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Kerala High Court · body

1987 DIGILAW 511 (KER)

RAMAKRISHNAN v. KALI

1987-10-15

SHAMSUDDIN, U.L.BHAT

body1987
Judgment :- 1. The first respondent herein is the mother of the petitioner herein. In the court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Pattambi, the first respondent described as represented by her next friend, daughter Kamalakshi, filed an application, MC No. 14 of 1984, under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for short 'the Code', against the petitioner claiming maintenance. The son appeared before the learned Magistrate and objected to the claim on various grounds. Overruling all these grounds, maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month was ordered from the date of the application. The son moved the Sessions Court in revision. But the revision petition was dismissed. These orders are now challenged under S.482 of the Code. 2. When this petition came up before the learned single judge, it was contended that since the application under S.125 of the Code was filed by the mother as represented by the next friend daughter, it was not maintainable in law inasmuch as there can be no application through a next friend. Learned single judge who heard the matter took the view that having regard to the importance of the question involved it should be heard by a Division Bench. That is how the matter has come up before us. 3. The short question for consideration is whether the application filed in this case under S.125 of the Code is not maintainable in law and if not whether we should interfere in this matter. 4. The application filed under S.125 of the Code describes the petitioner as Kali, i.e., the first respondent herein, represented by the next friend daughter, Kamalakshi. It was argued before the learned Magistrate that such a petition was not maintainable. Learned Magistrate took the view that S.125 is intended to subserve a social purpose and is a beneficial provision, that the statute does not prescribe any particular form for filing an application and what is required is only proof and since proof has been offered there is no legal defect in the proceeding. The learned Sessions Judge agreed with this view. 5. Sub-section (1) of S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads thus: "125. The learned Sessions Judge agreed with this view. 5. Sub-section (1) of S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads thus: "125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:" Sub-section (2) of S.125 reads thus: "Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance." S. 126 prescribes the forum and procedure. S.127 enables alteration in allowance in proof of change in circumstances. S.128 lays down manner of enforcement of order of maintenance. 6. Sub-s. (1) of S.125 enables the competent Magistrate to pass an order of maintenance or allowance on proof of neglect or refusal. This cannot and does not mean that an order can be passed without an application or on an oral request. Sub-s. (2) of S.125 which contemplates a direction to pay allowance from 'date of application' clearly indicates that there has to be an application invoking the jurisdiction of the court. There must be an application in writing before the Magistrate before the latter can call upon the opposite party to show cause and proceed to take evidence and pass order. 7. The question which next arises for consideration is whether the law requires that the person neglected himself or herself must move an application. A careful examination of the provisions in Chap.9 would indicate that the legislature did not intend to place any such restriction on locus standi. 7. The question which next arises for consideration is whether the law requires that the person neglected himself or herself must move an application. A careful examination of the provisions in Chap.9 would indicate that the legislature did not intend to place any such restriction on locus standi. The provisions in Chap.9 of the Code have a great social purpose to serve, alleviation of destitution and avoidance of vagrancy. The sensitivity of this statutory purpose is heightened by the constitutional concern expressed in the directive principles of State policy. S.125 does not necessarily follow the provisions in Personal Laws creating rights and liabilities in regard to maintenance. To a considerable degree the provisions of Chap.9 depart from the rights and liabilities which may be inherent in the parties under their Personal Law. The previsions create or at any rate, recognise an obligation on a person to maintain relatives falling within the ambit of clauses (a) to (d) of S.125(1). The persons who fall within the ambit of clauses (a) to (d) must necessarily be deemed to have a right to claim allowance; necessarily they must have a remedy to enforce the right. Equally the persons on whom the provision imposes the burden have a duty to maintain his relatives In our opinion, the persons falling under clauses (a) to (d) of sub-s. (1) who complain of denial of maintenance are aggrieved persons who have locus standi to move the court for an order of maintenance as contemplated in Chapter IV. Ordinarily they are expected to approach the proper court with a proper application. 8. This, however, cannot and does not necessarily fellow that no other person can move the court. As indicated in several decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court (See Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and another (AIR 1979 SC 362), Mst. Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh (AIR 1963 SC 1521), Ramesh Chander v. Veena Kaushal (AIR 1978 SC 1807) and Balan Nair v. Valsatnma (1986 KLT 1378), the provision in S.125 is a measure of social defence intended to protect human rights. The provision has to be interpreted bearing in mind the greet social purpose behind the provision. We notice that neither the section nor any other provision in Chap.9 of the Cede indicates any restriction is the manner of approach to the Magistrate. The provision has to be interpreted bearing in mind the greet social purpose behind the provision. We notice that neither the section nor any other provision in Chap.9 of the Cede indicates any restriction is the manner of approach to the Magistrate. It does not expressly or by necessary implication indicate that only the person neglected can move the court by an application. The Magistrate is to act on proof of the ingredients contemplated in the provision, viz., that the person arrayed as respondent has sufficient means and that he has neglected or refused to maintain his relatives who fall within the category of clauses (a) to (d). We are not inclined to accept that only the person who has suffered neglect can move the court. Any other person who has sufficient interest in the person neglected can also move the court by way of application. 9. The specific question referred to us is whether one person can at a next friend file an application on behalf of another. A Full Bench of this court in Balan Nair's (1986 KLT 1378) has indicated that "No doubt, provisions relating to maintenance occur in the Code of Criminal Procedure and not in the Code of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the proceedings are and the relief given is essentially of civil nature. Chap.9 prescribes a summary procedure for compelling a person to maintain his wife or children or parents. Findings of the Magistrate are not final or conclusive in the sense that they may in appropriate cases be open to scrutiny by a civil court. The case does not deal with an offence. The person against whom the claim is made is not an offender or an accused. The order passed against him does not spell out a finding that be has committed an offence. There is no punishment imposed on him, though as a mode of recovery, imprisonment is provided for. He is not charged for the commission of criminal offence. The object of the provision is not to punish him for the past neglect. The object is to prevent vagrancy and ameliorate distress." The court proceeded to state as follows: "The relief given, as we have indicated, is essentially of a civil nature and the proceedings are essentially civil proceedings and not criminal proceedings We are of the opinion that they are essentially of a civil nature. The object is to prevent vagrancy and ameliorate distress." The court proceeded to state as follows: "The relief given, as we have indicated, is essentially of a civil nature and the proceedings are essentially civil proceedings and not criminal proceedings We are of the opinion that they are essentially of a civil nature. The fact that the provisions occur in the Code of Criminal Procedure and not the Code of Civil Procedure and the fact that the recalcitrant opposite party who suffers the order of maintenance and does not obey the order may have to go to prison, will not change the nature of the proceedings from civil to criminal. The provisions have been incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure only with a view to expedite the proceedings, as it was thought that the Magistrate could better deal with the matter in a summary manner" 10. The fact that the proceedings are essentially civil in nature does not mean that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the proceedings. Learned counsel has referred to the provisions of 0.32 CPC, by which next friend of a minor or person of unsound mind is enabled to file a suit on behalf of the latter. Notwithstanding the fact that proceedings are essentially of a civil nature, we do not think the proceedings are governed by 0.32 CPC As indicated in Balan Nair's case (1986 KLT 1378 FB); the proceedings are summary in nature. They have been so made with a view to achieve expedition. We do not think it was the intention of the legislature to make the proceedings governed by various dilatory and technical provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. It is open to the person neglected to move the court by way of an application. It is also open to another person who has sufficient interest in the person neglected to move the court by an application under S.125. It has been suggested at the bar that even a social worker has locus standi to file an application. We do not thick in this case we are called upon to decide whether it is so. In this case it is the daughter who moved the court on behalf of her mother. A daughter must certainly be treated as a person having sufficient interest in her mother. She has locus standi to move the court. We do not thick in this case we are called upon to decide whether it is so. In this case it is the daughter who moved the court on behalf of her mother. A daughter must certainly be treated as a person having sufficient interest in her mother. She has locus standi to move the court. However, we do not think that the petition should have been brought in the name of the mother or that the daughter should have been described as the next friend. This complicated situation was brought about because the mother was very old and sickly and unable to move about at the time when the application was filed. We find that the mother herself came to court to give evidence, though she had to be assisted by two or three persons. Perhaps in the belief that in view of the condition of the mother the would not be able to come to court the daughter would have to give evidence on behalf of the mother and under the mistaken belief that the daughter could not give evidence without acting as next friend that the application was drafted in that way. This complication could have been avoided. The mother herself could be the petitioner and she could have signed the Vakalath and the petition at her own house. Alternatively the daughter could have signed and filed the application, not in any alleged capacity of next friend, but as a person having sufficient interest in the mother, the destitute. We are conscious that such a liberal interpretation of the locus standi in S.125 of the Code is susceptible to misuse and abuse. Magistrates will have to be on their guard to ensure that judicial process is not abused by vengeful or recalcitrant persons or busy bodies. 12. However, in the facts of this case we find that there was no abuse of the judicial process involved. The findings of the learned Magistrate show that the mother was neglected by the son who had sufficient means to pay maintenance. The revisional authority found no cause to interfere with the finding. The mother who is shown as petitioner did not sign the application nor the Vakalath. The daughter who signed the application and the Vakalath was not the petitioner but only the alleged next friend. Ordinarily this could be looked upon as a legal defect in the proceeding. The revisional authority found no cause to interfere with the finding. The mother who is shown as petitioner did not sign the application nor the Vakalath. The daughter who signed the application and the Vakalath was not the petitioner but only the alleged next friend. Ordinarily this could be looked upon as a legal defect in the proceeding. However, the fact remains that the daughter is a person having sufficient interest in the mother and the mother herself came to court, no doubt with great difficulty, and gave evidence in support of the claim made on her behalf and the claim has been accepted by the trial court. We therefore do not think that this legal defect should necessitate any interference. Substantial justice having been done there is no ground for interference. The Crl. M.C. is dismissed.