Judgment :- 1. After a variegated course in litigation a religious institution (Juma Masjid Mahal Sangham) succeeded in getting an order of eviction of a tenant from the building which belongs to the said institution. The impugned order is the one passed by the District Court in exercise of powers under S.20 of the Kerala Building; (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'The Act'). The challenge now is under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Waikom Town Juma Masjid Mahal Sangham" (hereinafter referred to as the society) filed an application before the Rent Control Court for an order of eviction on the ground that the building is bona fide needed by the sangham for its own purposes. The aforesaid ground was further expatiated in the averments stating that the society is conducting a school for teaching Arabic language (Madrassa) in a small building which is too insufficient to accommodate all the students and that the student strength in the Madrassa is on the increase and that the society has. therefore, resolved to make the present building available to house the Madrassa therein. The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the society bona fide needs the building. But since the tenant depends mainly upon the income derived from the business conducted in this building for his livelihood and since there is no other suitable building available in the locality to shift his business, both the said courts refused to grant the relief prayed for by the society. The District Court, in revision, expressed the opinion that the first two courts did not consider the applicability of the ground envisaged in S.11(7) of the Act. Hence the District Court remanded the case to the Appellate Authority with a direction to dispose of the appeal afresh after considering the scope of the applicability of the aforesaid sub-section to the facts of the case. The Appellate Authority thus found that the society is entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(7) and hence passed an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. That order was, in turn, challenged by the tenant, in revision before the District Court without success. On the death of the said tenant, his legal representatives have now filed the present original petition. 3. That order was, in turn, challenged by the tenant, in revision before the District Court without success. On the death of the said tenant, his legal representatives have now filed the present original petition. 3. Learned counsel contended that the society is not entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(7) since the application for eviction did not mention the aforesaid sub-section. It is true that the landlord-society has quoted in the application only sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of S.11 of the Act. But the averments in the application are clear in that, what the landlord society wanted was an order of eviction of the tenant as the society needed the building very badly to house the Madrassa therein. It was contended by the learned counsel that when a landlord has sought for an order of eviction on a ground which affords certain protections to a tenant, it is not open to the court to grant him an order on a different ground which does not afford the tenant such protections. According to the counsel, the ground mentioned in sub-section (3) is entirely different from the ground under sub-section (7) 4. Can it be said that the ground envisaged in S.11(7) is entirely different from the ground mentioned in S.11(3)? The main thrust in both the sub-sections is the need of the landlord. Though the need of the landlord envisaged in S.11(3) is specifically qualified to he his bona fide need, it cannot be contended that the landlord is not obliged to satisfy the court of its bona fides if the need urged is the one contemplated in S.11(7). Non-mention of the word "bona fide" in S.11(7) is of no consequence, since sub-section (10) of S.11 controls the former sub-section and the Rent Control Court is duty bound to reject an application if it is not satisfied about the bona fides of the claim. A Division Bench of this court pointedly stressed on the mandatory obligation of the court to investigate into the bona fides of the claim under sub-s. (7) of S.11. The decision of the Division Bench is reported in Haridas v. Mercantile Employees Association (1975 KLT 437). Thus the basic ingredient under sub-s. (3) and sub-s. (7) is the bona fide need of the landlord. The decision of the Division Bench is reported in Haridas v. Mercantile Employees Association (1975 KLT 437). Thus the basic ingredient under sub-s. (3) and sub-s. (7) is the bona fide need of the landlord. But the landlord who seeks eviction under sub-s. (3) is not entitled to get the order if the case falls within the ambit of any one of the four provisos enumerated under the sub-section, whereas the landlord who seeks eviction under sub-section (7) is not subjected to any such conditions. The legislative purpose in giving two different treatments in that regard is obvious. The bona fide need of a public institution of the kind envisaged in sub-section (7) is given super eminence over other considerations enumerated in the four provisos in sub-section (3). If the landlord is not a public institution envisaged in sub-section (7) his need, even if bona fide, roust yield to those considerations whereas those considerations should surrender to the need of the public institution. That must be the rationale behind the legislative exercise in making the aforesaid distinction. The classification mentioned has thus a reasonable object to be achieved. 5. If a public institution of the kind mentioned in S.11(7) applies to the Rent Control Court for an order to put the landlord in possession of the building on the ground that it needs the building for purposes of the institution, his application is not liable to be rejected merely because the particular sub-section is not quoted in the application. Nor could it be rejected merely on account of making a mention of sub-section (3) of S.11 in the application. Quoting a wrong provision of law to an application for eviction shall not work to the fatal detriment of the applicant, if the averments in the application are sufficient to make out the case otherwise. The act does not require that the application should contain mention of the particular provision or provisions, nor does any of the Rules enjoin on him to do so. The legal requirement is that every application shall contain the particulars necessary to support it, in addition to the particulars prescribed under S.27 of the Act, and "every application for eviction under S.11 shall also state the grounds on which the application is made" (vide R.7 of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979). The legal requirement is that every application shall contain the particulars necessary to support it, in addition to the particulars prescribed under S.27 of the Act, and "every application for eviction under S.11 shall also state the grounds on which the application is made" (vide R.7 of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979). The expression "the grounds on which the application is made" is not to be pedantically construed as one insisting on quoting the particular sub-section or sub-clause of the Act. "Grounds" are those relating to the fact upon which the grounds are to be made out. 6. The appellate authority has come to the conclusion that the landlord is an institution falling within the purview of S.11(7) of the Act. The finding that the landlord needs the building bona fide for the institution is not challenged. Hence the order for eviction has been passed in proper exercise of the jurisdiction. Neither the appellate authority nor the District Court bad transgressed out of the jurisdictional boundaries. Accordingly, I dismiss this original petition in limine.