Judgment :- 1. In the general election to the Kerala Assembly for which poll was taken en 23-3-1987 the petitioner and respondents 1 to 5 were the contesting candidates for the seat from No. 4 Hosdurg Constituency. Real fight was between the petitioner who was the candidate of the C. P. I., an ally of the L.D. F. and first respondent, sponsored by the Congress (I), an ally of the U.D.F. First respondent won by a majority of 59 votes, having polled 46,677 valid votes in his favour while the valid votes polled in favour of the petitioner was only 46,618. Petitioner seeks to declare the election of the first respondent void and to declare him elected. 2. Reasons alleged could be broadly categorised under two heads, namely (1) rejection of valid votes in his favour, reception of invalid votes in favour of the first respondent and acceptance of votes cast by impersonation coming under S.100(1) (d) (iii) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and (2) Corrupt practices under S.123 (2) and (3) coming within the purview of S.100(1)(b). 3. Allegations coming under the first count are (1) persons designated in the list as counting staff were partisans of the U. D. F. who were biased against the petitioner and in spite of the protest made by the petitioner on 16-3-1987 no action was taken by the District Collector to remove them (2) there was insufficiency of space in the counting hall and sorting and counting were in a hurry. Conscious and unconscious incorrect sortings were resorted to especially in table Nos. 1, 4,13 and 14 and the objections raised by the polling agents of the petitioner were not considered. In bundling also there were irregularities (3) returning officer rejected several valid votes as invalid overruling the protest of the petitioner that they were valid votes in his favour (4) several votes in favour of the first respondent were cast by impersonation and (5) request for recount was improperly rejected. Under the second head the allegations are (1) undue influence by the I.U.M.L. leaders and Muslim religious leaders characterising the election as Jehad', a fight for religious survival, by making inflammatory speeches warning the Muslim voters about danger to religion and appeals by them to the voters to exercise their franchise in favour of the first respondent and against the petitioner in the name of religion. Five specific instances of such speeches were pointed out stating that all of them were in mosques. The first three instances were said to be in the presence of the first respondent and the other two in the presence of his election agent Shri. Kottara Vasudev. The general allegation is that these speeches were at the instance of and with the consent of the first resplendent or his election agent for furthering prospects of his election. Threat of excommunication was also alleged. 4. First respondent by way of preliminary objection wanted the pleading in the petition to be struck off under 0.6 R.16 and the petition itself rejected under 0.7 R.11 for the reason that the averments in the petition do not disclose any cause of action at all. The matter was heard at length. 5. An overall picture of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act (for short the 'Act) and the Rules is necessary to consider the objection in its proper perspective. As provided in S.81 an election petition could be filed only on any one or more of the grounds specified in S.100(1) or 101 which include corrupt practices and ether items. Corrupt practices are defined in S.123. Pleadings are governed by S.83 which makes it obligatory that the petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and when any corrupt practice is alleged the petition shall set forth its full particulars including as full a statement as possible of the names of the perms alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of commission of each such practice. Though the omission to comply with S.83 is not made a ground under S.86 for dismissal of the petition, the powers of the court to strike out pleadings under 0.6 R.16 and reject the petition under 0.7 R.11 C. P. C. is always there in view of S.87 which makes the provisions of C. P. C. applicable as nearly as may be subject to the provisions of the Act and any of the Rules. Therefore the primary question to be decided is whether the petitioner complied with the provisions of S.83 and if not whether the petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold. 6. Therefore the primary question to be decided is whether the petitioner complied with the provisions of S.83 and if not whether the petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold. 6. Right to elect, right to be elected and the right to dispute an election are net fundamental rights, common law rights or rights in equity. They are pure and simple statutory rights under the Representation of the People Act and the Statutory Rules framed thereunder and will have to be exercised only within the limits of the four walls of the provisions and not beyond that. An election petition is a statutory proceedings involving a special jurisdiction which has always to be exercised only in accordance with the statute creating it. in the trial of election petitions the court is put in a straight jacket. There can be no election to the Parliament or State Legislatures and there can be no challenge to such an election except within different previsions of the Act and Rules right from the process commencing from the issuance of the notification upto the final resolution of the dispute. 7. The Act is a complete and self contained Code in itself. Superintendence, direction and control of the process of election right from the preparation of the electoral rolls including everything in relation to the conduct of election is entrusted with the Election Commission with sufficient checks and balances at all stages. The provisions are rather foolproof. From the stage of preparation of electoral rolls there are provisions for rectifications. Devices are there to complain and get rectified irregularities or illegalities during the election campaign. Sufficient participation is given to the candidates, their election agents and polling agents during the poll in order to enable them to point out and prevent malpractices. Such safeguards are there during counting also. These safeguards are made to ensure that every process on election including declaration of results is foolproof. If, even after being provided with all these safeguards, a person wants to challenge an election he will have to strictly confirm to the letter of the law in regard to the procedure laid down in the Act end Rules (See AIR 1982 SC 983 and AIR 1983 SC 1311). 8. Any interference with the election results is likely to inhibit the returned candidate in the discharge of his duties towards the nation and destabilise the elected Government. 8. Any interference with the election results is likely to inhibit the returned candidate in the discharge of his duties towards the nation and destabilise the elected Government. The sword of Damocles will be hanging ever the head of the elected candidate so long as the election petition is pending. In a democratic set up election is the mechanism to echo the will and wishes of the people as to who should govern them. Judicial scrutiny and control of the election results is poised in achieving two ends. First is to ascertain the true will of the people reflected in the results and the second is to secure that persons who are eligible and qualified under the constitution alone obtain representation. in older to ascertain the true will of the people courts will always step in and safeguard purity of elections. If corrupt practices have influenced the result or the electorate had been defrauded, deceived or compelled on any essential matter, the will recorded in the votes will not be taken as the 'free' or 'true' will exercised intelligibly by deliberate choice. At the same time courts will always be slow to set at caught the will of the people exercised in an election (1986 Supp. S.C.C. 315). 9. Election petitions will have to be considered in these backgrounds. Whether it be the defeated candidate or an elector who files the petition, the Act and Rules enables him to equip himself with all the accurate informations and supporting records to challenge an election. He will have to approach the court with specific allegations supported by all material facts and whenever there is an allegation of corrupt practice with full particulars also. 10. All primary facts to be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or deforce are material facts. Material facts would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the particular cause of action the party is bound to establish before court in order to succeed in that cause of action. Under S.83(1) (a) in any election petition all the material facts are to be alleged. Failure to allege even a single material fact will render the cause of action incomplete and render the pleadings in respect of that cause of action liable to be struck off under 0.6 R.16. Under S.83(1) (a) in any election petition all the material facts are to be alleged. Failure to allege even a single material fact will render the cause of action incomplete and render the pleadings in respect of that cause of action liable to be struck off under 0.6 R.16. If the election petition is based on such incomplete causes of action alone and if no other triable issue remains after the pleadings are thus struck off, the entire petition itself will be liable to be rejected under 0.7 R.11(a) as not disclosing a cause of action (See AIR 1987 S.C.1577) even at the threshold or at any later stage. 11. As distinguished from material facts under S.83(1)(a) particulars under S.83(1)(b) are details of the case set up by the party. Material particulars would mean all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the material facts already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the requirements of clause(a). 'Particulars' serve the purpose of finishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn, in order to make it full, more detailed and more informative. When undue influence in the form of threat is alleged, the place where the threat was alleged, the kind and nature of injury threatened, or injury, if any, actually caused, the particulars of the parentage, address etc. of the persons who exercised the threat, or who were threatened, that the person who was threatened was an elector, and how the threat constituted an interference with the free exercise of his electoral right are all material particulars to be alleged in order to maintain the cause of action (AIR 1983 S.C.1311). 12. S.83 (1) envisages a distinction between clauses (a) and (b). Material facts in clause (a) corresponds to 0.6 Rule (2) C.P.C. while clause (b) is analogous to 0.6 R.4 and 6. Different consequences may flow from deficiency of material facts or particulars, Both clauses (a) and (b) of S.83(1) are mandatory. While omission of a material fact entails the cause of action incomplete and renders it liable to be struck off, deficiency of material particulars, according to the discretion of court and subject to limitation, could be allowed to be supplemented. But as held in Manubhal v. Popatlal reported in AIR 1969 S.C. 734 evidence cannot be allowed to be given in respect of a charge not disclosed in the material particulars. But as held in Manubhal v. Popatlal reported in AIR 1969 S.C. 734 evidence cannot be allowed to be given in respect of a charge not disclosed in the material particulars. 13. S.N. Balakrishna v. Fernandez reported in AIR 1969 S.C.1201 has laid down that "material" indicates that facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated and under S.83(1)(b) the fullest possible particulars are necessary. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. Though material facts and particulars are distinct there may be overlapping. So far as corrupt practices are concerned the material facts will show grounds or corrupt practices whereas particulars will give the necessary information to present a full picture of the cause of action. Depending upon the particular head of the corrupt practice coming under the various provisions of S.123 full particulars required are those judged by the standards laid down in AIR 1983 SC 1311. 14. Here the corrupt practices alleged are those coming under S.123(2) and (3). In this case what is alleged under S.123(3) is an appeal to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of religion. The appeal must be by the candidate or his election agent. If it is by any other person it must be specifically alleged and proved to be by the consent of the candidate or his election agent. Here the alleged appeal is by "any other person" and there is no allegation with material facts or supported by full particulars that it was with the consent of the candidate or the election agent. That apart what AIR 1969 S.C. 851 and AIR 1984 Delhi 198 lays down is that the appeal to vote or refrain from voting for any person must be on the ground of his religion etc. which means the religion of the candidate. Here both the candidates are Non-Muslims (Hindus) and the allegation is that Indian Union Muslim League leaders and Muslim religious leaders mads the appeals on the basis of Muslim religion. There is no allegation as between the petitioner and the first respondent that the appeal was to prefer the first respondent on the ground that he is a real religious Hindu whereas the petitioner is not. There is no allegation as between the petitioner and the first respondent that the appeal was to prefer the first respondent on the ground that he is a real religious Hindu whereas the petitioner is not. On this basis the allegation under S.123 (3) was not seriously pressed before me and therefore that pare of the allegation will have to be struck off under Older 6 R.16. 15. Then the allegation of corrupt practice is confined to S.123(2). Five instances of offensive speeches are mads mention of in the petition. Three of them are said to be by Muslim leaders is the presence of the first respondent and two speeches are alleged to be by Moulavis in the presence of one Kottara Vasudev, the election agent of the petitioner. First respondent contended that Kottara Vasudev is not his election agent and petitioner now concedes this contention to be correct. If so the consent of the first respondent, even on the allegations, will arise only regarding the first three meetings. In support of the allegation of consent, barring the bald allegation of the presence of the first respondent, the only other alligation is that the speeches were "at the instance and with the consent of the first respondent or his election agent for furthering the prospects of the first respondent in the instant election " Except, stating that they characterised the election as Jehad', a fight for religious survival, made inflammatory speeches warning the Muslim voters about the danger to the religion and that if any Muslim did not do his utmost to defeat the L.D.F. he will not be considered as a Muslim, shouted "Allah no Akbar" and some leading members embraced the first respondent, no other details were given. The text of the speeches were not given. How the speeches interfered with the free exercise of any electoral right is not stated. The identity of the electors were not divulged. How, in what manner, when and to wham the consent was given by the first respondent is not stated. How the presence of the first respondent in the meetings could be taken as indicative of consent for the speeches is also not indicated. While pleading "consent" vaguely and ominously, except saying 'either or' the vague consent itself is not specifically attributed to anybody. 16. How the presence of the first respondent in the meetings could be taken as indicative of consent for the speeches is also not indicated. While pleading "consent" vaguely and ominously, except saying 'either or' the vague consent itself is not specifically attributed to anybody. 16. As held in Ram Autar Shastri v. Khurshid Alam Khan reported in AIR 1987 Allahabad 279 for a corrupt practice coming under S.100(1)(b) consent of the candidate is of vital importance. Consent is the life line to link up the candidate with the corrupt practice to which otherwise he has no connection. Consent is not a matter of better particulars, but a material fact itself and as such indispensable part of the cause of action. Therefore regarding consent better particulars cannot be inserted by amendment. Consent and its details will have to be set forth in the petition with all particulars. A mere recital of the statutory provisions of S.100 or 123 will not suffice. Without the details of consent there is no cause of action. 17. Undue influence under S.123 (2) includes undue influence under S.171C, I.P.C. and the two provisos to S.123 (2) of the Act take in threat with injury of any kind including social ostracism or excommunication or expulsion from any caste or community or inducement or attempt to make believe that he will be rendered the object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure. But there is no bar to a candidate or his supporters appealing to the electors not to vote for a party in the name of religion (Kanti Prasad v. Purshottamdas reported in AIR 1969 SC. 851). Canvassing in favour of a candidate against another is as much important as the right to vote. Something more than canvassing is required to make it a corrupt practice. It must be a tyranny over the mind (AIR 1984 SC. 309). Corrupt practice under S.123(2) is committed only if the speech is calculated to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right and to leave no choice to the electors in the matter. Effect of the speech is not material (AIR 1969 SC. 734). It is also now well settled that when corrupt practice alleged under S.123 (2) is in the form of speech the exact words of the offensive speech will have to be alleged. 18. Effect of the speech is not material (AIR 1969 SC. 734). It is also now well settled that when corrupt practice alleged under S.123 (2) is in the form of speech the exact words of the offensive speech will have to be alleged. 18. Consent of the candidate or his election agent is a matter which has to be specifically alleged with the fullest details and proved. When the consent was given, to whom it was given, in what manner and in whose presence etc. are matters ie be alleged so that the returned candidate whose election is challenged on that ground could get an effective opportunity of understanding the case and meeting the same: Dhortipakar v. Rajiv Gandhi reported in AIR 1987 SC. 1577, Azhar Jussain v. Rajiv Gandhi reported in 1986 (Supp.) S.C.C. 315 and a boast of earlier Supreme Court decisions have laid down the law like that. A bald omnibus statement "in the presence and with the consent of the candidate or his election agent" will not serve the purpose of law. On the basis of such allegation alone the petitioner cannot be allowed at the stage of evidence to give further shape to his plea and let in evidence. On the basis of the present allegation what be can prove is only that when the speeches were made first respondent was present. Since details of cement were not given, proof cannot be had in that respect. 19. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the plea of presence and subsequent embracing g alone could be taken as circumstances from which an inference of consent is possible. In support of that argument be relied on the decisions in AIR 1971 SC. 267, Janak Sinha v. Mahant Ram Kishore Das (AIR 1972 SC. 359) end A. S. Singh v. M. M. and Giri and others (1969 (3) S C.C. 492). Those are cases in which material facts, full particulars and evidence in support of those allegations were available for the inference of consent. The first was a case in which prior knowledge of the contents of the publication, knowledge that it is likely to be published, deliberate silence and refusal to prevent the same when prevention was within his power and refusal to repudiate after publication were matters alleged and proved. The first was a case in which prior knowledge of the contents of the publication, knowledge that it is likely to be published, deliberate silence and refusal to prevent the same when prevention was within his power and refusal to repudiate after publication were matters alleged and proved. The second was a case in which the candidate was voluntarily present in the company which exercised undue influence, made appeal in the name of caste and distributed objectionable pamphlets without any objection or making any attempt to stop. These facts were alleged and proved and they were accepted. The last case is also identical. Here the mere allegations are only the general words "presence and consent" of the candidate or his election agent." The agent has already gone out of the picture. In the presence of the candidate somebody else may make objectionable speeches not consented to by the candidate. Presence nerd not always cause an inference of consent. If there are circumstances from which an inference of consent is possible by the mere presence, those circumstances are also material facts or full particulars to be alleged and proved for establishing consent. Mere allegation that the candidate was embraced by somebody will not automatically raise a presumption of consent on his part. There is no allegation that the first respondent either encouraged or ratified or approved or did cot oppose. On a material fact the petitioner cannot request the court to make an inference without supporting pleading. When pleading is absent proof is also not possible. Without the objectionable portions of the speeches being made available proof in that respect is also not possible. 20. When there is an allegation of corrupt practice the proviso to S.83(1) requires an affidavit in form No. 25 in support of the allegation of corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. The affidavit filed does cot support the allegations of corrupt practice or the particulars thereof in full. In compliance of the provisions of R.74 of the Kerala High Court Rules the father's name, age or place of abode of the deponent are not stated. Which pares of the petition or affidavit is from knowledge and which paras are from information or belief or what is the source of information, knowledge or belief are not stated in the verification. R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules and form 25 were not complied with. Which pares of the petition or affidavit is from knowledge and which paras are from information or belief or what is the source of information, knowledge or belief are not stated in the verification. R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules and form 25 were not complied with. AIR 1974 S.C. 1957 has specifically laid down that the deponent must set out which statements are true to his knowledge and which are true to his information and the source of grounds of information are also required to be stated. Importance of the verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of the allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for them. Non-disclosure of the grounds or sources of information will indicate that the petitioner did net come forward with sources of information at the first opportunity. Necessity of grounds and sources is also to give the other side notice of contemporaneous evidence on which the election petition is based. It is also necessary to avoid future manipulations by evidence on the basis of vague and flexible allegations. So far as this case is concerned Schedule and affidavit are not exactly in accordance with the petition. In the schedule and affidavit what is stated is that first respondent and his election agent committed the corrupt practices, but in the petition the allegation ie that corrupt practices were by others with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. Here the annexure and Schedule do not contain evidence. They also relate to material facts and full particulars of the allegations including the corrupt practices and therefore an integral part of the petition requiring proper verification and containing material facts and full particulars. Importance of verification has been considered in AIR 1970 S.C. 652 also and it was laid down that verification is required to enable the court to find out whether it will be safe to act on such affidavit evidence. In the absence of proper verification affidavits cannot be admitted in evidence. 21. Defect in verification may be a curable defect. Se also it may be that annexures and schedules containing evidence alone and not the material facts or full particulars supporting the allegations in the petition need net be verified. But till the verification is amended the defect continues. In the absence of proper verification affidavits cannot be admitted in evidence. 21. Defect in verification may be a curable defect. Se also it may be that annexures and schedules containing evidence alone and not the material facts or full particulars supporting the allegations in the petition need net be verified. But till the verification is amended the defect continues. In fact C.M.P. 23032 of 1987 was filed for amendment and the only prayer therein is to add an affirmation in Annexure I of the truth of the facts stated therein. That will not solve the issue. That prayer itself is defective for want of the particular amendment sought for. Further the schedule and affidavit are not sought to be amended. Even if sought to be amended the basic defects in filing the petition cannot be amended. Material facts omitted in the petition, schedule, affidavit or annexure cannot be supplied by amendment. It follows that material facts and full particulars in respect of the corrupt practices are not alleged and hence the petition is defective for non-compliance of the mandate of S.83. 22. Then what remains is only the allegations coming under S.100(1)(d)(iii) contained in paras 4 to 7 of the petition summarised in paras 2 and 3 supra. Except 30 instances of alleged impersonation all the other allegations are as vague as anything. The material facts constituting the cause of action en the basis of these allegations are not there. The names of the counting staff and details of their political affinity or partisan nature were not given. The general bald statement is only that the counting staff were partisans of the U.D.F. and biased towards the petitioner. A copy of the petition alleged to have been filed on 16-3-1987 was not produced and its contents were net stated. Allegation regarding insufficiency of space in the counting hall and consequent difficulties experienced by the counting agents is too vague and general and is also barred by the provisions of the Act and Rules. A copy of the petition alleged to have been filed on 16-3-1987 was not produced and its contents were net stated. Allegation regarding insufficiency of space in the counting hall and consequent difficulties experienced by the counting agents is too vague and general and is also barred by the provisions of the Act and Rules. The names of the counting agents who made the complaints regarding sorting or counting, the specific nature of the complaints, the names of the counting staff against whom the complaints were made, the identity of the ballot boxes which contained she miscounted or missorted ballot papers, the specific compartments to which the missorted ballot papers were put, the identity of the bundle in which more than 50 or less or less than 50 votes were bundled or the number of the outsorted or miscounted votes were not given. No details of the valid votes alleged to have been rejected by the returning officer overruling the protest were given. Except the booth numbers given in Annexure I there is nothing alleged in the petition specifically that the 30 persons were impersonated by somebody else in exercising franchise. The whereabouts of the 30 persons mentioned is Annexure I were not given in the petition, schedule or Annexure except a vague statement in the petition that several votes were cast by impersonation and they were in several States in Gulf. Details of the recounting application were also not given and the application or order not produced. It is evident that since the difference is only 59 the petitioner wants a fishing and roving enquiry for a recount. Though it is stated that enquiry revealed the identity of the persons impersonated, no details regarding the enquiry were given. The schedule, Annexure and affidavit were not verified at all and the verification in the petition is improper. 23. S.46 and 47 of the Act provides for appointment of polling and counting agents. Agents so appointed will be familiar with the election process and conversant with the persons of the locality. R.35 provides for identification of electors and R.36 authorises the colling agent to challenge identity of voters. No such challenge was made. Polling agents of the petitioner in different booths will be having electoral rolls in which they may be marking the names of persons who voted. R.35 provides for identification of electors and R.36 authorises the colling agent to challenge identity of voters. No such challenge was made. Polling agents of the petitioner in different booths will be having electoral rolls in which they may be marking the names of persons who voted. These rolls could have been produced as material facts in support of the allegation that the 300 persons mentioned in Annexure I voted. 24. In a case of rejection of ballot papers the candidate, his election agent or counting agent will be getting an opportunity of noting the serial number of (he ballot paper so rejected. A prayer for inspection or recounting on that score must be supported by the serial number of the ballot paper improperly rejected and the polling station. They are material facts without which such a cause of action cannot stand (AIR 1984 Delhi 198 and AIR 1970 S. C. 276). The basic requirements to be satisfied before permitting inspection of ballot papers are (1) that there must be adequate statement of material facts and (2) the court must be prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and do complete justice between the parties, inspection of ballot papers is necessary. When allegations are made regarding rejection of valid votes or acceptance of invalid votes, the same must not be considered as an adequate statement of material facts when the petitioner has not disclosed the basis on which he arrived at those conclusions or figures. Bald assertion will not be sufficient. In order to obtain a recount of votes a proper foundation is required to be laid by the election petitioner indicating the precise materials on the basis of which it could be urged by him with some substance that there has been either improper reception of invalid votes in favour of the elected candidate or improper rejection of votes in favour of the defeated candidate or wrong counting of votes in favour of the elected candidate which in reality had been cast in favour of the defeated candidate. When such materials are not placed and discrepancies are insignificant it is not a case for recounting of votes (AIR 1984 S. C. 654). Recount cannot be had on the possibility of there being an error. The fact that margin is very narrow may be an important factor. But that by itself is no reason for recount. When such materials are not placed and discrepancies are insignificant it is not a case for recounting of votes (AIR 1984 S. C. 654). Recount cannot be had on the possibility of there being an error. The fact that margin is very narrow may be an important factor. But that by itself is no reason for recount. Irregularity or illegality in counting must be established by basic facts. Mere allegation of suspicions is also not sufficient (AIR 1975 S. C. 283). 25. Importance of secrecy of ballot cannot be ignored. Statutory rules are intended to provide adequate safeguards for examination of validity or invalidity of votes and for their proper counting. The defeated candidate must have bad ample opportunities to examine the voting papers before they are counted. In cases of objections raised and overruled, he knows precisely the nature of objections and voting papers to which they related. Without all these details he cannot be allowed to have a roving enquiry (AIR 1966 S.C.773). 26. Though 0.11 C. P. C. may not be strictly applicable regarding discovery and inspection, the returning officer not being a party to an election petition, the court can call upon the returning officer, to appropriate cases where the interest of justice demands it, to produce ballot papers and may permit inspection by the parties before it of the ballot papers. That power is clearly implicit in S.100(1)(d)(iii), 101 and 102 of the Act and R.93 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. But that should always be subject to the secrecy of ballot papers prescribed by S.94 and 128(1) and the principles mentioned above (AIR 1964 SC 1249) 27. Judged in the background of these principles, the allegations in the petition appears to me to be as attempt to have a roving enquiry to fish out materials when the petitioner is having nothing substantial in hand. Even taking for granted that there is substance is the allegation of impersonation in 30 cases, such a ground is available only if it is shown that it has materially affected the result of the election in so far as the returned candidate is concerned. The margin is 59 and even if 30 is deducted still there is a margin of 29. That apart the allegations in paras 4 to 7 of the petition are lacking material facts and full particulars. The margin is 59 and even if 30 is deducted still there is a margin of 29. That apart the allegations in paras 4 to 7 of the petition are lacking material facts and full particulars. Such pleadings are unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious and may tend to prejudice or delay the trial. The court can and must strike out such pleadings. 28. Accordingly paras 4 to 7 of the election petition are struck out under 0.6 R.16 C. P. C. The other paras contain only general statement of facts and prayers without any material facts or particulars of any cause of action. Therefore the election petition itself is rejected under 0.7 R.11 C. P. C. as not disclosing any cause of action. The petitioner will pay the cost of the first respondent which I quantify at Rs. 1,500/-.