JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner by this writ petition has prayed that the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda may be restrained from realising any octroi duty or any other Municipal tax from the petitioner company. It has further been prayed that the respondent Municipal Board, Nimbaheda may he directed to refund all amount of octroi duty or any other Municipal tax realised from the petitioner company so far. Lastly, it has been prayed that the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act extending the limit of the Municipal Board to the premises of the petitioner be quashed. 2. The notification which is sought to be challenged by the present writ petition has been issued on 13-2-1984 and published in the Rajasthan Raj patra Part VI 'Ka' and which reads as under: HINDI MATTER 377064 3. The petitioner company is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at Kamla Tower, Kanpur. Amongst other businesses the petitioner also manufacturing cement through one of its constituent units under the name of M/s J.K. Cement Works Nimbaheda. The aforesaid factory & establishment of M/s J.K. Cement Works Nimbaheda was established outside the Municipal limits of the Municipal town Nimbaheda. A lease-deed was executed and the petitioner company acquired 7.75 sq. miles land for limestone quarry. The premises of the petitioner company i e. the industrial area and colony No. 1 area are situated in such a manner that in between the existing Municipal limits and the area of the petitioner company there is no land available for housing or commercial development. The State Government issued a notification under section 6(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (here in after referred to as 'the Act') expressing its intention to include certain areas within the Municipal limits of Municipal Board Nimbaheda. The notification dated 3-11-1982 is on record as Annx. 1. By this notification it is averred that the State Government has proceeded to mainly and principally include the industrial and mining lease area of the petitioner company within the Municipal limits of the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. The petitioner company filed objections to the said inclusion of the premises of the petitioner within the Municipal Limits of the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. Copy of the objections has been placed on record as Annx. 2. The petitioner company filed objections to the said inclusion of the premises of the petitioner within the Municipal Limits of the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. Copy of the objections has been placed on record as Annx. 2. It is alleged that in those objections, the petitioner company specifically objected that the intended extension of the Municipal limits is neither bonafide nor valid nor would be in consonance with the object of developments to be curried out within the Municipal limits of the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. It is also submitted that whole area of the company's complex is a compact area in which the petitioner company has made large scale investments and have also provided various facilities of sanitation, drainage, road, school, medical facilities, gardens, cooperative buildings etc. It is further submitted that the Municipal town of Nimbaheda and the petitioner's factory and mines for a long distance there is no in habitation and in fact the town is not developing on the northern side at which the factory is situated, but on the western side and southern side Krishi Upaj Mandi, Panchayat Samiti, various Government offices, college, etc. have been constructed and industrial area is being developed. In this back ground. it was submitted that extension of the Municipal limits to include the area of the factory premises is not justified. No personal hearing or notice was given to the petitioner and finally on 23-2-1984 the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda has started forcible realisation of octoroi duty from the petitioner at the existing rates on various goods brought into the petitioner's premises and they started using coercive process by detaining the goods and vehicles. The petitioner made a demand of justice and made payment under protest. Inspite of the repeated protests and Inspite of the fact that no notification extending the Municipal limits under section 4(l) of the Act has been published in the Rajasthan Gazette the Municipal Board continues to coercively realising the octoroi duly from the petitioner on various goods brought by the petitioners within its premises. However, the petitioner company started paying the octroi under protest, but without any result. Thereafter, the petitioner company approached this Court by filing the present writ petition challenging the notification and action of the Municipal Board realising the octroi. 4. A return has been filed by the State Government as well as by the respondent Municipal Board. However, the petitioner company started paying the octroi under protest, but without any result. Thereafter, the petitioner company approached this Court by filing the present writ petition challenging the notification and action of the Municipal Board realising the octroi. 4. A return has been filed by the State Government as well as by the respondent Municipal Board. It has been submitted that the State Government thought it proper to extend the Municipal limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda Therefore, afrer considering the objections filed by the petitioner the notification under section 4 has been issued extending the limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. Thereafter, the Municipal Board started realising the octroi in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the notification which has been issued under section 4 is in serious violation of the provisions of section 6 as the objections filed by the petitioner have not been considered. Thus, the notification is arbitrary and beyond the scope of section 6. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to reproduce sections 4 and 6 which read as under : "4. Delimitation of Municipalities-(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6, the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette a. declare any local area to be a Municipality; b. define the limits of any Municipality; c. include or exclude any area in or from any Municipality d. otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality ; e. declare that any local area shall, from a date to be specified in the notification, cease to be a Municipality; Provided that for including in any Municipality the whole or a part of a Panchayat circle or for declaring the whole or part of a Panchayat circle a Municipality, it shall not be necessary to observe and follow the procedure laid down in the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act XXI of 1953), for excluding the whole or part of any Panchayat circle from any Panchayat or for declaring that any such Panchayat circle has ceased to be a Panchayat, not with standing anything contained in any judgment or order of any court; 2. Every notification constituting a new Municipality or altering the limits of an existing Municipality shall clearly set forth the local limits of the area to be included in or excluded from such Municipality, as the case may be ; 3. It shall be the duty of the Municipal Board in every Municipality already existing and of every Board newly established under this Act and of every Board whose local limits are altered as aforesaid to cause at its own cost, to be erected or set up, and thereafter to maintain at its own cost, substantial boundary marks of such description and in such positions as shall be approved by the Collector or any officer authorised by him in this behalf defining the limits or the altered limits of the Municipality subject to its authority, as set forth in the notification; 4. When any local area ceases to be a Municipality, the Board established therein shall cease to exist, and the balance of the Municipal fund and other property and rights vesting in such Board shall, subject to all charges and liabilities affecting the same, vest in the State Government and the proceeds thereof, if any, shall be expended under the orders of the State Government, for the benefit of the local area in which such Board had jurisdiction; 5. Not with standing any thing contained in sub-section (4) when any local area ceases to be a Municipality and is included within the local limits of the jurisdiction of some other local authority, the Municipal fund and other property and rights vesting in the Board shall vest in such other local authority and the liabilities of the Board should be the liabilities of such other local authority ; 6. When any local area is excluded from a Municipality and included in another Municipality such portion of the Municipal fund and other property vested in the Board of the first mentioned Municipality shall vest in, and such portion of the liabilities thereof shall be the liabilities of, the Board of the other Municipality as the State Government may, after consulting the Boards of both Municipalities, declare, by notification in the Official Gazette; provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply in any case where the circumstances, in the opinion of the State Government, render undesirable the transfer of any portion of the Municipal fund and properties or liabilities; 7. When any local area is included in a Municipality all rules and bye-laws made, orders, directions and notices issued and powers conferred and in force throughout such Municipality at the time when the said area is so included, shall apply thereto, unless the State Government otherwise directs, from the date of such inclusion; 8. Upon the exclusion of any area of Panchayat circle and its inclusion in a Municipality or upon its declaration as a Municipality, under sub-section (1); a. such area shall cease to be a Panchayat circle ; b. until fresh elections are held under this Act, the Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch and the member or members representing the area of the Panchayat circle so included in or declared as a Municipality shall be deemed to be the additional members of the Municipality in which such area of the Panchayat circle is included or the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the members respectively of the Municipality declared for such area, as the case may be; c. the whole of the assets vesting in, and of the liabilities subsisting against the Panchayat so declared to be a Municipality or in case where only a part or whole of a Panchayat circle is so included in a Municipality such portion of the said assets and liabilities as the Sate Government may direct, shall devolve upon the Municipality declared for such area or upon the Municipality in which such area of the Panchayat circle is so included; d. until new rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws are made or issued under this Act, the rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws applicable to the Municipality in which any such area is included shall continue to apply to the area so included; e. the Municipality so established by the inclusion of any area of a Panchayat circle therein or by the declaration of a Panchayat circle as a Municipality, shall levy or continue to levy such of the taxes as are law-fully imposed under the Act; f. any such area shall cease to be subject to all Rules, Notifications, Orders and bye-laws made under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act XXI of 1953); and g. the Municipality in which such area is included or the Municipality declared for such area shall exercise jurisdiction over such area and Panchayat established for such area shall cease to function there in, 9. For the purpose of facilitating the inclusion of any area of a Panchayat circle in a Municipality or of the declaration of any such area as a Municipality, the State Government may, by order in writing give such directions, as may appear to it to be necessary; 10. Save as otherwise provided in this section its provisions shall have effect not with standing anything contained in this Act, in the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act XXI of 1953) or any other law for the time being in force." "6. Procedure preliminary to notification under section 4.-(1) Not less than thirty days before the issue of any notification under section 4 the State Government shall cause to be published in the Official Gazette, and to be posted in conspicuous spots or proclaimed by beat of drum in the area concerned, a proclamation announcing that it is proposed to constitute such local area to be a Municipality, or to include or exclude it in or from any Municipality, or to alter the limits of any Municipality in a specified manner or to declare that such local area shall cease to be a Municipality as the case may be, and requiring all persons who entertain any objection to the said proposal to submit the same, with reasons therefor in writing, to the State Government within thirty days from the date of the said proclamation; 2. No notification under section 4 shall be issued by the State Government, unless the objections if any, so submitted are, in its opinion insufficient or invalid." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged this notification from various angles. The first and for most argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that no speaking order has been passed showing the application of mind on the objections raised by the petitioner company. Learned counsel further submitted that the Minister has not applied his mind at all and he has mechanically signed on the note sheet. The Collector's letter was never given to the petitioner for perusal of proposed extension in spite of his request. Learned counsel further submitted that the Minister has not applied his mind at all and he has mechanically signed on the note sheet. The Collector's letter was never given to the petitioner for perusal of proposed extension in spite of his request. In this connection, learned counsel has invited my attention to G.D. Mehra vs. The Stare of Rajasthan & Ors, 1980 WLN(UC) 301 ; The Notified Area Committee Rawat Bhata and Another vs. G D. Mehra & Ors, 1980 WLN (UC) 297 ; State of Orissa vs. Sridhar Kumar Malik & Ors, (1985)3 SCC 697 ; Givalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvq) Co. Ltd. vs. The Asstt. Commissioner of Sales Tax and Ors, (1974) a SCC 98 ; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur vs. The Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 ; The Municipal Board. Hapur vs. Raghuvendra Kripal & Ors, AIR 1966 SC 693 ; Minister of Health vs. The King, 1931 AC 494 ; Port Louis Corporation vs. Attorney General of Mauritius, 1965 AC 1111 ; F.E. Jackson and Co. Ltd. vs. Price Tribunal (2),(9) 1950 NZLR 433 ,: The King vs. Electricity Commissioner, (1923) 1 K.B. 171 ; Lower Hutt City Council vs. Bank, (1947)1 NZLR 545 ; Stafford vs. Minister of Health, (1946)1 K.B. 621 ; B Johnson & Co ' (Builders) Ltd. vs. Minister of Health, (1974) 2 All England Report 395 , and Union of India & Anr. vs. Tulsiratn Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 . 7. As against this learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that this is a legislative function and no principle of natural justice is required for affording any personal hearing or passing a detailed speaking order. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondents hai invited my attention to The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, AIR 1980 SC 882 , and R.K. Porwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1126 . 8. In this light I have to examine the. first and foremost objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have already quoted the relevant provisions of sections 4 and 6 above. According to the scheme of the Act when any area is required to be included in the Municipal limits then before inclusion of that area the objections are invited under section 6 of the Act. first and foremost objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have already quoted the relevant provisions of sections 4 and 6 above. According to the scheme of the Act when any area is required to be included in the Municipal limits then before inclusion of that area the objections are invited under section 6 of the Act. After receiving the objections the same have to be considered by the State Government whether in its opinion the objections are 'insufficient or invalid." In the present case the objections were invited and in pursuance of that the petitioner has filed the objections. Thereafter, the opinion of the Collector concerned was also sought and the same was sent to the State Government. The matter was considered and ultimately it was decided that a notification under section 4 may be issued including the area as notified in the existing Municipal limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. The respondent State Government has also placed on record the original note-sheet to show that the matter has been processed and ultimately it was denied to include that area and the Minister concerned has approved the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that according to the note-sheet, which has been placed on record, it is apparent that no speaking order was passed and in that connection he has stressed on G.D Mehra (1) and The Notified Area Committee Rawat Bhata (2) cases. 9. In G.D. Mehta's case (1) a notified area committee was appointed for the revenue village Rawat Bhata under section 313 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act and in that case the procedure contemplated under section 313 was followed and objections were invited for notifying the area committee for the revenue village Rawat Bhata, but no detailed speaking order was passed while disposing of the objections filed in pursuance of the notification and in that case the notification declaring the notified area committee for revenue village Rawat Bhata was quashed. But that case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner because under section 3 13 a special mode has been provided not with standing the mode prescribed in section 4 of this Act. There the stress was laid on the expression that the State Government shall take into consideration the objections filed against the notification appointing a notified area committee for that revenue village. There the stress was laid on the expression that the State Government shall take into consideration the objections filed against the notification appointing a notified area committee for that revenue village. In that connection, it was observed that when the Act specifically lays down that the objections were to be considered by the State Government then the same should be dealt with on merit and a detailed speaking order should have been passed. Learned Single Judge quashed the notification and thereafter the matter went in appeal and the Division Bench of this Court affirmed the finding of the learned Single Judge. But the present case stands on different footing. In the present case, the expression 'considered' does not appear and only the expression appears is that the State Government has to examine whether the objections filed by the incumbents are 'invalid or insufficient'. Mr. Mridul learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the legislature in its wisdom has used different expressions in different sections. Then they must be given its natural meaning and the same meaning cannot be attached to different expressions appearing in the Act. I think the submission of Mr. Mridul appears to be correct. In G.D. Mehia's case (1) the whole controversy centred round to the expression 'consideration' and consideration implies that the authorities are required to pass a detailed speaking order, while disposing of the objections filed by petitioners in that case. Learned counsel also invited my attention to Dr. Mrs Shahbir Fatima & Ors vs. The Chancellor, University of Allahabad & Ors, AIR 1966 All 45 . He has also submitted that the non-obstante clause appearing in section 313 makes this section a class apart and if the intention of the legislature was to follow the same procedure as prescribed under sections 4 and 6 then perhaps section 313 would not have been engrafted. The submission of Mr. Mridul appears to be well founded. By engrafting section 313 the legislature has adopted a new method making a departure from the normal procedure of establishing the Municipal Board or including or invoking the area from the Municipal Board. Thus, the consideration which is applicable to section 313 cannot be made applicable mutatis mutandis to sections 3 and 4. Mr. Mridul appears to be well founded. By engrafting section 313 the legislature has adopted a new method making a departure from the normal procedure of establishing the Municipal Board or including or invoking the area from the Municipal Board. Thus, the consideration which is applicable to section 313 cannot be made applicable mutatis mutandis to sections 3 and 4. Mr. Mridul has pointed out that so far as appointment of a notified area committee is concerned the right of franchise is taken away and the same is to be substituted by a nominated committee. This argument of Mr. Mridul does not appear to be well founded, that even after the appointment of the notified area committee and fixing the members the election has not been completely ruled out. Under section 313 of the Act the State Government can make a provision for election of all the members or partly elected and partly nominated by the State Government. But the fact remains that the reasoning applicable to Section 313 cannot be made applicable to sections 4 & 6 for including any part of any lacal area or village to the existing Municipal limits. Thus, the case of G D. Mehra (1) and The Notified Area Committe Rawat Bhota (2) are distinguishable and cannot be made applicable to the procedure applicable under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Mr. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before me a large number of cases to show that the objections have to be disposed of by passing a detailed order in the matter. So far as the case of Sridhar Kumar Mallik (3) is concerned, in that case, the question was that the notification issued by the State of Orissa was not in the local language so that the residents of the area could not file any objection as they could not understand the notification. In this context the notification was quashed and it was observed as under : " The reach out to the people, it must be published in a language with which they are familiar. In so fundamental a matter as local self Government the Legislature intended that an opportunity should be available to all persons residing with in the area to submit their objections. The local language of the area is Oriya, and, therefore, the State Government should have published the proclamation in that language in the newspaper. In so fundamental a matter as local self Government the Legislature intended that an opportunity should be available to all persons residing with in the area to submit their objections. The local language of the area is Oriya, and, therefore, the State Government should have published the proclamation in that language in the newspaper. On this point also we find ourselves in agreement with the High Court." Thus, in this view of the matter the notification issued by the Orissa Government was quashed. But the proposition of law which Mr. Bhatia wants to make out does not stand supported by this judgment. 10. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (4) case also does not help the petitioner in any manner. In this case it was held as under : "It is not possible to agree that if a Legislature confers power to make subordinate or ancillary legislation upon a delegate, the Legislature need not disclose any policy, principle or standard which might act as a guidance for the delegate in the exercise, of the power." This case also does not provide any assistance because the Legislature has already laid down that the objections filed by the incumbents should be fudged whether they are insufficient or invalid The expression "insufficient or invalid" hold a sufficient guideline that whether the objections which are filed against the notification are insufficient or invalid. It is true that for examining the insufficiency and invalidity the matter has to be examined to find out that whether the objections are insufficient or invalid. I shall deal with that later on regarding the merits of the objections filed by the petitioner. 11. In Roza Buland Sugar Co's case (5) the question was the validity of imposition of water tax in Rampur by the Municipal Board, Rampur and then the question arose regarding the scope of sections 131(3) & 135(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act. In that context it was held that section 131(3) is mandatory. So far as the present case is concerned, it is not the case that the provisions were mandatory or not. The question is whether while disposing of the objections whether it was necessary for the State Government to record a detailed speaking order while disposing of the objections filed by the petitioner. Thus, this case is wholly distinguishable and cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. 12. The question is whether while disposing of the objections whether it was necessary for the State Government to record a detailed speaking order while disposing of the objections filed by the petitioner. Thus, this case is wholly distinguishable and cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. 12. In the case of The Municipal Roard, Hapur (6), the Municipal Board, Hapur decided to impose water tax in Hapur under section 135(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act and in that case the action of the Municipal Board, Hapur as well as the validity of section 135(3) of the U P. Municipalities Act was challenged. It was held that the provisions of section 135(3) are valid and it was observed that this provision does not suffer from excessive delegation and it cannot be said to be discriminatory. 13. In Minister of Health's case (7) also when a power has been conferred upon the Minister to confirm the scheme then in that case the Minister could exercise that power, in terms of section 40 of the Housing Act. 1925 unless and untill both he and the local authority have complied with the prescribed procedure which the Act prescribes as preliminary to the making of such an order. The court is entitled to see that the statutory procedure has been complied with by the Minister before confirming the order or not. In this back ground the court examined the matter and found that the courts are competent to examine that whether the scheme prepared by the Minister is valid or not and that can only be examined if the Minister concerned has proceeded in terms of section 40 or not. So far as the present case is concerned, in this case the matter has reached to the Minister after necessary formalities being complied with as contemplated under sections 4 and 6. The question is that whether the general guidelines provided in the Act that the objections are insufficient or invalid has been considered or not. So far as the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid case the same is not disputed. 14. In Port Louis Corporation's case (8) also the question was that under section 73(1) of the Local Government Ordinance 162 the Governor in Council required consultation for changing the boundary of a town. So far as the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid case the same is not disputed. 14. In Port Louis Corporation's case (8) also the question was that under section 73(1) of the Local Government Ordinance 162 the Governor in Council required consultation for changing the boundary of a town. In that connection, it was observed that if there is a proposal to alter the boundaries of a town or district or village such alteration was not made until after consultation with the local authorities concerned It was observed that it follows that the local authority must know what is proposed before they can be expected to give their views. It was also observed that the requirement of consultation is never to be treated perfunctorily or as a mere formality. It was further observed that the local authority should be given a reasonably ample and sufficient opportunity to express their views. There is no quarrel to this proposition of law is concerned. 15. In FE. Jackson & Co. Ltd 's. case (9) the question was regarding fixing the price under Price Order No 1001 and the Tribunal was required to hold a public meeting. In this case the Price Tribunal did not hold a meeting in public no any person was heard in this context the so called fixation of price was held to be not proper. In this case as the price order emphasised that the price should be fixed after proper public hearing and the same was not done. such action was held to be with out jurisdiction. But that is not the case here. The question in that case was also that whether fixation of the price by the Tribunal was a quasi-judicial function or a legislative one. It was observed that the function of the Tribunal was to ascertain the price after due enquiry under the provisions of the Act. It was held that the Tribunal in its procedure is required to act judicially. 16. In King's case (10) a scheme was formulated to provide for the incorporation of a joint electricity authority representative of authorised undertakes within the electricity district. The Commissioners began to hold a local enquiry with a view to making an order embodying the scheme. It was held that the Tribunal in its procedure is required to act judicially. 16. In King's case (10) a scheme was formulated to provide for the incorporation of a joint electricity authority representative of authorised undertakes within the electricity district. The Commissioners began to hold a local enquiry with a view to making an order embodying the scheme. Certain companies effected by the scheme applied for writs of prohibition and certiorari on the ground that the scheme was ultra vires in so far as it compelled the joint authority to appoint the two committees and delegate to them powers and duties of the joint authority. In this context it was held that the scheme was ultra vires It was also observed that the two committees to whom powers were given under the scheme was neither joint nor representative either in their consultation or by inheritance from those who appointed them. After considering over the matter it was held that the scheme was ultra vires and a writ of prohibition was issued against the Commissioner for proceeding with further consideration of the scheme. But such is no the case here. 17. In Lower Hutt City) Council's case (11) it was held that the statutory requirement that a council, hall inquire into and dispose of objections is not merely preliminary and administrative but imports a judicial function. The issue raised in this cast was regarding closing of a street in a city or brought. In this context, it was observed that the Municipal Council should hear the objection, inquire into the matter and dispose of the objections. Those objections were not properly disposed of, therefore, it was observed that principles of natural justice to the extent that they were necessary in the light of the particular circumstances should be held to have relevance, and as such the closing was held to be bad. In this context it was also observed as under : "The power of the Court to intervene to require the observance of the rules of natural justice is no longer limited to judicial functions but applies to administrative functions if the interests of justice make it apparent that the quality of fairness is required." So far as the general proposition is concerned, the same cannot be disputed. The horizons of the principles of natural justice has been very widely extended by the Indian courts and it has been laid down by series of judgments of Supreme Court that the principles of natural justice should be invoked as far as possible except where the statute by specific provision excludes the same. 18. In Stafford's case(12) the local authority required compulsory purchase of certain piece of land for housing purposes and they informed the land owners of their intention. The land owners submitted their grounds of objection to the Minister in pursuance of the notice issued by the local authority. The Minister sent the notice and grounds, without informing the land owners to the local authority who sent the Minister a detailed reply. The Minister without informing the land owners of that detailed statement of the local authority's case confirmed the compulsory purchase. Such order of confirmation was found to be invalid and quashed on the ground that it did not constitute a proper presentation of the landowners' case as the local authority had had an opportunity of presenting their case in detail. 19. In B. Johnson & Co.'s case(13) also the question arose was regarding compulsory purchase of land for housing purposes and it was observed that the confirmation of the compulsory purchasing of the land for housing purposes is purely an administrative act and the obligation of the Minister did not go beyond making available to both sides matter which had come into existence for the purpose of the quasi-lis. It was in this context held that it was not obligatory on the Minister to make available material which came into his possession before that date. 20. In Tulsi Rum's case (14) the basic question arose was the scope of Articles 309, 310 and 311 vis-a-vis the provisions of Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. Mr. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner has specially invited my attention to page 492 of the above judgment and the word 'consideration.' While discussing Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 their Lordships of the Supreme Court overruling the earlier judgment of Challappan's case held that if such were the correct meaning of the word 'consider' it would render this part of Rule 14 unconstitutional as restricting the full exclusionary operation of the second proviso. The word 'consider' however does not bear the meaning placed upon it in Challappan's case. The word 'consider' is used in Rule 14 as a transitive verb. The meaning of the word 'consider' as so used is given in the Oxford English Dictionary as "To contemplate mentally, fix the mind upon, to think over, meditate or reflect on, bestow attentive thought upon give heed to, take note of". In the present case the expression 'considered' does not appear in section 6 of the Act. The expression appears there is 'insufficient and invalid'. In view of Tulsiram Patel's case (14) the word "consider' contemplates that 'consider' means to think over meaning thereby that those thoughts should be reduced into writing. But suffice it to say that the word 'consider' does not appear in section 6. In this context, it would be relevant to mention here the argument of Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents. While discussing the case of Tulsiram Patel (14) he pointed out that the word 'consider is significantly missing in section 6. Therefore, the legislature wanted to give a different connotation to section 6 vis-a-vis section 313 of the Act. Thus, this squarely answers the contention of Mr. Bhatia. 21. It was further submitted that the expression in its opinion' means an objective consideration and not a subjective consideration. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to The Rampur Distillery & Chemical Ltd. vs. The Company Low Board, AIR 1970 SC 1788 ; M. Gopal Krishnu Naidu vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 240 ; Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nisbet Shipping Co. Ltd., 1962 (2) QBD 330 ; R.D. Aggarwal & Anr vs. The Union of India & Anr., ILR 1974 (2) Delhi 520 and M.A. Rasheed & Ors vs. The State of Kerala, (1974)2 SCC 687 . 22. So far as the general proposition is concerned there is no quarrel. The expression in its opinion occurs in section 6 does not mean that it is only subjective, but it should be a subjective satisfaction in an objective manner. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Mridul has invited my attention to Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State Industrial Tribunal. The expression in its opinion occurs in section 6 does not mean that it is only subjective, but it should be a subjective satisfaction in an objective manner. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Mridul has invited my attention to Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State Industrial Tribunal. U. P. & Ors, AIR 1961 SC 1381 ; Barium Chemicals Ltd. and anothers vs. Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295 ; Swadeshi Cotton Mills etc. vs. Union of India etc, AIR 1981 SC 818 . 23. In Barium Chemicals' case (24) it was observed as under : "In other words, the enumeration of the inferences which may be drawn from the circumstances, postulates the absence of a general discretion to go on a fishing expedition to find evidence. No doubt the formation of opinion is subjective but the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the the sine qua non for action must be demonstrable. If The action is questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to an inference of the kind contemplated by the section exists, the action might be exposed to interference unless the existence of the circumstances is made out." Likewise in Rampur Distillery & Chemical Co.'s case (18) it was observed as under : "Investment of power in the Central Government under section 326 carries with it a duty to act judicially : i.e. to hold an enquiry in a manner consistent with rules of natural justice." The position that emerges is that if certain opinion has to formed then subjective opinion should be arrived at by process of reasoning and it cannot be in an arbitrary manner. The opinion has to be formed consistent with the principles of natural justice. So far as the present case is concerned the matter as mentioned above has reached the Minister concerned after placing on record the objections filed by the petitioner and the notes of the Collector. On the note-sheet the matter was processed and ultimately the Minister approved the addition of the area in the Municipal limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. This cannot be said to be a case where the opinion has not been formed properly and without following the principles of natural justice. On the note-sheet the matter was processed and ultimately the Minister approved the addition of the area in the Municipal limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. This cannot be said to be a case where the opinion has not been formed properly and without following the principles of natural justice. The objections were invited and thereafter they were placed before the Minister concerned and by the secretarial process it ultimately reached to the Minister concerned and the Minister approved the same. Such action he said to be improper. The action could have been invalidated if no objections have been invited. The objections were invited, they were processed and sent up to the Minister and the Minister has approved and thereafter the notification has been issued. 24. The result of the above discussion is that the objections were invited and the same were placed before the Minister concerned. The copies of these notes have been placed on record. Now the question that arises in the light of the aforesaid discussion of cases is that on the note sheet a detailed speaking order has been passed or not. In my opinion, the notification under Section 4 complies with the provisions of Section 6. As mentioned above Section 6 contemplates that the authority has to consider whether the objections are insufficient or invalid. A petusal of the note-sheet would show that the objections filed by the petitioner were also placed on record and the comments received from the Collector were also placed on record and there- after it was found that the objections are not sufficient and valid and does not hold good. This has to be the satisfaction of the State Government. Note-sheet was recorded by the Deputy Secretary then it went to Secretary and ultimately reached to the Minister concerned and the Minister concerned has approved the action. The expression 'invalid and insufficient' does not require a detailed speaking order to be passed in the matter. The expression 'insufficient and invalid' in contradiction with the word 'consider' cannot be assigned the same meaning as the word 'consider'. If that was so, perhaps the Legislature in its wisdom would have used the word 'consider' as used in section 313 of the Act. But the Legislature has employed a different expression 'insufficient and invalid' then those words have to be given its meaning. If that was so, perhaps the Legislature in its wisdom would have used the word 'consider' as used in section 313 of the Act. But the Legislature has employed a different expression 'insufficient and invalid' then those words have to be given its meaning. The expression 'insufficient' has been defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "not sufficient : lacking in strength; power, ability, capacity or skill; incompetent; unfit; to discharge the duties of an office; nut sufficiently furnished or supplied; deficient or lacking in something; inadequate to some implied or designated need, use or purpose". Likewise. the expression 'invalid' has been defined as "not strong, infirm, weak, inadequate, being without foundation in fact or truth, indefensible, etc " Thus, the Government has to examine the objections filed by the petitioner whether they are sufficient or valid not to add the area in question to the existing Municipal limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. This takes me to the questions whether the objections filed by the petitioner are sufficient or whether they are valid or not. Since, it has to be in the opinion of the State Government and that has to be exercised by the Minister concerned in the Local Self Government. That has been done by the Minister concerned Now, in the facts and circumstances of the case whether the objections filed by the petitioner company can be said to be insufficient or invalid or not. Though this aspect of the matter has not been discussed point-wise. Therefore, I have to consider those objections which are on record as Annx 2, by which it was objected that the petitioner company is looking after the sanitation of whole of the area and no useful purpose would be served by extending the area within the Municipal limits of Municipal Board, Nimbaheda. It was also submitted that the Municipal limits are extending to the other sides and not towards the petitioner's premises. Therefore, on this court also it will not be proper. It further submitted that the extension of the Municipal limits to include the premises of the petitioner company would involve illegal interference in this area and that could not be conducive to the petitioner company. The objection which has been raised by the petitioner more or less is to the effect that the petitioner has challenged the authority of the Government to extend the limit of the Municipality. The objection which has been raised by the petitioner more or less is to the effect that the petitioner has challenged the authority of the Government to extend the limit of the Municipality. It is no justification for saying that it would involve interference with the working of the petitioner company or that the petitioner company is already providing sanitation facilities to the residents. therefore, it is not necessary to add this area within the Municipal limits of the Municipal Board. It is within the discretion of the State Government if it thinks that the area should he included in the Municipal limits in view of the increasing population then there is no ground for the petitioner company to object to this proposed increase of the area. It has been pointed out that the population has been increased from 12,000 to 30,000 & number of small units have already come up. It is true that with the increasing population and fast industrial development the township is fast expending. If the State Government thinks that by extending the Municipal limits it will be useful then simply because that it is not conducive to the petitioner company then this is no ground for not proceeding with the addition of the area. This has to be a subjective satisfaction of the State Government and the State Government thinks it proper then it can certainly extend the area and such action cannot be said to be bad simply because it has not considered all the objections filed by the petitioner in detail in the note-sheet. The objections of the petitioner company are on record and according to the secretarial process if the Minister concerned has approved the extension of the Municipal limit and did not write out a long reasoning note that would not render the action of the State Government invalid. I would have certainly considered the matter of remanding the case to the Minister concerned, but after going through the objections filed by the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case that the objections which have been filed by the petitioner are not so serious so as to render the action of the State Government invalid. The objections which are on record are not sufficient so as to preclude the State Government for not including the petitioner's area in the Municipal limits. The objections which are on record are not sufficient so as to preclude the State Government for not including the petitioner's area in the Municipal limits. Thus, I find that the action of the State Government appears to justified and I overrule the objection of Mr. Bhatia. 25. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the action under section 4 is a legislative action and in that connection he has invited my attention to The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, AIR 1980 SC 882 . and R.K. Porwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1127 . But I need not to go into that question as I have already held that the action of the State Government is not bad and the notification is valid. 26. Next, it was contended by Mr. Bhatia that even if this area is included in the Municipal Board, Nimbaheda then too also the imposition of octroi is bad as a fresh notification imposing octroi has not been issued by the State Government. It has been submitted that in sub-section (7) of section 4 only lays down that if the local area is included in a Municipality all rules, bye-laws orders, direction and notices issued shall apply unless the State Government otherwise directs. 27. Learned counsel submits that section 104 under which the octroi is levied says clearly that every Board shall levy at such rate and from such date as the State Government may in such ease direct by a notification in the Official Gazette. Learned counsel submits that sub-section (7) of section 4 does not talk of any notification. Therefore, the notification issued under section 104 is not applicable. The argument of the learned counsel is devoid of any merit. Section 104 reads as under : " 104. Obligatory taxes.-(1) Every Board shall levy, at such rate and from such date as the State Government may in each case direct by notification in the Official Gazette and in such manner as is laid down in this Act and as may be provided in the rules made by the State Government in this behalf, the following taxes, namely : 1. a tax on the annual letting value of buildings or lands or both, situated within the Municipality; 2. a tax on the annual letting value of buildings or lands or both, situated within the Municipality; 2. an octroi on goods and animals brought within the limits of the Municipality for consumption, use or sale there in; and 3. a tax on profession and vocations : Provided that- a. the tax under clause (1) shall not be levied- i. on Kham houses, or ii. on building or lands or both, of which annual letting value is less than one hundred and eighty rupees; b. the tax under clause (2) shall not be on a motor vehicle as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) or any other mechanically propelled vehicle, and c. the tax under clause (3) shall not be levied on artisans: Provided further that, upon a representation made to it by and at the request of a Board, the State Government, if it is satisfied that circumstances exist which sufficiently provide the jurisdiction for a board not to levy, or to stop the levy of, any of the taxes mentioned in this section, may, by special order published in the Official Gazette, along with the reasons for making such order, permit the Board not to levy, or to stop the levy of any such tax; 2. A direction under sub-section (1) may provide for the levy of taxes at different rates in different Municipalities having regard to their varying local conditions and needs, and on the same considerations and by a like direction, the State Government may, from time to time - i. vary uniformally or differently in relation to different Municipalities, the rates of taxes levied, or ii.s withdraw any tax levied by any Municipalities." Now once the area concerned is incluced in the Municipal limits then all the rules, and all the provisions which govern the Municipality will be made applicable to the local area as well which is included. In this connection, sub-section (8)(d) of section 4 clearly lays down that until new rules, notification, order and bye-laws are made the rules, notification orders and bye-laws applicable to the Municipality in which any area is included shall continue to apply to the area so included. In this connection, sub-section (8)(d) of section 4 clearly lays down that until new rules, notification, order and bye-laws are made the rules, notification orders and bye-laws applicable to the Municipality in which any area is included shall continue to apply to the area so included. Sub-sections (8)(d) and (e) of section 4 read as under: "d. until new rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws are made or issued under this Act, the Rules, Notifications, Orders and bye-laws applicable to the Municipality in which any such area is included shall continue to apply to the area so included; e. the Municipality so established by the inclusion of any area of a Panchayat Circle therein or by the declaration of a Panchayat Circle as a Municipality, shall levy or continue to levy such of the taxes as are lawfully imposed under the Act." 28. Thus, by virtue of sub-section (8) (d) of section 4 the notification which has been issued under the directions of the State Government shall stand mutatis mutandis applicable to the newly added area also. Apart from this it is an obligation on the Municipality to levy the octroi and the State Government only directs by notification the rates. There is no option left with the Municipality so far as imposition of octroi is concerned and on the rates which are fixed by the State Government. The Municipality has only in its discretion to levy or not to levy octroi under section 105 which can he levied by the Municipality it it so chooses subject to any general or special orders of the State Government. So far as octroi under section 104 is concerned, it is obligatory on the Municipality and it has to impose octroi without any reservation. Simply the expression 'notification' not appearing in sub-section (7) of section 4 that will not absolve the Municipality from imposing octroi. As a matter of fact, the effect of inclusion of the area has been considered in detail in sub section (8) of section 4 and clauses (d) and (e) squarely cover the present situation. 29. Mr. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to Atlas Cycle Industries Lid. vs. Slate of Haryana & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 121 . 29. Mr. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to Atlas Cycle Industries Lid. vs. Slate of Haryana & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 121 . Visakhapatnam Municipality vs. Kandreguia Nukaraju and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2172 ; and Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of Haryana and Ors., 1985 IV SCC 124 . 30. The Atlas Cycle Industries's case (28) has been discussed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Lid. (30). 31. In Visakhapatnam Municipality (29) the A.P. Municipalities Act,1965 came into force on 2-4-1965. The respondents were respondents of two villages R. and S. Prior to the year 1969 the area comprised in these two villages was not included in the Municipal limits of the Visakhapatnam Municipality. Most of the respondents own properties situated within the limits of the two villages but they were not assessed to property tax under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) District Municipalities Act, 1920 which was in force until the introduction of the Act of 1965. They used to pay taxes to the village Panchayat. This area was included on 24-3-1966. On 24-3-1970 and 10-6-1970 the Municipal Council declared its intention to levy property tax in the areas newly included within the Municipal limits. The Municipal Council passed a resolution on 28-8-1970 confirming the levy of property tax on buildings and lands situated within the Municipal limits w.e.f 1-10-1970. Notices were issued to the residents of these villages also. These notices appear to have been issued on the supposition that taxes leviable under the District Municipalities Act, 1920 could be levied under clause 12, Schedule IX of the Act of 1965, unless the Government directed otherwise. In this hack-ground it was contended that property tax could not be imposed without following the procedure prescribed by sections 81 and 83 of the Act. In these circumstances, it was held that the imposition of property tax on the residents of the newly added areas without following the procedure prescribed by sections 81 and 83 was illegal. But this case is of no assistance to the petitioner for the reason that by virtue of sub-section (8) the effect on the newly added area has been properly taken into consideration and the newly added area will be under an obligation to pay octroi. But this case is of no assistance to the petitioner for the reason that by virtue of sub-section (8) the effect on the newly added area has been properly taken into consideration and the newly added area will be under an obligation to pay octroi. Thus, the above case cannot he of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 32. In the case of Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. (30), it was held that in Atlas Cycle Industries' case holding that absence of word 'notification' in the setting of the words 'Rules' bye-laws, Orders, Directions' in Section 5(4) (as it stood before amendment) of the Act rendered the notification dated August 10, 1965 inapplicable to the included areas-the Punjab Municipal (Haryana Amendment and Validation) Act, 1171 removing the deficiency retrospectively and validating the levy and collection of octroi in quest ion. Hence, levy and collection of octroi in the area included within the Municipal limits with retrospective effect from August 10, 1955 in accordance with notification issued earlier, held, valid and not open to challenge. 33. But in the present case, sub-section t8) of section 4 was in fact inserted by the notification published in Rajasthan Gazette, Part IV-A, Extraordinary dated 21-9-1974 removing the so called defect. As already mentioned above, sub-section (8) of section 4, it has been considered that on account of exclusion of any Panchayat Circle and its inclusion in the Municipality then what consequences shall follow and those all consequence have been detailed in clause (a) to (g) of sub-section (8) of section 4. What will be the effect of levy of octroi on this newly added area has been specifically covered by clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (8) of section 4 as quoted above. Thus, simply because the expression 'notification' does not appear in sub-section (7) will be of no consequence. Since, sub-section (8) of section 4 specifically covers that what shall be the effect of inclusion or exclusion of area in the Municipality, the contention of learned counsel has no merit and it is overruled. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the area cannot he included for the purpose of collecting taxes, and it is a fraud on the statute. It is true that if the intention was to collect the tax then it would have been a different matter. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the area cannot he included for the purpose of collecting taxes, and it is a fraud on the statute. It is true that if the intention was to collect the tax then it would have been a different matter. But for the purpose of extending all the benefits of the Municipal town the area is extended and in that process octroi has to be paid then such action cannot be said to be a fraud on the statute. Learned counsel further submitted that this would be in violation of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. This argument is also devoid of any merit. The freedom of trade of the petitioner has no where been infringed if the local taxes have to he paid in accordance with law and there is no question of violation of Article 301 and 304 of the Constitution. 35. It was also submitted that the Municipality would not be able to provide any Municipal Services to the petitioner as there is a long gap between the township and the factory. Since the area of the Municipality is being extended and with the expansion of urbanisation the so-called gap is not difficult to be covered. At the present there may not be much habitation between the two points but by the increase of the population it cannot he ruled out that there will be no habitation so as to get the benefit of the Municipal Services. There is no justification for saying that since the petitioner has been providing all the civic amenities to the resident labourers serving in the factory and to their colony, therefore, the area should not be extended. This argument is devoid of any force. Since the area is not included in the Municipal limits therefore, the sanitary facilities are not being provided by the Municipality but when the area is included in the Municipal limits it is obligatory duty of the Municipality to provide sanitation facilities. In this connection, learned counsel has invited my attention to and Colony Treasurer vs. PAC R. Co., 120 Federal Repors 712 . Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Birla Cotten Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & another, (1968) 3 SCR 251 . In this connection, learned counsel has invited my attention to and Colony Treasurer vs. PAC R. Co., 120 Federal Repors 712 . Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Birla Cotten Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & another, (1968) 3 SCR 251 . Both these cases are distinguishable on facts and it cannot he laid down as a general proposition for all times to come that because there is a vacant piece of land lying between the factory and the Municipal town therefore the area should not be extended. This general proposition is too wide. As a matter of fact, the development of the area and increase in the population cannot be ruled out. With the passage of time the whole area is likely to he inhabitated by the residents. 36. It was also contended that the area which is, sought to be included is not the local area, therefore. as required under sub-section (7) of section 4 this area cannot be included. In this connection, learned counsel has also invited my attention to Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, AIR 1961 SC 652 . and Om Prakash Agarwal & others vs. Giri Raj Kishori and others, 1986 1 SC 722 . But factually it is not correct. This area is a part of the Panchayat Samiti. It cannot be said that this area was not a part of the local area. Thus, the argument was based on factually incorrect data. The above cases cited by the learned counsel cannot help in the present situation. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that for fixation of the rates of cement they have not included this tax. I have perused the Cement Control Order, 1967. Paras 7 and 10 of this Order lays down that at the time of fixation of the rates local taxes should he included. 37. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents has also invited my attention to the terms of the lease-deed Ex. 10. Condition No. 4(2) reads as under:- "(ii) The rent as aforesaid excludes all kinds of taxes which the Municipal Board. 37. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents has also invited my attention to the terms of the lease-deed Ex. 10. Condition No. 4(2) reads as under:- "(ii) The rent as aforesaid excludes all kinds of taxes which the Municipal Board. Panchayat or any other civic body has imposed or may impose curing the period of lease in respect of the said plot and the lessee agrees to pay such taxes to the authorities concerned direct." This condition specifically excludes all kinds of taxes which may be levied by the Municipality or Panchayat. Thus, in terms of the lease deed, the petitioner knew it very well that as and when the taxes are levied by the Panchayat Municipality that will be over and above from the rent paid by the petitioner to the State Government, and shall be payable to the local authority. 38. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents has invited my attention to S J. Agarwal vs. Karji Narayanbhai and others, AIR 1980 SC 1611 . and Olga Tellis and others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1986 SC 180 Learned counsel submitted that if substantial justice has been done then this Court should not interfere in this matter. 39. Since I have examined the matter in great detail on merits and I do not find any merit in this writ petition, therefore, the same is dismissed. 40. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Writ Dismissed. *******