direction of this Court the competent authority was given liberty to pass a fresh order of suspension and as such the allegation of mala fide has been categorically refused in the counter-affidavit. The categoric assertion in the counter-affidavit is that respondent No. 2 being the competent authority had full jurisdiction to pass the impugned order of suspension and he applied his own mind and after taking into account the grave nature of misconduct committed by the petitioner the order of suspension was passed. The order of suspension has been passed with a clear stipulation that the departmental proceeding is being started separately which was not passed as a measure of punishment and, as such, no notice was required to be served upon the petitioner before passing the order of suspension and there is no violation of the principle of natural justice. Id accordance with Clause 30 of the Certified Standing Order the competent authority could in its discretion, if it considered immediate suspension necessary, suspend a workman pending enquiry into the allegations made against him. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that in absence of initiation of any departmental proceeding, the respondent had no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner in exercise of power under Clause 30 of the Boards Certified Standing Order cannot be upheld. 11. Reliance placed by the petitioners counsel on two decisions of this Court in the case of TV. Sundram V/s. State of Bihar and Ors., 1977 0 LIC 1344., and in the case of Binod Bihari Lal and Ors. V/s. Rameshwar Prasad Sinha, 1978 0 BBCJ 572 , is of no relevance because in a later decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Kapil Singh V/s. State of Bihar and Anr., 1982 0 BBCJ 3320, those two cases were dissented from on the ground that the attention of the Bench had not been drawn to Rule 49-A of the Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1930. Kapil Singh V/s. State of Bihar and Anr., 1982 0 BBCJ 3320, those two cases were dissented from on the ground that the attention of the Bench had not been drawn to Rule 49-A of the Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1930. In the said Rules, Rule 49-A was introduced by a notification, dated 8th August, 1973 and it reads: Rule 49-4 (1):The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the Governor by general or special order may place Government servant under suspension: (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending ; or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal Offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. 12. Therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in Dr. Kapil Singhs case (supra), and in view of Rule 49-A of the Rules, the submission of the petitioner that since the departmental proceeding has not been initiated, he could not have been suspended, cannot be sustained and must be rejected. 13. In this view, this writ application is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.