JUDGMENT M.M. Pareed Pillay, J. 1. Second defendant in OS 74 of 1976 of the Sub-Court, Trichur, is the appellant. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 instituted the suit for partition by metes and bounds of their 3/4th share in the plaint schedule properties. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the first defendant are brothers The allegations in the plaint are that the properties were purchased in 1962 by the plaintiffs and first defendant, that they were in joint possession of the same, that the plaintiffs were away at Cannanore and Devakottai in connection with employment, that the first defendant appropriated the profits of the properties and that he attempted to bring into existence certain collusive documents with the help of the second defendant to defeat their rights. First defendant remained ex parte. Second defendant claims to be a lessee under the first defendant. 2. The case was referred to the Land Tribunal under S.125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The Tribunal held that the lease set up by the second defendant is hit by S.74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and held that he is not a tenant. The trial Court accepted the findings of the Tribunal and decreed the suit. Second defendant filed AS 188 of 1981 before the District Court, Trichur. The Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the preliminary judgement and decree passed by the trial Court. 3. Admittedly Ext. A1 tenancy was created after the commencement of Kerala Land Reforms Act. In the written statement filed by the second defendant he has no case that he is entitled to the benefits under S.6C of the Land Reforms Act. Having not raised such a plea it is futile on his part to contend belatedly that he is entitled to the benefits under S.6C of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. S.6C is an exception to S.74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. A person who claims benefits under S.6C of the Act has to establish all the integrants under that Section. S.6C is an exception to S.74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. A person who claims benefits under S.6C of the Act has to establish all the integrants under that Section. S.6C reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in S.74 or in any contract, or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, any person in occupation at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, of the land of another person on the basis of a lease deed executed after the 1st day of April, 1964 shall be deemed to be a tenant if -- (a) he (including any member of his family) did not own or bold land in excess of four acres in extent on the date of execution of the lease deed and (b) he or any member of his family has made substantial improvements on the land." For the application of S.6C it has to be necessarily established that the person claiming benefits under the Section including any member of his family did not own or hold land in excess of four acres in extent on the date of execution of the lease deed He has also to establish that he or any member of his family has made substantial improvements on the land. Explanation to S.6C provides that improvements shall be deemed to be substantial improvements if the value of such improvements is more than fifty percent of the value of the land on the date of execution of the lease deed. Pleadings in the written statement do not at all show that any of the essential conditions of S.6C are satisfied. It is true that the second defendant has raised a contention in the written statement that he has effected improvements in the property spending Rs. 10,000/-. Assuming that contention is true even then he cannot claim benefits under S.6C as there is nothing in evidence to hold that he including any member of his family did not own or hold land in excess of four acres in extent on the date of execution of the lease deed. There is neither pleading nor evidence to hold that value of improvements effected in the property is more than 50 percent of its value. There is neither pleading nor evidence to hold that value of improvements effected in the property is more than 50 percent of its value. The belated contention that he is entitled to benefits under S.6C of the Land Reforms Act is totally untenable in view of complete lack of pleadings to that effect in the written statement. It is significant to note that the trial Court's judgment was passed on 18-8-1981. Though the judgment of the trial Court was passed 5 years after the incorporation of S.6C in the Act no attempt was made to amend the written statement claiming benefits under the Section. Therefore it is a sheer exercise in futility to claim the benefits under S.6C at a highly belated stage in the Second Appeal. As held in Bhagat Singh v. Janwant Singh ( AIR 1966 SC 1861 ) when a claim has never been made in the defence presented, no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. Before the lower appellate Court and also even before this Court no attempt was made to amend the written statement pleading benefits under S.6C of the Land Reforms Act. 4. Second defendant attempt to get over the void lease contending that he had varom rights even prior to Ext. A1. Such a pleading was singularly absent in the written statement. No amount of evidence can improve the case not pleaded by him in the written statement. 5. Another contention of the second defendant is that he is entitled to value of improvements. In the written statement there is no wish per that in the case of eviction he should be paid value of improvements. Before the trial court there was no issue with regard to value of improvements. Mere allegation that he has effected value of improvements is hardly sufficient to allow it. He did not take out a commission to substantiate his case that he has effected improvements in the property. Before the trial Court no argument was advanced claiming value of improvements. No such ground was raised in the memorandum of appeal (AS 188 of 1981) before the District Court. No argument was advanced at the time of hearing of that appeal. As the suit properties are paddy lands it is difficult to accept the contention of the second defendant that he has effected valuable improvements in it. No such ground was raised in the memorandum of appeal (AS 188 of 1981) before the District Court. No argument was advanced at the time of hearing of that appeal. As the suit properties are paddy lands it is difficult to accept the contention of the second defendant that he has effected valuable improvements in it. At any rate, as no specific pleadings are there claiming value of improvements it is too late to raise such a convention before this Court in the Second Appeal. 6. Contention of the second defendant that he is entitled to value of improvements cannot be granted as Ext. A1 lease deed is hit by S.74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. S.74 statutorily prohibits leases after the commencement of the Land Reforms Act. The question is whether under a prohibited tenancy a person can claim value of improvements. S.74(2) states that any tenancy created in contravention of sub-s.(1) shall be invalid. S.23 of the Indian Contract Act provides inter alia that consideration or object of an agreement is law full, unless it is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law. As Ext. A1 lease is clearly forbidden by the Land Reforms Act the Court cannot accept it. Acceptance of it would certainly amount to the court being a party to an illegal act. The principle of public policy is this, Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral or an illegal act. As the very case of the 2nd defendant stems from Ext. A1 which is statutorily interdicted he cannot legally claim any rights flowing from the void lease. In Kanakku Kumara Pillai Thanu Pillai v. Mathevan ( 1962 KLT 688 ) Full Bench of this Court had occasion to consider whether a person who Lad violated order of injunction of the Court and improved the property was entitled to value of improvements. This Court held as follows: "Payment should be denied for improvements effected in violation of an order of injunction. An act done in violation, of injunction, being unlawful is to be deemed ineffectual and unavailable as to the purpose intended as though it had not been done. This Court held as follows: "Payment should be denied for improvements effected in violation of an order of injunction. An act done in violation, of injunction, being unlawful is to be deemed ineffectual and unavailable as to the purpose intended as though it had not been done. It is the duty of a person bound by an order of injunction to obey its command. Disobedience will provide the foundation for a punishment not the basis for a claim." On the same analogy it has to be held that the 2nd defendant claiming value of improvements under a lease prohibited by the Land Reforms Act is not legally entitled to claim it. As the lease Ext. A1 itself is void under S.74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act the second defendant is not entitled to claim any value of improvements even if it is assumed that he had effected improvements. The learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the appeal and confirmed the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court. I find hardly any reason to interfere. The Second appeal is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.