ORDER Sivasubramaniam, J. 1. The unsuccessful tenant in R.C.O.P.No. 456 of 1982 on the file of the learned Rent Controller (13th Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras and in the appeal in R.C.A.No. 892 of 1984 on the file of the appellate authority (III Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras in the petitioner in C.R.P.No. 4205 of 1985 and similarly the unsuccessful tenant in R.C.O.P.No. 521 of 1982 and in the appeal in R.C.A.No. 911 of 1984 is the petitioner in both these cases. 2. The respondent/landlady filed two petitions in R.C.O.P.Nos.456 of 1982 and 521 of 1982 Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 for eviction of the two tenants, who are the petitioners in these two revision petitions, in respect of their respective sheds in old Door Nos.31/5 and 31/5L and new Door No. 6 Sattanna Naicken Street, Choolai, Madras-12 on the ground of owner's occupation for non-residential purposes on the following grounds; The revision, petitioners are tenants paying a monthly rent of Rs.565 and Rs.650 respectively for non-residential purposes. The landlady's son is carrying on business in timber in partnership under the name and style of M/s. Jeeva Jyothi Timbers in a rented premises bearing Door No. 226, Syednhams Road, Madras and he is not possessed of any other non-residential premises of his own in the city of Madras and therefore the landlady requires the petition premises under the occupation of the tenants bona fide for the purpose of her son. 3. The tenants resisted the eviction petitions raising the following contentions in their respective counter statements: The tenant R.C.O.P. No. 456 of 1982 contended that the landlady does not have any son and therefore the question of requiring the building for his purposes does not arise. The petition premises will not be suitable for timber business. The husband of the landlady one Pulliah has let out the premises bearing door No. 198, Domellows Road, Madras and it shows that the landlady was not really in need of the same. If really she had required the same he would not have let out said building to third parties. The landlady demanded enhanced rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 1,200 p.m., which was declined by the tenant and therefore the eviction petition has been filed within oblique motive. If really she had required the same he would not have let out said building to third parties. The landlady demanded enhanced rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 1,200 p.m., which was declined by the tenant and therefore the eviction petition has been filed within oblique motive. The requirement of the landlady is not for herself but for the partners of her son who are absolutely third parties to the landlady. Therefore she could not evict the tenant for the requirement of the third parties. The tenant in R.C.O.P.No. 521 of 1982 contended that the petition for eviction Under Section 10)(3)(a)(iii) of the Act in respect of two distinct and separate buildings taken on different occasions by creating two different tenancies on two different rates of rents is not maintainable. Even if she requires the building for non-residential purposes she is not entitled to claim more than one building. In other respects the raised identical contentions as in the other petition. 4. The learned Rent Controller on a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties came to the conclusion that Renganayakalu is the adopted son of the landlady that the requirement of the landlady is bona fide and that a single petition for eviction is maintainable in respect of the two buildings in R.C.O.P.No. 521 of 1982. Consequently he allowed the eviction petitions and ordered eviction by a common order. As against the said order the tenants preferred the appeals in R.C.A.Nos.892 of 1984 and 911 of 1984 respectively. The appellate authority by its common judgment confirms the findings of the Learned Rent Controller and dismissed the appeals. As against the said decision the tenants have preferred these revision petitions. 5. T.P. Sankaran Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in these two revision petitions raised a contention that the so called adoption of one Renganayakulu who has been examined as P.W.2 in this case is not valid in law and therefore he cannot be deemed to be the son of the landlady. If that is so the present eviction petitions on that basis are liable to be dismissed in limine. It is no doubt true that the respondent/ landlord did not specifically state in the petition that one Renganayakalu is her adopted son. But she has stated that he is her son. If that is so the present eviction petitions on that basis are liable to be dismissed in limine. It is no doubt true that the respondent/ landlord did not specifically state in the petition that one Renganayakalu is her adopted son. But she has stated that he is her son. However evidence was let in regarding the adoption and the same was accepted by the authorities below, P.W.1 who is the husband of the landlady has stated that he said Ranganayakulu (P.E.2) is his adopted son and in order to substantiate the said contention he has relied on the documents Ex.P-1, P-2, P-3, P-8, P-10 and P-11 and R.9. Accepting the evidence of P.W.1 and 2 and the documentary evidence particularly Ex.P-10 the registration copy of the gift deed dated 27-8-1976 executed by the respondent's husband in favour of the adopted son P.W.2. and Ex.P-3 the marriage invitation Card the authorities below held that P.W.2 is the adopted son of the landlady. The validity of the adoption is challenged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners particularly on the ground that P.W.2 was aged about 21 years on the date of the alleged adoption and therefore it is invalid as per Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act according to which a boy to be adopted must have completed 15 years. Even though this objection prima facie appears to be tenable it is unnecessary to go into that aspect in these summary proceedings. It is a matter to be established in appropriate forum. It is evidence that P.W.2 is the brother's son of the landlady and that there is no dispute that he was living with the landlady and that she has no issues of her own. Evidently he has been living as a member of her family and she has treated him as her son. This is sufficient to bring him under the definition of "member of the family". It has been categorically laid down by a Bench of this Court in Angamuthammal v. Muthu wherein it has been held as follows: The opening clause in Section 2 clearly indicates that the definition will apply only when the context to the situation does not call for any other meaning being given to the words defined in the section. It has been categorically laid down by a Bench of this Court in Angamuthammal v. Muthu wherein it has been held as follows: The opening clause in Section 2 clearly indicates that the definition will apply only when the context to the situation does not call for any other meaning being given to the words defined in the section. Therefore "members of the family" in relation to a landlord defined in Section 2(6-A) cannot be said always to take in only the persons mentioned therein viz., the spouse son, daughter, grand child or dependent parent. If the context so requires it is certainly permissible for the Court to held that any other person would also fall within the meaning of the expression 'member of the family' in relating to a landlord. Therefore, as per the expanded definition of "family" found in Section 10(3) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act P.W.2 must be treated as a member of the family of the landlady and as much she is entitled to maintain the petitions for eviction. 6. Another objection was taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the ground that a single eviction petition is not maintainable in respect of two sheds in R.C.O.P.No. 521 of 1982. The authorities below have found that the two factory sheds which are the subject matter of the petition bear one number and that no prejudice will be caused to the tenant by the composite application filed by the landlady. I do not find any infirmity in the said finding and the petitions are certainly maintainable. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the requirement of the landlady is not bona fide. According to the landlady, her adopted son P.W.2 is carrying on a partnership business under the name and style of Jeeva Jyoti Timbers in a rented premises bearing door No. 226 Sydenhams Road, Apparao Gardens, Madras-112. P.Ws.1 and 2 have categorically spoken about the business carried on by P.W.2 in partnership with some others. Reliance was placed on Exs.P.12, P.13, P.14, P.17 and P.18. It is seen that Ex.P-13 is the partnership deed dated 19-8-81 and Ex.P-14 is the property tax receipt issued by the Corporation of Madras in respect of door No. 226, Sydenhams Road in which it is mentioned that one K. Apparao is the name. Reliance was placed on Exs.P.12, P.13, P.14, P.17 and P.18. It is seen that Ex.P-13 is the partnership deed dated 19-8-81 and Ex.P-14 is the property tax receipt issued by the Corporation of Madras in respect of door No. 226, Sydenhams Road in which it is mentioned that one K. Apparao is the name. On the basis of the said evidence the authorities below concurrently found that P.W.2 is carrying on a partnership business in the said rented premises under the name and style of Jeeva Jyothi Timbers. Apart from that Ex.P-20 was filed as an additional document before the appellate authority to show that the partnership business has been dissolved and P.W.2 has become the sole proprietor of the same. Therefore the fact that the landlady requires the premises for the purpose of personal occupation for the benefit of P.W.2 cannot be disputed and therefore the requirement of the landlady is certainly a bona fide one. However the tenants contended that the petition buildings are not fit for the timber business as lorried cannot enter the same. It is a matter in which the tenants cannot have a say and it is for the landlady to decide as to the suitability of the buildings for the purpose of the business carried on by P.W.2. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners laid much emphasis on the question regarding reasonable requirement of the landlady. According to him, the landlady has to establish that P.W.2 is in need of all the buildings for the purpose of his business. It was pointed out that the present building occupied by P.W.2 is only about 500 sq.ft., in extent where as the total extent of the buildings, which are the subject-matter of these petitions, is about 3,000 sq.ft., It was argued that in view of this glaring difference, the landlady is bound to prove that the entire extent is required for the business of P.W.2. Learned Counsel relied on the decision of this Court reported in Rajarathnam Chetty v. Abdul Gani (1964) 1 M.L.J. 289, wherein this Court held that the term "require" implies that it is more under the force of personal circumstances than under the impulse of a desire that the landlord needs the premises. In that decision, reliance was placed on the decision of a Bench of this Court in Venkatesachary and Ors. In that decision, reliance was placed on the decision of a Bench of this Court in Venkatesachary and Ors. v. The Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras and Ors. (1949) 2 M.L.J. 784 wherein it was held that what is sufficient for the landlord is not the real question but whether he requires the entire building bona fide for his occupation, is the point. In dealing with this submission, the learned Judge accented the same as a principal but distinguished the same by saying that proposition may be right if the landlord requires the entire non-residential portion of the building if it is occupied by one tenant. But this principle may not be applicable if the non-residential portion of the building is occupied by different tenants. In such circumstances, the learned Judge held that the natural question would arise whether the landlord requires the entire portion or any portion of the non-residential building for his use and occupation. Learned Counsel cited another decision reported in Petroleum Workers Union v. V.A. Mohamed and Company, in support of his contention. But it relates to a case of additional accommodation and, therefore, those principles may not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sat-want Kaur v. Dhund Singh, where, while considering the question under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act regarding the bona fide user of the landlord, the Supreme Court took note of the nature of the business of the landlord to find out as to whether such business requirement should necessarily be satisfied by requisitioning the entirety of the premises in question in the occupation of the tenant. This aspect of the matter was considered by Nainar Sundaram, J., in Wilagaraj Match Works Messrs, v. C. Sundaram 98 L.W. 219. The learned Judge held that there must exist essential ingredients to establish that the landlord has an honest need to occupy the premises in question and that bona fide is very much allied and concern with a subjective element and has got to be spelt out by the entirety of facts and circumstances in such case. However the Learned Judge left open the question whether under the provision of the Act eviction from the premises as a whole is asked for. 9. However the Learned Judge left open the question whether under the provision of the Act eviction from the premises as a whole is asked for. 9. In considering the requirement of a landlord, there is inconsistent Judicial opinion as to the fact whether a landlord is bound to prove bona fide before succeeding in an application filed Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. This question assumes importance because if it is case of bona fide need not be established it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the landlord requires all the premises or only a part of them. In the above decision of Nainar Sundaram, J., it was pointed out that it would be a relevant factor to be considered for proving the bona fide of a landlord. V. Ramaswami, J., as he then was in Khan Mohammed v. P. Narayanan Nambiyar and 3 Ors. 1986 D.R.C.R. 428 held that the absence of the words "landlord requires" in Clause (iii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act clearly shows that the landlord need not show any bona fide for getting an order of eviction under the said section. The same opinion was expressed by Ramanujam, J., in Abdul Rahman v. Sadasivam. However a contrary view has been expressed by Maheswaran, J., in Madras District Central Co-operative Bank Limited v. A. Venkatesh and by the learned Chief Justice in Saravana Cycle Mart v. A.S. Vasan 99 L.W. 880. As I have already expressed in C.R.P.No. 253 of 1986 D. Munuswami Achari v. Animuga Chetty, order, dated 12-11-87 the matter requires to be settled by a Bench of this Court. However in this case controversy may stand in the way of disposing of the present revision petitions. 10. In this case we find that there sheds are involved which are the subject matter of the eviction petitions. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the authorities below should have applied their mind to the question whether the landlady required all the buildings or one among them. Learned Counsel for the respondent replied by saying that this aspect of the case was never raised before the authorities below and therefore it is not open to the petitioners to raise this point at this stage. However I find that this aspect of the matter was canvassed during the enquiry and questions were put to witnesses at this aspect. Learned Counsel for the respondent replied by saying that this aspect of the case was never raised before the authorities below and therefore it is not open to the petitioners to raise this point at this stage. However I find that this aspect of the matter was canvassed during the enquiry and questions were put to witnesses at this aspect. During the course of the evidence P.W.1 has stated that he requires the buildings for his timber business and that two sheds are necessary for his business. Again he was cross examined regarding the extent of the building used by him at present and the extent of the portion mentioned buildings. It is also in evidence that the three sheds have got separate roofings and separate entrance having an inter-connections between them. P.W.1 has spoken elaborately about these aspects and he was also cross examined as to the necessity for carrying on timber business of the son of the landlady. This point was also raised in the grounds of appeal filed by the petitioners before the appellate authority. However the appellate authority based on a wrong assumption that it is the case of the tenants that the petition buildings are not sufficient for the business of the son of landlady. What was suggested on behalf of the tenants was that the petition buildings are not suitable for. Timber business. The Learned Judge states as follows in the Judgment: Therefore it is obvious that this aspect of the matter has not been considered in proper perspective. It is no doubt true that the requirement of the landlady cannot be weighed in golden scale and it is not also the law that she is not entitled to claim mere extent of the building that what is occupied by her sons at present. If it is one building this difficulty would not have arisen. But when there are three buildings thee must be something on record to show that the authorities have applied their mind to the need of the landlady. In view of this position it has become necessary to remit the matters of the appellate authority for considering this limited question alone namely whether the landlady requires all the three sheds for the business carried on by her son or only a part of the same. In other respects the findings of the authorities below are confirmed. 11. In view of this position it has become necessary to remit the matters of the appellate authority for considering this limited question alone namely whether the landlady requires all the three sheds for the business carried on by her son or only a part of the same. In other respects the findings of the authorities below are confirmed. 11. In the result these two revision petitions are allowed to the limited extent as indicated above. The orders of the authorities below are set aside and the matters are remitted back to the appellate authority for disposal in the light of the observations made herein. Since the matters are ending for a long time the appellate authority is directed to dispose of the appeals within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is open to the parties to let in additional evidence if necessary. There will be no order as to costs in these revision petitions.