JUDGMENT R.K. Gulatt, J. 1. This application has been filed under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, seeking review or recalling of our order dated January 22, 1987, passed in I.T.R. No. 1141 of 1977 (Addl. CIT v. Hasmat Rai Raj Pal [1987] 167 ITR 794) by which two questions referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act"), were answered against the applicant, M/s. Hasmat Rai Raj Pal. The aforesaid reference related to the assessment year 1960-61. 2. The assertions made in this application are that against a consolidated order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62, the Revenue had sought two references under Section 256(2) of the Act, one for each year. The reference relating to the assessment year 1961-62, being I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980 was decided in the absence of the applicant but in its favour, by a Division Bench of this court, vide its order dated April 8, 1985 ([1985] UPTC 591). It was held in this reference that there was no failure or omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for completing the assessment for the assessment year 1961-62 and thus reassessment proceedings initiated for that year were bad. As the applicant was not aware of the aforesaid decision given in I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980, it could not bring to our notice that decision which was in its favour when the matter relating to the assessment for the year 1960-61 was heard and decided by us, vide our order dated January 22, 1987. It is asserted that the decision given by us runs counter to the earlier decision and, therefore, our order requires a review or recalling thereof and should be disposed of afresh in terms of the order passed in I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the applicant and do not find any merit in this application. 4. There were a number of cash credits found recorded in the books of the assessee maintained for the assessment year 1961-62. Two items, out of such deposits, each amounting to Rs. 25,000, fell in the financial year relevant to the assessment year 1960-61. 4. There were a number of cash credits found recorded in the books of the assessee maintained for the assessment year 1961-62. Two items, out of such deposits, each amounting to Rs. 25,000, fell in the financial year relevant to the assessment year 1960-61. Notwithstanding that those two items of cash credits were recorded in the books of the assessee maintained for the assessment year 1961-62, the Income-tax Officer assessed those deposits as income of the assessee from undisclosed sources in the assessment year 1960-61, taking the financial year as the previous year. The remaining items of cash credits were brought to tax in the assessment year 1961-62. It may be noted that all items of cash credits assessed in the respective two years were taxed by taking reassessment proceedings with the aid of Section 148 of the Act. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, while deciding the appeal for the assessment year 1960-61, took the view that the two items of deposits taxed in that year were not liable to be sustained. It gave two reasons for it. Firstly, when action under Section 148 was taken, the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 had been repealed and thus the disputed deposits could be assessed only in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It held, according to the provisions of the latter Act, that the disputed items, being unexplained deposits, which were found recorded in the books of the assessee could only be assessed in the assessment year 1961-62 taking the previous year as adopted by the assessee and on which it maintained its books of account. These could not be assessed taking the financial year as the previous year which was possible only under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which had no application in the present case. 5. The second finding recorded by the Tribunal was that there was no failure or omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for the assessment year 1960-61. It held that the disclosure of the disputed credits in proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62 absolved the assessee of its obligation to make full and true disclosure for the assessment year 1960-61. 6. It held that the disclosure of the disputed credits in proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62 absolved the assessee of its obligation to make full and true disclosure for the assessment year 1960-61. 6. Now, in I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980 ( 1985 UPTC 591), the only question referred to this court was "whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally correct in holding that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material necessary for the completion of the assessment for the assessment year 1961-62?" That was answered in the affirmative. The facts on which that question was referred were different from the facts which were involved in the assessment year 1960-61. In the assessment year 1960-61 with which we were concerned, two questions were referred which have been dealt with by us in detail in our order dated January 22, 1987. We have held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not right in entertaining the view that the impugned deposits were taxable in the assessment year 1961-62. This question was not at all the subject-matter of consideration in I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980. 7. Regarding the second question, whether there was failure or omission on the part of the assessee to disclose all material facts, we have held that there was failure and omission on the part of the assessee within the meaning of Section 147(a) of the Act. According to the assessee's own case, it had made disclosure of cash deposits only during the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62. No disclosure of any nature was made in the proceedings relating to the assessment year 1960-61. We have taken the view that any disclosure made in the assessment year 1961-62, on the facts of the present case, did not absolve the assessee of its obligation to make full and true disclosure of the disputed amounts in the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1960-61. This question also did not arise for consideration in 1961-62 in the manner it has been decided by us. In our view, it is totally incorrect to suggest that our judgment dated January 22, 1987, is in conflict with the decision rendered in I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980. 8. This question also did not arise for consideration in 1961-62 in the manner it has been decided by us. In our view, it is totally incorrect to suggest that our judgment dated January 22, 1987, is in conflict with the decision rendered in I.T.R. No. 370 of 1980. 8. That apart, the kind of application now filed by the applicant is wholly misconceived and untenable. In CIT v. Tehri Garhwal State [1934] 2 ITR 1, a case decided by the Privy Council, the facts were that Tehri Garhwal State (for brief "the State") had been subjected to tax by the income-tax authorities under Section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in respect of income in the year 1926-27. This liability was contested by the State and ultimately the matter came to this court by way of reference under Section 66(2) of that Act (which corresponds to Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961). By the time the judgment had been delivered by this court, it had apparently been ascertained that the State had in fact no taxable income in the year 1926-27. Out of the tax liability determined against the State, a sum of Rs. 25,000 had been paid by the State before the reference leaving a balance of Rs. 18,294-14-0 to be paid. The State claimed the return of Rs. 25,000 on the ground that it had no taxable income in the year 1926-27 while the Revenue's case was that it was liable to payment of the balance amount. Thereupon, a second reference was made to the High Court for its opinion by the Commissioner on his own motion on the following two questions (at p. 5) : "(1) Does the judgment delivered by the High Court in Miscellaneous Case No. 671 of 1929 on November 21, 1929 (Ramprasad, In re, AIR 1930 All 389), operate of its own force to require the Income-tax Department to refund the sum of Rs. 25,000 paid by the Tehri Darbar, and to refrain from collecting the balance of Rs. 18,294-14-0 ? (2) if the answer to question (1) is in the negative- (a) Is the Tehri Darbar liable to pay the balance of Rs. 18,294-14-0? (b) Is the Tehri Darbar entitled to a refund of the amount already paid, i.e., Rs. 25,000?" 9. 25,000 paid by the Tehri Darbar, and to refrain from collecting the balance of Rs. 18,294-14-0 ? (2) if the answer to question (1) is in the negative- (a) Is the Tehri Darbar liable to pay the balance of Rs. 18,294-14-0? (b) Is the Tehri Darbar entitled to a refund of the amount already paid, i.e., Rs. 25,000?" 9. The reference was heard by the same judges (who had decided the previous reference) who answered the first question in the affirmative and held that the State was not liable to pay the balance of Rs. 18,294-14-0 and that it was entitled to refund of Rs. 25,000 already patd. Against that decision, the matter was taken to the Privy Council at the instance of the Revenue. The Privy Council accepted the contention of the Revenue and pointed out that they might be prepared to endorse the view taken by this court regarding the true meaning of Section 3 of the Act of 1922. The former judgment rendered by the High Court had not been appealed against and whether right or wrong must govern the relations of the parties in the particular case. The Privy Council further observed (p. 8) ; "It is to be noticed that under Section 66(5) of the Act of 1922, the judgment of the High Court is to contain the grounds upon which the decision is founded : that a copy of the judgment is to be sent to the Commissioner, and that the case is to be disposed of by the income-tax authorities conformably to such judgment. Under this provision, their Lordships think that the judgment as a whole is binding between the parties in the particular case. If the judgment expounded a wrong construction of the Act, as the appellant now contends, an appeal against it was open, and there is no other procedure by which it could be corrected. 10. In Seth Mathuradas v. CIT [1940] 8 ITR 412, a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court held that an application for a review of the judgment passed in a reference under Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is not maintainable, for, a Tribunal which determines the questions referred under that section does not operate as a civil court so as to attract the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In Emperor v. Kajori Mal Kalyan Das [1930] 4 ITC 60 (All), it has been held that for the reason that this kind of an opinion is not a decree or order, there could be no review of such a judgment. 11. The Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. [1935] 3 ITR 188 have also laid down the same proposition where it was held that the court when acting under the powers conferred by Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was exercising a special jurisdiction and that its proceedings were not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and that no review lay. 12. We are of the view that the jurisdiction, which the High Court exercises under Section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is only an advisory jurisdiction and not that of original, appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Under the Income-tax Act, there is no power of review conferred on the High Court and we are not inclined to hold that in the absence of such specific conferment of such power, this court can exercise the power of review or of recalling its previous judgment purporting to exercise power under Order 47, Rule 1, or Section 151, CPC. We are conscious of the fact that the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction in order to do justice in special circumstances, such as to rectify a mistake of clerical nature which had crept in by inadvertence or restore a case when dismissed in default on the cause being shown reasonable or even when the case was decided on merits without due notice to parties or to a party concerned on account of the mistake of the High Court office. The exercise of such power is different from those conferred under Order 47, Rule 1 or under Section 151, CPC. The grounds on which the present application has been moved seeking review or recalling of our order dated January 22, 1987, are not of the type on which any review can be sought invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court. For what has been stated above, this application is rejected.