JUDGMENT 1. - In this case, the point of controversy is that one Mahendra Singh who claims himself to be the landlord of House No. 228 situated in Indira Colony, Sri Ganganagar filed a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent against shri Bachan Singh in the Court of learned civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar on 16.5.1984 for the recovery of the arrears of rent from September 1982 to April 1984. In that suit, the written statement was filed by shri bachan Singh and he took a plea that mahendra Singh is not his landlord and he is not his tenant and, therefore, he cannot claim any arrears of rent from him. Subsequent to the filing of this written statement. Mahendra Singh filed another suit in the Court of learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate Sri Ganganagar on 30.4.1985 pleading, inter alia, that Shri Bachan Singh has not paid him rent since September, 1982 and therefore he is in arrears of rent for over a period of 6 months and so, the landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction against Shri Bachan Singh. It was further contended by the plaintiff in that suit that the defendant in his written statement filed in Civil Suit No. 80 of 1986 i.e. the suit for arrears of rent has pleaded that no relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the defendant and the plaintiff, and this is another ground on which the plaintiff has claimed that he is entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant from the suit premises. On the application of the plaintiff, the suit which was filed in the Court of learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar was transferred to the Court of learned Civil Judge, Sri Naganagar by an order of the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar and that suit, after transfer in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar has been registered as Civil Original Suit No. 81 of 1986. 2. The defendant filed an application in suit No. 81 of 1986 that the proceedings in that suit be stayed because the questions involved in the later suit are substantially the same as that of suit No. 81 of 86. The plaintiff also filed an application under Section 151 CPC that both these suits should be amalgamated. 2. The defendant filed an application in suit No. 81 of 1986 that the proceedings in that suit be stayed because the questions involved in the later suit are substantially the same as that of suit No. 81 of 86. The plaintiff also filed an application under Section 151 CPC that both these suits should be amalgamated. The learned Civil Judge Sri Ganganagar, by his order dated 2.3.1987 has dismissed the application of the defendant wherein as has accepted the application of the plaintiff and has ordered for the amalgamation of the suits. Aggrieved against this order, the defendant has filed this revision petition. 3. Mr. R.K. Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that even in the earlier suit, the ground taken was for the recovery of arrears of rent and in the later suit, the eviction has also been claimed on the basis of arrears of rent and, therefore, the matter directly and substantially is the same in both these suits and so, the proceedings in the later suit be stayed. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Dr. Narpat Singh v. Shri Krishna Kumar Chandra Lekha, 1973 WN Part-1 Page 10), wherein it has been held that if the matter directly and substantially is the same in a suit filed at Jodhpur to that of a suit filed at Kanpur then the Court at Jodhpur should stay the proceedings. 4. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in Munilal v. Sarvajeet, 1982 WLN 756 , wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 10 CPC are mandatory and the trial of a subsequently instituted suit is bound to be stayed if any party makes a request before the Court trying that a previously instituted suit is pending determination either in the trial Court or the first appeal or second appeal arising therefrom is pending for decision. It was further held that as no objection under Section 10 CPC to the trial of the subsequently instituted suit was taken until the termination of the proceeding in the suit, the objection must be deemed to have been waived by the petitioner and it is not open to him to raise such an objection in the appeal arising out of the subsequently instituted suit. A similar view has also been expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Heeralal, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 527 wherein it has been observed that the provisions of Section 10 are clear, definite and mandatory and powers of the Court under Section 151 CPC can be exercised by the Court for the ends of justice. It has further been observed that in view of the provisions of this section, it was open to the respondent to apply for the transfer of the suit at Asansol to the Indore Court, the two suit could have been tried together. 5. Mr. attention was also drawn to a decision of this Court in Khushal Das v. Laxmi Lal and another, 1981(1) All India Rent Control Journal 360 . In that case, the petitioner filed a suit for fixation of the standard rent but the landlord took the plea that the petitioner Khushal Das was not his tenant and actually, the shop has been let out to Rameshwar Lal who has sub-let the premises to Khushal Das. Subsequently, Laxmi Lal filed a suit for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent against Rameshwar Lal in Khushal Das pleading inter alia that Rameshwar Lal was his tenant and Kushal Das was his sub-tenant. An application under Section 10 CPC was filed. The High Court while deciding the revision based on the decision of the trial Court on an application under Section 10 CPC observed that in view of this, it would have been proper that both the cases should be consolidated for the purpose of hearing. 6. Mr. Singhal has drawn may attention to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Rana v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Delhi 118, wherein it has been held that the 'words matter in issue' in Section 10 mean all disputed material in question in the previous suit. The words 'matter in issue' do not mean entire subject-matter in issue in the two suits. He has, therefore, submitted that matter in issue in both these suits is arrears of rent and, therefore, simply because the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and that has been made an additional ground for eviction, it does not mean that matter in issue in both these suits is not the same. 7. Mr. He has, therefore, submitted that matter in issue in both these suits is arrears of rent and, therefore, simply because the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and that has been made an additional ground for eviction, it does not mean that matter in issue in both these suits is not the same. 7. Mr. B.L. Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioner has submitted that both the suits are based on two separate causes of action. According to him, the earlier suit is based on arrears of rent that were due up to April 1982. Of course, in that suit, a plea has been taken that arrears of rent that may become due thereafter may also be paid to him and so, no claim has been made in the subsequent suit for the recovery of any arrears of rent. The subsequent suit is based on two causes of action i.e. default in payment of rent for over a period of six months and secondly, denial of the title of the landlord and, therefore, two suits are totally separate and are based on two separate causes of action. According to him, the arrears of rent for over a period of six months were due even after the filing of the first suit and that by itself becomes a separate cause of action. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Vijay Kumar v. Manohar Lal, AIR 1979 Delhi 1 wherein it has been held that Section 10 will not be applicable where suits are filed for recovery of rent for different periods. Section 10 does not bar the trial of a suit for rent for a period subsequent to that included in the previously instituted suit for rent although the same question may be involved in the two suits. He has, therefore, submitted that the cause of action in both the suits are absolutely different but as they are related to each other, the learned lower Court was perfectly justified in amalgamating both these suits for achieving the ends of justice by issuing such an order in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 10 CPC. 8. I have considered the rival submissions raised by both the learned counsel. It is true that the earlier suit was filed for arrears of rent up to April, 1984. 8. I have considered the rival submissions raised by both the learned counsel. It is true that the earlier suit was filed for arrears of rent up to April, 1984. If the subsequent arrears are not paid and the tenant challenges the title of the landlord, he is at liberty to file a suit and that actually gives him a fresh cause of action which is totally independent from the earlier cause of action. The earlier suit has been filed for the from the earlier cause of action. The earlier suit has been filed for the arrears less than 6 months and in the subsequent suit he has not claimed any arrears of rent. He has only based his plea of eviction on two grounds : on is default over six month without claiming arrears and the other is that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord. As the eviction has been claimed on the basis of the arrears of rent for over a period of six months and, therefore, the learned lower Court was perfectly justified in amalgamating these two suits. I, therefore, feel that the contention of Mr. Singhal cannot be sustained. 9. Mr. Singhal has also based his argument about the maintainability of the second suit under Order 2, Rule 2, CPC. That contention was not raised before the learned lower Court. He has cited certain authorities in support of that contention but I would not like to go in that because still the written statement has to be filed by the defendant in the subsequent suit and he can still take that plea in the written statement whether the subsequent suit is maintainable or not and, therefore, when there is no such decision on the point of the trial Court, this matter should not detain any further. 10. In the result, I find no force in this revision petition and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. *******