Judgment :- 1. As per the second proviso to S.11(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Court) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act'), when Rent Control Court records a finding that denial of landlord's title is bona fide, it is for the landlord to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court on any of the grounds mentioned in the Section. In this case, a Rent Control Court recorded a finding that denial of landlord's title is bona fide. The landlord, instead of filing a civil suit, preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority and got the aforesaid finding set aside. But the District Court, in revision, restored the finding of the Rent Control Court. This Original Petition is at the instance of the landlord under Art.227 of the Constitution, in challenge of the District Judge's order. 2. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are the following: The petitioner is the son of one Joseph who is the son of one Kurien. In 1960 the aforesaid Kurien settled his properties in favour of his children. As per the settlement deed, the tenanted building (together with the land appurtenant thereto) was set apart to the share of Joseph (petitioner's father). The settlement deed further provided that Mariamma (sister of Joseph) shall have the right to take profit from the said item of property during her life time. While so, the building was leased to this tenant in 1963 for which the tenant executed a rent deed in favour of Kurien and Mariamma. After the death of Kurien, while the tenancy arrangement was subsisting, Mariamma executed a relinquishment deed in favour of her brother Joseph, transferring all her rights to Joseph. Subsequently Joseph executed a gift deed in favour of his son, the present petitioner, transferring his rights in the building and the land appurtenant thereto. When the petitioner filed the application for eviction under S.11 of the Act, the tenant contended, inter alia, that Mariamma is not entitled to transfer her rights in the property and hence the deed of relinquishment is invalid in law, and therefore the petitioner did not get valid title over the property in question. The aforesaid contention was pressed into service as amounting to denial of landlord's title. 3. The aforesaid contention was pressed into service as amounting to denial of landlord's title. 3. The Rent Control Court and District Court, referring to S.6(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, took the view that Mariamma is not entitled to transfer her rights and hence the denial of title was held to be bona fide. The Appellate Authority on the other hand, took the view that neither S.6(d) nor S.6(dd) of the Transfer of Property Act could impose any hurdle on Mariamma's rights being transferred or relinquished. Further according to the Appellate Authority, the tenant who came into possession of the building pursuant to a lease created by Mariamma cannot subsequently question the title of the transferee of Mariamma. Appellate Authority further held that "at any rate such a contention cannot be accepted as a bonafide one". The aforesaid view of the Appellate Authority was found by the District Judge as unsustainable and hence the finding of the Rent Control Court was restored. 4. The second proviso to S.11(1) of the Act reads as follows: "Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded". The proviso is meant for a jurisdictional purpose. Intricate or vexed questions relating to title cannot normally be left to be decided by tribunals which are created for limited purposes. One of the legislative ideas in creating authorities like Rent Control Court and Accommodation Controller is to afford expedient remedies or reliefs to the tenants or landlords in relation to the buildings concerned. The said idea is adumbrated in S.24 of the Act which prescribes a time limit to pass final orders, subject to practical problems. R.11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 informs that the Rent Control Court need make only a brief note of the evidence adduced by parties and witnesses. The said idea is adumbrated in S.24 of the Act which prescribes a time limit to pass final orders, subject to practical problems. R.11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 informs that the Rent Control Court need make only a brief note of the evidence adduced by parties and witnesses. So the enquiry conducted by the Rent Control Court is expected to be only in a summary manner. It is far the said reasons that the legislature wanted such vexed and intricate questions of title to be determined by the Civil Court in the regular manner. But no tenant should be allowed to compel a landlord to resort to civil suit just because the tenant denied the title of the landlord. This court in Vasudevan Namboodri v. Omana Amma (1982 KLN 766) pointed out that a bare statement denying the title is not sufficient to attract the proviso. As per the said proviso, power is given to the Rent Control Court to decide about its own jurisdiction when a tenant denies landlord's title. Such power can be discerned from the words "the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial of claim is bona fide". Thus, Rent Control Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the denial of title is bona fide. Further exercise of Rent Control Court's jurisdiction depends upon the result of the exercise of its initial jurisdiction. What is the outline of the scope of Rent Control Court's initial jurisdiction, when a tenant denies the title of the landlord? 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contended that if the Rent Control Court is satisfied that the denial is made honestly, and not with the oblique idea to protract the dispute, the Rent Control Court has to record a finding. "Bona fide" (or good faith) is a familiar term in legal parlance. Honesty, of course is one of the attributes of good faith, but that is not enough. In certain contexts that which is done with due care and attention is said to have been done in good faith. But the ward "bona fide", when used in relation to jurisdictional permutations, has a wider import and a higher degree than the other two attributes. The aspect of bona fides in the context in which it is mentioned in the proviso may be referable to the state of mind of the tenant. But the ward "bona fide", when used in relation to jurisdictional permutations, has a wider import and a higher degree than the other two attributes. The aspect of bona fides in the context in which it is mentioned in the proviso may be referable to the state of mind of the tenant. But when a court has to come to a finding regarding such state of mind, there must be objective satisfaction for court that the tenant had that state of mind. The court, whose jurisdiction stands ousted on a finding that a certain plea or assertion made by a party is bona fide, must be in a position to hold that the plea is based on a very fair and reasonable supposition, In holding so, the court must have the satisfaction that there are strong or atleast substantial grounds or sufficient materials in support of the plea. The court must be in a position to say that the chances of the plea being upheld by the civil court are fairly on the higher side. Then alone the Rent Control Court is justified in finding that the denial of landlord's title is bona fide. In White v. Feast (Law Reports QB. Vol. VII 353) Cockburn, C. J. met the problem of deciding about summary jurisdiction of magistrates under a certain statute. When defendant set up a case of bona fide claim of right, his lordship observed that the defendant is not entitled to call upon such magistrates to hold their hands "unless he gives them sufficient evidence to convince them that he acted under a fair and reasonable supposition that he had aright to do the act, although he may have honestly believed that he was justified in doing the act". Lord Greene, M.R. in Re Welsh Brick Industries Ltd., (1946 All. ER Vol. 2-197) did not think that there is any difference between the words "bona fide disputed" and the wards "disputed on some substantial grounds". Lord Greene, M.R. in Re Welsh Brick Industries Ltd., (1946 All. ER Vol. 2-197) did not think that there is any difference between the words "bona fide disputed" and the wards "disputed on some substantial grounds". The observation was made in the background of a contention that a petitioning creditor had no locus standi, in winding up proceedings, to present a petition because his alleged debt was the subject of a bona fide dispute, and that the county court judge should have dismissed the petition on the ground that winding up proceedings are not the appropriate procedure for dealing with disputed debits The aforesaid observations lend support to the view which I take that there cannot be a finding that tenant's denial of title is bona fide unless the denial is based on a very fair and reasonable supposition of the plea on the strength of strong and substantial materials. 6. In this case, the fact that Mariamma had executed an instrument relinquishing all her rights in the property is admitted. It is the validity of that instrument which the tenant has now questioned. He is not competent to question the validity of such a transfer made by Mariamma in favour of another person. There is no dispute as between the transferor and the transferee. Mariamma does not now claim any right ever the property. If that be the position, it does not matter that a stranger challenges the deed of transfer. 7. That apart, there is no force in the contention that Mariamma is not entitled to relinquish her rights in the property. Clause (d) or Clause (dd) of S.6 of the Transfer of Property Act would not afford any help to invalidate the transfer made by Mariamma. S.6 empowers transfer of property of any kind, and Clauses (a) to (h) of the Section enumerate the kind of rights which cannot be so transferred as per the said provision. Clause (d) reeds thus: "An interest in property, restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally carrot be transferred by them." Clause (dd) says: "A right to future maintenance, in whatsoever manner arising, secured or determined cannot be transferred." The ownership of the building stood transferred to Joseph on the execution of the settlement deed. It cannot be said that what Joseph got as per the settlement deed was only a restricted interest in its enjoyment. It cannot be said that what Joseph got as per the settlement deed was only a restricted interest in its enjoyment. Perhaps the interest which Mariamma Led secured by the settlement deed can be termed as an interest restricted in its enjoyment personally. But ownership of the property was not transferred to her and hence Clause (d) has no application at all. What is questioned by the respondent is the transfer made by Mariamma in favour of Joseph and not the transfer made by Joseph in favour of the present petitioner. Nor would Clause (dd) apply because what was created in favour of Mariamma as per the settle men deed, was not the right to future maintenance. 8. The Appellate Authority has come to the right conclusion that there is no denial of the title of the landlord in this case, much less any bona fide denial. The District Court in reversing the said conclusion, has transgressed the jurisdictional limits by depriving the Rent Control Court of its powers to dispose of the application for eviction on merits. I therefore quash the order of the District Court and restore the judgment of the Appellate Authority I direct the Rent Control Court to proceed with the application for eviction under S.11 of the Act and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible. There is no orders as to costs. Issue photo copy on usual terms.