JUDGMENT - V.V. VAZE, J.:---One Shobha Deshpande was married to Ravindra Karkhanis, a divorcee on 17-3-1980 at Bombay under the Hindu Customary Rites. The marriage was also registered and the couple started living together as husband and wife at Laxman Zulla, Ranade Road, Bombay-400028. A daughter Ruta was born out of the wedlock on 20-11-1980 but as difference arose the couple started living separately from 16th October, 1980. They applied in January 1985 to the Bombay City Civil Court under section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, for passing a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage. As a period of six months is provided for under sub-section (2) of section 13-B for a motion to be made the learned Judge of the City Civil Court had made the petition filed on 2-1-1985 returnable on 19-8-1985. Before that date the petitioner No. 1 took out a Notice of Motion praying that maintenance may be granted for her daughter Ruta and explained that even though she had stated in the petition under section 13-B that the couple had agreed that custody of the child shall be with the wife and that the wife shall not claim any maintenance for the daughter Ruta, such an averment was formal one and inserted at the instance of the common advocate who was acting for both of them. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court made the motion absolute and granted maintenance of Rs. 200/- p.m, with effect from August 1985 giving rise to the present appeal. 2. Mr. Gavanekar, the learned Counsel for the husband Ravindra has underscored the fact that the wife who is double-graduate and engaged as a teacher had, out of her own free will, agreed that she shall not claim any maintenance for the daughter Ruta and that the plea of this averment being of a formal nature is a clear after thought. If the wife is now allowed to retract from her stand taken in the consent petition so the argument proceeds nothing would prevent her from even retracting from her stand that she would not claim any maintenance or alimony either past or future embodied in para 9 of the joint petition. 3. It is no doubt true that the wife had stated in the combined petition that "she shall not claim any maintenance for the daughter Ruta". 3. It is no doubt true that the wife had stated in the combined petition that "she shall not claim any maintenance for the daughter Ruta". It is unnecessary to go into the question whether this was supposed to be a formal term as alleged by the wife or the question of the property of engaging a common advocate for presenting a petition for divorce by mutual consent. What stares at us from this petition is that the husband and wife took away the jurisdiction of the Divorce Court to determine the amount of maintenance of the child Ruta with which it was charged under section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which provides that a legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is minor. Such a situation arose in (Bennett v. Bennett)1, (1952)1 K.B. 249, in which before pronouncement of a decree nisi the couple had entered into a deal whereby the husband agreed to make financial provision for his wife and son in consideration of which the wife covenanted not to proceed with the prayers for maintenance and to consent to their being dismissed and not to present any further petition for maintenance. Holding that the deed is unenforceable being against the public policy Denning, Lord Justice after following an earlier view of Lord Chancellor Hailsham in (Hyman v. Hyman)2, 1929 A.C. observed (at p. 262) : "An award of permanent maintenance on a divorce is peculiarly a matter for the Divorce Court, and the jurisdiction of that Court in regard to it cannot be ousted by the private agreement of the parties. The reason lies in public policy. First, it is in the public interest that the wife and children of a divorced husband should not be left dependent on public assistance, or no charity, when he has the means to support them. They should therefore be able to come to the Divorce Court for maintenance, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary : (Hyman v. Hyman) (1929) A.C. 601. They should therefore be able to come to the Divorce Court for maintenance, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary : (Hyman v. Hyman) (1929) A.C. 601. " Similar is the view of Kerala High Court in (Thulasikumar v. Raghavan)3, A.I.R. 1985 Kerala 20 in which it was held that the mere fact that the child's mother as per the agreement between herself and her husband had undertaken the responsibility of maintaining the child, does not precluded the child from claiming maintenance against the father. In proceedings under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code the Hyderabad High Court in (Anjayya v. Parutal)4, 1952 Cri.L.J. 577 also concluded that an agreement entered into by the father with the natural mother of the child cannot be ipso facto binding on the minor children. Hyderabad Court enjoined upon the Criminal Court in such a case with the duty of seeing whether the compromise was really beneficial and advantageous to the minor. In the facts of that case, giving of a full was held out sufficient to meet the maintenance of the children for the future. 4. The matter can be looked at from other angle. What the mother has done in filing a joint petition under section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act is to abandon the entire claim of maintenance of the minor. The provision of Order XXXIII C.P.C. relating to abandonment provided that when the plaintiff is a minor the claim shall not be abandoned without the leave of the Court and in practice the Court examines whether the abandonment or a compromise is in the interest of the minor. In the present case the stage of examination of the joint petition by the lower Court did not arise because the Court had made the application returnable on 19-8-1985 and before that date the wife realised her mistake in agreeing to something by which the maintenance of her daughter was given away. Even if the mother had not challenged the abandonment of the claim of maintenance of the minor, the Court would surely have looked into the terms of the compromise and refused to sanction something that was totally against the interest of the minor. Even if the mother had not challenged the abandonment of the claim of maintenance of the minor, the Court would surely have looked into the terms of the compromise and refused to sanction something that was totally against the interest of the minor. 5 Thus it is amply borne out by authority that the term in the consent petition by which the wife stated that the she shall not claim any maintenance for the daughter Ruta is void being against public policy and is not enforceable. 6. That brings me to the provisions of section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, under which Ruta was entitled to claim maintenance from her father as well as mother. The learned Judge of the lower Court has taken into consideration the fact that though the petitioner is gainfully employed, she is suffering from slipped disc which is a physical disability. The learned Judge has also observed that "even though the wife is employed that does not mean that husband should be exempted or ex-honerated from his liability." From that observations I am satisfied that the lower Court has weighed the paying capacities of both the parents of Ruta and come to the conclusion that the father should pray maintenance of Rs. 200/- for the minor child Ruta and there is no reason to interfere. Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----