Judgment :- 1. During the pendency of a rent control proceeding for an order of eviction, the landlord and the tenant entered into a compromise. Pursuant to a petition filed by both parties an order was passed by the Rent Control Court. The tenant surrendered the possession of the building to the landlord in compliance with the terms of the compromise. But the landlord is not willing to perform his part of the compromise, though he secured the advantage of getting vacant possession of the building. The Rent Control Court, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority did not help him in his attempt to squirm out of his liability. Hence the landlord has now approached this Court with a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The landlord filed a petition before the Rent Control Court for a direction to put him in possession of the tenanted premises, on two grounds, that the tenant committed default in payment of rent and that the building needs reconstruction. The tenant contested the petition initially, but later both of them entered into a compromise and a compromise petition was filed before the Rent Control Court. As per the terms of the compromise, the tenant agreed to vacate from the building since he was convinced about the precarious condition of the building. On the part of the landlord, he agreed to complete reconstruction of the new building within six months from the date of getting possession of the building. He further agreed to put the tenant in possession of the southern room of the new building, on fair rent. Provision is made in the agreement for fixation of the rate of fair rent. The Rent Control Court, on the compromise petition being filed, passed an order which reads thus: "Parties have come to terms and tiled a compromise; the compromise is recorded; the petition is hence decreed in terms of the compromise". Subsequently, the tenant surrendered possession of the building to the landlord. A new building has been constructed in the same site. But the tenant was not inducted into possession of a room in the new building. Hence he initiated frantic steps to get the room allotted to him. His earlier efforts, to enforce the clause in the compromise, through the execution court did not fructify. A new building has been constructed in the same site. But the tenant was not inducted into possession of a room in the new building. Hence he initiated frantic steps to get the room allotted to him. His earlier efforts, to enforce the clause in the compromise, through the execution court did not fructify. His later efforts through Rent Control Court registered some success, but the Appellate Authority directed the Rent Control Court to fix the fair rent first and then to put the tenant in the room of the building. So he filed a petition in the Rent Control Court praying for determination of fair rent of the building. The landlord resisted the petition by advancing all possible contentions, including the contention that the order passed on the compromise is a nullity. All such contentions were spurned down and the Rent Control Court fixed the fair rent of the room at the rate of Rs. 115/- per month. The landlord then filed an appeal, but the Appellate Authority dismissed the same. His revision was also dismissed by the District Court. Hence he has approached this Court now. 3. Obviously the tenant paid a heavy penalty for believing this landlord when signing the compromise document. The tenant has graciously performed his part of the agreement by surrendering possession of the building without any demur, in accordance with the terms of the compromise. The landlord who got the benefit of the compromise, has acted unfairly in denying the tenant the fruit of his endeavour which culminated in the compromise. Had the tenant any inkling of the meandering designs of the landlord, I am sure, the tenant would never have capitulated to the terms of the compromise. The fun of it is, that the landlord has the impudence to say that determination of fair rent of the building has resulted in "miscarriage of justice." Perhaps his notion of justice is different from what others think about. The only contention now raised is that the tenant is not entitled to enforce the terms of the compromise as the order based on compromise is a nullity. 4. The only contention now raised is that the tenant is not entitled to enforce the terms of the compromise as the order based on compromise is a nullity. 4. In support of the contention, learned counsel relied on the following observation in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal (AIR 1970 SC 794): "Where the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the court was not competent to pass the decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity". In that care a landlord filed a suit for ejection under S.13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, on she ground that the tenant had sublet the premises to another person. The suit was contested defying the allegation of subletting. But a compromise petition was filed and the court passed a decree in terms of the compromise. S.13 of the said Act contained a ban of eviction of tenants, unless the court is satisfied of one of the grounds enumerated in the Section. The Supreme Court noted that "the compromise petition does not make any reference to the alleged sub-lease". On the materials before court, it was held that since the court was not called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not, the order passed by the court on the compromise petition does not show that the subletting complained of has taken place. 5. In a later decision (K.K. Chari v. Seshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311) the Supreme Court distinguished Ferozi Lal Jain's case on facts and held that an order of eviction based on consent of parties is not necessarily void. In that case a landlord filed a suit for eviction under S.10(3) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on the ground that he required the premises for his bona fide use and occupation. The tenant contravened the landlords' claim. After letting in some evidence, both parties entered into a compromise, as per which the tenant withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. The court, on the filing of compromise memo, passed an order in the following terms: "Compromise memo filed and recorded; by consent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate ". The terms of the compromise were incorporated in the order. The court, on the filing of compromise memo, passed an order in the following terms: "Compromise memo filed and recorded; by consent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate ". The terms of the compromise were incorporated in the order. The Supreme Court, on the aforesaid facts, held thus: "The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S.10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the patties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based If the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry". 6. In Nagindas v. Dalpatram (AIR 1974 SC 471), a person filed a suit under Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 for eviction of the tenant on the grounds of arrears of rent and also of bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own use. During pendency of the suit, the parties compromised the dispute the terms of which were incorporated in the decree passed by court. The tenant agreed to pay the arrears of rent claimed by the landlord. Under the Bombay Act, a decree for eviction can be passed on the ground that the tenant committed default in payment of rent. While the Supreme Court said that the Rent Control Court is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act, their Lordships further held that the consent decree passed by the court is not necessarily a nullity. While the Supreme Court said that the Rent Control Court is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act, their Lordships further held that the consent decree passed by the court is not necessarily a nullity. The court observed, "if there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree, of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12 or S.13, it will be presumed that the court was satisfied about the existence of such statutory ground and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid". 7. While dealing with another situation which is almost similar to the above, Supreme Court has observed in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal (AIR 197S SC 2130) that "if parties choose to enter into a compromise, it is open to them to do so and the court can pass a decree on the basis of compromise. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law". 8. An analysis of the above decisions would show that there cannot be any proposition that an order passed by a Rent Control Court on compromise is necessarily a nullity. 9. There is no provision in the Act which forbids the landlord and his tenant entering into a compromise as between them in respect of the tenanted premises. The prohibition contained in S.11(1) of the Act is against eviction. The relevant words are these: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act". Sub-s. (3) enables a landlord to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. Sub-s. (3) enables a landlord to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. Sub-s. (10) shows that if the Rent Control Court is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bonafide, it shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The Sub-section further says that "if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application". If a landlord applies on one or more of the grounds enumerated in S.11 for an order of eviction and if the tenant agrees that he would vacate on one or more of 'those grounds a compromise petition can be filed in court. It is for the Rent Control Court to decide whether the compromise can be acted on. It is open to the court to reject the petition for the reason that the court is not satisfied of the grounds. But if the Rent Control Court chooses to act on the compromise and pass an order on its basis, the order can be deemed to be one passed on satisfaction of the Rent Control Court that the ground for exists. Merely because the Rent Control Court did not say in so many words, in the order, that the court is satisfied of the existence of the ground for eviction, no inference can be drawn that the court is not so satisfied. Satisfaction of the Rent Control Court regarding the ground of eviction is implied in such an order. The Order passed by the Rent Control Court, on the compromise petition filed by the parties, cannot therefore be regarded as a nullity. On the other band it is a valid order which is capable of enforcement. Accordingly, I dismiss this Original Petition in limine.