Judgment R. N. Thakur, L. P. N. Shahde, JJ. 1. The sole appellant has been found guilty for an offence under Sec.302, I. P. C. and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution story as stated by P. W.1 in the Court is that on 19-7-83 she (P. W.1) had gone to see cinema in J. M. Talkies along with her deceased husband, Banwari. At about 8.30 p. m. in the night they were returning to their home. The deceased was driving the cycle and P. W.1 was sitting on the carrier with her baby. When they reached near the Zila School crossing, P. W.1 saw one man coming from behind, and when they reached near the Railway Gumti, the man who was following them fired at her husband. Her husband fell down and died then and there. The informant thereafter raised alarm but nobody came. The man had fired at her husband fled away She could recognize the murderer by face. Thereafter P. W.1 after leaving her husband and the cycle at the spot went to the Police Station and lodged case, which was investigated by P. W.10 after closing the investigation submitted charge-sheet against this appellant. In course of investigation, the appellant was arrested on 20-7-83 and was put on test identification parade in jail on 8-8-83, where he was identified by P. W.1 to be the assailant of her husband. 3. Ultimately the appellant was put on trial, where 12 witnesess were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The appellant denied the allegation and pleaded his innocence. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned trying Court did not appreciate the evidence properly and therefore, came to a wrong conclusion. 5. Out of the 12 witnesses, P. W.1 is the informant herself P. W. s 3, 4, and 7 have been tendered. P. W.10 is the Investigating Officer. P. W.11 is the Magistrate who conducted the T. I. Parade and P. W.12 is the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination. P. Ws.2, 5 and 9 are the witnesses who have said about the threat given by this appellant to the deceased before the date of the occurrence P. Ws.6 and 8 are formal witnesses. 6. The motive has been alleged in this case. P. Ws.2, 5 and 9 are the witnesses who have said about the threat given by this appellant to the deceased before the date of the occurrence P. Ws.6 and 8 are formal witnesses. 6. The motive has been alleged in this case. One week before the occurrence, the deceased had disclosed to P. W.1 that one boy named as Prem had challenged him and had also threatened him to kill. 7. On the point of identification, there is a solitary evidence of P. W.1. According to the prosecution case itself, the occurrence is alleged to have taken place at 8-30 p. m. in the night, while the informant and the deceased were returning after seeing the cinema. It has also come in evidence that the appellant was not known to her from before. She has not said about the means of identification, in which light she could see the face of this appellant. Apart from this, p. W.1 stated that she was called at the police Station by the Dy. S. P. and the Officer Incharge. This appellant was there at the Police Station and was in Hajat. Then he was brought to the place where the Dy. S. P. and the officer Incharge were present and P. W.1 was asked to identify him. She further says in paragraph 7 of her evidence that man to whom he had seen at the Thana was identified by her in the T. I. Parade. Therefore, it is clear from the evidence of P. W.1 itself that the appellant, before he was put at the T. I. Parade was shown, to her, at the Police Station. In view of this admission of P. W.1, the Identification Parade becomes meaningless. In the f. I. R. she gave a description of the culprit. While she -was cross-examined in the court, she said that the appellant was a healthy man having a robust healh, in the F. I. R. she had stated that the man who had shot at her husband was a tall and slim man. Then she further says that without seeing the face of the appellant she cannot describe his face. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid admission of the P. W.1, the identification becomes very doubtful. Then she further says that without seeing the face of the appellant she cannot describe his face. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid admission of the P. W.1, the identification becomes very doubtful. No doubt, there is no hard and fast rule that the coviction of a culprit cannot be maintained even on one identification but that one identification must be above the board and free from blamish. But in the present case, the, single identification of P. W.1 cannot be said to be above the board in the circumstances set forth above. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has also argued that according to the doctor undigested rice was found in the stomach of the deceased at the time of the post-mortem examination according to the doctor, the deceased might have taken his meal just before the occurrence. But there is no evidence on behalf of the prosecution that the deceased had taken his meal before the occurrence, rather according to the prosecution case, the informant and the deceased were returning from cinema house after witnessing a cinema. Be as it may, on the point of identification itself, the prosecution case becomes doubtful for the reasons stated above. 9. We, therefore, hold that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 10. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the appellant is given benefit of doubt The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. He is accordingly, discharged from the liability of his bail bond. Appeal allowed.