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1987 DIGILAW 445 (KER)

Beena Philipose v. State of Kerala

1987-09-03

K.S.PARIPOORNAN, K.SREEDHARAN

body1987
Judgement SREEDHARAN, J. :- These Original Petitions are by a sister and brother. It was alleged that they secured admission to the M.B.B.S. Degree Course by producing fake mark lists showing inflated marks in the qualifying examinations. The Syndicate of the University of Kerala enquired into the matter, found them guilty of manipulating the mark lists and consequently cancelled the examinations taken by them. They challenge the said action of the Syndicate. 2. A Division Bench of this court while disposing of a batch of Original Petitions by judgement dated 23-12-1981 detected various irregularities in the conduct of examinations, preparation of mark lists and in the admission of students to various professional courses. In pursuance to the said decision, when the authorities enquired into the various aspects relating to the admission of students to professional courses, a large number of malpractices came to light. Bogus and fake mark lists were seen to have been used for securing admission to professional courses like medicine and engineering. It was revealed that the petitioners herein had resorted to such means in securing admission to M.B.B.S. Degree Course. Consequently, proceedings were taken against them and the University of Kerala passed Ext. P18 in O.P. No. 6898 of 1986 and Ext. P20 in O.P. No. 6906 of 1986, cancelling the examinations taken by the petitioners and debarring them from appearing in any examinations of the University to be conducted in future. The petitioners challenge the above orders. 3. Substantially identical questions arise in these Original Petitions. Therefore, we consider it advantageous to dispose of these original Petitions by a common judgement. We will narrate the short facts in O.P. No. 6898 of 1986 for a proper understanding of the case. The petitioner therein, namely, Smt. Beena Philipose, passed her B.Sc. Degree Examination in April, 1977. She got herself admitted to the M.B.B.S. Degree Course in the Medical College, Trivandrum. While she was in the fourth year, on 29-12-1981, the police filed a First Information Report, Ext. P1 in this case, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Trivandrum. On 5-1-1982, the principal of the Medical College suspended the petitioner from the college as per Ext. P2 order. She challenged that order before this court by filing O.P. No. 249 of 1982. By Ext. P3 order dated 4-6-1982, the Controller of Examinations informed the petitioner that her results in B. Sc. On 5-1-1982, the principal of the Medical College suspended the petitioner from the college as per Ext. P2 order. She challenged that order before this court by filing O.P. No. 249 of 1982. By Ext. P3 order dated 4-6-1982, the Controller of Examinations informed the petitioner that her results in B. Sc. Degree Examination and the first year M.B.B.S. Examination have been quashed and that she has been debarred from appearing in any examination till the enquiry against her is finally disposed of. Ext. P3 was challenged by the petitioner in O.P. No. 4232 of 1982. On 1-1-1983, the Controller of Examinations by Ext. P4 memo informed the petitioner that her results in the B.Sc. Degree Examination and the first year M.B.B.S. examination have been suspended and that she has been debarred from appearing in any examination pending enquiry into the alleged mark list forgery case. Enquiry Officer appointed by the Syndicate issued Ext. PS memo of charges on 13-5-1982. The petitioner gave Ext. P6 reply on 5-6-1982. She wanted the assistance of a lawyer in the enquiry. When that was denied, she approached this court by filing O.P. No. 10195 of 1982. This court dismissed Original Petition Nos. 249 of 1982 and 4232 of 1982 along with similar Original Petitions filed by others, on 28-2-1983. O.P. No. 7733 of 1985 filed by the petitioner praying for a direction to allow her to continue her studies and to appear in the examinations, was dismissed by this court on 14-10-1985. Writ Appeal No. 511 of 1985 filed against the said decision was dismissed in limine on 30-10-1985. While disposing of O.P. No. 10195 of 1982 on 6-11-1985, this court allowed the petitioner to be represented by a lawyer at the enquiry. A new Enquiry Officer was appointed by the University. He issued a fresh memo of charges on 7-12-1985. The petitioner approached this court by filing O.P. No. 11084 of 1985 for quashing the said memo of charges. The Standing Counsel representing the University reported to this Court that the Enquiry Officer has resigned on account of the filing of the Original Petition and that a new Enquiry Officer will be appointed in his place. On the basis of that representation, this court disposed of O.P. No. 11084 of 1985. Thereupon the 5th respondent was appointed Enquiry Officer. He issued Ext. P9 memo of charges on 21-2-1986. On the basis of that representation, this court disposed of O.P. No. 11084 of 1985. Thereupon the 5th respondent was appointed Enquiry Officer. He issued Ext. P9 memo of charges on 21-2-1986. He conducted the enquiry and filed his report, Ext. P16, dated 23-4-1986. The petitioner was served with a copy of the report and was asked to show cause why her B. Sc. Degree Examination should not be cancelled, why the Senate be not recommended to cancel the B. Sc. Degree conferred on her, why the M.B.B.S. Examinations taken by her during her course of study be not cancelled and why she be not permanently debarred from appearing in any examination of the University. The petitioner gave her reply, Ext. P17 on 23-5-1986. After considering the report and the explanation given by the petitioner the Syndicate passed final order, Ext. P18 dated 19-7-1986. 4. As stated earlier, Ext. P18 in O.P. No. 6898 of 1986 and Ext. P20 in O.P. 6906 of 1986, both dated 19-7-1986, are under challenge. The main grounds of attack are : (i) The Syndicate has no authority to pass orders like those dated 19-7-1986 impugned in these petitions, (ii) The enquiry conducted by the member of the Syndicate was in violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) The impugned orders were passed on no evidence, and (iv) The University should not have passed orders like those impugned in these petitions after long lapse of time. Before dealing with the above grounds of attack, it is pertinent to note that the petitioners did not question the authority of the Syndicate to pass the final orders impugned before us. After the enquiry report was received the Syndicate issued notices to the petitioners calling upon them to show cause why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. In the objection filed by the petitioners, they did not demur to the competence of the Syndicate to impose the punishment. When the competence of the Syndicate was not challenged before the Syndicate, the petitioners cannot raise that question before this court for the first time in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. In Trivandrum Co-Operative District Wholesale Society v. Dy. When the competence of the Syndicate was not challenged before the Syndicate, the petitioners cannot raise that question before this court for the first time in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. In Trivandrum Co-Operative District Wholesale Society v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trivandrum 1975 Ker LT 589 : (AIR 1976 Ker 124), a Division Bench of this Court observed : "It is thus clear that this court has been for nearly two decades declining jurisdiction when the lack of jurisdiction of a Tribunal or authority was not taken before that Tribunal or authority but was urged for the first time in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. The exercise of a writ jurisdiction being discretionary in nature this court ordinarily must exercise its discretion against those who take the chance of a decision and were not diligent enough to urge the lack of jurisdiction of a Tribunal or authority before the Tribunal or authority itself." On this short ground, these Original Petitions are liable to be dismissed. Even so, we will proceed to deal with the contentions raised by the petitioners. 5. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the Syndicate has jurisdiction in relation to the conduct of examinations alone. Once the results of the examinations are announced, and the certificate or degree granted, the Syndicate has no jurisdiction to cancel the examination taken by the candidate. The certificate or the degree can only be cancelled by the Senate. The Senate did not decide to cancel the certificates or degrees granted to the petitioners. So they contended that the impugned orders are illegal and have to be ignored. 6. Section 5 of the Kerala University Act, 1974, enumerates the powers of the University. Clause (v) of that Section enables the University to grant diplomas, certificates or other distinctions to persons who shall have pursued a prescribed course of study under prescribed conditions. Clause (vi) of the same Section gives power to the University to withdraw or cancel degrees, titles, diplomas, certificates or other distinctions under conditions that may be prescribed by the Statutes, after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity to present his case. Section 19 of the Act deals with the powers and functions of the Senate. Clause (vi) of the same Section gives power to the University to withdraw or cancel degrees, titles, diplomas, certificates or other distinctions under conditions that may be prescribed by the Statutes, after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity to present his case. Section 19 of the Act deals with the powers and functions of the Senate. Sub-Sec. (j) to Cl.(2) of that Section empowers the Senate to cancel any degree, diploma, title or any other distinction granted to any person in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes. The powers of the Syndicate are dealt with in S.23 of the Act. Clause (xv) of this Section empowers the Syndicate to conduct University Examination and approve and publish the results thereof. Clause (xxi) gives power to the Syndicate to withhold or cancel the result of any candidate at any University Examination. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the University granted Degree and certificates to the petitioners showing that they had successfully completed the Degree examination and pre-Degree examinations. The degree and certificate must be deemed to have been issued by the Senate and it could be cancelled only by the Senate as provided by Sub-Sec. (j) of Cl.(2) of S.19. The Syndicate which could not have cancelled the certificate has now resorted to a dubious method of canceling the examination and it is ultra vires its powers. 7. To appreciate the above argument, for disposal of O.P. No. 6906 of 1986, it is necessary to see whether the Pre-Degree Certificate can be considered to be a certificate issued by the Senate. Chapter 5 of the University First Statutes deals with the powers of the Senate. Clause (ii) of this chapter empowers the Senate to grant diplomas, titles, certificates and other academic distinctions to persons who shall have pursued a prescribed course of study under prescribed conditions. Chapter 27 of the University First Statutes enumerates the various degrees, diplomas, certificates and titles that may be conferred by the University. The certificate of Pre-Degree Examination is not one mentioned therein. In this circumstance, the certificate granted on successful completion of the Pre-Degree Course cannot be considered to be a certificate granted by the Senate which could be cancelled only by the Senate. Therefore, it cannot be said that the senate is the only authority which can cancel a certificate. The certificate of Pre-Degree Examination is not one mentioned therein. In this circumstance, the certificate granted on successful completion of the Pre-Degree Course cannot be considered to be a certificate granted by the Senate which could be cancelled only by the Senate. Therefore, it cannot be said that the senate is the only authority which can cancel a certificate. Now we will have to consider whether the Syndicate has got power to cancel the Pre-Degree Examinations taken by the petitioners. As stated earlier, Cl.(xxi) of S.23 of the Kerala University Act, empowers the Syndicate to cancel the result of a candidate at any University Examination. This power of the Syndicate is subject to the provisions contained in the Act and Statutes. Chapter 6 of the Kerala University First Statutes relates to the Syndicate. Clause (3) therein enumerates the powers and duties of the Syndicate. Sub cls.(xxv) and (xxvi) of Cl.(3), Chapter 6 are relevant for deciding the issue before us. We read the same : "(xxv) The Syndicate, may cancel the examination of a candidate and/or debar him/her from appearing at any examination of the University for one or more years, if it is discovered afterwards that the candidate was in any manner guilty of misconduct in connection with his/her examination and/or was instrumental in the tampering of the University records including the answer books, mark sheets, result sheets, diploma and the like; (xxvi) The Syndicate may cancel the examination of a candidate and/or debar him/her from appearing at an examination of the University for one or more years, if it is discovered afterwards that the candidate had obtained admission to the examination by misrepresentation of facts or by submitting false certificates or by forging documents." Sub-clause (xxv) quoted above is clear enough to indicate that the Syndicate can cancel the examination of a candidate if it is established that the candidate had tampered with the mark-sheet given by the University. Argument of the learned counsel is that the Syndicate is concerned with the conduct of the examination and the publication of result alone. Once the results are published, it is argued, the Syndicate cannot cancel the examination. This is devoid of any substance in view of the specific provisions in the Statutes quoted above. Tampering of a mark-sheet can happen only after the results are published and mark lists issued thereafter. Once the results are published, it is argued, the Syndicate cannot cancel the examination. This is devoid of any substance in view of the specific provisions in the Statutes quoted above. Tampering of a mark-sheet can happen only after the results are published and mark lists issued thereafter. If it is found that such a mark-sheet has been tampered with, the examination taken by the candidate can be cancelled at a later stage. 8. Chapter 7 of the University First Ordinances, 1978, deals with the conduct of examinations. Ordinance 23 in that Chapter is in the following terms. "Debarring candidates and quashing results : If at any time after the publication of results, it is found that a candidate was not eligible for taking the examination, on that he has secured admission to the course or the examination, or production of false information in the application form or that he has used unfair means at an examination, the Syndicate shall have power to quash the results of thee examination, taken by the candidate, and/or debar him from appearing for any examination of the University permanently or for a specified period according to the gravity of the offence committed by the candidate." "Provided further that it shall be competent for the Syndicate to suspend the results already published of a candidate suspected of having resorted to unfair means at an examination taken by him pending an enquiry into the result. On the basis of the enquiry, report, the Syndicate shall also have the power to quash or cancel results of the candidate in the examination taken by him while the enquiry proceedings over the use of unfair means at that examination were pending." This provisions makes it clear that the Syndicate has not only got the power to cancel the examination taken by a candidate wherein he had secured admission on production of false information but also to debar him from appearing for any examination in future. A combined reading of the Statutes and Ordinances quoted above shows that Syndicate has power not only to cancel the examination, mark list of which has been tampered but also the subsequent examinations taken by the candidate, the admission to which has been secured by production of false information as well. A combined reading of the Statutes and Ordinances quoted above shows that Syndicate has power not only to cancel the examination, mark list of which has been tampered but also the subsequent examinations taken by the candidate, the admission to which has been secured by production of false information as well. In this view of the matter, we hold that the Syndicate acted well within its competence to pass an order in the nature of Ext. P18 in O.P. No. 6898 of 1986 and Ext. P20 in O.P. No. 6906 of 1986, cancelling the Degree and Pre-Degree Examinations and the ubsequent examinations, taken by the petitioners. 9. Coming to O.P. No. 6898 of 1986, the learned Counsel argued that the Degree granted to the petitioner can be cancelled only in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter 31 of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1974. The said provision reads as follows : "1. Procedure : If evidence is laid before the Syndicate to show that any person on whom a degree, title or other distinction has been conferred or to whom a diploma, licence or certificate has been granted by the Senate, has been convicted of what in their opinion is an offence involving moral delinquency, the Syndicate may propose to the Senate that the degree, diploma, title, licence, certificate or other distinction shall be cancelled, and if the proposal is accepted by not less than two-thirds of the members present at a meeting of the Senate and is confirmed by the Chancellor, the degree, diploma, title, licence, certificate or other distinction shall be cancelled accordingly. Provided that before cancellation of the degree, diploma, title, licence, certificate, or other distinction of a person, the person affected shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case." Since, according to the learned Counsel, the above provisions have not been satisfied, the Syndicate was wrong in passing Ext. P18 order in O.P. No. 6898 of 1986. Hence, according to the Counsel, the order is void and has only to be ignored. We find it difficult to accept this argument. As stated earlier, the Syndicate has got the power to cancel the examination. By Ext. P18, the Syndicate cancelled the B.Sc. degree examination taken by the petitioner and decided to recommend to the Senate for cancelling the B.Sc. Degree conferred on her. We find it difficult to accept this argument. As stated earlier, the Syndicate has got the power to cancel the examination. By Ext. P18, the Syndicate cancelled the B.Sc. degree examination taken by the petitioner and decided to recommend to the Senate for cancelling the B.Sc. Degree conferred on her. In other words, the Syndicate has not cancelled the degree conferred on the petitioner. The Senate has to consider the validity or otherwise of the recommendation made to it by the Syndicate and a decision should be arrived at. Unless and until the Senate takes a decision on the above recommendation of the Syndicate, it cannot be stated that the degree conferred on the petitioner has been cancelled, since the Syndicate has not taken a decision to that effect. We think that it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the circumstances contemplated by Chapter 31 of the University first statutes are satisfied or not because the Senate has not taken a decision on the issue. 10. The learned Counsel would argue that the cancellation of the B.Sc. Degree Examination taken by the petitioner will tantamount to cancellation of the B.Sc. Degree conferred on her. According to the Counsel, if the Senate is not accepting the recommendation made to it by the Syndicate, it will lead to an anomalous situation of the petitioner having the degree while the examination taken by her stood cancelled by the impugned order. According to the Counsel, the only authority competent to act was the Senate. It having not taken any decision, it is submitted that the order of the Senate is ultra vires its powers. We find it difficult to countenance this argument. If the Senate cancels the Degree and the Syndicate takes no decision to cancel the examination, a similar anomalous situation would arise. On such a contingency the result of the examination will continue to be in force while the degree stood cancelled, if the Syndicate does not fall in line with the decision taken by the Senate. In a situation where the degree is to be cancelled necessarily the examination taken by the candidate must also be cancelled. It would be better to have the Degree and Examination cancelled simultaneously or in quick succession. In the instant case, the Syndicate decided to recommend to the Senate to cancel the B. Sc. Degree conferred on the petitioner. In a situation where the degree is to be cancelled necessarily the examination taken by the candidate must also be cancelled. It would be better to have the Degree and Examination cancelled simultaneously or in quick succession. In the instant case, the Syndicate decided to recommend to the Senate to cancel the B. Sc. Degree conferred on the petitioner. Before the Senate could consider that recommendation the petitioner has approached this court by filing this Original Petition. Therefore, the Senate did not take a decision on the recommendation of the Syndicate. If the Senate chooses to accept the recommendation of the Syndicate, no stalemate will arise. In case the Senate differs from the view taken by the Syndicate, then the Syndicate will have to fall in line with the said decision. In such circumstances also no anomalous situation will be created. Since the Senate has not taken a decision on the recommendation made to it by the Syndicate, we do not think it necessary to go into this aspect any further. Thus we find no merit in the first contention raised by the petitioners. 11. The second contention raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the 5th respondent conducted the enquiry in violation of the principles of natural justice. In Union of India v. T.R. Varma AIR 1957 SC 882, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed : "Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them." On the basis of the above statement of law, it was contended that the evidence of the University should have been taken in the presence of the petitioners. Since, no witness was examined in their presence and no evidence let in their presence, it is contended that the enquiry conducted by the 5th respondent was violative of the principles of natural justice. Since, no witness was examined in their presence and no evidence let in their presence, it is contended that the enquiry conducted by the 5th respondent was violative of the principles of natural justice. In State of Mysore v. Sivabasappa, AIR 1963 SC 375, another Constitution Bench considered the effect of the observation "the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence", made in the earlier cited decision. The same learned Judge, Venkatarama Aiyar, J., who delivered the judgement in the earlier case observed : "What was actually under consideration was the procedure to be followed by quasi-judicial bodies in holding enquiries and the decision was that they were not bound to adopt the procedure followed in Courts, and that it was only necessary that rules of natural justice should be observed. Discussing next what those rules required, it was observed that the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation. When the evidence is oral, normally the examination of the witness will in its entirety, take place before the party charged, who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him, and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word, and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities, and rules of natural Justice are matters not of form but of substance. In our opinion they are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies thereof given to the person charged, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine them." The Court proceed to state : "Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not Courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity had been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in Courts." In Prem Prakash Kaluniva v. Punjab University AIR 1972 SC 1408, dealing with the natural justice contemplated in an enquiry to be conducted by the University Authorities, it was observed : "The law on this point is well settled that an examinee must be adequately informed of the case he has to meet and given a full opportunity of meeting it. As to what the extent and content of that information should or ought to be would depend on the facts of each case. The examinee can ask for more information or details with regard to the material or evidence which may be sought to be used against him and normally if he makes a request in that behalf, the University authorities, in order to inform him adequately of the case he has to meet, would supply him the necessary particulars or details of the evidence. In the very nature of things no hard and fast rule can be laid down and so long as the court is satisfied that the opportunity which was afforded to the examinee was adequate and sufficient, it will not interfere with any orders prejudicial to him which may have been made by the University Authorities." Again in Hira Nath Mishra v. Principal Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, AIR 1973 SC 1260, dealing with an enquiry conducted by the Educational Authorities, Their Lordships quoted with approval the observation of Harman, J. in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd., (1958) 2 All ER 579. "What, then, are the requirements of natural justices in a case of this kind ? "What, then, are the requirements of natural justices in a case of this kind ? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith, I do not think that there really is anything more." In Hira Nath Mishra v. Principal Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, AIR 1973 SC 1260 : (1974) 1 SCJ 223. Their Lordships had to consider whether the statements given by the girl students who were molested by the male students should be recorded in the presence of delinquent students. In the enquiry the girls were neither examined in the presence of delinquent students nor copies of their statements given to the accused. The Supreme Court sustained the action taken by the College Authorities, observing : "the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application depends upon several factors." We have dealt with these aspects in detail in a judgement delivered separately today in O.P. 3320/1983 and W.A. No. 127/84, - the cases which were heard along with these cases. 12. In the instant case the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contend that the tabulated statements of marks submitted by the petitioners to secure admission in medical college and the statement given by Sri D. Krishnankutty Nair were recorded behind the back of the petitioners and so the proceedings were violative of the well known principles of natural justice. We find it difficult to accept this argument. The entire files relating to the enquiry conducted by the 5th respondent were made available to us by the learned Counsel representing the University. It contains copies of letters sent to the petitioner by the 5th respondent. The copy of letter sent to petitioner in O.P. 6898/86 reads as follows : "At the time of the hearing on 17-3-1986 and 19-3-1986, only the extract of marks from the University records were shown to you. The Controller of Examinations produced the original records for verification on 21-3-1986. I accepted the same as evidence. In the light of this, it is only fair that you are also given a chance to peruse this record the Controller produced before the Enquiry Officer. The Controller of Examinations produced the original records for verification on 21-3-1986. I accepted the same as evidence. In the light of this, it is only fair that you are also given a chance to peruse this record the Controller produced before the Enquiry Officer. Hence you are requested to be present at 11-30 a.m. on Saturday 5-4-1986 at the Syndicate Room of the University to peruse the record. You can bring your Advocate also for this verification. If you want to examine the University Officers who are in charge of these records, that can also be permitted. If you fail to turn up at 11-30 a.m. on Saturday 5-4-1986 at the Syndicate Room of the University, it will be presumed that you are not interested in perusing the Original Record made available by the University and decision will be taken basing on all available facts and records." The minutes prepared by the 5th respondent on 5-4-1986 is in the file. It states : "the statement made by Shri D. Krishnankutty Nair was recorded and a copy taken by the accused." The petitioners were represented by advocate before the Enquiry Officer. That advocate had not filed any objection before the Enquiry Officer about his having been denied a fair opportunity to put forward the case of the petitioners. The enquiry report states : "The controller of Examinations produced before the Enquiry Officer the original tabulated statements of marks on 21-3-1986. Beena Philipose was asked to be present on 5-4-1986 for perusal of these records as well as the statement of marks, submitted by the Director, Medical Education, kept in Medical College, Trivandrum (Ext. No. 7). On 5-4-1986, the original consolidated result sheets of marks obtained by Beena Philipose for Part I English, Part II Malayalam of April 1976, Part II Malayalam alone of September 1976 and Part III Chemistry (Main), Mathematics and Physics, subsidiaries of April 1977. photostat copies attached (Ext. No. 8). the Statement of Marks submitted by Beena Philipose to secure admission in Medical College kept in Medical College and submitted by the Director, Medical Education (Ext. No. 9), the statement given by D. Krishnankutty Nair (Ext. No. 10) and other records supplied from office were also presented for perusal by Beena Philipose," What the petitioner has stated in the Original petition is as follows : "On 5-4-1986, no original or primary records were seen produced. No. 9), the statement given by D. Krishnankutty Nair (Ext. No. 10) and other records supplied from office were also presented for perusal by Beena Philipose," What the petitioner has stated in the Original petition is as follows : "On 5-4-1986, no original or primary records were seen produced. Only a bunch of tabulation sheets stitched together and containing entries of marks of several students including the petitioner, purporting to be those of B.Sc. Examinations held in April, 1977, alone were shown to her. The petitioner objected to the acceptance of the said sheets which were not authenticated or certified to be true by any one. In view of the said objections, no evidence was taken by the enquiry officer on 5-4-1986 also." We are not in a position to place any reliance on this statement of the petitioner because of the facts available in the file, the contents of the letter sent to the petitioner and the categorical findings in the enquiry report detailed herein above. 13. In view of what has been stated above, we hold that the 5th respondent acted strictly in compliance with the principles of natural justice in conducting the enquiry. Accordingly, we overrule the objection raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. 14. On going through the report, Ext. P16, submitted by the 5th respondent, we do not find our way to agree with the arguments of the petitioners that the report is based on no evidence. In dealing with the validity of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer and the decision arrived at on it, the High Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the authority concerned. Its jurisdiction is limited, if the order in question is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court may quash it. But the conclusion that the order in question is not supported by any evidence must be rejected after considering the question as to whether the probabilities and circumstantial evidences do not justify that conclusion. In the case before us the Enquiry Officer went into all relevant circumstances and documents. He, after appreciating those matters came to a reasonable conclusion of finding the petitioners guilty of the charges levelled against them. The conclusion arrived at by the Enqiury Officer cannot be rejected on the ground that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion. He, after appreciating those matters came to a reasonable conclusion of finding the petitioners guilty of the charges levelled against them. The conclusion arrived at by the Enqiury Officer cannot be rejected on the ground that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion. We are of the opinion that there were sufficient materials before the Enquiry Officer and based on those materials he came to a reasonable conclusion. In this view of the matter we find no infirmity in the report submitted by the 5th Respondent. 15. According to the learned Counsel, the University had verified all the mark lists submitted by them, before they were admitted to the M.B.B.S. Examinations taken by them. On such examinations no malpractice could be found and they were allowed to take the examination. Thereafter, it is urged that the University cannot cancel the examinations on the ground that they used fake mark lists for securing admission to the M.B.B.S. Course. We do not find any substance in this argument. In the Enquiry Report, the 5th respondent has recorded the steps taken by the Office of the Kerala University, while admitting a student to the M.B.B.S. Examination. They are : "1. Whether the name entered in the application for examination is correct as per the qualifying certificate; 2. Whether the student has studied physics, chemistry and Biology as optionals at the Pre-Degree stage or passed the B.Sc. degree Examination; 3. Whether the student has the minimum qualification for admission; 4. Whether the certificate is signed by the appropriate authority." The marks entered in the application for admission to the M.B.B.S. Course were not being verified with the tabulated statement of marks in the University. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the petitioners' marks in the qualifying examination were verified with the University Records at the time when they were admitted to the various examinations taken by them while undergoing the M.B.B.S. Course. 16. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners then relied on the decision in Krishan v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376, to contend that the University had acted beyond its powers in cancelling the examination, after having allowed the petitioners to take the subsequent examinations. We find that the said decision has no application to the facts of the case before us. We find that the said decision has no application to the facts of the case before us. Their Lordships interfered with the decision taken by the Kurukshetra University to cancel the candidature of the student because by force of the University Statutes, the University had no power to withdraw the candidature. The situation in the instant case is entirely different. The provisions of the Act. Statutes and Ordinances quoted earlier give sufficient power to the Syndicate to cancel the examinations and to debar a student from appearing in any examinations to be conducted in future. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the fourth contention raised by the petitioners. 17. Lastly the learned counsel submitted that this Court should quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. The F.I.R. was filed as far back as in December 1981 and so far no further step was taken by the prosecution. So according to counsel the proceedings are only to harass the petitioners and it will result in miscarriage of justice. We fail to see any substance in this argument either. On enquiry it is found that the petitioners did use fake mark lists showing inflated marks in the qualifying examinations for securing admission to the M.B.B.S. course. In view of this finding it cannot be said that the criminal complaint is without any substance. Accordingly we refuse the prayer to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. 18. In view of what has been stated above, we find no substance in these Original Petitions. They are accordingly dismissed. 19. Immediately after the judgement was pronounced, Mr. K.V. Kuriakose, counsel for the petitioners, prayed that a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court may be granted in these two cases. We are not satisfied that the cases involve a substantial question of law of general importance and that it needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We decline to grant the certificate prayed for in these two cases. 20. Issue photostat copies of this judgement to counsel appearing in the case on usual terms. Petition dismissed.