JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - The petitioners are rice millers in district Philibhit. They hold licence under the provisions of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. Licence is also held by them under the U. P. Foodgrains Dealers Licencing and Restriction on Hoarding Order, 1976 as well as under S. 17 of the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1964 (U. P. Act No, 25 of 1964). They make purchase of paddy from the producers which is hulled into rice at the rice mills belonging to them and then sold in open market after giving 60% of the rice to the State Government as required under the U. P. Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1985 issued under S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. On April 11, 1978 the State Government issued a notification under S. 8(l)(a) of the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 declaring that with effect from May 1,1978 agricultural produce mentioned in Schedule B (including rice and paddy) shall be included in the list of the specified agricultural produce of Market areas mentioned in Schedule A. Schedule A' covers 250 market areas comprised in various districts of this State. Schedule B refers to nearly 100 commodities. The State Government in exercise of the powers under S. 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam issued a notification, which is Annexure I-B to the writ petition, declaring that with effect from July 16, 1984, the date of publication of this notification in the gazette, the wholesale transaction of the agricultural produce in respect of the Philibhit Principal Market Yard of Philibhit Market Area specified in Schedule A appended thereto shall be conducted only within the Philibhit Principal Market Yard of Market Area specified in Schedule B. Following this there was directive issued by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Philibhit in March 1986 (vide Annexure 3-B) requiring the licenced traders such as the petitioners to apply within March 20, 1986, for the allotment of shops constructed in the Principal Market Yard. 2. Aggrieved the petitioners have approached this Court challenging the vires of S. 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam and also the validity of the notification dated July 16, 1984, besides the sanctity of the directive given by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Philibhit to the petitioners for shifting the wholesale transactions in rice and paddy to the Principal Market Yard. 3. 2. Aggrieved the petitioners have approached this Court challenging the vires of S. 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam and also the validity of the notification dated July 16, 1984, besides the sanctity of the directive given by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Philibhit to the petitioners for shifting the wholesale transactions in rice and paddy to the Principal Market Yard. 3. Various grounds were raised by Sri S. P. Agarwal counsel arguing for the petitioners which may broadly be categorised as under : - 1. In view of the declaration under Entry 52 List-1 of Schedule VII of the Constitution (as contained in Section 2 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958) the State Legislature had no competence to enact Section 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam; (2) The U.P. (Amendment) Act, 1979 (U.P. Act 19 of 1979) which substituted Section 7(2)(b) in its present form is ultra vires the Bill having been introduced in the State Legislature without the previous sanction of the President envisaged under the proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution; 3. Section 7(2)(b) is ultra vires Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution; 4. Section 7(2)(b) and the notification of the State Government issued thereunder on 16-7-1984 are inconsistent with the Essential Commodities Act and the U.P. Rice & Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1985 issued thereunder; 5. Section 7(2)(b) is inconsistent also with Section 17 Sale of Goods Act; 6. The notification issued under Section 6 of the Adhiniyam in the year 1966 did not cover paddy or rice and was not made in conformity with the procedural requirements nor was a subsequent notification made in modification after compliance to Sections 5, 6 and 8; 7. The Mandi Samiti has not provided requisite facilities or amenities for wholesale business to be carried on within the notified Principal Market Yard; 8. The rental fixed by the Mandi Samiti for the shops is exorbitant and arbitrary; 9. The notification dated 16-7-1984 cannot operate with respect to the mill premises of the petitioners Nos. 4, 6, 9, 11 and 16 situate outside the limits of the Principal Market Yard; Point No. 1 4. The Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 in Section 2 contains declaration to the effect : - "It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the rice milling industry". 5. The Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 in Section 2 contains declaration to the effect : - "It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the rice milling industry". 5. This declaration is under Entry 52 List-1, Schedule VII of the Constitution which reads : - "Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the Public interest". 6. The declaration as above is not an abstract proposition in itself. Section 2 we cannot read dehors the Act wherein it is contained. The Act prescribes the extent of control and specifies it. The declaration has to be construed strictly as it trenches upon the State legislative power. "The control has to be concrete and the mode and method of its exercise must be regulated by law" (Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Pr) Ltd. v. State of U.P.) (1980) 4 SCC 136 at P. 143 : (1980 All U 950 at Pp. 955-56). The Rice-Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 regulates the working of rice mills in the country with the object that the hand-pending industry gets . reasonable facilities for development and employment is provided for rural population and at the same time requisite facilities for converting paddy into rice are not curtailed. To carry out this object the Act provides for licensing of the rice-mills (see Section 6). Provision for revocation, suspension and amendment of licences is made in S. 7. A new rice mill may not be established except under and in accordance with a permit granted . under section 5 (see Section 8 ). Penalties for breach are laid down in S. 13. The marketing of hulled rice or purchases and sale of paddy or rice are significantly outside the purview of this Act. 7. Sri S. P. Agarwal counsel for the petitioners contends that there is take over of the rice milling industry under the 1958 Act of Parliament, and therefore, the State Legislature was not competent to enact S. 7(2)(b) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam). A little analysis serves to demonstrate that the submission lacks substance. 8. The relevant entries in List-II Seventh Schedule of the Constitution are : - Entry 28. Markets and fairs. Entry 26. A little analysis serves to demonstrate that the submission lacks substance. 8. The relevant entries in List-II Seventh Schedule of the Constitution are : - Entry 28. Markets and fairs. Entry 26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III. Entry 27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List-Ill. Entry 24. Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I. Entry 66. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any court. 9. In the Concurrent List Entry 33 (a) and (b) provides as follows : - (a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oil seeds and oils. 10. The Adhiniyam was enacted by the State Legislature with the Presidents assent and came into force on 10th Nov. 1964. The Preamble recites : - "An Act to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor". 11. The Statement of Objects and Reasons gives an insight into the material contents of the Adhiniyam and the back drop : - "The present chaotic state of affairs as obtaining in agricultural produce markets is an acknowledged fact. There are innumerable charges, levies and exaction which the agricultural, producer is required to pay without having any say in the proper utilisation of the amount so paid by them. In matters of dispute between the seller and the buyer, the former is generally put at a disadvantage by being given arbitrary awards. The produce is also denied a large part of his produce by manipulation and defective use of weights and scales in the market. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country have also been inviting the attention of the State Government from time to time towards improving the conditions of these markets. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country have also been inviting the attention of the State Government from time to time towards improving the conditions of these markets. The proposal to enact a marketing legislation was first taken up in 1938 but it could not go through as the then Ministry went out of y office soon after its inception. The Planning Commission stressed long ago the legislation in respect of regulation of markets should be enacted and enforced by 1955-56. Most of the other States have already passed legislation in this respect. The proposed measure to regulate the markets in this State has been designed with a view to achieving the following directions :- (i) to reduce the multiple trade charges, levies and exaction charged at present from the producer-seller; (ii) to produce the verification of accurate weights and scale and see that the producer-seller is not denied his legitimate due; (iii) to establish market committees in which agricultural producer will have his representation; (iv) to ensure that the agricultural producer has his say in the utilisation of market funds for the improvement of the market as a whole (v) to provide for fair settlement of disputes relating to the sale of agricultural produce : (vi) to provide amenities to the producer-seller in the market; (vii) to arrange for better storage facilities; (viii) to stop inequitable and unauthorised charges and levies from the producer-seller; and to make adequate arrangements for market intelligence with a view to posting the agricultural producer with the latest position in respect of the markets dealing with his produce". Vide U.P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated 4th August, 1964. 12. Provision is made for declaration of market Area with a view to regulate and control sale and purchase of agricultural produce therein. Principal Market Yard and sub-market Yard are carved out of it. Section 9 introduces licensing; trade charges other than those prescribed are impermissible vide Section 10. "Agricultural produce" is specified in the Schedule appended to the Adhiniyam vide Section 2 (a). Principal Market Yard and sub-market Yard are carved out of it. Section 9 introduces licensing; trade charges other than those prescribed are impermissible vide Section 10. "Agricultural produce" is specified in the Schedule appended to the Adhiniyam vide Section 2 (a). Section 7(2)(b) which is material for our purposes lays down as under: - "(2) The State Government, where it considers necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, may, by notification : - (b) declare that the wholesale transactions of all or any of the specified agricultural produce in respect of a market area shall be carried on only at a specified place or places within its principal market yard or sub-market yards". 13. Provision is made for charging market fee (Section 17) the superintendence, management and control is entrusted to the Mandi Samiti (Market Committee) which if superseded is represented by Administrator. This, in short, is the pith and substance of the Adhiniyam. 14. The settled principles in relation to the application of Article 246 read with the legislative entries are : - 1. A legislation falling exclusively, in its pith and substance, within any of the entries in List-II would be within the exclusive competence of the State legislature : - 2. A State law, which in its pith and substances, falls within any entry in List-II, would be valid even though it might incidentally touch upon a subject falling within List-I; 3. A State law, which in its pith and substance, dealt with a matter falling within List-I would be invalid and ultra vires the Constitution. "To resolve the controversy if it becomes necessary to ascertain to which entry in the three Lists, the legislation is referable, the Court has evolved the doctrine of pith and substance. If in pith and substance, the legislation falls within one entry or the other but some portion of the subject matter of the legislation incidentally trenches upon and might enter a field under another List, then it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though, it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence". 15. If in pith and substance, the legislation falls within one entry or the other but some portion of the subject matter of the legislation incidentally trenches upon and might enter a field under another List, then it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though, it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence". 15. If the entrenchment is minimal and does not affect the dominant part of some other entry, which is not within the competence of the State legislature, the Act may be upheld as constitutionally valid, vide I.T.C. v. State of Karnataka, 1985 Supple SCC 477 at p. 495 (see also : State of Karnataka v. Ranganath Reddy, (1977) 4 SCC 471 ; ( AIR 1978 SC 215 ). In Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd., (1972) 2 SCC 218 : ( AIR 1972 SC 2301 ) the Supreme Court considering the impact of Entry 18 List II read with Entry 42 List III on the one hand and Entry 52 List-I on the other laid down that effect is not the same thing as subject matter. The observation made, which the Court reaffirmed in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills case, (1980 All LJ 950) (supra) was : - "It seems to us clear that the State has legislative competence to legislate on Entry 18, List-II and Entry 42, List-Ill. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52, List I. Effect is not the same thing as subject matter. If a State Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in List-I it does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry in List II or List III. The object of Sections 4 and 5 seems to be to enable the State to acquire all the lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4(1). These provisions are really incidental to the exercise of the power of acquisition. The State cannot be denied a power to ascertain not be denied a power to ascertain what land should be acquired by it in the public interest". 16. Considered in this light it will be noticed that in its true nature and character, the Adhiniyam has its roots in Entries 28 and 66 of List II. The State cannot be denied a power to ascertain not be denied a power to ascertain what land should be acquired by it in the public interest". 16. Considered in this light it will be noticed that in its true nature and character, the Adhiniyam has its roots in Entries 28 and 66 of List II. The enactment is regulatory of the marketing of agricultural produce and provides for matters incidental thereto. The extent of control covered under the Central Act i.e. the Rice-Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, as we have just seen, moreover, is exclusive of marketing of the produce of the rice mills. That is not its subject matter. Therefore there is not merely no direct collusion or conflict between them, the Parliament evidently not intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject matter or to occupy the field. No question consequently of repugnance Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648 . The decision in M. A. Tulloch & Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 ' and Baij Nath Kedia, (1969) 3 SCC 838 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1436 ) are illustrative of cases in which the Parliament evinced intention to cover the whole field. To what extent a declaration under Entry 52 List I can go, it was held, is for Parliament to determine. Once this declaration is made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation "to the extent laid down" becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament. In this case the extent thereof being limited, the State Legislation does not entrench thereupon. 17. The sheet-anchor of Sri Agarwals arguments has been the Supreme Court's pronouncement in ITC Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1985 Suppl SCC 477) (supra) which, however, is clearly of no assistance to the petitioners. In this connection the provisions contained in the Central Act i.e. Tobacco Board Act, 1975 in that case must not be overlooked. The provisions are referred to in paragraph 8 at page 492 of the report and need not be reproduced. In this connection the provisions contained in the Central Act i.e. Tobacco Board Act, 1975 in that case must not be overlooked. The provisions are referred to in paragraph 8 at page 492 of the report and need not be reproduced. Suffice it may to notice that among the Boards powers were specifically included in that Act - (c) maintenance and improvement of existing markets, and development of new markets outside India for Indian Virgina tobacco and its products and devising of marketing strategy in consonance with demand for the commodity outside India, including group marketing under Limited brand names : (cc) establishment by the Board of auction platforms, with the previous approval of the Central Government, for the sale of Virginia tobacco by registered growers or curers, and functioning of the Board as an auctioneer at auction platforms established by or registered with it subject to such conditions as maybe specified by the Central Government;". 18. Under R. 35 of the Tobacco Board Rules, 1976. the market committees were debarred from auctioning or dealing in tabacco or its products unless they were registered with the Board. The Central provisions, in other words, cover also the marketing of tobacco or its products and, therefore, the provisions in the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 were held ultra vires the State Legislature encroaching as they did an occupied field, Fazal All J., representing the majority view laid down - "When the Parliament took over the tobacco industry without any preconditions or permutations and combinations and established a Tobacco Board for regulating the sale and purchase of tobacco under Entry 2 of List-I the entire field of tobacco industry was fully occupied and nothing remained for the States to do, and thus neither the doctrine of entrenchment nor that of pith and substance would have any application". The case before us is not even on the border-line there being no occupied field by the superiors Legislature and therefore, the competence of the State Legislature to enact S. 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam cannot be doubted. Point No. 2. 19. Section 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam was inserted by the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam., 1979 (L.P. Act 19 of 1979) which came into force on April 17, 1979. The two-fold arguments of the petitioners counsel are (1) that the assent of the President not having been obtained Cl. Point No. 2. 19. Section 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam was inserted by the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam., 1979 (L.P. Act 19 of 1979) which came into force on April 17, 1979. The two-fold arguments of the petitioners counsel are (1) that the assent of the President not having been obtained Cl. (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution does not save its validity and (2) that it would be hit by Article 301 and the proviso to Article 304 does not protect because the bill was introduced in the State legislature without the previous sanction of the President. As to (1), we hardly need add to what has been said above in discussing point No. 1 except to point that this is not a case of repugnance or inconsistency. The legislation is within the States own sphere not encroaching upon the Central area. In regard to (2) the concept of trade, commerce and intercourse postulated by Article 301 indisputedly recognises the need .and legitimacy of regulatory control. The Presidents sanction to the introduction of the Bill leading to the U.P. Act 19 of 1979 referred to for the respondents was communicated through letter dated May 9/10, 1979, according to the petitioners contention the Bill had been introduced earlier videlicet March 16, 1979. Assuming this as correct, it does not vitiate the enactment - the law being well settled that Regulatory measures do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution. (Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan etc. AIR 1962 SC 1406 ; Atiabari Tea Co. v. State Of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 Regulatory measures which, it was held, do not hamper trade, commerce and inter-course but facilitate them are not hit by Article 301. In the context of Sugar (Control) Order 1966 the expression reasonable restrictions was thus interpreted in P. P. Enterprises v. Union of India , (1982) 2 SCC 33 at p. 36-37 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1016 at Pp. 1018-1019) : - "The expression reasonable restrictions signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of that right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. 1018-1019) : - "The expression reasonable restrictions signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of that right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. No cut and dry test can be applied to each individual statute impugned, nor an abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable in all cases. The court in each case has to strike a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1 )(g) and the social control permitted by Cl. (6) of Article 19. By the impugned order the Central Government has only put an embargo on the dealers on keeping sugar in excess of the quantity specified. It was passed only with a view to prevent hoarding and black marketing, and to ensure equitable distribution and availability of sugar at fair prices in the open market". 20. The test is laid down in M/s. Laxmi Khansari v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 600 : ( AIR 1981 SC 873 ). The standard has to be objective designed to exercise social control by restricting the rights of the citizens where the necessities of the situation so demand. The object is to strike a just balance between the deprivation of right and danger or evil sought to be avoided. The restrictions may even be complete or permanent but they must bear "a close nexus with the object in the interest of which they are imposed", they must not, of course, be excessive or arbitrary. The central object of the Adhiniyam being the amelioration of existing marketing conditions concerning the agricultural produce and the elimination of evils attendant upon it, that cannot be sub served nor may the Market Committee superintend or the check be effective unless the traders are required to sell and purchase the produce in one complex. The provision is confined to wholesale transactions and the freedom to negotiate including as to the price, the custom, the quality is left unhampered. If there be no shifting insisted upon, the entire project may remain a paper transaction. The whole object of the Act is the supervision and control of the transactions of purchase by the traders from the agriculturists in order to prevent exploitation of the latter by the former. If there be no shifting insisted upon, the entire project may remain a paper transaction. The whole object of the Act is the supervision and control of the transactions of purchase by the traders from the agriculturists in order to prevent exploitation of the latter by the former. The supervision and control can be effective only in specified localities and places and not throughout the extensive market area Kewal Krishna Puri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 . This was reiterated in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U.P. etc., AIR 1980 SC 1124 ; (1980 All 490) in relation directly to the provisions of the Adhiniyam, observing : - "Nobody can be permitted to carry on his business anywhere in the Market area as the Market Committee will not be able control and levy fee throughout the Market area". 21. In R. K. Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1127 in reference to corresponding provisions of the Maharashtra Act, the Supreme Court reaffirmed : - "It cannot but be said that the establishment of a Principal and subsidiary markets for the marketing of declared agricultural produce and the bar against marketing operations being carried on elsewhere than in the market so established is only to further and to give effect to the purposes of the Act". Point No.3. 22. This is covered substantially by the discussion under point No. 2. Marketing in a developing country like ours has assumed very large proportions. The legislation on the subject intends to meet a long felt need of the society. In P. P. Kutti Kaya v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 621 the Division Bench dealt with the marketing legislation and need for the same and referred to the report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India. The Madras Act, it was observed, did undoubtedly restrict the freedom of a citizen to trade "as and where he wills" but the restrictions are reasonable and valid under Article 19(6). The Supreme Court affirmed this in M.C.V.S. Arunchala Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300 . The Madras Act, it was observed, did undoubtedly restrict the freedom of a citizen to trade "as and where he wills" but the restrictions are reasonable and valid under Article 19(6). The Supreme Court affirmed this in M.C.V.S. Arunchala Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300 . Subba Rao, J. tracing the historical background of marketing legislation observed : - "The Act, therefore, was the result of a long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by providing suitable and regulated market by eliminating middlemen and bringing face to face the producer and the buyer so that they may meet equal terms, thereby eradicating or at any rate reducing the scope for exploitation in dealings. Such a statute cannot be said to create unreasonable restrictions on the citizens right to do business unless it is clearly established that the provisions are too drastic, unnecessarily harsh and overreach the scope of the object to achieve which it is enacted". 23. In that Act also the provision was that after the markets were built or opened by the Marketing Committees, all growers had to resort to the market for vending their goods. The aim is to ensure equal bargaining powers, to prove storage accommodation and facilities for correct weight in addition to the elimination of various cuts and charges so that the growers may bring the agricultural produce to the market and sell them at reasonable prices. Clause (6) of Article 191 accords adequate protection to restrictions inherent in such a situation. The provisions, of the Act are neither so harsh nor so drastic as to constitute unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on trade. (Vishnu Dayal Mahendra Pal v. State of U.P., (1974)2SCC 306 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1489 ) Atma Ram Ratan Lail v. State of U.P., 1979 All U 126 (Division Bench). Another Bench of this Court in Vishal Traders v. State of U.P., 1983 All WC 204: (1983 All LJ 786) as well repelled the argument that the shifting of the Market Yard from one place to the other amounts to an unreasonable act or violates the petitioners fundamental rights under Article 19 or that it contravenes Article 301 of the Constitution. Point No. 4. 24. Point No. 4. 24. Grievance raised for the petitioner is that there is inconsistency with the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Licence in Form B issued under Cl. 4(3) of the U.P. Food grains Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976 provides in para 2 "2. (a) The licensee shall carry on the aforesaid business at the following place. (b) Food grains in which the aforesaid business is to be carried on shall not be stored at any place other than any of the god owns mentioned below and the following particulars in respect of each such godown shall be given (i) Mohalla (ii) House No. (iii) Bounded by Note : If the licensee stores his food grains in places other than those specified above he shall give an intimation thereof within 48 hours of its actual occupation and shall produce that licence for making requisite changes by the licensing authority." 25. The petitioners place of business is noted in the licence. It is argued that to require them to carry on business in a place other than that mentioned in the licence would entail breach of the Licensing Order, 1976 and may consequently lead to punishment under Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. That would, it is added, also contravene Cls. 5(1) and (2) of the U.P. Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order. 1985 and be impracticable. It was urged further that in terms of S. 4(2) of the Adhiniyam : - The Provisions of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the order made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in this Act or in any rule, bye-law or order made thereunder". 26. The argument was also made that section 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam would be ultra vires Sections 3/5 of the Essential Commodities Act based upon Entry 33 of List III of the Constitution. The contention to our mind is misconceived. There exists neither a state of collision or inconsistency nor does the Essential Commodities Act occupy the field. That Act has for its central object the equitable and fair distribution of essential commodities at reasonable rates; the Adhiniyam concerns the prevailing marketing conditions. Both may operate in their respective spheres. The contention to our mind is misconceived. There exists neither a state of collision or inconsistency nor does the Essential Commodities Act occupy the field. That Act has for its central object the equitable and fair distribution of essential commodities at reasonable rates; the Adhiniyam concerns the prevailing marketing conditions. Both may operate in their respective spheres. The Licence (Form B) no doubt has the column for specification of the place of business to ensure obviously that the licensing authority remains aware of it for purposes of effective checking etc. and it remains a matter of public knowledge. It does not restrain a change as has to be brought about by operation of law or as a result of vis-major. In any such event, the new place of business will get substituted for the old and moreover para 14 of the licence which reads." The licensee shall in a case where he functions in a regulated market abide by such instructions relating to his business as are given by the marketing authority having jurisdiction and in any other case by such body as may be recognised by the State Government in this behalf" would safeguard such a change. We do not discern inconsistency between the Licensing Order on the one hand and S. 7(2)(b) on the other. Nor may Cl. 5 of the Levy Order, 1985 come into conflict with the carrying out of the shifting to the Principal Market Yard in terms of S. 7(2)(b). As Sri B. D. Madhyan, learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti, rightly points out the attack against the shifting founded upon alleged inconsistency with the Control Orders under the Essential Commodities Act was negatived by brother Banerji, J. in W. P. No. 7736 of 1985 (Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Allahabad) dated 27-6-1985 with which we are in respectful agreement. Point No. 5. 27. For the petitioners the submission also is that S. 7(2)(b) of the Adhiniyam is ultra vires S. 17 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. It is deary untenable for obvious reasons. S. 17 is merely enabling in nature which defines the mode in which sale by sample may take place. The mode prescribed by rule 76 covered under S. 40(2)(xix) of the Adhiniyam envisages sale by open auction. This aims at openness and fairness designed to secure competitive prices. It is deary untenable for obvious reasons. S. 17 is merely enabling in nature which defines the mode in which sale by sample may take place. The mode prescribed by rule 76 covered under S. 40(2)(xix) of the Adhiniyam envisages sale by open auction. This aims at openness and fairness designed to secure competitive prices. The attack against its validity on ground of unreasonableness was repelled in Vishnu Dayal Mahendra Pal v. State of U.P. etc., (1974) 2 SCC 306 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1489 ) observing : - "In order that the producers obtain the best price for their commodity, sale by open auction is prescribed under Rule 76(1) to fulfil one of the important purposes of the Act. Sale by auction is a well known mode of sale by which the producers, for whose interest this Act has been made, can obtain the best price for their commodities. The definition of sale and purchase to which our attention has been drawn by the petitioners do not run counter to the provisions for auction-sale under Rule 76. It cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be an unreasonable mode in the entire scheme of the Act. The Legislature is intervening to see that the producers get the maximum pecuniary return possible in their transactions and, as a necessary concomitant, eliminated the mode of private sale by individual negotiations resulting in malpractices. Besides by the proviso to R. 76(1) the restriction is not allowed to operate in the case of retail sales. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission that R. 76(1) violates the fundamental right of the petitioners under-Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution". 28. Sale through auction does not moreover exclude sale by sample Rule 76(6) provides in this respect : - "(6) No deduction shall be made from the agreed price of the consignment, except on account of deviation from sample where purchase is made by sample, or on account of deviation from the standard where purchase is made by reference to a known standard, or on account of difference between the actual and the standard weight or measure". 29. The auction may well take place of rice or paddy in the principal market yard or sub-market yard, as the case may be, even by exhibiting them by samples. 29. The auction may well take place of rice or paddy in the principal market yard or sub-market yard, as the case may be, even by exhibiting them by samples. The Rule takes care to provide for deduction from the price if the quality delivered does not conform to the sample. There is neither inconsistency nor repugnance arising even against S. 7(2)(b) which relates to specification of the place where the transaction is to be conducted and not the mode of sale. 30. It was urged by Sri Agarwal that the situs may not be changed and that the case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 661 assists him in advancing this proposition. This in our view has only to be stated to be rejected, Suffice it does to extract para 33 at p. 682 of the report which interprets Article 286 (l)(a) and the Explanation thereto:- "The shifting of the situs of a sale or purchase from its actual situs under the general law to a fictional situs under the Explanation takes the sale or purchase out of the taxing powers of all States other than the State where the situs is fictionally fixed. That is all that Cl. (l)(a) and the Explanation do. Whether the delivery State will be entitled to tax such a sale or purchase will depend on the other provisions of the Constitution. The assignment of a fictional situs to a sale or purchase has no bearing or effect on the other aspects of the sale or purchase, e.g., its inter-State character or its export or import character which are entirely different topics. This fixing of a situs for a sale or purchase in any particular State either under the general law or under the fiction does not conclude the matter. It has yet to be ascertained whether that sale or purchase which by virtue of the Explanation has taken place in the delivery State was made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. For this purpose the explanation can have no relevancy or application at all.". Point No. 6. 31. Sri Agarwal submits then that paddy and rice were not included in the definition B of agricultural produce contained in S. 2(a) If of the original enactment. The Schedule to it the Adhiniyam was inserted by the U.P. (Amendment) Act. For this purpose the explanation can have no relevancy or application at all.". Point No. 6. 31. Sri Agarwal submits then that paddy and rice were not included in the definition B of agricultural produce contained in S. 2(a) If of the original enactment. The Schedule to it the Adhiniyam was inserted by the U.P. (Amendment) Act. 1970 which includes paddy and rice but, it is urged, there was no notification issued by the State Government as contemplated under Sections 6, 7 and 8 read with R. 129 and hence those Commodities may not fall within the purview of S. 7(2)(b) The contention does not bear scrutiny. 32. The Adhiniyam as originally enacted F defined agricultural produce in Section 2 (a)as under - "Agricultural produce means all or any of the produce of agriculture horticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry, and of forest whether processed or not". 33. According to the petitioners the State Government in the purported exercise of power under S. 6 of the Adhiniyam issued a notification in the year 1966 declaring the market area in respect of agricultural produce. The U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 (U.P. Act 10 of 1970) came into force on April 8, 1970. By S. 2 thereof the definition of agricultural produce appearing in S. 2(a) of the principal Act was amended and the Schedule introduced with retrospective effect (that is, with effect from 10-11-1964). In the Schedule paddy and rice are also included. Section 13 of the Amendment and Validation Act, 1970 validates declarations of market areas and additions to market areas providing as it does - "13. In the Schedule paddy and rice are also included. Section 13 of the Amendment and Validation Act, 1970 validates declarations of market areas and additions to market areas providing as it does - "13. Certain declarations of Market Areas and additions to Market Areas not to be invalid - Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Principal Act or in any rule made under that Act - (a) no declaration made or purporting to have been made prior to the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the (Ordinance of 1968), under sub-section (1) of Section 5 or under Section 6 of the Principal Act; and (b) no order made or purporting to have been made, prior to such commencement, under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the principal Act for including any area in a Market Area, shall be invalid or be deemed ever to have been invalid on the ground that the same was made only by notification in the Gazatte and not in the prescribed manner". 34. Likewise S. 14 validates declarations of principal market yards or sub-market yards. It follows that as a result of this Act (which was retrospective in operation) it was not required of the State Government to issue a fresh notification under S. 6 with respect to paddy or rice and the infirmity existing, if any, in the notification made earlier due to the alleged non-compliance to the provisions made in Sections 5, 6 and 8 or in any rule framed under the Act stood cured. In the .light of subsequent notifications, however, this is rendered of academic interest only. , 35. On June 29, 1970 through a notification issued under S. 5(1) of the Adhiniyam the State Government declared its intention to regulate the sale and purchase of the agricultural produce specified in respect of the area notified therein. Objections were invited thereto and it was followed by the notification dated January 6,1972 made under S. 6 where under the State Government declared with effect from January 30, 1972 the limits of Philibhit Market Area in respect of specified agricultural produce including rice and paddy. Objections were invited thereto and it was followed by the notification dated January 6,1972 made under S. 6 where under the State Government declared with effect from January 30, 1972 the limits of Philibhit Market Area in respect of specified agricultural produce including rice and paddy. In partial modification thereof the State Government issued notification dated March 15, 1977 under S. 5 read with S. 8(1 )(b) declaring the intention of the State Government to regulate the sale and purchase of agricultural produce mentioned in Schedule B (including rice and paddy) in the market Area mentioned in Schedule A. To this objections were invited through that notification and taken into consideration. This was followed by the notification No. 584/XII-8-104-76 dated April 11,1978 under S. 8(1)(a) declaring that with effect from May 1, 1978 that agricultural produce mentioned in Schedule B shall be included in the list specified agricultural produce of the market Area mentioned in Schedule A. The validity of this notification was upheld by the Division Bench in 1979 All LJ 126 (Atma Ram Ratan Lal v. State of U.P.) The Bench, inter alia, took note of the fact that objections had been invited to the proposed declaration and objections and suggestions received had been considered before this notification was issued. The contention for the petitioners that there should have been separate notifications concerning the area of each Mandi Samiti or that the consolidated notification inviting objections and suggestions, if any, does not meet the statutory requirements carries little force and is unacceptable. There is no sound basis either to hold that the objections and suggestions were not invited or that these were not duly considered as recited in the notification dated April 11, 1978 which is regarded a legislative act. 36. In paragraph 6 of the rejoinder affidavit filed by Girish Kumar a partner of the petitioner No. 11 firm claiming to be pairokar for others avers, among other things, that in issuing the notifications under section 6 and S. 7(2)(b) opinion of the Law Department was not obtained; these were not placed before Chief Minister or the Council of Ministers and thus the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution were not observed. Sri S. P. Agarwal referred this also in the course of his arguments. The allegations to say the least are reckless. Sri S. P. Agarwal referred this also in the course of his arguments. The allegations to say the least are reckless. The deponent purports to swear the entire para 6 - the whole of the affidavit paras 1 to 8 for that matter on personal knowledge. We have no hesitation to discard this as untrustworthy. Counsel is unable to satisfy us moreover as to how may this be regarded as justiciable or confer a right to the petitioners to assail the notifications on such basis. The impression that the notifications should have been placed before the Governor personally for his approval or signature is also mistaken apart from the counsel overlooking cl. (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution and its effects Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab ( (1974) 2 SCC 831 ) : ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ). Point No. 7:- 37. Learned counsel refers then to the complaint of the petitioners regarding the lack of requisite facilities in the notified Principal Market Yard. There may be no denying that there must be good roads, god owns, lavatories, canteen, electricity, telephones, post office, bank, police out post, etc. to enable carrying on the wholesale business in agricultural produce with reasonable convenience. From the material placed before us we find the Mandi Samiti is alive to this and there has been substantial effort made in this direction. Subsequent to the issue of the notification under S. 7(2)(b) dated 16th July, 1984 till about February, 1986, the Market Yard was held by the Food Corporation of India for store of grain. Thereafter the formal inauguration took place on June 25, 1986 but the trade was shifted in April, 1986 thereto. The shops in varying categories A, B and C are available for allotment; the god owns have also been raised, The counter-affidavits filed for the Mandi Samiti as well as the State Governments reveal that the provision for roads, electricity, drinking water, canteen etc. has been made building for the police outpost had been raised and steps were under way to have the outpost established. For establishing the branch of the bank and the post office too the Samiti had taken steps; the Samiti has undertaken to render all possible assistance in securing telephone connections and has in the meantime offered use of the phone installed in its office within the Market Yard. For establishing the branch of the bank and the post office too the Samiti had taken steps; the Samiti has undertaken to render all possible assistance in securing telephone connections and has in the meantime offered use of the phone installed in its office within the Market Yard. There is, it would appear, the lack of willing co-operation on the part of the concerned petitioners. Given the requisite determination to accept in the larger public interest that the "old order change yielding place to new" in a welfare State there is no good reason why such of the teething pains or inconveniences as are felt in the day to day working may not be eliminated before long. The observations made in R. K. Porwal, ( AIR 1981 SC 1127 ) (supra) furnish valuable guidelines which the Court has followed in these matters. "While a notification may be quashed if nothing has been done beyond publishing the notification, in cases where some facilities and conveniences have been provided but not some other which are necessary the Court , may instead of quashing the notification give appropriate time bound directions for providing necessary facilities and conveniences." 38. The notification under S. 47(2)(b) dated 20th November, 1981 involved in Khandsari and Grain Merchants Association Muzaffarnagar v. State of U. P. (W. P. 1318 of 1982) decided on 2nd March, 1982 also it will be noticed, was not quashed though in that case the requisite number of shops had still to be raised. In the case before us things have proceeded long ahead and for the Mandi Samiti it is undertaken also, moreover, to extend all reasonable assistance with promptitude to remedy such other inconvenience as the traders bring to notice after having commenced the transactions. We hope and trust that there will be no occasion for genuine complaint on this score. Point No. 8 39. From the letter of the Secretary, Mandi Samiti dated March 20, 1986 vide Annexure 3A to the writ petition it would appear that the shops constructed in the Principal Market Yard are of three categories-A, B and C. The rental is Rs. 790/-, 700 and Rs. 240/- per month respectively. In the , counter-affidavit there is specification made of the accommodation and its capacity. 790/-, 700 and Rs. 240/- per month respectively. In the , counter-affidavit there is specification made of the accommodation and its capacity. Category A comprises of one room and a godown of the capacity of storing 100 M.T. Category B consists of one Gaddi and a godown capable of storing 50 M.T. or 500 bags of food grains; category C has one godown and one verandah capable of storing 150 bags of food grains. In addition there are available two god owns of the capacity of 1000 M.T. and two other god owns of the capacity of 200 M.T. for which no rent is charged separately. The contention of Sri Mandhyan for the Mandi Samiti is that the cost of construction is the chief factor taken into account for assessing the monthly rental. Counsel for the petitioners argued that Mandi Samiti has accumulated funds constituting of collections made of market fee and the shops raised are from that fund. The case is of recurring service which would need be rendered by the Mandi Samiti in future also. With the growing industrialisation and the rise in population the demand for further expansion is bound to be pressing. The outlook no doubt does not have to be of rack-renting or commercial but we do not find adequate justification to restrict the Mandi Samiti to nominal maintenance charges only as suggested for the petitioners. It was urged that in the neighbouring districts the rental charged is much less. In the absence of requisite dates we are not aware of the costs incurred in construction at those places which may vary also in part with the difference in the period when the shops came to be raised. The nature and extent of the godown facilities available at those place is also not distinctly present before us. Our attention was drawn in this connection to the U. P. Agricultural Markets Project submitted by the State Agricultural Produce Markets Board Act, 1981 which is referred to in U. P. Forest Corporation v. State of U. P. (Writ Petn. No. 2358 of 1981 and the connected writ petitions including the Writ Petn. No. 13941 of 1981) decided by a Division Bench on January 28, 1983 in the context of the imposition of the market fee which is not in issue before us. No. 2358 of 1981 and the connected writ petitions including the Writ Petn. No. 13941 of 1981) decided by a Division Bench on January 28, 1983 in the context of the imposition of the market fee which is not in issue before us. The project contemplates that 38.76 of the total costs of the project shall be met by the European Economic Community and 4.15% by loan from the State Agricultural Board and the rest to be raised by the Regional Marketing Committee, from the market fee, licences fee, income from sale forms, interest on deposits and subsidies from the State Government and the Government of India. The investment which the Market Committee makes in raising this construction is expected also to yield reasonable return so that the fund keeps on flowing and there is no stagnation brought about after the lapse of certain time. It is difficult to uphold on mere conjectures that the Committee has resorted to profiteering nor is there indication that it was indulged into charging premium. We are not persuaded consequently to strike down the rental as exorbitant or arbitrary. Point No. 9:- 40. The rice mills belonging to the petitioner Nos. 4, 6, 9, 11 and 16, argues the learned counsel are situate outside the notified limits of the Principal Market Yard to which mention is made in the impugned notification dated 16th July, 1984 issued under S. 7(2)(b) and, therefore, in its terms assuming that the notification is valid, it may not be applied to these petitioners Nos. 4, 6, 9, 11 and 16. It appears the Principal Market Yard notified under S. 7(1) of the Adhiniyam corresponded to the municipal limits of Philibhit. In the counter-affidavit filed for the Mandi Samiti it is not disputed that the rice mills of these five petitioners are situate outside the municipal limits. Section 7(2)(b) no doubt empowers the State Government to declare that wholesale transactions of specified agricultural produce "in respect of a market area" shall be carried on only at specified place within its principal market yard but the State Government has not chosen to exercise the powers to that extent through the notification dated 16th July, 1984. Instead the State Government confines its scope to wholesale transactions of specified agricultural produce "in respect of the Principal Market Yard", that is, within the municipal limits of Philibhit. Instead the State Government confines its scope to wholesale transactions of specified agricultural produce "in respect of the Principal Market Yard", that is, within the municipal limits of Philibhit. In other words, it ordains that wholesale transactions in such produce as are carried on within Philibhits municipal limits shall henceforth be carried on only within the Principal Market Yard - the boundaries whereof are given in Schedule-B to the notification, which admittedly, are outside the municipal area. The wholesale transactions carried on by these petitioners are in respect of the market area, it is true,1 but this being not with respect to municipal limits these fall outside the purview of the impugned notification. 41. The petition is dismissed except that in relation to the petitioners Nos. 4, 6, 9, 11 and 16 we direct the respondent No. 1, namely, the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Philibhit, not to compel these petitioners to shift to the Principal Market Yard in pursuance of the Notification No. 2220/X 11-5-600(7)-84 dated July 16, 1984 (Vide Annexure-B to the writ petition). The interim order dated August 25, 1986 is vacated accordingly. Costs on parties. 42. Immediately on the judgment being pronounced, Sri S. P. Agarwal, counsel for the petitioner, made a prayer orally that leave be granted for appeal to the Supreme Court. In deciding this case we have proceeded on settled principles and, in our view, this does not give rise to substantial question of law of general importance such as may require decision of the Supreme Court. The leave prayed for is, therefore, refused.