(1) AFTER hearing Shri V.N. Kowa, learned counsel forthe Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Shri A.K. Ganguli, learned counsel appearing for th Industrial Gases Ltd., we feel that this application for clarification must be allowed. There is no doubt or difficulty as tothe scope of rfrence tothe umpire as perthe terms of this courtS order dated 17/12/1980 appointing Shri H.R. Khanna, ex-Judge of this Court, as an umpire.the terms ofthe rfrence are sufficiently compre- hensive to includethe power to Fixthe rate of supply of electricity bythe Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. forthe period of supply underthe terms of th agreement.the courtS order appointing Shri H.R. Khanna asthe umpire specifically mentions that he would hvethe jurisdiction and power to adjudicate upon ailthe disputes which had been referred to late Shri P.K. Sarkar, a retired Judge ofthe Calcutta High court. We find thatthe High court by its order dated 14/07/1975 had interpretedthe scope ofthe rfrence so as to includethe daims arising forthe sub- squent period aiso andthe said order is binding as betweenthe parties. Th operative portion ofthe order passed bythe High court reads as under: "THERE may be successive daims for successive periods but if ail th daims of same nature are raised withinthe periods fixed under th said agreement, in my view, having regard tothe spcial type of agreement,the daims forthe subsquent period may aiso be included in one rfrence otherwise it would be contrary tothe gn- ral principles of preventing multiplicity of proceedings, which, in my view, should aiso include arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator or umpire." --- *** --- The contention of Shri A.K. Ganguli, learned counsel forthe respon- dents that to constitute a valid rfrence it cannot be said that a dispute bas arisen betweenthe parties withinthe meaning ofthe arbitration clause merely because there is failure to pay duringthe subsquent penod, cannot be dispute. Butthe question is as tothe applicability of that principle tothe facts ofthe prsent case.the question does not arise hre in view ofthe plain ternis in whichthe High court had delineatedthe scope ofthe rfrence made tothe arbitrator orthe umpire. lt is quite apparent that the-junsdiction ofthe arbitrator orthe umpire was wide enoughthe include daims with regard tothe sub- squent periods. We accordingly allowthe application for clarification in tenus ofthe prayer contained therein.