JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - In this petition directed against order of removal from service of an official of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the principal attack on validity of the order was omission to give a second opportunity to show cause on proposed punishment under regulation 37(4)(a) as it stood when inquiry commenced. But what turned out to be of greater or better consequences for petitioner was the failure both of punishing and appellate authority to appreciate that the provision for major and minor penalties in regulation and award of either for good and sufficient reasons required application of mind. 2. Since opposite parties have chosen not to put in appearance despite service, the petition is being disposed of finally, on unrebutted averment in writ petition at admission stage under Chapter XXII, Rule 2 of Rules of Court. 3. Taking up the first question namely if the order is bad for failure to afford what was popularly known as second opportunity it appears regulation 36(4)(a) of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Conduct, Dispute and Appeal) Regulation (hereinafter referred to as regulation) which incorporated provision for an opportunity to show cause against proposed punishment was amended in July, 1985 and the Disciplinary Authority was empowered to impose any of the major penalty on the evidence adduced during inquiry without giving the employee any further opportunity, to make representation. But what was vehemently urged was that formal inquiry against petitioner having commenced in March, 1984 he had a vested right of inquiry and punishment in accordance with regulations as they stood on that date. Reliance was placed on Workmen v. Firestone Rubber Co. Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813 . From inquiry report it is clear that it was completed in June, 1985. But when was it submitted to Disciplinary Authority is not known. The order of removal, however, was passed in September, 1985. In absence of any material it has to be assumed that the report must have been submitted after July, 1985. An employee have a valuable right to continue in service unless he is removed under the rule which are not opposed to public policy and are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Regulations 34 to 38 deal in detail with major and minor penalty, the procedure to be followed and the manner in which penalties can be imposed. An employee have a valuable right to continue in service unless he is removed under the rule which are not opposed to public policy and are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Regulations 34 to 38 deal in detail with major and minor penalty, the procedure to be followed and the manner in which penalties can be imposed. Regulation 37 deals with action on Inquiry report. Its sub-rule 4(a) dealt with second opportunity. This was taken away obviously to bring the regulation in line with constitutional amendment of Article 311. It is neither opposed to public policy nor it is violative of Article 14. The right of an employee under regulations to continue in service unless removed in accordance with law remained untouched. The ratio in the Supreme Court decision is not of much assistance. It related to interpretation of Section 11-A added to Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which abridged rights of employees and gave power to Tribunal to differ both on the findings of misconduct and proposed punishment. The Hon'ble Court held that the amendment did not apply to disputes already referred. The employer under the unamended Act had a vested right under law to record finding of misconduct and award punishment. This right vested in them on the date the dispute was referred for adjudication. In absence of any expression provided in the Act this right could not be curtailed. The petitioner's right, however, did not extent beyond what was provided by regulations. And that has not been curtailed in any manner. Giving of notice to show cause against proposed punishment pertained to procedure only. Apart from it the inquiry report appears to have been submitted after regulation had been amended. Therefore, the date on which order was passed it was the amended regulation which could apply. The proceedings before punishing authority having commenced and terminated both under amended regulations, the petitioner could not claim that the order was bad because no second opportunity was afforded as contemplated in regulation 37(4)(a) as it stood prior to July, 1985. 4. For purposes of the next challenge that is the orders are bad for want of reasons, it is essential to have a close look on the regulations dealing with penalties. 5. 4. For purposes of the next challenge that is the orders are bad for want of reasons, it is essential to have a close look on the regulations dealing with penalties. 5. Regulation 34 reads as under : The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on an employee who is found guilty of misconduct or a breach of any regulations or orders made by the Commission or by any authority empowered in that behalf by the Commission namely : - Minor Penalties (i) * * (ii) * * (iii) * * (iv) * * * Major Penalties (v) * * * (vi) * * * (vii) * * * (viii) Removal from service which shall now be a disqualification for future employment (ix) * * * Regulation 36 lays down in detail the procedure for imposing major penalties. And Regulation 37 deals with action on Inquiry Report. Regulation 38 provides the manner of imposition of minor penalties. The penalty major or minor under Regulation 34 could, therefore, be imposed for misconduct or violation or regulations depending on gravity of default or omission and for `good and sufficient reasons'. Although on such words have been used in Regulation 37 which permits disciplinary authority to impose penalty if the authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charges and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses V to IX on regulation should be imposed'. But that, appears to be necessary both on principle of fairness and requirement of the regulation. An employee who is removed from service is entitled to know not only the reasons for his removal or dismissal but has the right of claiming that Disciplinary Authority should pass the order after applying his mind otherwise the entire proceedings may appear to be mockery of justice. If the removal can be effected without giving any reason sufficient reason shall stand reduced to a force. Further use of words `good and sufficient reasons' in Regulation 34 is not without purpose. Both these words are of wide import. But when used in law they convey the same sense namely, "adequate", "enough". They have been used to impress upon authorities that the power conferred on them is not arbitrary. Further use of words `good and sufficient reasons' in Regulation 34 is not without purpose. Both these words are of wide import. But when used in law they convey the same sense namely, "adequate", "enough". They have been used to impress upon authorities that the power conferred on them is not arbitrary. The regulations by using these words cast an obligation on duty on Disciplinary Authority to be cautious and careful while imposing penalty. Whether a particular order satisfies that test may depend on facts. But if the order is bereft of any reason or finding except agreement with Inquiry Report then to say the least it is in utter disregard of statutory provisions. It would no be out of place to mention that regulation 36 which deals with minor penalty requires punishing authority to record finding on each imputation or misbehaviour. It cannot be imagined that even though the authority proceeding to impose minor penalty is required to record finding on each imputation of misconduct the authority imposing major penalty is absolved of that responsibility. It is in fact more stringent as the power could be exercised only for good and sufficient reasons. In Ram Chandra v. Union of India, 1986 UPLBEC 594 it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that duty to give reasons is an incident of the judicial process. The order of punishing and appellate authority fails to satisfy this test. 6. Even the last submission that punishment awarded to petitioner is not commensurate to the punishment inflicted appears to be well founded. The petitioner was appointed as apprentice Geologist afters election by Union Public Service Commission in August, 1956. In September, 1959 Oil and Natural Gas Commission was constituted. The services of petitioner were transferred to it. He was made permanent Geologist in April, 1966. According to the petitioner he was promoted as senior Geologist in June, 1968, Deputy Superintendent Geologist in April, 1978 and the Superintendent Geologist in October, 1982. From June, 1975 to June, 1983 the petitioner was in Cambay. During this period differences arose between him and other officials resulting in suit for injunction in Civil Court for permitting petitioner to carry out certain test, a writ petition against award of adverse entry and finally his transfer in April, 1983 as Superintendent Geologist to head office Dehra Dun. From June, 1975 to June, 1983 the petitioner was in Cambay. During this period differences arose between him and other officials resulting in suit for injunction in Civil Court for permitting petitioner to carry out certain test, a writ petition against award of adverse entry and finally his transfer in April, 1983 as Superintendent Geologist to head office Dehra Dun. He was not satisfied as he had the feeling that he was doing very good work at Cambay which was in the interest of O.& N.G.C. He, therefore, voiced his feeling to General Manager Cambay who informed him that he would be better placed at Dehradun. The petitioner, however, contained complaining, and suggesting about exploration etc. and taking lest. And all this culminated in the charge-sheet, dated 3rd March, 1984 in which four charges were levelled against petitioner : (i) That he has wilfully and unauthorisedly absented from duty during the periods, 7-10-1981 to 20-10-1983, 1-11-1983 to 16-11-1983, 8-12-1983 to 20-12-1983 and has been wilfully and unauthorisedly absented from duty since 27-12-1983 in contravention of Regulation 6 of ONGC (CDA) Regulations, 1976 ; (ii) that he has been neglecting his duty ; (iii) that he disobeyed the lawful orders/instructions of his superior given vide Memo No, MSG/ME/6S/l(4)/83, dated 26 12-1983 and U.O. No. MSG/ME/PS/1 (4)/73, dated 23-12-1983 ; and (iv) that he met with the authorities in the Ministry of Energy, Government of India, New Delhi and addressed them letters/representations for seeking redress of grievances in service matters, thereby violated the provisions of Regulation 25 of the ONGS (CDA) Regulations, 1976." As is apparent the first three charges are inter-linked whereas the fourth related to violation of regulation framed by the Commission. The Inquiry Officer found ail the fourth charges established. The question, however, is if the finding on first three charges constituted misconduct, so as to warrant removal from service. From various annexures filed with writ petition which have not been controverted the petitioner appears to be enthusiastic officer dedicated to his job. His zeal and tenacity in exploration was appreciated even by Chairman and members. When he was posted at Dehra Dun and was entrusted with task of development of exploration of state graphic traps he submitted an ambitious plan on which he was advised to await orders. His zeal and tenacity in exploration was appreciated even by Chairman and members. When he was posted at Dehra Dun and was entrusted with task of development of exploration of state graphic traps he submitted an ambitious plan on which he was advised to await orders. Since nothing was coming out it the petitioner appears to have felt frustrated and applied for leave to seek redress outside Commission. Even when he applied for leave from 10th October, to 5th November, 1983 on 6th October with permission to prefix 7th and 8th October which were holidays and left station on 7th without awaiting for sanction under bonafide belief that the leave shall be granted, he came back immediately and joined duties on 20th October when he was informed that by order dated 13th October his application had been rejected and he was required to join, it has not been found that petitioner misbehaved or exhibited insubordination. He was not rash in his behaviour nor used any intemperate language in his representation. His fault was overstaying or leaving station without waiting for sanction of leave. It was not proper. After all efficient functioning to office depends on observance of rules and regulations. An employee committing breach of it is liable to be penalised. 8ut should every such breach result in the severest penalty. For that regulations itself provide guideline by- using word misconduct and breach of regulations. Violation or disobedience of regulation may become misconduct depending on gravity of breach. But normally misconduct is understood or is associated with, integrity. For instance in A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 115, it was held that unbecoming conduct of a public servant did not reflect on integrity therefore, it could not be construed as misconduct. Similarly in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, 1993 (3) SCC 442 an employee of forest department guilty of illegal felling was let of by imposing minor penalty by the Supreme Court as his action did not cause any loss of revenue and charge against integrity was not established. After all a Disciplinary Authority should not forget that dismissal or removal from service effects livelihood of the employee and his family members. The exercise of power which selects such right has to be tested on touchstone of fairness and reasonableness the concept which have become part of our growing jurisprudence. After all a Disciplinary Authority should not forget that dismissal or removal from service effects livelihood of the employee and his family members. The exercise of power which selects such right has to be tested on touchstone of fairness and reasonableness the concept which have become part of our growing jurisprudence. The least application of mind by the Disciplinary or even the appellate authority would have left no room for doubt that ends of justice could have been met not only by uprooting petitioner but by penalising him, in a manner which could have had curing effect on him. Depriving a person of his bread and butter without adequate jurisdiction is arbitrary exercise of power violative of constitutional guarantee under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of Constitution. Tested on anvil of Supreme Court decision in Bhagat Ram's case and in absence of charge or finding touching upon honesty or integrity or indiscipline or misbehaviour of petitioner the order removing petitioner from service is rendered infirm. 7. On findings recorded above two courses appears to be open one to direct the Disciplinary Authority to pass fresh order and the other to impose one of the minor penalties as was done in Bhagat Ram's case. The letter course is normally to be avoided in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. But the opposite parties have left no option by not contesting the petition. In the circumstances in the guideline provided by Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram's case it is proposed to pass the order specially because petitioner has been out of employment for more than three years now. 8. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 25th September, 1985 and 11th March, 1986 passed by Disciplinary and Appellate Authority are quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated. He shall, however, be censured for his absence without leave. A censure entry shall be proposed by the competent authority and shall be entered in his character roll. He shall not be entitled for any salary for the period during which he was absent without leave. For that period the petitioner shall be granted extraordinary leave without pay. 9. Since opposite parties have not contested the petition there shall be no order as to costs.