Judgment :- 1. The 3rd respondent applied to the second respondent Collector of Trichur District for the issue of permit for the establishment of a new rice mill in Sy. No. 284/2 of Puzhakkal Village, Adatt Panchayat, Trichur District, as required under S.5(1) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (the Act for short). The power to issue the permit has been conferred on the Collector by notification issued by the first respondent Government in exercise of the powers conferred under S.4 of the Act. S.5(4) of the Act requires the authority competent to issue the permit to cause a full and complete investigation to be made in respect of the application and the authority shall also have due regard to the various conditions prescribed in clauses (a) to (f) before granting any permit. The 3rd respondent's application was accordingly caused to be enquired into by the Taluk Supply Officer, Trichur, inter alia that the average yield of paddy in Puzhakkal Village was only 2,50,000 paras and that there were eight rice mills already existing and functioning in the Village. He also reported that there was a rice mill within one furlong of the mill proposed by the 3rd respondent. On the basis of this investigation by the Taluk Supply Officer and the report furnished by him, the second respondent passed an order on 31-1-87 rejecting the petitioner's application for licence. A true copy of that order is produced by the 3rd respondent as Ext. R3 (a). 2. The facts as reported by the Taluk Supply Officer do not appear to have been correct and therefore on receipt of Ext. R3(a) the 3rd respondent filed an application before the second respondent himself setting forth the facts and requesting the District Collector to conduct a fresh enquiry into the matter and grant the permit prayed for. He also enclosed the order of the District Industries Centre, Trichur, registering his unit as a small scale industrial unit as also the no objection certificate issued by the Adatt Panchayat. This petition was styled as an appeal petition and purported to be filed against the order of the District Supply Officer. Trichur dated 31-1-1987. He also enclosed the order of the District Industries Centre, Trichur, registering his unit as a small scale industrial unit as also the no objection certificate issued by the Adatt Panchayat. This petition was styled as an appeal petition and purported to be filed against the order of the District Supply Officer. Trichur dated 31-1-1987. The 3rd respondent has in bis counter affidavit stated that this was a mistake committed by him and that really what he bad sought was a re-consideration of the matter by the Collector himself on the basis of the true facts placed by him in the appeal petition Ext. R3 (b). 3. On receipt of this petition the Collector made personal enquiries, conducted a local inspection and also obtained a report from the Joint Director of Agriculture, Trichur, regarding the availability of paddy. The latter reported that having regard to the average yield in the area, the approximate production of paddy in the Puzhakkal Village will be about 700 MT and that since there was only one rice mill in the area there was ample scope for establishment of a new rice mill. The Collector also, on the basis of his local inspection, noted that the nearest rice mill was not within the vicinity as reported by the Taluk Supply Officer, but about 400 meters away and that the other rice mills in the area were all only within a radius of 2 KMs. The Collector also noted that the petitioner's unit bad been registered as a small scale industrial unit with the District Industries Centre under the self employment scheme and that it was the Government's policy to help such applicants. The Collector noted that there had been some error in passing the previous order and that the 3rd respondent should not be penalised for the error. He, therefore, passed fresh orders in the matter Ext. R3 (c) granting permission to the 3rd respondent to establish a rice mill. 4. Ext. R3 (c) is challenged in these two original petitions. OP. No. 5128 of 1987 is filed by another rice mill owner of the locality and hence as per the decision of this court in Mohammedkutty v. Kunhikoya Haji 198S KLT. 69, it is not maintainable. It has only to be dismissed. 5. 4. Ext. R3 (c) is challenged in these two original petitions. OP. No. 5128 of 1987 is filed by another rice mill owner of the locality and hence as per the decision of this court in Mohammedkutty v. Kunhikoya Haji 198S KLT. 69, it is not maintainable. It has only to be dismissed. 5. The entire matter relating to the locus standi of a rival trader to challenge the grant of permit, has been discussed by Bhat, J. in relation to the provisions of the Act. I am in full agreement with the dictum of the learned judge and therefore hold that O.P. No. 5128 of 1987 is not maintainable. 6. Apparently realising that O.P. No. 5128 of 1987 is not maintainable, another petition has been filed by a person, who according to the 3rd respondent is stated to have married a first cousin of the petitioner in O.P. No. 5128 of 1987. The grounds of challenge in that original petition are also the same. The 3rd respondent's contention is that this original petition has been got filed by the petitioner in O.P. No. 5128 of 1987 on his realising the non-maintainability of his application, that it has been filed malafide and that it is not a case of the petitioner ventilating any genuine grievances of the public. On the other hand, it is only intended to subserve the interest of the rival rice mill owner, the petitioner in O.P. No 5128/87. Counsel for the 3rd respondent drew attention of this court to the decisions in Thangathammal v. Secretary, Food Department, 1977 (2) MLJ. 221, Jasbhai Mothibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR. 1976 SC. 578 and in NR & F Mills v. N.T.G. & Brothers, AIR. 1971 SC. 246. He also referred to other decisions, particularly the second paragraph in Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India. AIR. 1982 SC. 1473. In the view that I am taking on the merits of the case, I do not feel called upon to go into this matter in detail, in as much as I am of the opinion that even assuming that the original petition is maintainable, the original petition has to fail on merits. 7. AIR. 1982 SC. 1473. In the view that I am taking on the merits of the case, I do not feel called upon to go into this matter in detail, in as much as I am of the opinion that even assuming that the original petition is maintainable, the original petition has to fail on merits. 7. The contention raised by counsel for the petitioner is that the Collector having passed his order rejecting the 3rd respondent's application by the order Ext R3(a), it was no longer open to him to pass fresh orders in the matter of granting the prayer for permit. It is pointed out that there is no power of review conferred on the Collector under the Act. Ext. R3(c) is in substance an order reviewing the order Ext. R3(a) and in the absence of any power in that regard it is totally null and void. Alternately it is also submitted that if the 3rd respondent was aggrieved by Ext. R3 (a), his remedy was to take it up in appeal under S.12. 8. The second of these grounds is without substance. S.12 only provides for an appeal against the decision of a licencing officer under S.6 or S.7 and not against an order refusing a permit under S.5. 9. Dealing with the main ground of attack, it has to be noted that an order passed by the Collector under S.5 of the Act is not a quasi-judicial order, but one passed by him in exercise of bis functions as an administrative authority. In granting or refusing a permit under S. S he is not dealing with any dispute between the parties, nor does he pass any orders affecting the rights of third parties. The question considered is only whether the circumstances of the case are such that a permit may be granted or not, as to whether the application for permit is one liable to be granted having regard to the facts, particularly those enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of S.5(4). This position is now well established by the decisions of this court and others, namely in N. P. Paul v. State of Kerala. 1966 KLT 1173. Maina Bat v. State of M. P. AIR 1965 M. P. 247, Ramanathan Chettiar v. Board of Revenue 1963 (2) MLJ 320 and Venugopala Reddi v. Venkata Narasimhulu AIR 1962 A P. 363. This position is now well established by the decisions of this court and others, namely in N. P. Paul v. State of Kerala. 1966 KLT 1173. Maina Bat v. State of M. P. AIR 1965 M. P. 247, Ramanathan Chettiar v. Board of Revenue 1963 (2) MLJ 320 and Venugopala Reddi v. Venkata Narasimhulu AIR 1962 A P. 363. I may just extract the passage from Maina Bai's case where the matter is dealt with in extenso. "The grant or refusal of a permit under the Act to start a new rice mill is based on the subjective opinion of Government. The Rules framed under the Act do not prescribe any procedure for investigation in respect of the application. The Act or the Rules made thereunder nowhere provide for that; the "opinion" on the basis of which the Govt. is to act in the exercise of its discretion in the matter of the grant or refusal of a permit, must be formed on certain facts ascertained in a certain manner by means of evidence or after considering the representations and objections of the parties affected. The Government is free to base its opinion on whatsoever material it thinks fit and however obtained in the course of its executive functions or derived from the evidence at an enquiry, if held. The Government is not required to decide the matters enumerated in S.5(4) or R.3(2) objectively. That being so, it cannot be said that the Government discharges quasi-judicial functions under S. S in the matter of grant or refusal of a permit. Its order granting or refusing a permit is therefore an administrative order in which case there is no obligation on the Govt. to hear the applicant before rejecting the application." 10. The power exercised under S.5 being thus purely administrative in nature, there could be no bar to the second respondent rectifying a mistake committed by him in dealing with an application for permit. The grant or refusal of a permit does not affect the rights of any person, except rivals in the trade, who as noted already, have no locus standi to question the grant of permit. No right inheres in any person by the refusal of a permit so that the cancellation of that order does not in turn affect the rights of any other person. No right inheres in any person by the refusal of a permit so that the cancellation of that order does not in turn affect the rights of any other person. S.21 of the General Clauses Act prescribes that where by any Central Act a power to issue orders is conferred then that power includes the power exercisable in like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions to add, to amend, vary or rescind such order. The Act by itself does not impose any limitation on the power to vary or rescind any order passed under S.5 of the Act, so that S.21 must be deemed to enable the second respondent to vary or rescind the order Ext. R3(a) if the circumstances of the case warranted. This power is inherent in the second respondent by virtue of the fact that the powers administered by him under S.5 are administrative in character. The position would have been different if the power he was exercising was quasi-judicial in nature. In such cases what the authority does is not to exercise any power to review any previous order, but one rectifying a mistake in exercise of the powers which are inherent under S.5 itself. The Supreme Court has noted the distinction between the exercise of powers in such circumstances, drawing the line between orders passed in exercise of quasi-judicial powers and administrative orders in the decision in R. R. Varma v. Union of India, AIR. 1980 Supreme Court 1461. Chinnappa Reddi, J. speaking for the court observes as follows in Para.5: "The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the Government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyamunshinghji Arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273, D. N. Roy v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCR 522: (AIR 1971 SC 1045) and State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas (1976) 2 SCR 128: (AIR 1975 SC 2277). All the cases cited by Shri. Garg are cases where the Government was exercising quasi-judicial powers vested in them by statute. All the cases cited by Shri. Garg are cases where the Government was exercising quasi-judicial powers vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any Government must be free to alter its policy or its decisions in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hide-bound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court. We see no force in this submission of the learned counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed." The Andhra Pradesh High Court had also affirmed the power of Government to reconsider orders passed in an administrative capacity in a matter arising under the Pensions Act. It was held in Suryanarayana Murthy Dora v. State of Madras AIR 1959 Andhra Pradesh 487 that when on further enquiry Government came to the conclusion that they proceeded on misapprehension as to basic facts in passing order in an administrative capacity, it was within their powers to reconsider that order and to pass fresh orders in the matter. 11. The original order Ext. R3 (a) in this case had been passed by the Collector on a misapprehension of the basic facts. The original report was that the total production of paddy in the village was only about 2.5 lakhs tonnes and that there was a rice mill in close vicinity of the proposed mill. 11. The original order Ext. R3 (a) in this case had been passed by the Collector on a misapprehension of the basic facts. The original report was that the total production of paddy in the village was only about 2.5 lakhs tonnes and that there was a rice mill in close vicinity of the proposed mill. On both these factors, the facts disclosed were wrong in as much as the Joint Director of Agriculture, an official who must be in the know of the quantity of paddy production in the village had reported that the production of paddy in the village will be around 7 lakhs tonnes and there was a further report that the nearest mill was about 400 meters away and the other mills in the village were situated only within the radius of 2 KMs. It was also the policy of the Government to encourage such small scale industrial units by self employed persons. The Collector had conducted a personal inspection and been satisfied that a gross error had been committed in passing the order Ext. R3 (a). The order Ext. R3 (c) was only one rectifying this mistake committed by the Collector based on wrong facts and information. There is nothing in law which bars the Collector from rectifying a mistake committed by him and passing fresh orders in the matter. As pointed out in the decision of the Supreme Court an administrative order is liable to be rectified. In doing so the authority is not exercising any function akin to the power of review of a quasi-judicial order. 12. It has to be noted that if such a power of rectification of mistake is not recognised in the second respondent in relation to the action taken by him under S.5, it is likely to lead to gross injustice. An order passed under S 5 is Dot liable to appeal under S.12 so that if on the basis of wrong facts and information furnished the authority refused to grant a licence, a situation wilt arise where the applicant will be totally disabled from getting the permit despite the facts being in his favour. Such a situation could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Act when they enacted S.5. 13. I therefore hold that Ext. Such a situation could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Act when they enacted S.5. 13. I therefore hold that Ext. R3(c) had been passed validly in exercise of the powers vested in the second respondent and that it is not open to challenge by the petitioners. The original petitions therefore, entail dismissal. They are accordingly dismissed without however, any orders as to costs. Dismissed.