Saikia, C. J. - The petitioner, Shri Ved Prakash Goel, a Gauhati based busi­nessman, seeks the quashing of the Vigilance Police Station Case Dispur No. 2 of 1986, which was registered on a First Information Report on 8.9.86 under Sections 120 B/420/418/409/109/511 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 (2) read with Section 5(1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is at its investigation stage, in so far as the petitioner is concerned. 2. The First Information Report, shortly "the F.I.R.", was lodged at the Vigilance Police Station, Dispur by the 1st respondent, Shri P. Bania. Superintendent of Police, Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell, Assam, Dispur, alleging, inter alia, that during 1984, Shri Hiteswar Saikia, the then Chief Minister of Assam, who was also in charge of Forest, in collusion with (1) Shri Khanindra Kumar Barua, the then Chief Conservator of Forests (General), Assam, (2) Shri Prafulla Kumar Barua, the then Divisional Forest Officer, Haltugaon Division, and (3) Shri .lanjit Patwari, the then Range Officer Protection Squad, Kokrajhar entered into a criminal conspiracy with the petitioner (4) Shri Ved Prakash Goel, and (5) Shri Jagadish Bansal, a represent­ative of the petitioner and some of their agents in Gauhati and Kokrajhar, with a view to cheat the Forest Department of the Government of Assam, and to misappropriate huge quantity of valuable Sal timbers worth several lakhs of rupees, and in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy, the aforesaid persons allowed either for them selves or for the other persons and their agents, undue pecuniary benefit to the tune of several lakhs of rupees, by abusing their official position as such public servants, thereby causing huge financial and wrongful loss to the State Exchequer by issuing permits of timbers to the aforesaid persons, in violation of the Government policy decision of 198081 for departmental operation, and that when the said business­men applied for timber permits for running their respective Saw Mills the then Chief Minister, Shri Hiteswar Saikia who had associ­ation with the said businessmen, passed orders on the body of the applications under his signature giving 2000 Cms, to Assam Timber Udyog and 1000 Cms, each to Jagadamba Wood Products and New Hansara Mill, Kokrajhar by dishonestly abusing his official position with a view to cover up non-existence of the Saw Mills. 3. 3. The petitioner's contentions are that though in the F.I.R. allega­tions of collusion and criminal conspiracy have been made against the petitioner, yet while stating therein the facts constituting the offences, there has been no allegation in respect of the petitioner and no ingredient whatsoever of the F.I.R. offences has been alleged against the petitioner and, as such, the F.I.R. does not allege or disclose the essential ingre­dients of the aforesaid offences and as such the F.I.R. cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of lawful investigation in so far as the petitioner is concerned. In other words, no cognizable offence against the petitioner has at all been disclosed in the F.I.R. and, there­fore, it is not within the power and province of the Police to investigate into the F.I.R. ; that the conditions precedent to the commencement of Section 157 Cr.P.C. and the F.I.R. having not disclosed any prima facie case, the investigation and the proceeding in so far as the petitioner is concerned, is liable to be quashed ; that the petitioner has no link with the alleged offence ; that he is not dealing in timber nor has he got any Saw Mill, nor has he got any implicit or explicit connection with the said firms and no incriminating documents were found on search of his business premises on 9.9.86 ; that the F.I.R. has been lodged with a view to harass the petitioner and mainly the former Chief Minister of Assam on the wrong assumption that the petitioner was closely associa­ted with him, through the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell-the 1st respondent, against whom the former Chief Minister held an enquiry, and thus the F.I.R. has been lodged out of vindictiveness by the present Government in power who bears grudge against the former Chief Minister, Shri Hiteswer Saikia and the petitioner has become the victim of the circumstances though he has got on connection whatsoever with the alleged conspiracy ; and thus the F.I.R. has been lodged out of political vendetta against the former Chief Minister implicating the petitioner with him with a view to torture the petitioner and to extract from him incriminating confessional statements to feed fat the grudge. Hence the prayer for quashing the investigation and the proceeding in so far as the petitioner is concerned. 4. Hence the prayer for quashing the investigation and the proceeding in so far as the petitioner is concerned. 4. The petition is being resisted by the respondents by filing an affidavit-in-opposition through Shri Dimbeswar Bhuyan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chief Minister's Special Vigilance Cell the Investigating Officer in the case, stating, inter alia, that the petitioner is not a law abiding citizen, inasmuch as in this case he was granted ad interim bail with condition to appear before the Investigating Officer but instead of doing that he has filed this writ petition and his bail automatically stood cancelled; that non- appearance of the petitioner before the Investigating Officer has hampered the progress of the case which is at its very initial stage ; that it is incorrect to say that there is no allegation or disclosure of essential requirements of the offences alleged against the petitioner; that in the alleged criminal conspiracy there are materials against the petitioner which disclose offences against him and a prima facie case to go to trial ; that the conduct of the petitioner has seriously hampered the investigation, that the 1st respondent bore no grudge against the former Chief Minister of Assam, Shri Hiteswar Saikia and that there are already enough materials in possession of the Investigating Officer disclosing serious offences against the petitioner and others for which this petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. Mr. A. M. Mazumdar, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this petition is only for the petitioner, Shri Ved Prakash GoeJ.whois not a Government servant and not for any other persons named in the F.I.R. and that is not defending their cases. Mr. Mazumdar's main contention is that the respondents have accused the petitioner mainly on the basis of the F.I.R. (Annexure-A to the petition ) ' and the seizure list (Annexure-B to the petition) and that neither of these documents has any material to connect the petitioner with what has been stated in the F.I.R. and the respondents having had no material the prosecution of the petitioner in the Vigilance P.S. Case No. 2/86 in so far as the petitioner is concerned is an abuse of the process of the Court, and the F.I.R. and the investigation on its basis, in so far as against the petitioner is concerned, have, therefore, to be quashed. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Mazumdar points out that though in the F. I. R. allega­tions of collusion and criminal conspiracy were made against the petitioner, yet while narrating the facts constituting the offences was no allegation in respect of the petitioner, all the allegations having been made against the then Forest Minister. Shri Hiteswar Saikia the then Chief Conservator of Forest-Shri Khanindra Kumar Barua' the then Divisional Forest Officer, Haltugaon Division Kokrajhar-Shri Prafulla Kumar Barua, the then Range Officer, Kokrajhar-Shri Ranjit Patowari on the one hand and Shri Shyam Sundar Goel Shri Satyapal Goel, and Shri Jagadish Sarawgi on the other. Besides, the r ingredients of the offences alleged under Sections 120B/ 420/ 418/409/109/511 I. P. C. and Section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, were not avail­able against the petitioner who was not a public servant and, as such, the F. I. R. could not constitute the foundation or starting point of lawful investigation in so far as the petitioner is concerned. Except the vague allegation that the then Chief Minister, Shri Hiteswar Saikia, acted in collusion with the petitioner and others for the purpose of cheating the various departments of the Government of Assam and misappropriated large quantity of valuable timbers worth several lakhs and gave undue pecuniary benefits to the tune of several lakhs of rupees by abusing their official position as public servants and thereby caused huge financial losses to the State Exchequer by issuing the permits of timber to the persons in violation of the Government policy decision of 1980-81, there are no facts alleged to substantiate these allegations against the petitioner. At any rate, Mr. Mazumder submits, permits were never issued to the petitioner nor did he ever apply for any such permit. Mr. At any rate, Mr. Mazumder submits, permits were never issued to the petitioner nor did he ever apply for any such permit. Mr. Mazumdar submits that it would be apparent that this vexatious F. I. R. which does not disclose any collusion with the petitioner, has been lodged with in view to harass, malign and humiliate the former Chief Minister, Shri Hiteswar Saikia, and to make out a case against him the petitioner has also been named in the F. I. R. and when the former Chief Minister who was known to be in precarious health applied to this Court for necessary facilities in the event of his arrest in a non-baillable offence, the Hon'ble Minister of Law, Government of Assam, has allegedly made a remark that he (Shri) Saikia) "will be sent to jail and not for honeymoon" and this, according to Mr. Mazumdar, showed vindictiveness and it amounted to interference with the process of law. The petitioner, it is submitted, has business at Calcutta, Delhi, Hisar and Guhati but he had no connection with the allegations made in the F, I. R. and he is not a dealer in timber ; that the F. I. R. has been lodged out of political vendetta by the present Government in power who bean grudge against the former Chief Minister and the petitioner has become the victim of circumstances. Mr. Mazumdar argues that unfettered discretion cannot be given to the Police to investigate into congizable offences where there is no prima facie material to proceed with the investigation; that the liberty of a citizen cannot be interfered with except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the law that the instant investigation, if allowed to continue, will be naked assault on personal liberty of a citizen and the State should not be a party to such intrusion on personal liberty; and that such investigation must be stopped to prevent any uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual citizen. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. P. K. Goswami, the learned Advocate General, Assam, demurring submits that in the instant case the F. I. R. itself disclosed an offence and the materials collected in course of investigation have disclosed that the petitioner has been the kingpin in the conspiracy and, therefore, the investigation must be allowed to proceed to find out the offenders ; and there can be no question of quashing the F, I. R. or the investigation in so far as the petitioner is concerned inasmuch as the investigation is one and indivisible and only after investigation it will be known who are the culprits, and in the interest of public justice the petition has to be rejected and the investigation allowed to proceed Mr. Goswami states that the Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell, Dispur is a declared police station and the police officer has the duty to investigate a cognizable offence and there is hardly any scope for a writ petition for quashing an investigation which started only after the F.I.R. was lodged which disclosed cognizable offence and the police proceeded to investigate. Mr. Goswami does not dispute the power and juris­diction of this Court to quash an investigation but questions under what circumstances power ought to be exercised ? If there is no offence disclosed, argues Mr. Goswami, the proceeding may be quashed but it is not open for the Court to quash an investigation in so far as a certain person is concerned. Mr. If there is no offence disclosed, argues Mr. Goswami, the proceeding may be quashed but it is not open for the Court to quash an investigation in so far as a certain person is concerned. Mr. Goswami asserts that it is not the legal proposition that the Court should look only to the F.I.R. and refuse to look into other materials produced before it; and that the Court under law is first to examine the nature of the allegations contained in the F.I.R. and also other relevant materials produced before it irresp­ective of the stage at which those materials have been collected and unless the Court finds that there is malafide exercise of power-in which case the investigation will be stopped-the Court is bound to look into the materials collected and then decide the matter ; and only when in an exceptional case where non-interference will result in miscarriage of justice, the Court should interfere, otherwise the criminal process should not be interfered at a stage of investigation and the police has the right to investigate where he has reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence in the interest of justice and whether an offence is disclosed or not is a question of fact. Mr. Goswami submits that only at the time of submitting the charge-sheet whether an offence will be clear but not at this stage as charge sheet has not yet been submitted. Mr. Goswami further submits that in case of a charge of conspiracy under Section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, an abetor, who is a private person, may be tried by the Special Judge and as such in case of offence of criminal conspiracy and of abetment a private person may be tried with a public servant and there is no provision in law prohibiting investigation in a case of conspiracy between public servant and private individuals and that once an offence is disclosed there can be no question of quashing investigation either all or against any one. Mr. Goswami further submits that the petitioner has failed to show any malafide and to show any extraor­dinary case of gross abuse of power by those in charge of investigation. Mr. Goswami also submits that even if nothing is found in the F.T.R. but something is found in course of investigation the proceeding cannot be quashed against the petitioner. Mr. Goswami further submits that the petitioner has failed to show any malafide and to show any extraor­dinary case of gross abuse of power by those in charge of investigation. Mr. Goswami also submits that even if nothing is found in the F.T.R. but something is found in course of investigation the proceeding cannot be quashed against the petitioner. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner obtained anticipatory bail and was subsequently ordered to appear before the investigating agency for which he repeatedly took time but ultimately instead of so appearing he has filed this writ petition for quashing the investigation and as such he has not come to this Court with clean hands and his own conduct disentitled him to any relief. Replying to the allegation of enmity or grudge of Shri P. Bania, the informant, Mr. Goswami states that shri P. Bania who submitted the F.T.R. is not the Investigating Officer in this case and the alleged enquiry against Shri P. Bania during the regime of former Chief Minister, Shri Hiteswar Saikia, was dropped and as such there could be no question of his bearing any grudge as alleged. At any rate Shri Bania is not presently the Investigating Officer in the instant case and one Shri Dimbeswar Bhuyan has bee-' investigating the case. 8. The first question to be decided, therefore, is whether on the facts and circumstances the accusation of the petitioner can be said to be an abuse of the process of law, as alleged by the petitioner but denied by the respondents. 9. What then is an abuse of process of law? Generally speaking, abuse of process is the malicious and improper use of some regular legal proceeding to obtain some advantage over an opponent. It means abuse of legal procedure ; a frivolous or vexatious action where in the party bringing it is not acting bonafide, and merely wished to annoy or embarrass or harm his opponent, or where no probable cause of action is disclosed. As was observed in N. Narayana Nambia v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 SC 1116 : 1963 (2) Cri. L. J. 186, abuse means misuse, i, e. using his position for something for which it is not intended. The abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise than those means. The word 'otherwise' has wide connotation. As was observed in N. Narayana Nambia v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 SC 1116 : 1963 (2) Cri. L. J. 186, abuse means misuse, i, e. using his position for something for which it is not intended. The abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise than those means. The word 'otherwise' has wide connotation. The juxtaposition of the word 'otherwise' with the words 'corrupt or illegal means', and the dishonesty implicit in the word 'abuse' indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on one's part to bring him within the meaning of the expression. Whether one abuses his position or not depends upon the facts of each case. An abuse or malicious abuse of process is its wilful or malicious use to obtain a result which the process was not intended by law to effect. It is not limited to the issuance of process, but extends to its oppressive use after issuance. Abuse of process has been distinguished from false imprisonment. Malicious use of process is to be distinguished from the malicious abuse of. process the first being an employment of process for its ostensible purpose, although without probable cause, whereas the second is employment of process for a purpose not contemplated by law. In malicious use it has to be shown that the action in which the process was used, has terminated, while in the latter it is unnecessary to show that the action has terminated. So also the malicious abuse of process is somewhat different from malicious arrest, though both are contrary to individual's interest in freedom from confinement, whether such confinement is physically of the person or a limitation of one's personal freedom, as in holding a person to bail, and if: is immaterial whether the act of the prosecutor directly or indirectly causes the confinement. In malicious arrest termination of the proceeding in which the arrest was made, has to be shown, whereas in the abuse of process it is not necessary to show termination of the proceeding in which the process was abused. Malicious use of process is the employment of process for its legitimate purpose, but maliciously and without probable cause. In other words, it is the employment of process from its legitimate purpose, but maliciously and without probable cause. The gravamen of the wrong is the malice and want of probable cause. Malicious use of process is the employment of process for its legitimate purpose, but maliciously and without probable cause. In other words, it is the employment of process from its legitimate purpose, but maliciously and without probable cause. The gravamen of the wrong is the malice and want of probable cause. Abuse of process may be in civil actions or criminal prosecutions 10. 'Damnum absque injuria'. In the field of tort the elements of process are an ulterior purpose, an act constituting misapplication of the process, and resulting damage. Thus the ingredients are a wilful intent, or ulterior, or wrongful purpose, and an act constit­uting misapplication of the process, which causes damage to the plaintiff. A wrongful purpose may be inferred from acts constituting misapplication of the process but not vice versa. Abuse of process is not confined to causing of a process to issue but also includes the use of the process for a purpose for which it is not legitimately meant. 11. In criminal proceedings the mere institution of criminal procee­dings for a wrongful purpose is an abuse of process. The unlawful use of process after its issuance is the gist of the abuse of process. Unlawful use of a lawful process after its issuance is also an abuse of process. In other words, the bad intent must culminate in an actual abuse of the process by perverting it to a use to obtain a result which the process was not intended by law to effect ; as where the process is perverted in the manner of its execution, or used to accomplish a collateral purpose not contemplated by law, or in the case of criminal process, where the process is executed in an oppressive and unlawful manner, or where it is used unlawfully to coerce the accused, such, for instance, as coercing him to make a confessional statement. However, mere arrest and detention under a lawful warrant, without any act amounting to misuse or oppression, are not an abuse of process. An abuse of process, in order to be blameworthy must have been wilful and for a wrongful purpose and malice is generally regarded as essential. In other words, the abuse of process must have been wilful and for an unlawful purpose and not in good faith. Good faith may constitute a defence. An abuse of process, in order to be blameworthy must have been wilful and for a wrongful purpose and malice is generally regarded as essential. In other words, the abuse of process must have been wilful and for an unlawful purpose and not in good faith. Good faith may constitute a defence. Some authorities have held that while malice is never essential in connection with the issuance of the process, it may be essential in connection with the use of the process. However, malice need not be independently proved, but may be legally inferred for a wilful perversion of process with a wrongful purpose, although it cannot be inferred from a mere mistake. Where, however, the circumstances afford no inference of malice, it has been held that actual malice must be proved 12. Validity of the process is, however, not defence to a charge of abuse of process. Since an action for abuse of process presupposes an originally valid and regular process, duly and properly issued, the vali­dity of the process is no defence to a charge for its abuse. Again, want of probable cause for instituting the proceeding in which the process was issued is not an essential element of an action for abuse of process. Some authorities, however, held that want of probable cause for acts constituting the abuse of process is essential, while others have indicated that it is not essential, because there can be no such thing as probable cause for perversion of process. 13. Applying the foregoing principles we find, as stated by the learned Advocate General at the Bar that the A.G.P. Government assumed office on 24.12.85 and took a decision on 23.2.86 to cancel all timber permits. The instant F.I.R. was lodged at the Vigilance Police Station at Dispur by the 1st respondent, Shri P. Bania, Superintendent of Police, Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell, Dispur on 8.9.86 alleging offences to have been committed during 1984. In the F.I.R. it is stated that on 7.11.84 one Snyain Suudar on behalf of Assam Timber Udyogp Chandrapur, Gauiiati, one 6atyapal Goei. The instant F.I.R. was lodged at the Vigilance Police Station at Dispur by the 1st respondent, Shri P. Bania, Superintendent of Police, Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell, Dispur on 8.9.86 alleging offences to have been committed during 1984. In the F.I.R. it is stated that on 7.11.84 one Snyain Suudar on behalf of Assam Timber Udyogp Chandrapur, Gauiiati, one 6atyapal Goei. on behalf of jagadamba Wood Products, Chandrapur, Guwahati, and one Jatadish Sarawagi on behalf of the New Hansaia Mills, Kokrajhar, P.O. Kokrajhar, applied to the then Chief Minister, in three different printed letter heads in English for permit of sal timber from seized and unclaimed stocks alleging that their Saw Mills faced extreme difficulty to run for want of raw materi­als ; and Shri Saikia, who allegedly had close association with the above businessmen, passed orders on the body of the applications under his signature straightway allotting 2,000 cu.m. to Assam timber Udyog, Had 1,000 cu.m. each to Jagaaamba Wood Products and New Hansara Saw Mill and the Government issued permits to those Mills on 31.12.S5 and Shri Khaniudra Kumar Barua, the then Chief Conservator of Forests (Con) gave clearance on 21.2.85 for reduction of monopoly fee. Thus the F.I.R was lodged alter nearly two years of the occurrence. As was held in Emperor v. Kawaja. Nazir Ahmed, AlR 1945 Privy Council 18,the object of the F.I.R. is to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, to record me circumstances before there is ­time for them to be forgotten or embellished. Prompt lodging of F.I.R. goes in favour of prosecution. (Tarachand v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1971 SC 1891 ; Asharam v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 1 315 1971 Cri. L.J. 903). In Stale of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2407 ), it was held that when there was delay in lodging an F.I.R. the facts of the case and the distance to the police station have to be taken note of. In the State of Punjab v, Tarlok Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1 /21. where the prosecution made no attempt in Explaining the delay in lodging the F.I.R., such delay, it was held, caused doubt on the prosecution version that the report was lodged without unnecessary lapse of time. In the State of Punjab v, Tarlok Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1 /21. where the prosecution made no attempt in Explaining the delay in lodging the F.I.R., such delay, it was held, caused doubt on the prosecution version that the report was lodged without unnecessary lapse of time. In Lalji Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 1266 what delay in riling the F.I.R, was satisfactorily explai­ned the prosecution proved the origin of occurrence the conviction was upheld. Following 1973 Cri.L.J. 185 (S.C.) it can be said to be settled law that an (unexplained and inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to prosecution case. The public interest demands that criminal justice should be swift and sure, that the guilty should be punished while events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial) M. S. Sheri v. State if Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri L.J. 1019. 14. As it appears that (he facts alleged in the F.I.R, were not earlier complained of by any disclosed source and the informant in the Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell may have discovered those facts. The question would, therefore, arise how the starting point occurred ? There is not even a whisper about the present Chief Minister. The F.I.R. itself is silent on the point. The petitioner alleged that the informant, Shri P. Bania harboured grudge against the former Chief Minister, Shri Hiteswar Saikia during whose time a departmental proceeding was drawn up against Shri Bania. Mr. Goswami categorically states that the proceeding was dropped and there could, therefore be no question of harbouring any grudge by Shri Bania. Mr. Bhattacharjee, while replying, stated at the Bar that it was dropped only after change of the Government. Unfortunately no affidavit has been filed by Shri Bania. Mr. Goswami categorically states that the proceeding was dropped and there could, therefore be no question of harbouring any grudge by Shri Bania. Mr. Bhattacharjee, while replying, stated at the Bar that it was dropped only after change of the Government. Unfortunately no affidavit has been filed by Shri Bania. Para 38 of the writ petition states: "That this FIR has been lodged with a view to malign and harass your petitioner besides Shri Hiteswar Saikia, the former Chief Minister of Assam, which will be evident from the fact that the Supdt of Police, Vigilance Cell, Shri P. Bania against whom an enquiry by the former Chief Minister Shri Hiteswar Saikia was instituted has been given charge to make investigation." In reply in para 29 of the affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated : "That while denying the statements mad in para 38, the deponent begs to state that to the knowledge of the deponent there is no allegation against the deponent and the question c f bearing any grudge against the former Chief Minister does not arise as alleged." Thus the allegation that Shri P. Bania bore grudge against the former Chief Minister was not refuted. 15. The fact chat the Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell was applying criminalistics and finding out a case of criminal conspiracy against the former Chief Minister of the same State, has been alleged. In para 24 of the writ petition it has been stated that it would be apparent that the "vexatious F.I.R. has been lodged with a view to harass, malign and humiliate the former Chief Minister Shri Hiteswar Saikia, and to make out a case your petitioner has also been named in the FIR." In Para 20 of the affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated : "while denying the statements made in paragraph 24 of the petition the deponent begs to state that the statements made in the aforesaid paragraphs itself goes to show that the petitioner is taking up the case of another accused." It was denied that there was any attempt to harass the former Chief Minister or any one else as alleged, and that the petitioner was trying to give a political colour in respect of a criminal case. 16. 16. In prra 24 of the writ petition it has further been stated : "The former Chief Minister, Shri Kites war Saikia applied before this Hon'ble Court to provide him with necessary facilities in case of his arrest in a non-bailable offence due to his failing health and when the matter was before Court for adjudication, the Hon'ble Minister of Law, Govt., of Assam made a statement that he will be sent to jail and not for honeymoon which speaks of the taste of the Hon'ble Minister. The Minister took it for granted that the former Chief Minister will be convicted, as one is sent to jail only after conviction. The said remark of the Hon'ble Minister is a clear interference of the process of law.” In para 20 of the affidavit-in- opposition it is countered saying: "It is not admitted that the Hon'ble Law Minister made the statements as alleged in this paragraph. The petitioner is trying to give a political colour in respect of a serious criminal case which is for misappropria­tion, cheating and misuse of official position." As the Hon'ble Law Minister has not been impleaded in the petition, no affidavit is forthcom­ing from him. We have already made it clear that this petition is confined to the petitioner and not the others named in the F.I.R. ] 7. The statement of the petitioner that he has no link with the alleged offence and that the F.I.R. has been lodged with a view to harass the petitioner and mainly the former Chief Minister and that the petitioner was falsely implicated upon wrong assumption of fact that he was close associate of Shri Hiteswar Saikia, has been denied in para 27 of the counter saying that the statements made in paragraph 37 are not correct and that there were enough materials against the petitioner in the case In para 28 of the counter it is stated that it was absolutely incorrect that the F.I.R. was lodged to harass the petitioner or other co-accused, as alleged. Mr. Goswami now argues that the-petitioner was the kingpin in the criminal conspiracy. However no such statement was there in the F.I.R., or even in the counter where it is said that there are enough materials against the petitioner and if he is interrogated more materials will come up. 18. Mr. Goswami now argues that the-petitioner was the kingpin in the criminal conspiracy. However no such statement was there in the F.I.R., or even in the counter where it is said that there are enough materials against the petitioner and if he is interrogated more materials will come up. 18. Would it thus be reasonable to hold that the accusation/ prosecution of the petitioner has not been bonafide and that criminal process is being maliciously used for a purpose for which it was not meant in law ? The fact that the Chief Minister's Vigilance Cell is accusing/prosecuting the petitioner alleging conspiracy with the former Chief Minister is prone to introduce some political flavour to the case which can be countervailed only by the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The fact that the allegations were marshaled into the F. I. R. by Shri P. Bania who suffered a procee­ding during the time of the former Chief Minister also inducts an element of interest in the prosecution other than the legitimate purpose in law. This could be counterweighed only by the persons showing the nature and gravity of the offence charged with, and denying his personal interest. There is no explanation why Mr, Bania, the 1st respondent, has not filed any counter to this statement. 19. Can the accusation/prosecution of the petitioner along with the others be said to be a bonafide action ? Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta-External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts. Can the criminal process be said to have been used not for bonafide purpose of punishing the offences but for ulterior motive of satisfying political vendetta ? It is to be noted that the petitioner himself is not a political personality but he is stated to be close to the former Chief Minister; and he states that it is for the purpose of extracting statements from him, by third degree. This has been denied by the respondents. 20. Bona fide means in good faith, without fraud or deceit. It means honestly, without collusion or participation in wrong doing. The effect of fraud would be to vitiate any act or order. Qui per fraudem agit frustra agit-what a man does fraudulently, he does in vain. Law protects the victim. Lex et tutissime cassis , sub clypeo legis memo decipitnr-law is the safest helmet ; under the shield of law no one is deceived. 21. Mr. The effect of fraud would be to vitiate any act or order. Qui per fraudem agit frustra agit-what a man does fraudulently, he does in vain. Law protects the victim. Lex et tutissime cassis , sub clypeo legis memo decipitnr-law is the safest helmet ; under the shield of law no one is deceived. 21. Mr. Mazumdar also submits that the accusation/prosecution is with malice in its original sense of wicked intention. However 'malicious^' may mean intentionally or recklessly, that is to say, with the foresight of the likelihood or possibility of the consequences, either to do the particular kind of harm or recklessly whether such harm should occur or not but having it in mind. The desire for political vengeance is suggested as the motive. Careful analysis would he necessary to decide this question. Bishop Butler and Jeremy Bantham expressed that criminal law ought to and does make the pratification of a revenue an object. Punishment, therefore, takes the place of compensation. Sir James Stephen says: "The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite". (General View of the Criminal Law of England, P. 99). Malice, says Holmes, as used in common speech, includes intent, and something more. When an act is said to be done with an intent to do harm, it is meant that a wish for tie farm is the motive of the act. But when an, act is said to be done maliciously, it is meant, not only that a wish for the harmful effect is the motive, but also that the harm is wished for its own sake, or, as Austin would say with more accuracy "for the sake of the pleasurable feeling which knowledge of the suffering caused by the act would excite". Bentham calls them "pleasures of malevolence". "They result from the sight or the thought of pain endured by those beings who do not love us, whether man or animals. 22. To find out whether the prosecution of the petition is malicious or not we have to ascertain the dominant motive in instituting the prosecution. If it is the intent to do harm, or gratification of vengeance or pleasure of malevolence, it has to be held malicious and otherwise not) This will depend upon the allegations made in the F, I. R. against the petitioner with transferred malice. 23. If it is the intent to do harm, or gratification of vengeance or pleasure of malevolence, it has to be held malicious and otherwise not) This will depend upon the allegations made in the F, I. R. against the petitioner with transferred malice. 23. It is seen from the F.I.R. and the counter that no particular act, abetment or attempt has been alleged against the petitioner. Sections mentioned in the F.T.R will not be applicable to the petitioner who is not a public servant individually. Mr. Goswami contends that still the petitioner could be found guilty of abetting the commission of the offences by the public servants and also may be found guilty under Section 120B for criminal conspiracy with the public servants and the other businessmen named in the F.I.R. Sections 120A and 120B read : "120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy. When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,- (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy : Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation : It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object." ''120B Punishment of criminal conspiracy. (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both." 24. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both." 24. The criminal conspiracy alleged was to cheat the Forest department of Government of Assam by applying for and obtaining Sal timber permits in the names of non existent firms granted by the public servants contrary to Government policy of direct operation of timbers thereby causing huge loss to Government revenue and illegal gain to the conspirators. But the petitioner's name has not been mentioned at any stage of the conspiracy and no specific agreement with him is alleged. Yet Mr. Goswami argues that all the conspirators need not perform any part of the conspiracy, the gravamen of the crime being the agreement to commit the crime. Even then was would like to observe that, the informant, Shri P. Bania being a fully trained person, if there was any act attributable to the petitioner there was no reason why it could not be mentioned in the F.I.R. when so many other details about the others were elaborately mentioned. If really no role of the petitioner could be stated, roping him through the concept of criminal conspiracy may amount to invasion of his personal liberty. It is true, as was held in Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 1971 (3) SCC 432 that there is seldom, if ever, direct evidence of conspiracy can be forthcoming. Conspiracy from its very nature must be conceived and hatched in complete secrecy and that only circumstantial evidence is generally forthcoming and when the broad features are proved by trustworthy evidence connecting all the links of a complete chain, then ( on isolated events the confessional statements of the co-accused lending assurance to the conclusions of the Court can be considered as relevant implication of persons who had material?) However, this will not justify nothing to do with the conspiratorial acts alleged. 25. Multiparty crimes have always been regarded as especially serious. More so, when the participants evince a settled anti-social propensity and resolve to defy the law. It is for this reason that the agreement itself is made criminal. However, conspiracy, like attempt, is an inchoate crime. 25. Multiparty crimes have always been regarded as especially serious. More so, when the participants evince a settled anti-social propensity and resolve to defy the law. It is for this reason that the agreement itself is made criminal. However, conspiracy, like attempt, is an inchoate crime. Critics point out that conspiracy law is abused when it is alleged to have involved substantial numbers, though only two would be enough. Charging large number of people as participants in a conspiracy having menial roles in the offence compels each of them to defend himself against charges of misconduct by all the, others, known or unknown in the particular accused, wherever the conspiracy may have taken place, perhaps ante-dating or suspecting the accused association with the others. Simultaneous trial results in more time, expenses, hardships to each accused persons. Again unfairness may arise because a conspiracy is punishable where any part of it was carried out and a person who was never in that place may also find himself being tried at that place. Conspiracy between two persons at one place may, therefore, haul up persons widely separated by distance and time. Even so, before concluding that the instant prosecution amounts to abuse of the process of the law, we have to examine the materials which made the informant to feel justified in lodging the F.I.R. We find that it is only through the allegation of criminal conspiracy that the petitioner has been named in the F.I.R. without stating where he was and what he was doing at the relevant time of alleged conspiracy. Nothing incriminating is contained in so far as the petitioner is concerned either in the F.I.R. or in the seizure list (Annexure-B). The idea of the petitioner having been kingpin does not appear on the face of the F.I.R. and the seizure list. The alleged criminal conspiracy is the only notion whereby the petitioner has been roped in. 26. The next question is does the F.I.R. disclose any offence of criminal conspiracy or any ailed offence ? No particular meeting or agreement between the alleged co-conspirators and the petitioner has been mentioned. If the named businessmen after agreement tried to cheat the Government by making applications for permits in the name of non-existent firms, they would commit the offence of criminal conspiracy. No particular meeting or agreement between the alleged co-conspirators and the petitioner has been mentioned. If the named businessmen after agreement tried to cheat the Government by making applications for permits in the name of non-existent firms, they would commit the offence of criminal conspiracy. If the Minister in-charge of Forest believing on the applications issued orders thereon and the officers of the department carried out that order by issuing permits whether it would amount to conspiracy or not has to be seen. However, no menial or intellectual role of the petitioner has been alleged in the F.I.R The petitioner could not, therefore, be said to have agreed to do or caused to be done an illegal act or an act which was not illegal by illegal means ; as no overt act has been attributed to the petitioner, If no criminal conspiracy was committed the question of punishing him for criminal conspiracy would not arise./ 27, As we have already indicated whether there was a criminal conspiracy between the persons named in the F.I.R. other than the petitioner need not be decided in this case. In so far as the petitioner is concerned the question would be whether the F.I.R. and the accompanying materials disclosed any offence which needed investiga­tion and whether such investigation should be allowed to proceed involving the petitioner. 28. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Consti­tution of India and not under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Thou/h the two jurisdictions cannot be said to be exactly the same, one may serve as a guide in the other. It is settled law that Sec. 482 Cr. P. C. confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been seriously abused: Municipal Corpo­ration of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, 1983 CRI, L. J. 159 : AIR 1983 SC 67 . However, as was held in State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar, 1983 CRI. L I, 980: AIR 1983 SC 545 , the High Court should not quash proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P. C. on slender grounds. However, as was held in State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar, 1983 CRI. L I, 980: AIR 1983 SC 545 , the High Court should not quash proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P. C. on slender grounds. The power to quash proceedings has to be exercised sparingly was was ruled in Raj Kapoor v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC'258; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna, AIR 1976 SC 1947 and Sharda Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 . In Smt. Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M. S. Paintal, 1982 CRI. L. J. 1383 : AIR 1982 SC 1181 where no cause was made out against the appellant for issuance of process the issue of process by the Magistrate on the basis of complaint itself was quashed. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala, AIR 1983 SC 158 , where the Directors of a Sugar Mill were prosecuted for manufacturing adulterated milk toffee on a private complaint averment which gave complete details of the role played by the Directors and their liability, it was held that the High Court was n.)t justified in quashing the proceeding against the accused Directors under S. 482 Cr. P. C. In the instant case no such averments are there against the petitioner. The meanings of 'abuse of process' were explained in Ram Niwas v. Zafar Abbas, 1978 Cri. L. J. 706 Starting a proceeding which is wanting in bona fide is one of them. Where there was no material on record on which any Tribunal could reasonably find the accused guilty, action to quash the proceeding was held justified in State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489 . It was held that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the Court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the 'exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted is such as to make conviction reasonably possible. 29. Generally speaking so long as a crime lies merely in the mind it is not punishable, because criminal thoughts may occur to people who do not put them into execution. However, when some step is taken to put the desire into effect a crime may be committed. In England at common law there could be a criminal conspiracy to commit various non-criminal acts, such as a tort. However, when some step is taken to put the desire into effect a crime may be committed. In England at common law there could be a criminal conspiracy to commit various non-criminal acts, such as a tort. So, even where it was not a crime for one person to do the act, it was a crime for two persons to agree to do it. However, the common law of conspiracy has now been superseded by the Criminal Law Act, 1977. Section 1 (1) of that Act provides : "If a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question". This had narrowed down the common law of conspiracy, requiring that the object of the conspiracy must be criminal. In the instant case conspiracy to cheat the Government is alleged, but no application for Sal timber permit has been shown to have been made by the petitioner. Without more materials than were disclosed in the F. I.R. and the seizure Memo, the conviction of the petitioner cannot be reasonably possible. The counter filed by the respondents also did not disclose any additional material. 30. The most important question is whether quashing of the investigation in so far as the petitioner is concerned, would be justified in law. All leading cases on the question take the cue from the Privy Council decision in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed (supra). The question in that case was whether the High Court had the power under Section 561A Cr.P.C. to quash all proceedings taken in pursuance of two F.I.Rs dated 31.8.1941 and 5th September, 1941-the first alleging offence in breach of Section 420 I.P.C. but it was doubtful whether the offence should not have been described as committed in breach of Section 417 I.P.C. instead of Section 420 I.P.C. It was argued that the only information report under Sections 154 to 156 Cr. P.C. was that recorded on 31st August 1941, that the allegations recorded at a later stage of 5th September were not an information report, but a statement taken in course of an investigation under Sections 151 and 162 of the Code ; that there was therefore no reported cognisable offence into which the police were entitled to enquire, but only a non-cognisable offence which required a Magistrate's order if an investigation was to be authorised. The Privy Council repelled this argument pointing out that the respondent treated each document as a separate information report since each disclosed separate offence, the second not being a mere amplification of the first, but disclosed further criminal activities. The privy Council also observed :- "But, in any case, the receipt and recording of an information report is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. No doubt in the great majority of cases, criminal prosecutions are undertaken as a result of information received and recorded in this way but their Lordships see no reason why the police, if in possession through their own knowledge or by means of credible though informal intelligence which genuinely leads them to the belief that a cognisable offence has been committed, should not of their own motion underlet,; an investigation into the truth of the matters alleged. Section 157, Criminal P.C., when directing that a police officer, who has reason to suspect from information or otherwise that an offence which he is empowered to investigate under S. 156 has been committed shall proceed to investigate the facts and circumstances, supports this view. In truth the provisions as to an information report (commonly called a first information report) are enacted for other reasons. The object is to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, to record the circumstances before there is time for them to be forgotten or embellished, and it has to be remembered that the report can be put in evidence when the informant is examined if it is desired to do so". In that case the High Court decided that it was emitted to quash the proceedings and prohibit investigation. In that case the High Court decided that it was emitted to quash the proceedings and prohibit investigation. I he Privy Council observed that there may have been good ground for rejection of accusation, and a dismissal of an prosecution launched upon his information if such a prosecution ultimately takes place and if the Court are then satisfied that no crime has been established. But that stage bad not been reached and that police investigation was stopped and it could not be said with certainty that no more information could be obtained. But even if it were not, it was the duty of a criminal Court when the prosecution for a crime took place before it to form its own view and not to reach its conclusion by reference to any previous decision which was not binding upon it. Their Lordships went on to observe : "In their Lordships' opinion however, the more serious aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference by the Court with the duties of the police. Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost important;? that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under S. 491, Criminal P.C., to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then". "No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and for this reason Newsam J. may well have decided rightly in A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 129. Bui that is not this case." 31. In B..P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , where F.I.R. was lodged against the appellant alleging offences under Sections 420-109, 114 and 120B I.P.C. and the Punjab High Court moved under See. 561 Cr. P.C. dismissed his petition, on appeal by special leave the Supreme Court at para 6, observing that S. 561A Cr. P.C. saved the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as might be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, held : "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it rray be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice...- - ..............." It was further observed that ''in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusa­tion made against the accused would not be sustained"-It was also observed that because of the utmost importance that investigation into criminal offences must always be free from any objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to the grievance of the accused that the work of investigation is carried en unfairly or with any ulterior motive. 32. In State of West Bengal v. S.N Basak, AIR 1963 SC 447 where the respondent filed the petition in the High Court when only a written report was made to the police by the Sub-Inspector of Police Enfor­cement Branch and on the basis of that report a First Information Report was recorded by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station and investigation had started and there was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail it was observed : "The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are cont­ained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section .154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and S.156 with investigation into such offences and under these Sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the Police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under S.439 or under the inherent power of the court under S.561A of the Criminal Procedure Code." In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore, AIR 1964 SC 221 , it was held that Section 157 Cr.P.C. prescribes the procedure in the matter of such an investigation which can be initiated either in information or otherwise. It is clear from the said provision that an officer in charge of a police station can start investigation either on information or otherwise. In Sailendranath vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292 , it v\as held that a permission under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 is a permission to investigate a case and that laying a trap is a part of investigation. In Sailendranath vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292 , it v\as held that a permission under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 is a permission to investigate a case and that laying a trap is a part of investigation. An investigation is one and individible and includes all the proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or any person other than a Magistrate, who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. However, in S. N. Sharina vs. Bipin Kumar Tiwari, AIR 1970 SC 786 it was held that the power of police to investigate has been made independent of any control by Magistrate under S.159 Cr.P.C. and that though the Cr.P.C. gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art, ?26ofthe Constitution under which if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. This power of the High Court to quash proceeding has to be exercised sparingly As was held in Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 , where the High Court quashed the F.I.R. lodged by the University even before police started investigation and no proceeding was pending in any Court, it was observed that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice but the statutory power under S. 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In Prem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 613 it was also emphasised that the exercise of power by the police must be bonafide and that vague allegations and secret hearings were not permissible and that stringent test must be applied in order to avoid easy possibility of abuse of power to the detriment of the fundamental freedoms. All powers including police powers must be informed by fairness and malafide is fatal. All powers including police powers must be informed by fairness and malafide is fatal. In State of Bihar vs. I.A.C., Saldana, AIR 1980 SC 326 it was held that under Art 226 it is not open to the High Court to give direction to close case and that investigation is exclusively reserved to the executive through police department, which is normally not to be interfered with by the judiciary. 33. In State of West Bengal vs. Swapan Kumar, AIR 1982 SC 949 , it has been ruled that the First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation and that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F. I. R. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report ( F. I. R ) which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice will suffer. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does net interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed. But it cannot be said that the investigation must necessarily be permitted to continue and will not be prevented by the Court at the stage of investigation. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not in respect of a certain person must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, of an offence is disclosed involving one person it cannot be said that offence is disclosed for all and sundry. If on a conside­ration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If on a conside­ration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the Court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed involving an accused person it will be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F. T. R.. prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the Court has then no power to stop it for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offenses. If, on the other hand, the F. I. R, does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. If, on the other hand, the F. I. R, does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Swapan Kumar (supra) discussed the decisions in R. P. Kapur (supra), S. N. Sharma (supra), State of West Bengal vs. S. N. Basak (supra), Johan Singh vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 1146 : 1974(3) SCR 794 , King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nizam Ahmed (supra) and emphasized the statement of the Privy Council in the last case that if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation, and that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F. I. R.; that the judiciary should not interfere with police in matters which are within their province; and that it is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. Their Lordships also observed that there is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. Attention was also drawn to the warning uttered by Mathew J. in his majority judgment, in Prabhu Dayal Deorah vs. The District Magistrate, Kamrup (1974) 2 SCR 12 at pages 22-23: AIR 1974 SC 183 at p. 199, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accor­dance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws, and that the history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under the Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. In paragraph 64 Justice A. N. Sen. J. held :- "Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the Court zealously guards them and protects them". It was reiterated in L. V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao, AIR 1983 SC 1219 , that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr, P. C. should be used sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that process of law is being misused to harass a citizen. Similarly, in E. A. Mills Shri Virendra Kumar v. Rajiv Poddar, AIR 1985 SC 1668 , it was reiterated that save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result ii miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. 34. Mr. Mazumdar argued that the petitioner could not be compelled to self-incriminate or incriminate; others falsely. The submission is not tenable in this wide form but may be tenable within limits. While the proposition of law relating to information and investigation cannot be disputed the position of human rights vis-a-vis criminal law must not be lost sight of. The Magna Carta in Clause III of General Constitutional interest embodied: "No freeman . shall be taken or imprisoned or diseased or out lawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him, save by the lawful judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. The Magna Carta in Clause III of General Constitutional interest embodied: "No freeman . shall be taken or imprisoned or diseased or out lawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him, save by the lawful judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. To no one will sell, deny or delay right or justice." In Clause VI-Judicial matters-it was embodied : "that nothing shall from henceforth be taken for the writ of inquiry touching life or limb but that it shall be granted freely and not denied ; that no bailiff shall henceforth put anyone on trial on his mere word without reliable witness brought for that purpose ; that no one shall be taken or imprisoned on account of the appeal of a woman for the death of any one other than her husband." In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948) the rights to freedom include the right to life, liberty and security of person; freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial Tribunal; and the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. In an application under Article 226 of the Constitution the human rights are also to be considered along with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India deal with human rights in criminal jurisprudence. Article 20 confers immunity from double jeopardy and self-incrimination. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 22 enacts the protections against arrest and detention. These principles were already underlying the criminal law before the Constitution of India came into force. They have now been clearly enshrined in the Constitution of India. I be privilege against self-incrimination is fundamental. Let rigorous investigation proceed according to Jaw to find out the truth from external sources instead of extorting confessions on unverified suspicion or interested allegation. True, it may lead to increase in difficulties for the investigating machinery in detection of suspected .crimes and criminals. I be privilege against self-incrimination is fundamental. Let rigorous investigation proceed according to Jaw to find out the truth from external sources instead of extorting confessions on unverified suspicion or interested allegation. True, it may lead to increase in difficulties for the investigating machinery in detection of suspected .crimes and criminals. But then the problem is that of balancing the two needs or ideals of the society, namely, need for detection and punishment of crimes on the one hand and the protection of the individual's personal liberty and dignity of the individual on the other. I he social interest in protecting the innocent is to be weighed against the interest in detecting the crime and punishing the guilty at any cost. In the language of Lewis Mayers : "To strike the balance between the needs of law enforcement on the one hand and the protection of the citizen from oppression and injustice in the hands of the law enforcement machinery on the other is a perennial problem of statecraft". Constitution having prohibited self-incrimination in criminal jurisprudence the citizens are to be protected from testimony obtained through intimidatory, overbear or third degree practices: Where the F. I. R. and relevant materials do not disclose any offence against an accused, subjecting him to such process will be violative of the above constitutional mandates. In Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 it was held that the prohibitive range of protection from self-incrimination gees back to the stage of police interrogation and is not confined to court proceedings only. It was held that "if there is any made of pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or -indirect, but sufficiently substantial, applied by the police in obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt, it becomes compelled testimony violative of the privilege against self-incrimination". The accused has the right to refuse to answer incriminating questions. Non-incriminating questions can be asked and the accused is bound to answer where there is no clear tendency to incriminate Whether a particular question has a tendency incrimination or not will depend on ''surrounding facts. The accused has to consider it. However unreasonable or timorous apprehensions would not be enough. It is, often said that questions in interrogations are put primarily to establish criminality and not for altruistic purpose. The accused has to consider it. However unreasonable or timorous apprehensions would not be enough. It is, often said that questions in interrogations are put primarily to establish criminality and not for altruistic purpose. The personal encounter with the interrogating bodies often make people appre­hensive irrespective of truth or otherwise of the matters investigated. The law of immunity from being compelled to be a witness against himself is available to a person formally accused of an offence though the prosecution in court has not yet commenced. Dastagir v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 756 . In Sharma v. Satish(1954) S. C. R. 1077 it has been ruled that the immunity commences from the moment a person is named in the F. I. R. against any volitional act on his part. In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu, AIR 1961 SC 1808 it was ruled that if accusation has been made as to commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in prosecution, the protection is available. To be a witness includes oral as well as written testimony. Even where offence is disclosed then also these protections are available to the accused 35. The question then is whether in case of suspected conspiracy offence disclosed against ore would amount to offence disclosed against all. In an inchoate offence of criminal conspiracy wherein number of persons may be implicated unless one's role is indicated it may be difficult to hold that offence is disclosed against him also. The meeting of the minds must be shown. It is open for every one to show that his mind did not meet and that he did not enter into the conspiracy. To hold that when offence is disclosed against one it is disclosed against everybody would amount to accepting the existence of the alleged conspiracy It is true that whether there was a conspiracy or not and if so who were involved will be known only after investigation what steps investigation under S.4 (1) Cr. P.C. comprises were stated in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 and in State of M.P. vs. Mubarak Ali, AIR 1959 SC 707 . P.C. comprises were stated in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 and in State of M.P. vs. Mubarak Ali, AIR 1959 SC 707 . Under the Cr.P.C. investigation starts after the police officer receives information in regard to an offence and consists generally of the following steps : (i) procee­ding to the spot; (ii) ascertaining the facts and circumstances of the case ; (iii) discovery and arrest of the suspect offenders ; (iv) collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence, which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused; and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer minks fit, (b) the search of places of seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and (v) formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge-sheet under S.173. It is for this reason that in State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar (1983) 2 S.C C. 384 it was held that the High Court could not arrive at a conclusion on the guilt or innocence of the accused at an interlocutory state when the prosecution has still to lead its evidence. However, if no offence was disclosed against an accused in the F.I.R. and initial statements, investigation itself would be without jurisdiction and the question of accepting testimony collected there by dots not arise. 36. If the public servants in this case caused loss to the Government by undervaluing Govt. timber and issuing permits to non-existent V firms the public servants could be liable. The nature of the offence under S.5 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was analysed in Om Prakash vs. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 458 . Under S.I20B I.P.C. as was held in State of H. P. vs. Kishan Lal, AIR 1987 SC 773, the offence of criminal conspiracy consists in a meeting of minds of two or more persons for agreeing do or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means, and the performance of an act in terms thereof. Under S.I20B I.P.C. as was held in State of H. P. vs. Kishan Lal, AIR 1987 SC 773, the offence of criminal conspiracy consists in a meeting of minds of two or more persons for agreeing do or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means, and the performance of an act in terms thereof. If pursuant to the criminal conspiracy the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them will be liable for the offences even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the offence?) 37. Mr. Goswami submits that even assuming that the F.I.R, did not attribute any role to the petitioner, subsequently sufficient materials have been found against him. However the allegation that Shri Bania harboured a grudge against the petitioner having not been refuted by him filing affidavit the accusation of the petitioner has to be held not to be in good faith ab initio, and it cannot be buttressed by subse­quent recording of evidentiary materials. Quod initio non valet, tractum temporis non valet-A thing void in the beginning does not become valid by lapse of time. Materials collected in course of an investigation pursuant to F.I.R. lodged in bad faith in so far as the petitioner is concerned, cannot cure the initial bad faith. 38. Mr. Goawami lastly argues that the conduct of the petitioner in not appearing before the investigating agency for which he was granted by the High Court ad interim bail with condition to appear before the investigating agency on 20.11.86 and on his prayer 3 weeks further time was granted by the High Court and instead of so appearing his filing this petition is enough to disentitle him to any writ remedy. Considering the fact that the criminal case involves the personal liberty and immunity of the petitioner, we are not inclined to reject this petition on that ground. Liberty is that natural faculty which permits everyone to do anything he pleases except that which is restrained by law or force. Libertas is omnibus rebus favorabilior est-Liberty is more favoured than all things (anything). 39. Liberty is that natural faculty which permits everyone to do anything he pleases except that which is restrained by law or force. Libertas is omnibus rebus favorabilior est-Liberty is more favoured than all things (anything). 39. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the investigating Dy.-S.P. the investigation is said to be at the initial stage and more and more serious materials are forthcoming against the petitioner and that the materials disclose the role played by the petitioner in connection with the various transactions stated in the F.I.R. It is further stated that the petitioner is avoiding arrest and interrogation and that if the petitioner is interrogated many more materials will come up, and that non-appearance of the petitioner before the Investigating Officer has hampered in the progress of the case. However, (no additional materials have been disclosed in the affidavit. As we have already observed, the original taint of the F.I.R. cannot be cured by the above statements and materials in the case due which was produced. 40. For the reasons discussed above we are constrained to hold that the petitioner has been accused in the instant F.I.R. not in the interest of public prosecution but out of grudge harboured by the informant Shri P. Bania who has not denied the allegation by filing any affidavit, and as such, we hold the accusation to be an abuse of criminal process. Consequently the investigation in the case, in so far as the petitioner is concerned, is quashed ; and if the investigation proceeds in so far as I the other accused persons are concerned, it shall proceed de hors the petitioner. This ipso facto will not impede the investigation of the case against the other accused persons. It will also not confer any criminal immunity on the petitioner other wise in the case. 41. In the result, the petition is allowed and the Rule made absolute to the above extent only. We leave the parties to bear their own costs. I agree CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE