JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner was appointed as an Administrator of the Sahkari Sangh Limited, Biswar, Mathura by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies by virtue of the powers vested in the Registrar under section 29 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act')- THE petitioner has been replaced by another Administrator by an order of the Registrar dated 6-3-1987 in which order certain misconduct was also imputed to the petitioner. 2. SRI D.P.S. Chauhan appearing for the petitioner contends that the petitioner could not have been removed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, without following the procedure prescribed under Section 35 of the Act for the super-session or suspension of a Committee of Management. The argument is based on a reading of Section 29 (5) of the Act which runs as follows:- "The Administrator appointed by the Registrar under sub-section (4) shall, subject to any directions which the Registrar may from time to time give, have the power to perform all or any of the functions of the Committee of Management or of any officer of the society and shall be deemed for all purposes under this Act, the Rules and the bye laws of the society to be the Committee of Management." Sri D.P.S. Chauhan argues that once an Administrator is appointed under sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the Act, he shall be deemed to be the Committee of Management. From this, he argues that the Administrator is a Committee of Management which is superseded or suspended on charges of misconduct. It is the Committee of Management which is being removed and all the provisions of Section 35 of the Act which deal with the super-session or suspension of a Committee of Management, shall apply. 3. AN Administrator appointed under section 29 of the Act is appointed where the term of the office of the Committee of Management expires and a fresh election had not been held; where as an Administrator is appointed under section 35 of the Act when there are certain charges of misconduct against the Committee of Management which as a result of an enquiry, have been found to be substantiated. The Administrator appointed under the two sections, namely section 29 and section 35 of the Act, are appointed in different circumstances and for different purposes. The Administrator appointed under the two sections, namely section 29 and section 35 of the Act, are appointed in different circumstances and for different purposes. Merely from the fact that sub-section (5) of section 29 of the Act uses the phraseology "and shall be deemed for all purposes under this Act, the rules and the bye-laws of the Society to be Committee of Management" does not mean that an Administrator appointed under sub-section (4) of section 29 would be the Administrator under section 35 of the Act. This phraseology has been used to clothe the Administrator with a power of the Committee of the Management and does not make him the Committee of Management. 4. SECTION 29 (4) (b) of the Act vests in the Registrar a power to change an Administrator from time to time. In the present case, there has been an exercise of the power by the Registrar under section 29 (4) (b) of the Act and this power can be exercised from time to time. In the case of Saheb Singh v. Kashi Nath, 1986 ALJ 477, it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court, in paragrph 10, as follows:- "It is implicit in section 29 that the right, if any, acquired under the appointment to the office is subject to be determined by then Registrar. Such a precarious right is created from the very beginning. And if the right itself is determinable under the statute, there is really no interference with it. The Registrar has an undoubted power to change the Administrator from time to time. By the exercise of this power there is no interference with any right, including civil right, of an Administrator. Even if there be such an interference it is a necessary incidence to the exercise of the statutory power." 5. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that whenever there is a charge amounting to a misconduct as against an Administrator appointed under section 29 of the Act, the procedure prescribed under section 35 of the Act for dealing with the cases of misconduct by a Committee of Management, has to be followed. We are not prepared to accept this argument. A Committee of Management appointed under section 35 of the Act comes into being as a result of an elective process by the members of a Society. We are not prepared to accept this argument. A Committee of Management appointed under section 35 of the Act comes into being as a result of an elective process by the members of a Society. THE legislature has, therefore, thought it fit that before such a Committee of Management is superseded or suspended, there must be some enquiry or some sort of an adjudication. THE appointment of an Administrator deprives the members of a Society of their right to manage their own affairs. An administrator appointed under section 29 (4) of the Act after the expiry of the term of the Committee of Management, holds the post until the reconstitution of such Committee of Management in accordance with the provisions of the Act and he can be changed by the Registrar from time to time. There is no reason to deny the said power of the Registrar to change an Administrator from time to time. 6. THE power conferred on the Registrar under section 29 (4) of the Act is not restricted by the terms of the Statute. Sri D.P.S. Chauhan argues that while a statute may not impose any restriction on the powers of the Registrar to replace an Administrator from time to time, the limitation should be read in that power should be exercised reasonably. Unless malafides are shown to exist, an order of replacement of an Administrator cannot be challenged. Malafides certainly vitiates all exercise of powers. In this case, Sri D. P. S. Chauhan argues that the action of the Registrar is arbitrary. We see no reason to hold that the exercise of power is arbitrary. The Registrar was not satisfied with the work of the petitioner and thought it fit to replace him. He has done so. There is no right vested in the petitioner to continue as an Administrator. No rights of the petitioner has been violated by the impugned order. 7. WE find no merits in this petition, which is summarily dismissed.