JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---Gone are the good old days when a man would honour his words or commitment even at the cost of his life. Now-a-days the tendency is to wriggle out of the commitment or the undertaking solemnly given even to the Court by challenging the same on the ground that it is illegal, without jurisdiction or void. 2. In the instant case the facts are that the petitioner is a landlord who filed Distress Warrant cases Nos. 14 of 1986 and 85 of 1986 before the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur for recovery of arrears of rent from the respondent/tenant. In the said cases the articles and/or the movable property belonging to the respondent/tenant was seized and attached during the execution of the warrant in the said cases. On 27-10-1986 the respondent/tenant filed an undertaking in the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur in the aforesaid Distress Warrant Cases which was accepted by the petitioner. It is clear from para 3 of the said undertaking that the arrears of rent due upto date were Rs. 34,200/- which the respondent undertook to pay in instalment as given in the said para. He had paid an instalment of Rs. 11,700/- on the date of the undertaking itself i.e. 27-10-1986. He had further undertaken that he would pay the current monthly rent separately in advance by 5th of each calendar month. The next para which is also numbered as para 3 in the undertaking shows that the respondent agreed and gave an undertaking before the Court that he would vacate and deliver vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the petitioner by 31-3-1987. The said paragraph also shows that the above undertaking was an undertaking given to the Court and it was not to be a part of the compromises. He then stated in para 3 that even after vacation of the premises after 31-3-1987 his liability to clear off the arrears upto the date of vacation would continue to be the subject matter of the undertaking. He then stated in para 3 that even after vacation of the premises after 31-3-1987 his liability to clear off the arrears upto the date of vacation would continue to be the subject matter of the undertaking. In para 4 he reiterated the undertaking about vacation of the tenanted premises by 31-3-1987 and further stated that he was aware of the consequences of the breach of his undertaking about payment of arrears of rent and about vacation of the tenanted premises ; viz., that the breach of the undertaking would amount to contempt of Court within the meaning of section 2(b) and section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He prayed in para 5 that the above undertaking should be recorded and the proceedings should be filed and the auction of the attached property fixed for 13-11-1986 and 27-10-1986 should be postponed till 31-3-1987 and the custody of the attached property should be continued with the petitioner. 3. On the same day i.e. 27-10-1986 the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur disposed of the Distress Warrant Cases on the basis of the said undertaking holding that the compromise between the parties is an undertaking by the respondent to make the payment. However, in spite of the above undertaking being given, the respondent did not make the payment of arrears of rent to the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, served him with the notices dated 12-12-1986 and 5-1-1987 but without any effect. Hence he filed Contempt Petition No. 13 of 1987 in this Court against him. In the said contempt case a further undertaking was given to this Court that the respondent would deposit the amount in question by 29-4-1987. This Court, therefore, passed an order on 15-4-1987 that after the arrears are so deposited by 29-4-1987 the petitioner should not withdraw the amount so deposited by the respondent until articles attached are returned to the petitioner which was to be done by 2nd May, 1987. Accepting thus the undertakings this Court discharged the notice for contempt. 4. The respondent, however, did not abide by the undertaking which he gave to this Court. He did not deposit the amount of arrears of rent by 29-4-1987. He did not vacated the tenanted premises also by 31-3-1987 as undertaken by him in his original undertaking dated 27-10-1986. Accepting thus the undertakings this Court discharged the notice for contempt. 4. The respondent, however, did not abide by the undertaking which he gave to this Court. He did not deposit the amount of arrears of rent by 29-4-1987. He did not vacated the tenanted premises also by 31-3-1987 as undertaken by him in his original undertaking dated 27-10-1986. The petitioner, therefore, filed the instant contempt petition on 8-6-1987 in this Court complaining about the breach of undertaking given by the respondent on 27-10-1987 as well as the undertaking given in the aforesaid contempt case. 5. The respondent has filed his affidavit in reply to the instant contempt petition filed by the petitioner. As regards the payment of arrears of rent it is stated in para 14 by the respondent that the amount of arrears of rent up to 30-4-1987 which was payable by 29-4-1987 as per the order of this Court in the aforesaid contempt case was Rs. 31,500/-. Further, according to him due to extreme financial stringency it was not possible for him to pay the aforesaid amount by 29-4-1987. He has stated that he did not intend at any time to disregard the undertaking given to this Court or to act contrary to it. However, he could not arrange the huge amount of Rs. 31,500/- by 29-4-1987, and since 30-4-1987 and 1-5-1987 were holidays and 2-5-1987 was the last working day before the summer vacation he promptly deposited the arrears of rent on 8-6-1987 i.e. the first day after the Court reopened after the summer vacation. He has thus justified in his reply that no intentional or deliberate contempt is committed by him. In these circumstances he prayed that he should be excused for non-payment or arrears of rent by 29-4-1987 as per the undertaking given to this Court. 6. The respondent has also stated in para 15 of his reply that it is the petitioner who has committed contempt of this Court by committing a breach of the direction of this Court in its order dated 11-4-1987 in the aforesaid previous contempt petition, because he withdraw on 7-7-1987 the aforesaid amount of Rs. 31,500/- deposited by him on 8-6-1987 without first returning the articles attached in the aforesaid distress warrant cases, as directed by this Court in the previous contempt case. 31,500/- deposited by him on 8-6-1987 without first returning the articles attached in the aforesaid distress warrant cases, as directed by this Court in the previous contempt case. He has, therefore, urged that the petitioner should be hauled up for contempt of this Court which is intentional and deliberate. 7. As regards the alleged contempt of the breach of undertaking in respect of vacation of the tenanted premises by 31-3-1987, the respondent has urged in paras 16 and 17 that the said undertaking is unlawful being against the public policy of the Rent Control Legislation viz. the Central Provinces Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, "the Rent Control Order"), which according to him is a welfare legislation intended to protect the tenants. Further, according to him the public policy underlying the Rent Control Order requires permission of Rent Controller upon the grounds enumerated in Clause 13(3) of the said Order before claiming vacation of the tenanted premises and any undertaking or agreement contrary to the above public policy under the said Order would amount to contracting out of the legislative mandate and would, therefore, be unlawful. He has urged in this regard that although labelled as an undertaking the learned Small Causes Court has treated it as a settlement or compromise between the parties and has passed its order on that basis. It is, therefore, his case that the compromise between the parties in this case although styled as an undertaking was unlawful as regards vacation of the tenanted premises being contrary to public policy as shown above. His submission also is that the learned Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to pass any decree of ejectment against the respondent without a prior permission from the Rent Controller and, therefore, the said undertaking before a Court which had no jurisdiction was a nullity. 8. After the aforesaid reply was filed by the respondent the petitioner has filed an affidavit on 1-10-1987 in which, according to him, the amount on account of arrears of rent which was actually due upto 29-4-1987 was Rs. 44,381.72 and Rs. 31,500/- only which the respondent deposited on 8-6-1987. As this stage itself is made clear that the amount of Rs. 44,381.72 and Rs. 31,500/- only which the respondent deposited on 8-6-1987. As this stage itself is made clear that the amount of Rs. 44,381.72 calculated as arrears of rent by the petitioner upto 29-4-1987 includes arrears of electricity charges, arrears of water charges, and arrears of Corporation taxes which, according to the petitioner, the respondent was liable to pay as per the agreement of lease. The respondent, however, disputes the said additional liability as payable under the agreement of lease. It may be seen that the undertaking dated 27-10-1986 filed by the respondent in the Court of Small Causes and accepted by the petitioner shows that the arrears of rent which the respondent is liable to pay as per the said undertaking are calculated at the flat rate of rent of Rs. 1,800/- per month as referred to in para 2 of the said undertaking. Hence the additional liability calculated by the petitioner on account of arrears of rent as shown above does not form the subject matter of the undertaking and must, therefore, be left out of consideration so far as the instant contempt petition is concerned. 8-A. Continuing the narration, the petitioner stated in his affidavit dated 1-10-1987 that before he withdrew the amount of Rs. 31,500/- deposited by the respondent he had requested the respondent and also his uncle who actually resided in the tenanted premises a number of times to arrange for a matador or even a hand-cart to take back the articles attached in the distress warrant cases, but they did not do so. Hence he had withdrawn the amount. However, he stated that he was ready and willing to restora the attached property to the respondent at any time. It may be stated at this stage that during the hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner has tendered unconditional apology for the alleged breach of the order of this Court dated 15-4-1987 in the previous contempt case and has accordingly on 14-10-1987 put in writing the unconditional apology of the petitioner. 9. To this affidavit the respondent has filed his reply dated 6-10-1987 in which he denied that he was liable to pay Rs. 44,381.72 and that the petitioner even met him or his uncle requesting either of them to take back the attached property. He has also filed still another affidavit dated 13-10-1987 in which he stated that he had deposited Rs. 44,381.72 and that the petitioner even met him or his uncle requesting either of them to take back the attached property. He has also filed still another affidavit dated 13-10-1987 in which he stated that he had deposited Rs. 3,600/- in the Small Causes Court on 12-10-1987 which represented the amount of arrears of rent for the period from 1-5-1987 to 30-6-1987. He further stated that he had paid the rent for the month of November 1986 on 19-11-1986 which payment is admitted by the petitioner in para 6 of this petition. He has also stated that due to his weak financial position he is unable to make the payment of rent for the period from 1-7-1987 onwards up to date which he would definitely clear by 7-11-1987. He has then stated that he would have made the said payment earlier but since in the property attached the V.C.R. of the third person was also attached he was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with him and hence he could not pay the further arrears of rent up to date. It is on the basis of these facts and circumstances that the question whether the respondent has committed contempt of this Court has to be decided. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that in not vacating the tenanted premises by 31-3-1987 the respondent has not committed any breach of his alleged undertaking in that regard. His submissions in that regard are as follows. It is his case that such an undertaking is incompetent and without jurisdiction as it is in violation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order and the public policy underlying thereunder. According to him such a condition is illegal and void as it amounts to contracting out of the provisions of the welfare legislation like the Rent Control Order. Further, according to him, although the document dated 27-10-1986 filed before the Small Causes Court is styled and worded as "undertaking" it is in fact a compromise petition and even the learned Small Causes Court has treated it as a Compromise Petition and has passed an order in terms of compromise in that regard. Further, according to him, although the document dated 27-10-1986 filed before the Small Causes Court is styled and worded as "undertaking" it is in fact a compromise petition and even the learned Small Causes Court has treated it as a Compromise Petition and has passed an order in terms of compromise in that regard. His submission, therefore, is that since the alleged undertaking relating to vacation of the suit premises is in fact a term of compromise it is invalid being against the public policy as shown above and cannot, therefore, be enforced. He has also urged that even the learned Court of Small Causes has not made it a part of his compromise order and, therefore, even assuming that it is valid it is not executable since it is not the part of the compromise order passed by the learned Court of Small Causes. At any rate it is his case that even assuming that it is not the part of the compromise order it can be executed by taking the executing proceedings but in no case it can amount to an undertaking to the Court the breach of which can make him liable for action for contempt of Court. 11. As regards the question of payment of arrears of rent, the learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that the breach of undertaking in that regard given originally on 27-10-1986 and before this Court in the previous contempt case is not intentional and deliberate because due to financial stringency he could not pay the huge amount of arrears of rent before 29-4-1987. He was further urged that the respondent promptly deposited the arrears of rent on the first day after the reopening of the Court after summer vacation i.e. on 8-7-1987. He has therefore, prayed that as stated in para 14 of the affidavit in reply, the respondent should be excused in that regard. 12. Taking up first the question of breach of undertaking relating to payment of arrears of rent, there cannot be any doubt that the respondent has committed a breach of his original undertaking dated 27-10-1986 as well as the undertaking given to this Court in the previous contempt case. 12. Taking up first the question of breach of undertaking relating to payment of arrears of rent, there cannot be any doubt that the respondent has committed a breach of his original undertaking dated 27-10-1986 as well as the undertaking given to this Court in the previous contempt case. It may be seen in this regard that as per the original undertaking given by the respondent in the Court of Small Causes on 27-10-1986 the respondent was to pay the arrears of rent which, according to him, worked out to Rs. 43,200/- at the rate of Rs. 1800/- per month in suitable instalments as stipulated therein. However, except paying the instalment of Rs. 11,700/- on 27-10-1986 the respondent did not pay any instalment due thereafter on 27-11-1986, 27-12-1986, 27-1-1987 and 27-2-1987 respectively. The petitioner served him with notices on 12-12-1986 and 5-1-1987 reminding him about the breach of his undertaking in not making the payment of the instalments as undertaken by him. However, instead of making the payment the respondent justified his non-payment by his reply dated 22-1-1987 on the ground that the petitioner ought to have returned the articles which were seized and attached but which did not belong to him. 12-A. The petitioner was, therefore, required to file a contempt petition (Contempt Petition No. 13 of 1987) in which a fresh undertaking was given by the respondent to deposit the amount of arrears of rent due by 29-4-1987 in the lower Court. Upon that being done the petitioner undertook to return the attached articles and property by 2nd of May, 1987. This Court thus disposed of the contempt petition in terms of the undertaking given by the parties on 15-4-1987. The respondent, however, did not deposit the amount of arrears of rent by 9-4-1987 and the amount which, according to the respondent, came to Rs. 31,500/- up to 29-4-1987 was deposited by him on 8-6-1987 in the lower Court. This Court thus disposed of the contempt petition in terms of the undertaking given by the parties on 15-4-1987. The respondent, however, did not deposit the amount of arrears of rent by 9-4-1987 and the amount which, according to the respondent, came to Rs. 31,500/- up to 29-4-1987 was deposited by him on 8-6-1987 in the lower Court. It is therefore, clear that in not making the payment of the instalments on the due date as per the original undertaking dated 27-10-1986 and in not depositing thereafter the amount of arrears of rent by 29-4-1987 when a further concession was given to the respondent by this Court on an undertaking being given by him that he would deposit the arrears of rent by 29-4-1987, the respondent has committed the breach of his under taking in this regard and has therefore committed contempt of Court. 13. The next question then is whether the commission of contempt is intentional or deliberate. The explanation given by the respondent in para 14 of his reply is that due to financial stringency he could not pay the rent by 29-4-1987. Had he stopped at that it was possible to say something in his favour but he has further stated in the said para that since 30-4-1987 and 1-5-1987 were holidays and 2nd May, 1987 was the last working day before summer vacation he promptly deposited the amount of arrears of rent on the first day after reopening of the Court after summer vacation i.e. on 8-6-1987. The above pleading of the respondent exposes his true intention. The said pleadings show that had 30th April and 1st May, 1987 not been holidays he would have paid the arrears by the said dates. They further show that even thereafter till 8.6.1986 he could pay the arrears of rent but for the intervening summer vacation. He has sought to explain that he was under the impression that during the summer vacation the payment was not accepted in the Court. 14. It may be seen in this regard that all through the respondent is ably assisted by his Counsel. If bona fide he was under a financial stringency he could have moved this Court for extension of time prior to 29-4-1987 when the Court was working and which he was duty bound to do because he had given an undertaking that he would make the payment by 29-4-1987. If bona fide he was under a financial stringency he could have moved this Court for extension of time prior to 29-4-1987 when the Court was working and which he was duty bound to do because he had given an undertaking that he would make the payment by 29-4-1987. Even thereafter also at any time he did not move this Court for being allowed to deposit the arrears of rent by condoning the lapse, if any, on his part. It appears that the respondent had learnt about the instant contempt petition being filed by the petitioner and has, therefore, made the payment on 8-6-1987 which is also up to 29-4-1987. All through it appears that his conduct in non-payment of rent is intended to harass the petitioner. In fact by 8-7-1987 the rent after 30-4-1987 had become due and instead of paying the rent up to date till the said date the respondent chose only to deposit the arrears of rent up to 30-4-1987 although in the original undertaking filed in the Court of Small Causes, he had undertaken that he would pay the current month's rent every month and that even though he may vacate the premises still he would pay the arrears of rent upto date. It may be seen that it is only when this conduct of the respondent was brought to the notice of his learned Counsel appearing in this Court during the hearing of the instant contempt petition that the respondent has deposited the arrears of rent from 1-5-1985 to 30-6-1987 on 12-10-1987. It is pertinent to see again that on 12-10-1987 the rent from 1-7-1987 onwards had become due which still the respondent did not pay. Looking to his conduct in the whole case, his justification for the said non-payment on the ground that he was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with the third person whose V.C.R. was attached by the petitioner can hardly be believed. It is not in dispute that the said V.C.R. was attached from the tenanted premises of the respondent and the objections in the regard were alleged to be made before the lower Court. 15. 10,000/- with the third person whose V.C.R. was attached by the petitioner can hardly be believed. It is not in dispute that the said V.C.R. was attached from the tenanted premises of the respondent and the objections in the regard were alleged to be made before the lower Court. 15. It may then be seen that the averment of the respondent in para 14 of his reply that the respondent did not intend at any time to disregard the undertaking given to this Court or to act contrary to it can hardly be believed as true looking to his conduct as is clear from the above facts and circumstances. His statement in the said para that in the circumstances narrated by him he should be excused is also hardly genuine and the said statement cannot even amount to an unconditional and unequivocal apology for the contempt committed by him. It thus to be held that the respondent is guilty of contempt of Court in nonpayment of rent as per the undertaking given by him in this Court which breach is clearly intentional and deliberate for which he deserves to be suitably punished. 16. Before proceeding further to examine the first contention relating to the undertaking about the vacation of the tenanted premises. I may at this stage dispose of the legal contention raised on behalf of the respondent that since there is a compromise between the parties as per the document of compromise dated 27-10-1986 although styled as an undertaking which is so held even by the Court of Small Causes by its order dated 27-10-1986 it may be enforced by the execution proceedings but there is no question of any contempt for breach of the compromise terms or the order passed by the Court in terms thereof. In this regard it may be seen that as regards the payment the Court in passing the consent order has also construed it as an undertaking to make the payment. If that is so, the said undertaking can be enforced by contempt proceedings for breach thereof as held by this Court in the case of (Bairanglal Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd.)1, A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 336 and also in the case of (Abdul Kadar v. Abbasbhai)2, (1975)77 Bom.L.R. 107 in which it is held that an undertaking is an additional safeguard and can be enforced by taking contempt proceedings for its breach. 336 and also in the case of (Abdul Kadar v. Abbasbhai)2, (1975)77 Bom.L.R. 107 in which it is held that an undertaking is an additional safeguard and can be enforced by taking contempt proceedings for its breach. It is also held in the case of Bajranglal Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd., cited supra that a breach of an undertaking on the basis of which the Court sanctioned a particular course also amounts to its contempt. A similar view is also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of (Chhaganbhai v Soni Chandubhai)3, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1909 that an order passed in view of an undertaking is not merely a consent order but its breach is punishable by an action for contempt. In the light of the above decisions, the above contention raised on behalf of the respondent that since the undertaking dated 27-10-1986 is construed as a compromise by the Court it does not amount to contempt deserves to be rejected. 17. Turning now to the first question which has been vehemently contested by the respondent before me, it is necessary to determine the true nature of the original undertaking dated 27-10-1986 and the order passed thereon by the learned Court of Small Causes on the same date. It is clear and it is not in dispute, that the respondent did give an undertaking in respect of payment of arrears of rent as also in respect of vacation of the tenanted premises by 31-3-1987. An endorsement of the petitioner on that document shows that he had accepted the said undertaking which would mean that there is a compromise between the parties in terms of the undertaking given by the respondent. It is for this reason that the learned Court of Small Causes has referred to the said undertaking as a compromise. It is clear from the perusal of the order of the learned Court of Small Causes that it has constructed the said compromise as an undertaking by the tenant to make the payment. He accepted the said compromise and, therefore, held that the proceedings in distress warrant cases do not thus survive and stand disposed of. However, as per the agreement he directed that the articles which are seized and attached during the execution would remain in the custody of the landlord and the attachment would continue and would remain in force as per the agreement. 18. However, as per the agreement he directed that the articles which are seized and attached during the execution would remain in the custody of the landlord and the attachment would continue and would remain in force as per the agreement. 18. It is clear from the order of the Small Causes Court dated 27-10-1986 that no reference is made by it to the undertaking given by the respondent in respect of vacation of the tenanted premises by 31-3-1987. It is, therefore, clear that the said undertaking in respect of vacation of premises is not a part of the compromise order. The question, therefore, that arises in the light of the submissions made on behalf of the respondent is whether despite the fact that the term of the undertaking in relation to the vacation of the tenanted premises by 31-3-1987 is not a part of the order of the learned trial Court a breach of it would amount to Contempt of Court. In fact it may be seen in this regard that the undertaking of the respondent dated 27-10-1986 itself makes it clear in para 3 that the said undertaking given by him is not by way of compromise. However, para 4 of the said undertaking dated 27-10-1986 would show that he has nonetheless bound himself by the said undertaking because he has expressed that he is conscious on the fact that any breach in honouring the same would amount to contempt of Court under section 2(b) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 19. The main thrust of the submission on behalf of the respondent is that the above undertaking is unlawful and is given before a Court which had no jurisdiction to grant the decree for eviction of the respondent. According to him the suit premises are admittedly governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order and therefore, there would be no lawful agreement in respect of the vacation of the suit premises as the said matter is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Rent Control Order is a welfare Legislation intended to protect the tenants and its provisions envisage a public policy and impliedly prohibits contracting out of the said provisions . The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Rent Control Order is a welfare Legislation intended to protect the tenants and its provisions envisage a public policy and impliedly prohibits contracting out of the said provisions . The submissions thus is that unless a permission from the Rent Controller is obtained upon any of the grounds given in Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order no suit to evict the tenant can be filed before the Court of Small Causes. Any agreement to voluntarily deliver possession of the suit premises without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller upon the grounds enumerated in Clause 13(3) would, therefore, according to him, be against the public policy and would therefore, be void under section 23 of the Contract Act. In support of the above submissions the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following decisions. ( Nagindas v. Dalpatram)4, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 472, (Murlidhar v. State of U.P)5, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924, (Waman Shriniwas v. R.B. Co.)6, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 689, (Ratilal Narbheram v. Welji Nagji)7, 1975 Mh.L.J. 136 (Shakarlal v. Uday Singh)8, 1976 Mh.L.J. 321. 20. Further in support of his submission that a breach of an undertaking given in a proceeding which is void or before a Court which had no jurisdiction, does not amount to contempt of Court, the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of this Court in (Dwarkadas v. Shantilal)9, 1980 Mh.L.J. 404. As regards the question that the proceedings initiated for ejectment of the tenant are without jurisdiction and the Court has no jurisdiction to pass any decree in such a proceeding in the absence of the permission being granted by the Rent Controller to give quit notice to the tenant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of (Namdeo Nathuji v. Prakash)10, 1987 Mh.L.J. 595. 21. To appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the respondent it is necessary to understand the scheme of the Rent Control Order in regard to eviction of tenants. It is clear from the scheme of the Rent Control Order that it does not by itself create any forum for eviction of the tenants upon the grounds enumerated in clause 13(3) thereof. It is clear from the scheme of the Rent Control Order that it does not by itself create any forum for eviction of the tenants upon the grounds enumerated in clause 13(3) thereof. Clause 13(1) clearly shows that the permission of the Rent Controller has to be obtained before giving any notice to the tenant to quit the tenanted premises as required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is further clear from Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order that the permission to give quit notice under Clause 13(1) can be granted by the Rent Controller only upon any of the grounds enumerated in Clause 13(3). It is, therefore, clear from the above scheme of the Rent Control Order that after the permission is granted by the learned Rent Controller to give quit notice the landlord has to terminate the tenancy by giving an appropriate notice required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and then file a suit for eviction which lies under the ordinary law before the Court of Small Causes. The Rent Control Order as is clear from its scheme does not prohibit giving up of or surrendering possession by the tenant of the tenanted premises voluntarily. It does not even prescribe any formalities for doing so like section 20 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, which requires the surrender to be in writing and to be verified by the Tahsildar. 22. It is thus clear from the above scheme of the Rent Control Order that the permission of the Rent Controller is necessary where it is necessary for the landlord to give quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. However, where there is determination of tenancy by surrender or implied surrender as contemplated by section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act no notice to quit under section 106 of the said Act needs to be given and, therefore, in such a case the provisions of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order are not attracted. When the lease is thus determined by surrender as agreed to between the parties and when the tenant had agreed to vacate by 31-3-1987, such an agreement cannot be characterised as being against the public policy for contravening or for by passing the provisions of the Rent Control Order which are not at all attracted. When the lease is thus determined by surrender as agreed to between the parties and when the tenant had agreed to vacate by 31-3-1987, such an agreement cannot be characterised as being against the public policy for contravening or for by passing the provisions of the Rent Control Order which are not at all attracted. In this view, I am fully supported by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Kamlabai others v.Mangilal)11, (1987)4 S.C.C. 585 . It is not, therefore, necessary for me to consider in detail the decisions cited supra which the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon in support of his proposition that the undertaking about vacation of the tenanted premises is against the public policy underlying the Rent Control Order and amounts to contracting out of the provisions of the said Order and hence is void under section 23 of the Contract Act. 23. It may also be seen that there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court on the question of passing a decree for ejectment in a suit based upon landlord-tenant relationship because such a suit lies before the Court of Small Causes under section 26(1) of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act which is inserted by the Maharashtra Amending Act No. 24 of 1984 which is brought into force with effect from 1-1-1985 by the State Government Notification dated 11-12-1984. It may further be seen that after the amendment of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976 the Court can incorporate the terms in the compromise decree which are not the subject matter of the suit itself, if other wise the compromise is lawful and the Court has jurisdiction to pass such a decree. It is thus clear that the undertaking given by the respondent on 27-10-1986 relating to vacation of the tenanted premises does not suffer from any basic infirmities in the sense that the said undertaking is in direct violation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order or that it is given before a Court which had no inherent jurisdiction at all to try the subject matter of the undertaking. 24. 24. However, even otherwise, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the undertaking about the vacation of the tenanted premises is void under section 23 of the Contract Act and hence is not enforceable is not tenable. Scrutinising closely the nature of the said undertaking itself its genesis shows that by giving the said undertaking about vacation of the tenanted premises the respondent has obtained certain concessions from the petitioner for payment of arrears of rent, viz., the payment by instalments over a certain period and for release of the attached property thereafter. It cannot be disputed that the Small Causes Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the distress warrant cases initiated by the petitioner for recovery of arrears of rent and it is in these proceedings on which the Small Causes Court had jurisdiction that the respondent gave an undertaking about the vacation of the suit premises to get the concessions about the payment of arrears of rent by instalments and the release of the attached property thereafter. As already pointed out and as even urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent himself the said undertaking is not a part of the compromise or an agreement between the parties. It only remains as an undertaking to the Court on the basis of which the agreement for payment of rent in instalments for release of attached property thereafter is arrived at. 25. It is clear from the cases cited on behalf of the respondent that they all deal with a term of a consent agreement or compromise between the parties which is sought to be executed by the landlord against the tenant. The question thus construed in the said cases is whether such an agreement between the parties is lawful or not or in other words whether such an agreement is illegal or void under section 23 of the Contract Act. No such question can arise where such a term is not a part of the agreement or a compromise but is an undertaking to the Court on the basis of which certain concessions are obtained by a party. The decisions relied upon on behalf the respondent to show that the consent agreement which is against public policy is void under section 23 of the Contract Act are, therefore, not relevant in the instant case. The decisions relied upon on behalf the respondent to show that the consent agreement which is against public policy is void under section 23 of the Contract Act are, therefore, not relevant in the instant case. The relevant decision in this regard, to my mind, is the decision of this Court in the case of (Indian Hotel Co. Ltd.,v. T. Stevenson)12, A.I.R. 1982 Bom. 160. The other relevant decision on the point is of Lenting. J., rendered on 21-12-1973 in Company Application No. 120 of 1973 in Company Petition No. 170 of 1967 (R. N. Bhagat v. Official Liquidator)13 (unreported judgment ) which is relied upon and referred to in extenso in the aforesaid reported decision of this Court. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the ratio of these two decisions in detail. 26. The facts in the judgement of Lentin, J., cited supra, would show that in that case one Shri Bhagat had given an undertaking to the Court in consideration of permission granted to him by the official liquidator to continue to use and occupy the Company flat at Kanta Niwas. The undertaking, inter alia, was that in the event of certain contingencies arising on the Official Liquidator calling upon him to hand over the flat, he and his family members would forthwith remove themselves from the said flat and hand over peaceful possession to the official liquidator without claiming any right or interest therein. It appears that the land lords thereafter took out a chamber summons against the official liquidator for order and direction against him for delivery of possession of the suit flat to them. The official liquidator was in the said judge's summons directed to get possession from Bhagat and hand over the same to the landlord. Bhagat, however, opposed handing over possession, inter alia. On the ground that he had acquired protection under section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act since February 1973 and that he was relieved of or was discharged from his undertaking by reason thereof. 27. In the above facts and circumstances, Lentin, J., observed as follows in the above judgment: " Does it now behave the applicant to come forth and ask that he be discharged from his undertaking or that the same be modified when on the faith thereof he obtained from the Court, which otherwise he would not have the Indulgence and concession to occupy the suit premises? In my opinion, the answer is in the negative. To answer otherwise would be to shake the very foundation of the confidence reposed by the public at large in the solemnity of assurances given to the Court. If the Court were to find itself helpless in such circumstances, the value of such solemn assurances given by a party to the Court, on the faith whereof he obtain a concession, indulgence, or relief from the Court would be nil, and would result in subversion of judicial authority to be detriment of public interest." 28. Lentin, J., further observed that even prior to coming in to force of section 15-A, the applicant i.e. Shri Bhagat, would claim a sub-tenancy protected by the Bombay Rent Act as he was in exclusive possession since 1955. According to him it was in order to ensure that he would not make any such claim that he was required to give a personal undertaking that he would vacate the flat as when called upon to do so by the official liquidator. He then held that even assuming that the applicant was a deemed tenant under section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act it was open for him to say that he would not stake his claim to tenancy. He, therefore, held that having already given a solemn undertaking to the Court that he would vacate the flat, even though he is deemed to be a tenant under section 15-A in view of his personal undertaking that he was not to claim any title except by way of permission use, he cannot avail himself of any title bestowed upon him by section 15-A. The following observations made by Lentin, J., aptly apply in the instant case also: "..................Greater the reason why the undertaking given by the applicant were not the result of any agreement or compromise between him and any party to the proceedings but were solemn assurances given in order to obtain and on the faith of which he obtained a relief, indulgence and concession from the Court to continue to occupy the flat. There is no question of the applicant and the Court having arrived at a contract. There can be no contract between party and the Court." 29. In the case of Indian Hotel Co. There is no question of the applicant and the Court having arrived at a contract. There can be no contract between party and the Court." 29. In the case of Indian Hotel Co. Ltd. cited supra it was sought to be urged on behalf of the defendant that there is a distinction made in the judgment of Lentin, J., between an indulgence or concession obtained from the Court pursuant to the undertaking given to the Court and the concession or indulgence received from the opposite party on the basis of such an undertaking. According to him, in the later case such an undertaking would not lawfully bind as it was part of the settlement and he would be entitled to be relieved of the same. Modi, J., in the case of Indian Hotel Co. Ltd. in para 20 of his judgment rejected the contention that there was any distinction between the two types of undertakings. He held that the undertaking given to Court for whatever reason must also remain an undertaking to the Court and the purpose for which it is given cannot make any difference to its ultimate effect. Referring to the observations of Lentin, J., in the case cited supra that it was to ensure that Bhagat would not make any claim in future as he may otherwise be free to make that he was required to execute the personal undertaking to vacant the flat, he held that the position had not in any way changed by enactment of section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act and even assuming that Bhagat was deemed to be a tenant under section 15-A he would not be able to execute that undertaking given to the Court while setting a matter and arriving at consent compromise between the parties. 30. Perusals of para 19 at page 171 of the judgment of Modi, J., would show that the two contentions raised therein were that firstly, the background and the context under which the earlier undertaking was given was designed merely for preventing the applicant in the said case from committing default in the payment of compensation and secondly, that the object of enforcing the undertaking was to aid, implement, perpetrate and approve of an illegal compromise or to sanction an illegality, which contentions are more or less similar to the contentions raised in this petition. Both these contentions were negatived by Modi, J., in the case cited supra. The observations of Modi, J., in para 21 reproduced below are apt in this regard: " This being the position I am of the view that it lies in the mouth of any party to say " though I have given a solemn undertaking which I had given for obtaining concession from the opponent and though I have now enjoyed the full benefit of the concession, please relieve me of the same because though it is within my power to comply with the undertaking the Legislature has now sought to give me further benefit". The benefit given by the Legislature is a right conferred on the party but it does not take away the power of the party to comply with the undertaking and this by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the party is not bound by the undertaking or for relieving the party from the undertaking". 31. It is thus clear that an undertaking given to the Court on the basis of which certain concessions are obtained by the respondent from the petitioner regarding payment of arrears of rent and about release of the attached property is an undertaking to the Court and is not a part of the compromise which would be subject to section 23 of the Contract Act although, as held by Modi, J., even if treated as a part of the compromise, the respondent was bound to comply with the same. Moreover, as pointed out above, since there is no prohibition in the Rent Control Order for voluntarily giving up of possession to the landlord, the respondent could comply with the said undertaking. It was, therefore, necessary for him to comply with the said undertaking given to the Court in the absence of which there is a clear breach of the undertaking for which he is liable to be hauled up for contempt. 32. It is next urged that the undertaking was given before a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment of the tenant in the absence of the permission from the Rent Controller. In support of above submission reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in the following cases Dwarikadas v. Shantilal, 1980 Mh.L.J. 404 and Namdeo Nathuji v. Prakash, 1987 Mh.L.J. 495. In support of above submission reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in the following cases Dwarikadas v. Shantilal, 1980 Mh.L.J. 404 and Namdeo Nathuji v. Prakash, 1987 Mh.L.J. 495. In the case of Dwarikadas cited supra, the suit was filed on the footing that the plaintiff was a licencee and for injunction restraining his eviction otherwise than due course of law which suit did not lie before the Court of Small Causes under the Provisional Small Causes Courts Act. It is, however, clear from the perusal of the said judgment that after examining the Supreme Court Cases the learned Judge held that if there is breach of order passed in proceedings which are ad inito void for lack of jurisdiction from their very inception then there is no contempt in such cases. 33. The statement of the American Law on the subject as found in para 19 of Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume XVII, which was referred to with approval in the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below : " Disobedience of, or resistance to, a void mandate, order, judgment or decree, or one issued by a Court without jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties litigant, is not contempt, and where the Court has no jurisdiction to make the order, no waiver can cut off the rights of the party to attack its validity. The lack of jurisdiction must be such as is manifest in the inception of the proceedings and not that which develops through the hearing and determination of the cause.................." It is clear from the above statement of law that the lack of jurisdiction must be such as is manifest in the inception of the proceedings, and not that which develops through the hearing and determination of the case. 34. In the light of the above law it may be seen that in the instant case it cannot be disputed that the Small Causes Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the distress warrant cases initiated by the petitioner for recovery of arrears of rent. Even as regards the question of ejectment in a suit based upon landlord and tenant relationship there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court because such a jurisdiction is conferred upon it under section 26 of the said Act as shown above. Even as regards the question of ejectment in a suit based upon landlord and tenant relationship there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court because such a jurisdiction is conferred upon it under section 26 of the said Act as shown above. In this regard, on the question of inherent lack of jurisdiction the ratio of the decision in the case of Namdeo Nathuji v. Praksh, 1987 Mh.L.J. 495 would not be attracted in the instant case, because since there is giving of or surrender of possession voluntarily in the instant case, there is no question of obtaining permission under the Rent Control Order of the Rent Controller to give quit notice which is not necessary in the case of surrender of tenancy as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kamalbai others v. Mangilal, (1987)4 S.C.C. 585 . 35. However, what has to be seen is when to secure certain concessions in the subject-matter of the suit an undertaking is given which falls outside the subject-matter of the suit whether it can be said that such an undertaking is void and unenforceable. In my view, if the Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit the undertaking which may strictly speaking be outside the subject-matter of the suit but which is the basis for obtaining certain concessions in respect of the subject-matter of the suit can be enforced against the person who has given such an undertaking and obtained the concessions in the subject-matter of the suit, even though such an undertaking may not form part of the compromise. It may be that the party in whose favour such an undertaking is given may not be able to execute it by way of execution proceedings to execute the consent decree but no breach of such undertaking he can surely initiate proceedings for contempt of Court for taking suitable action against the person who has committed breach of such an undertaking. The respondent is thus guilty of contempt of Court for breach of undertaking to the Court that he would vacate the tenanted premises on or before 31-3-1987. 36. The last question which remains to be considered is whether the petitioner is guilty of contempt by withdrawing the amount of arrears of rent deposited by the respondent in the trial Court without first returning the attached articles or property to the respondent. 36. The last question which remains to be considered is whether the petitioner is guilty of contempt by withdrawing the amount of arrears of rent deposited by the respondent in the trial Court without first returning the attached articles or property to the respondent. The submission on behalf of the petitioner in this behalf is that before withdrawing the amount he had intimated the respondent and his uncle but they failed to make the arrangements for taking back the articles. It may be seen that the order of the Court in the previous contempt case passed on 15-4-1987 made it a condition precedent that the amount deposited by the respondent should not be withdrawn by the petitioner until the articles which are attached are returned. Even assuming that the petitioner had asked the respondent or his uncle to take back the articles but they failed to make any arrangements regarding thereto it was necessary for the petitioner to bring this fact to the notice of the learned trial Judge or at any rate to give a notice in writing for taking back the attached articles within a stipulated period before withdrawing the amount deposited by the respondent. The petitioner is also, therefore, guilty of breach of the order of this Court dated 15-4-1987. 37. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner without seriously canvassing the contentions in this regard at the outset had tendered unconditional apology for the breach of the aforesaid order of this Court dated 15-4-1987 which apology of the petitioner he placed in writing before this Court on 14-10-1987. In view, the conduct of the petitioner in hurriedly withdrawing the amount of arrears of rent is understandable because neither the respondent had paid him the arrears of rent nor was it possible for him to recover the same by disposing of the attached articles. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the petitioner without much seeking to justify his action the contempt. If any, committed by him is not so grave as the contempt committed by the respondent. The unconditional apology tendered by the petitioner is, therefore, accepted and it is not, therefore, necessary to take any action against him for contempt of Court. 38. If any, committed by him is not so grave as the contempt committed by the respondent. The unconditional apology tendered by the petitioner is, therefore, accepted and it is not, therefore, necessary to take any action against him for contempt of Court. 38. As regards the action to be taken against the respondent for contempt of Court committed by him breach of his undertaking in respect of non-payment of arrears of rent and vacation of the tenanted premises, it may be seen that there is no extenuating circumstance in his favour. He has strenuously justified his action and even as regards non-payment of rent his apology is not clean and unequivocal. Moreover, his conduct subsequent to 29-4-1987 would show that he wants to harass the petitioner by not clearing his arrears and not paying rent even thereafter regularly. Taking all these circumstances into consideration the ends of justice would be served if a fine of Rs. 2000/- is imposed upon the respondent for committing contempt of Court in not complying with his undertaking about payment of arrears of rent and about vacation of the tenanted premises. The respondent is directed to the above fine of Rs. 2000/- within one month from the date of this order, failing which he is directed to undergo a simple imprisonment for one week. 39. Besides the above punishment for committing contempt of Court, the respondent is directed to comply with the following directions. The respondent is directed to comply with his undertaking relating to the vacation of the suit premises by giving vacant possession to the petitioner of the said premises on or before 31-3-1988. The respondent is also directed as per his original undertaking dated 27-10-1986 to pay the rent upto the date of vacation of the tenanted premises, on or before 5-2-1988. If any of the above directions are breached, the respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one week on each account. Both the sentences, however, shall run concurrently if the breach is committed of both these directions. If any of the above directions are breached, the respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one week on each account. Both the sentences, however, shall run concurrently if the breach is committed of both these directions. Looking to the conduct of the respondent as is clear from the facts and circumstances narrated in this judgment it is directed by modifying the order dated 15-4-1986 passed in the previous contempt case that as per the original undertaking the attached property shall continue to remain under attachment and in the custody of the petitioner till the above directions are complied with by the respondent. 40. The respondent is directed to pay costs of the instant contempt petition to the petitioner which are quantified at Rs. 1,000/- and which he should pay to the petitioner along with the rent payable on or before 5-2-1988. 41. Rule in this contempt petition is thus made absolute against the respondent in terms of paras 38, 39 and 40. Rule made absolute. -----