JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The Union of India and Chief Superintendent, Central Telegraph Office, who are tenants in House No. 22, Kutchery Road, (Dr. B.N. Verma Road), Lucknow owned by Dr. Dinesh Chandra, opposite party No. 3, have directed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against their eviction ordered by the courts below in proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). The petitioners lost before the Prescribed Authority as well as before the IXth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, who decided the appeal. 2. In the application under Section 21 the landlord pleaded that he had constructed the house with the sole purpose of occupying it himself along with the members of his family. He was in Government service and was posted outside the town and he accordingly let out the house to the petitioners for a period of five years in April, 1972. The period expired but the petitioners continued to remain in occupation of the house. He was due to remain in February, 1982 and in order to have the house available to him on retirement, he served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act upon the petitioners on 14-4-1981 and also notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereafter filed suit for eviction. This suit for eviction was filed on the basis that the Act was not applicable to the house aDd, therefore, the restrictions on eviction provided under Section 20 were also not attracted. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the Act and Section 20 thereof were applicable and since none of the grounds mentioned in Section 20 for claiming eviction had been made out. After the dismissal of the suit, the application under Section 21, which has given rise to the present petition, was filed on 5-9-1984. In this application the petitioner's plea was that he had retired from Government service and requires the house in question for his personal occupation along with the members of his family. He pointed out that he had already returned to town and his own house being in occupation of the petitioners, he had taken a house on rent in the Aliganj Extension Scheme, Lucknow. He pointed out that he had already returned to town and his own house being in occupation of the petitioners, he had taken a house on rent in the Aliganj Extension Scheme, Lucknow. It was alleged that his wife was a patient of Engina and was receiving treatment for the said ailment. He described his family as consisting of himself, his wife, two sons and two daughters. The daughters had been married to officers of All India Services, At the time of moving the application, one of the sons was posted at Paris. In Paragraph 18 it was posted that considering his own status and status of his sons-in-law and sons, the entire accommodation was required by him. The petitioner was Assistant Collector, Central Excise. 3. The above application was contested by the petitioners who denied the claim of bona fide requirement pressed by the landlord. It was stated that the house in question was a "public building" and was beyond the purview of the Act, It was pleaded that the petitioners were running the essential public service and they were catering to the requirements of the major business community of Lucknow and particularly the public staying or having business dealings in and around Aminabad. On this basis it was stated that it was not possible to shift the offices which was operating from the house in question. 4. The Prescribed Authority as well as the learned Additional District Judge negatived the claim of the petitioners that the Act was not applicable to the house in question. They upheld the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement. On a comparison of the hardships they came to the conclusion that the landlord will suffer greater hardship from the rejection of his application than the petitioners will suffer on the application being allowed. 5. In the present petition the first challenge raised by the learned Counsel for the Union of India is directed against the maintainability of the application. He pressed that the landlord himself had stated in his application that the Act was not applicable and, there form there was no occasion for the Prescribed Authority and the learned Additional District Judge to hold that the Act was applicable. He pressed that the landlord himself had stated in his application that the Act was not applicable and, there form there was no occasion for the Prescribed Authority and the learned Additional District Judge to hold that the Act was applicable. The learned Council invited my attention to Paragraph 8 of the application, Annexure 3, wherein the following statement has been made : "That since the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was not applicable to the said house, no application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the said Act could be moved." This statement of course can be said to contain the landlord's admission that the Act is not applicable to the building in question and, therefore, application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is not maintainable. In my opinion it is a piece of bad drafting. If the averments made in Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the application are read together, it would be apparent that the landlord intended to say that he was of the opinion that Act was not applicable and, therefore, he filed suit for eviction after terminating the tenancy but in that suit it was held that the Act was applicable and, therefore, accepting the finding he was moving the present application. 6. Even in Paragraph 8 of the application is treated as containing landlord's own admission on the applicability of the Act, the said admission is on a legal question and an admission of a legal question cannot operate to create estoppel against the person making the admission. If on admitted facts it is established that the Act is applicable, the landlord cannot be denied relief on the basis of the so called admission made in Paragraph 8. There is no dispute between the parties that the house in question was let out to the petitioners. In April, 1972. In fact this is established also from the lease-deed copy of which has been filed as Annexure 1. This lease-deed bears the date 4th April, 1972. Obviously the house was in existence on 4th April, 1972, The present application was filed by the landlord on 5th September, 1984. By this date ten years, from the date of commencement of the lease, had already expired. Under Section 2 (2) of the Act, the Act is not applicable to a building during the period of ten years from the date its construction is completed. By this date ten years, from the date of commencement of the lease, had already expired. Under Section 2 (2) of the Act, the Act is not applicable to a building during the period of ten years from the date its construction is completed. Even if we treat the construction of the house to have been completed on 4th April, 1972, the period of ten years, as mentioned herein, had already expired and, therefore, the Act was applicable. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, pleads the inapplicability of the Act on a different ground. He pleads the applicability on the basis of Section 2 (1) (a) read with Section 3 (o). Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 says that nothing in the Act shall apply to any public building and Clause (o) of Section 3 defines the term public building. The definition is in the following terms :- "Public building means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any Public Sector Corporation." The submission of the learned Counsel is that the house in question has been taken on lease by the Central Government and, therefore, it is a public building within the definition of the term contained in Clause (o) of Section 3 and, therefore, in view of the provision contained in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section the Act, including Section 21 thereof, is not applicable and consequently the applicable was not maintainable. The argument of the learned Counsel omits to take note of the amendment brought about in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 through the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 (U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983) which was later replaced by U.P. Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 which was succeeded by U.P. Ordinance No. 6 of 1984 and last in the series of Ordinances being U.P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1984. The amended Clause (a) reads as follows ;- "(a) Any building of which the Government or a local authority or a Public Sector Corporation is the landlord." The consequence of this amendment is that the exemption which was earlier applicable in respect of public building is not now available only in respect of buildings of which the Government or a local authority or Public Sector Corporation is the landlord. In view of this amendment if the Union of India had let out the house in question, the Act would not have been applicable to this tenancy, U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was promulgated on 18-5-1983 while the application is question, as mentioned earlier, was filed on 5-9-1984 i.e. after the amendment of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2. The learned Counsel is, therefore, not entitled to rely upon the unamended Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2. 8. The argument of the learned Counsel also omits to take note of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Punjab National Bank v. Sugan Chandra and another (1985 Lucknow Rent Journal 121); 1985 ARC (1) 215 (F.B.) in which it has been held that the Act was applicable even on the basis of the unamended Section 2(1) (a). Earlier in certain cases this Court had taken the view that in view of amendment Section 2 (1) (a) read with Section 3 (o), Act was not applicable to Corporations, State and Central Governments. One such case was Om Kumar v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others (1980 Allahabad Rent Cases 144). This case and similar other cases were over-ruled by the Full Bench. The Full Bench has observed in paragraph 37 of the report thus :- "-------------Where the Government, local authority or such corporation is in capacity of landlord of a building taken on lease, that is to say, if they have chosen to let out such building, then that would be protected against the ordinary requirements, to be fulfilled in the Act but for any other landlord who seeks to proceed in respect of a building let out to these bodies there is no exemption granted or contemplated." 9. Sub-section (8) of Section 21 debars a landlord from moving a application under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) for eviction against authorities specified in the said sub-section. The authorities specified in this sub-section are the State Government, local authority. Sub-section (8) of Section 21 debars a landlord from moving a application under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) for eviction against authorities specified in the said sub-section. The authorities specified in this sub-section are the State Government, local authority. Public Sector Corporation and recognised educational institutions. The Central Government is not mentioned in this sub-section. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim exemption from the provisions of the Act either under Section 2(1)(a) read with Section 3(o) or under sub-section (8) of Section 21. 10. For claiming inapplicability of the Act the learned Counsel referred to the decision in Smt. Husaini Begum v. State of U.P. and others, 1983 Lucknow Law Journal 83 : 1985(1) ARC 492 (LB) also. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. In this case the petitioner before this Court was the landlady of a house which had been let out to the Director of the Harijan Social Welfare of the U.P. Government. The landlady made an application for enhancement of rent under the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 21. The District Magistrate rejected the application of the ground that the Act was not applicable to the building in question. Obviously the District Magistrate relied upon unamended Section 2(1)(a). As mentioned herein above sub-section (8) debars a landlord from claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement against certain authorities. The authority in this case was the State Government as the building had been let out to one of its office. Accordingly sub-section (8) was applicable and, therefore, the landlady was not entitled to maintain an application under Section 21(1)(a). The proviso to sub-section (8) provides that in the case of such a building the District Magistrate may enhance the monthly rent payable for the building. The extent to which the rent may be enhanced is also provided in the proviso. The landlady had applied for enhancement of the rent under this proviso. It was held by this Court that the proviso entitled the landlady to maintain the application for enhancement. Accordingly, the order of the District Magistrate was set aside and the case was sent back to the District Magistrate for deciding the application on merits. I am unable to appreciate how this judgment helps the petitioners. It was held by this Court that the proviso entitled the landlady to maintain the application for enhancement. Accordingly, the order of the District Magistrate was set aside and the case was sent back to the District Magistrate for deciding the application on merits. I am unable to appreciate how this judgment helps the petitioners. In this case the Act was applied and, therefore, on the basis of this decision it cannot be ground that it was held by this Court the Act was not applicable. Only a certain provision of the Act was not applicable, namely, Section 21(1)(a). 11. It was submitted by the learned Counsel that instead of making application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act the landlord should have moved an application under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The submission is absolutely misconceived. Under the scheme of this Act the private owner of a building has no right to seek possession of property in the tenancy of the Government. Under the Act the eviction proceedings can be initiated only by the Estate Officer appointed under Section 3. The landlord opposite party had not been appointed Estate Officer under Section 3 and, therefore, it was not possible for him to take recourse to the provisions of the said Act in order to obtain possession over the house in dispute, even if the petitioners are threated to be unauthorised occupants with in the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Act. 12. In view of the above it is held that the Act was applicable and the application under Section 21 (1) (a) moved by the landlord opposite party was maintainable and the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act were not attracted. 13. The next submission of the learned Counsel is that the finding of bona fide requirement is vitiated as the landlord was already living in a rented accommodation which was sufficient for his requirement. It is true that the landlord was living in a rented accommodation and it was not his case that the extent to the accommodation available in the rented house was insufficient for his requirement but that, in my opinion, cannot vitiate the finding of bona fide requirement. It is true that the landlord was living in a rented accommodation and it was not his case that the extent to the accommodation available in the rented house was insufficient for his requirement but that, in my opinion, cannot vitiate the finding of bona fide requirement. The landlord's case was that he had wanted to live in the house in question himself after retirement but he had to take a house on rent as his house was not immediately available. When the landlord has got his own house and he has to stay in a rented accommodation, in my opinion, his requirement for the accommodation will have to be held as bona fide. 14. It was also submitted that in considering the size of the landlord's family the Court below committed manifest error in counting married daughters also. The married daughters have been counted and referred to only for the purpose of saying that off and on they are also bound to come and stay with the landlord and considering the status of the landlord and his sons-in-law, the landlord would require the entire accommodation. Primary consideration which had weight with the Court below was that the landlord had retired and his accommodation, is not available to him and, therefore, he is presently staying in a rented accommodation. In my opinion the finding of fact, in respect of bona fide requirement, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 15. It is next argued that the comparison of hardship is illusory and is not based on consideration of relevant factors ; rather relevant factors, especially those prescribed in Rule 16 (2) of the rules framed under the Act have not been considered at all. It has also been submitted that the court below was swayed by financial resources available to the Union of India in recording the finding on comparative hardship in favour of the landlord and this was not a relevant consideration. In support of the plea that financial resources is not a relevant consideration the learned Counsel has relied upon Purshottam Das v. The VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad and others. (A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1520). In this case the High Court has not considered the question of comparative hardship and, therefore, their lordships remanded the case for that consideration. (A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1520). In this case the High Court has not considered the question of comparative hardship and, therefore, their lordships remanded the case for that consideration. In the present case the court below has considered the question of comparative hardship and, therefore, this authority has no application to the facts of the present case. The District Judge has not held that the hardships were not to be compared. In Indu Bhushan Dass v. The First Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others (1980 A.R.C. 141) reliance has been placed upon the observations contained in Paragraph of the report. In Paragraph 6 of the report contained the observations of Hari Swarup, J. in Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. State of U.P. and others (1975 ALR 664). The observation reproduced is as follows :- "If it were possible to accept that the resources of the tenant and his richness are valid grounds for granting permission for his ejectment then it may not be possible for the Government to resist any application for its ejectment from a private accommodation as the Government cannot be deemed to be not possessed with resources enough to construct a building. Such could not have been the intention law." I agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioners that financial resources of the Government or of any tenant for that matter will not be enough for recording a finding of comparative hardship in favour of the landlord. In the present case the finding has been recorded in favour of the landlord not only on the basis of the financial resources of the petitioners but other factors have also been taken into consideration. The question of financial resources of the petitioners has been considered in the background of the financial resources of the landlord to construct or acquire another building for his residence after retirement. The learned District Judge has observed that while it will be possible for the petitioners to acquire another building without much inconcenience it would not be possible for the landlord to erect another house for his residence after his retirement in the present hard days. By the application of the authority cited by the learned Counsel the assessment of comparative hardship does not, therefore, get vitiated. 16. By the application of the authority cited by the learned Counsel the assessment of comparative hardship does not, therefore, get vitiated. 16. Much stress was laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the fact that the petitioners are rendering public service and if they are made to vacate the accommodation in question, the public would suffer. It cannot be doubted that the petitioners are rendering public service but it cannot also be said that the said public service can be rendered only from the house in question. There is no material on record to show that no other accommodation is available in the vicinity of the present accommodation where the offices of the petitioners may be satisfied. There is also no evidence that the accommodation, if available, would be on exorbitant rent. It is also not on record that similar offices are not already available within reasonable distance of the present accommodation. It cannot, therefore, be held that by the eviction of the petitioners from the present house the public at large would suffer. 17. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 upon which strong reliance was placed enumerates various factors which should be taken into consideration while disposing of an application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) in respect of a building let out for the purposes of any business. Clause (a) of the aforesaid rule mentions that the fact that greater the period since when the tenant or the original tenant has been carrying on his business in that building the less is the justification in allowing the application. Clause (b) mentions that where the tenant has available with him, suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. Clause (c) mentions that greater the existing business of the landlords own, apart from the business proposes to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority. Under Clause (d) is mentioned that where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendent of the landlord has, after building or originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and went to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration. 18. The above clause will require consideration, if on the facts of a particular case they are attracted. If on facts they are not attracted, there is no question of their consideration. Clauses (a) and (b) seek to protect the tenant from financial loss in shifting his place of business. In the present case the petitioners are running a telegraph office post office in the building in question, Union of India monopoly in respect of items sold at the post office and in respect of the financial transactions done at a telegraph office. If the post office or telegraph office is shifted from the building in question, the customers or clients of the Union of India will get the required items purchases or work done at another such office of the Union of India. Therefore, the petitioners will not suffer any financial loss by the shifting of their offices from the building in question. Consequently neither of the two clauses was attracted on the facts of the present case. 19. Clause (c) and (d) cater to the interest of the landlord. Clause (c) would be attracted if the landlord is carrying on any business. In the present case it is not the claim of either party that the landlord is carrying on any business. It is also not the case of the landlord that the house is required for establishing his son or daughter in business which is requirement for the applicability of Clause (d). Therefore, Clauses (c) and (d) are also not attracted. 20. In view of the above, on the facts of the present case, Rule 16 (2) was not attracted and, therefore, the order of the court below cannot be faulted on the ground that the factors prescribed therein had not been considered. 21. Therefore, Clauses (c) and (d) are also not attracted. 20. In view of the above, on the facts of the present case, Rule 16 (2) was not attracted and, therefore, the order of the court below cannot be faulted on the ground that the factors prescribed therein had not been considered. 21. The last submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the court below has filed to apply the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 inasmuch as no compensation has been allowed to the petitioners for eviction from the house in question. This proviso lays down that if any application under Clause (a) is made in respect of a building let out exclusively for non-residential purpose, the prescribed authority while making the order of eviction shall, after considering all relevant facts of the case, award against the land lord to the tenant an amount not exceeding two years rent as compensation. It has been held by several authorities of this Court, including a Division Bench authority, that the proviso is not mandatory and its benefit cannot be claimed for the first time in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Division Bench authority is reported in Inderjeet Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Moradabad and another (AIR 1974 Allahabad 120) and the Single Judge authorities are : 1. Gandhi Ashram v. Smt. Ram Dulari and others (1977 ARC 32); 2. Sri Sohanlal and another v. VI Additional District and Sessions Judge Shaharanpur and others (1978 ARC 320); and 3. Junaid Ahmad v. II Additional District Judge (1986 U.P. Rent Control Cases 426) : (1986 (1) ARC 418). In the present case also the claim for compensation was not made either before the Prescribed Authority or before the learned District Judge. The claim was not out in the writ petition. It was only at the state of oral argument that the claim was made. In the circumstances the grievance regarding non-compliance of the second proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) is misconceived and cannot be entertained. 22. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with costs to opposite party No. 3. The petitioners are, however, allowed the months time to vacate the accommodation.