Judgment :- 1. The petitioner filed an application before the Rent Control Court to set aside an ex parte order. That application was dismissed by the Rent Control Court on the ground that it was filed out of time and also on the ground that there was no sufficient cause to set aside the ex parte order. The petitioner filed an appeal, but the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal only on the ground that the application was out of time. The petition for revision filed under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act') was dismissed by the District Court as per Ext. P3 order. This Original Petition is under Art.227 of the Constitution challenging those orders. 2. Facts which are relevant in this Original Petition are the following: A landlord filed an application for eviction on the ground of subletting under S.11(4)(i) of the Act. The application was filed against three persons including this petitioner who is shown as second respondent. The first respondent in the said application was the tenant according to the landlord and the other respondents were the sub-tenants. Before the present petitioner entered his appearance in the Rent Control Court, the first respondent-tenant withdrew his contentions and hence the Rent Control Court passed an ex parte eviction order on 14-11-1980. The petitioner filed IA 3481/80 before the Rent Control Court on 17-12-1980 to have the ex parte order set aside. The said I. A. was filed on the averments, inter alia, that be was served with a copy of the order on 15-12-1980. It must be stated at this stage itself that there is no dispute that a copy of the order was served on this petitioner but there is dispute regarding the date of such service. According to the landlord, the copy of the order was served on the petitioner on 4-12-1980. The fact finding courts held that the copy of the order was served on the petitioner only on 5-12-1980. 3. According to the petitioner, he is entitled to file an application to set aside the ex parte order within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order and hence his application should have been found to be within time. He relies on sub-rule (3) of R.13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and 'Rent (Control) Rules, 1979 (for short'the Rules'). He relies on sub-rule (3) of R.13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and 'Rent (Control) Rules, 1979 (for short'the Rules'). The material portion of the said sub-rule reads thus: "In any case in which an order is passed ex parte, against a tenant or a landlord, the tenant or the landlord, as the case may be, may within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order, apply to the Accommodation Controller or the Rent Control Court, as the case may be, by whom the order was passed, for an order to set aside...". The main contentions were advanced on the basis of the said sub-rule. (1) As the petitioner is not a tenant, he is not entitled to have recourse to the said sub-rule. (2) As the petitioner is not in receipt of the order, he cannot claim fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order. 4. The word "tenant" is defined in S.2(6) of the Act. Tenant means "any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes ". The definition shows that any person by whom rent is payable for a building would come within the ambit of the word "tenant". A sub-tenant is also a person who pays rent to his landlord, though his landlord may be the tenant of the owner of the building. It may be, there is no privity of contract between the owner of the building and the sub-tenant. Even then, under law a sub-tenant is also a tenant, though for certain other purposes a sub-tenant has no protection or claim as against the original landlord. The Explanation given to the definition of "landlord" in S.2(3) of the Act makes the position further clear. That Explanation reads thus: "A tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant". What is deducible from the said Explanation is that a sub-tenant cannot be excluded from the purview of the definition of the word "tenant" in the Act. The outline of every definition clause is subject to contextual adaptations since the controlling words "unless the context otherwise requires" indicate. There is no reason to deny the benefit of R.13(3) to a sub-tenant as the context does not require a different treatment. 5. The outline of every definition clause is subject to contextual adaptations since the controlling words "unless the context otherwise requires" indicate. There is no reason to deny the benefit of R.13(3) to a sub-tenant as the context does not require a different treatment. 5. If the petitioner can make an application under the said sub-rule, his application would be within fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. But the sub-rule says that the period of fifteen days must be counted from the "date of receipt of the order". If the Rule is given a literal interpretation no tenant or landlord can possibly avail of the benefit of the Rule, for, the court would not deliver its order to the party, though it usually gives copies of the orders passed. Obviously, the draftsmanship of the Rule is unskillful. Hence the pragmatic interpretation of the expression will make it as "date of receipt of a copy of the order". If a landlord or tenant does not take steps to obtain a copy of the order even after getting knowledge about the passing of the order, period of fifteen days would start running from the date of knowledge of the order. In such cases the words "receipt of the order" would mean receipt of knowledge of the order. In this case the petitioner received a copy of the order on 5-12-1980 as found by the Appellate Authority. Hence I. A. 3481/80 filed by the petitioner cannot be dismissed as time barred. I therefore quash the orders of the Appellate and Revisional Authorities (Exts. P2 and P3). I direct the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal on merits and dispose it of afresh as expeditiously as possible and not later than two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Issue carbon copy on usual terms.