JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act XIII of 1972) hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. 2. The property in dispute is a portion of the house situated on the first floor numbering 113, Maida Moballa, Lal Kurti Bazar, Meerut Cantt. The petitioner is a tenant of the said accommodation. Respondent no. 2, Smt. Prakashwati, is the landlady of the premises. It has been stated in the petition that the petitioner is a tenant of the accommodation since 1959. In the year 1975 an application was made under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act by the land-lady on the ground of bonafide need. This application was numbered as Case No. 5 of 1975. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application. Against the order of the Prescribed Authority an appeal was filed. The appellate court dismissed it on 25th May, 1977. Against the order dated 25th of May, 1977, writ petition no. 1498-A of 1977 was filed in this Court. This Court by an order dated 4th of October, 1979, affirmed the two orders, passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority. The applications consequently for release stood dismissed. The land-lady, again, on change of circumstances, moved an application for release in the year 1979. being Case No. 192 of 1979. This application was subsequently dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction. The land-lady thereafter moved another application for release in the year 1982. This was registered as P. A. Case No. 29 of 1982. The Prescribed Authority, by an order dated 2-11-1982, rejected her application. The landlady challenged the order dated 2-11-1982 in Misc. Appeal No. 374 of 1982 before the District Judge, Meerut. The appeal came up for hearing in the Court of III Addl. District Judge, Meerut. The appeal was allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. The application of the land-lady under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was allowed and the petitioner was directed to vacate his possession from the said premises within a period of six weeks. This judgment was delivered on 9th of February, 1983. District Judge, Meerut. The appeal was allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. The application of the land-lady under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was allowed and the petitioner was directed to vacate his possession from the said premises within a period of six weeks. This judgment was delivered on 9th of February, 1983. The petitioner has now challenged the order dated 9th February, 1983, by means of this petition in this Court. 3. By means of the impugned order the III Addl. District Judge has categorically found that the need of the landlady for the disputed premises was bonafide and genuine. It has been further found that on a comparison of the hardship of the tenant and the landlady, greater hardship would be caused to the landlady in case the release application is not allowed. The appellate court also took the view that explanation to section 21 (1) (a) was attracted to the facts of the present case and the tenant petitioner is debarred from contesting the release application of the land-lady. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three contentions before me. His first contention is that the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the need of the land-lady for the accommodation in dispute was bonafide and genuine, is a finding erroneous in law. The second contention is that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that greater hardship would be caused to the land-lady in case the release application is rejected is a finding based on irrelevant considerations and the third contention of the learned counsel is that the lower appellate Court has wrongly applied the Explanation to section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any illegality in the finding recorded by the lower court in regard to the bonafide need of the land-lady. He placed before me various affidavits filed by the parties before the Prescribed Authority. On going through the various affidavits I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has rightly recorded the finding that the need of the land-lady was a bonafide one. It has been found that the land-lady is living with her relations at Modi Nagar. He placed before me various affidavits filed by the parties before the Prescribed Authority. On going through the various affidavits I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has rightly recorded the finding that the need of the land-lady was a bonafide one. It has been found that the land-lady is living with her relations at Modi Nagar. It has, further, been found that the husband of the land-lady has got possession over shop no. 114 which is situated on the ground- floor of the disputed premises and that her husband has to come to the shop no. 114 at Meerut every day from Modi Nagar causing inconvenience and expenditure to the land-lady. On these facts it cannot possibly be said that the land-lady does not require the accommodation and that her need is not bonafide or genuine. In the circumstances, the first contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion does not have any substance. In regard to the second contention, the lower appellate Court has recorded a finding that the land-lady has no alternative accommodation whatsoever where she can live with her husband and as stated above she is living with some relations at Modi Nagar. It has been further found that the son of the tenant, Mahendra Pal Gupta, has acquired two accommodations, one is a portion of house no. 81 Maida Mohalla, Lalkurti Bazar, Meerut Cantt. It has been further found that Mahendra Pal Gupta, the son of the tenant, has further acquired a residential accommodation from Avas Evam Vikash Parishad. Since there are two alternative accommodations available with the tenant and no alternative accommodation is available with the land-lady, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the learned appellate Court that greater hardship would be caused to the land-lady in case the release application in not allowed, cannot be said to have been based on irrelevant considerations, in view of the above, in my opinion the second contention raised by the learned counsel also does not have substance. In view of the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court, namely, that the need of the land-lady is bonafide and genuine and that greater hardship would be caused to her in case the release application is not allowed, it is not necessary for me to go into the last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner; but, since I have heard learned counsel for the parties on this contention, I am considering the same. 5. The Explanation to section 21 (1) (a) provides that where the tenant or any member of his family who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him has built or has otherwise acquired residential building in the same city no objection by the tenant against an application for release is entertainable. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on the date when the release application was filed Mahendra Pal Gupa, the son of the petitioner-tenant had already shifted to another accommodation and was living separately and as such the Explanation would not be applicable to the case of the petitioner. In short the submission of the petitioner is that it is necessary for the applicability of the Explanation that a member of the family of the tenant should be actually residing in the accommodation in dispute when the release application is filed and it is only such a member of the family, if he acquires in a vacant state, another building then the Explanation is applicable otherwise not. 6. The Explanation to Section 21 (1) of the Act is quoted below :- " Explanation-In the case of a residential building :- (i) Where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained ; (ii)......... (iii)......... (iv)......... " The word used in the Explanation "who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him" has to be interpreted. (iii)......... (iv)......... " The word used in the Explanation "who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him" has to be interpreted. In 'High School English Grammar And Composition' by Wren and Martin, Hundred and Ninth Edition, at page 109 Article 223, it has been laid down that the Present Perfect Continuous Tense is used for an action which began at some time in the past and is still continuing. The use of the expression by the Legislature " who has been normally residing " is a Present Perfect Continuous Tense and as such the submission of the learned counsel is that the residence of the member of the family must begin sometime in the past and should still continue when he acquires another building in a vacant state. There is no dispute in my opinion to this part of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In order to make the Explanation applicable it is necessary that at the time when the member of the family acquires in a vacant state another residential building he should be a member who has been normally residing with the tenant. 7. On a reading of the Explanation it does not say that the member of the family should also be residing on the date when the release application was filed. If such an interpretation is made it will make the Explanation absolutely nugatory and will defeat the very purpose of the Act. The intention of the Legislature in adding an Explanation to section 21 is to the effect that if a member of the family has been normally residing with the tenant and he has acquired a building in a vacant state he should not be permitted to object to the release application. It is not intended that on the day when the release application is filed he should also be in possession. 8. The argument of the learned counsel can be tested by an example. A member of the family who has been normally residing with the tenant acquires building in a vacant state on a particular day and on the same day he shilts to that building, then if the petitioner's contention is accepted the Explanation to Section 21 (1) would not apply if the release application is made the next day and the purpose of enacting the Explanation will be completely defeated. In my opinion, consequently, the words used, namely,' the member of the family who has been normally residing with the tenant ' are relevant only at the time when such a member of the family acquires residential building in a vacant state and this clause is not at all relateble to the date of the making of the release application. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited in support of his submission, a Full Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya v. First Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, 1982 AWC 523 . He has further relied upon paragraph 12 of the report. The question raised before the Full Bench was entirely different than the one which had been raised in this case. There the question for interpretation was whether a person who has been normally residing with the tenant has also to be wholly dependent on such a tenant. The Full Bench held that this is not necessary and it was held that if a person who has been normally residing with the tenant builds or otherwise in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city etc., the building under tenancy shall be deemed to have become vacant. Similarly, if a person who is wholly dependent on the tenant does the offending act, namely, acquires etc., another residential building, the same result will follow. It is not necessary that a person should both be normally residing with the tenant aswell as be wholly dependent on such tenant before his acquiring another building. 9. In my opinion the decision in the case of Smt. Ram Devi Shakhya (Supra) does not advance the argument raised on behalf of the petitioner. In my opinion on the interpretation of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 it is clear that it is not necessary that the member of the family who has acquired in a vacant state a residential building should be residing in the said building on the date when the application for release is made. In the circumstances, I do not agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. In the circumstances, I do not agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. In the end I may further add that the lower appellate Court has categorically recorded a finding that when Mahendra Pal Gupta acquired a residential accommodation in a vacant state, Mahendra Pal Gupta was normally residing with the petitioner tenant and this being a finding of fact the Explanation to section 21 (1) was fully applicable to the facts of the present case. It can, therefore, be said that the decision in this regard of the lower appellate Court is, in any manner, erroneous in law. In the result, I do not find any merit in this case and accordingly dismiss the petition. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. The petitioner prays for some time to vacate the premises. This prayer, in my opinion, is justified. The petitioner is granted three months' time to vacate the premises provided the petitioner gives an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a month from today that he would vacate the premises immediately after the expiry of three months and handover the vacant possession of the premises to the respondent no. 2. In case he does not give any undertaking the release order shall be enforced forthwith.