JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order of the Director, Land and Building Tax, Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated October 9, 1985 (Anx. 6) whereby he directed the Assistant Director, Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur to reassess the petitioners under Section 15-B, Rajasthan Lands and Building Tax Act, 1964 (here in after to be called as 'the Act') and also for quashing the order of the Assistant Director, dated March 20, 1985 (Anx. 5) refusing to refund the amount of tax deposited sarlier and his notice (Anx. 7) issued under Section 15-B of the Act. The facts of the case giving rise to this petition may be summarised thus.: The petitioners own Suresh Bhawan, 803 Chopasani Road. Jodhpur. The Assistant Director assessed it as one unit, valued at Rs. 837000/- and levied tax of Rs. 6370/-w e.f. April 1, 1979 by his order dated July 21, 1981. On appeal, the Deputy Director Urban Land Buildings Tax, Jodhpur, set aside the order dated July 21, 1981 and remanded the case with certain directions by his order dated October 20, 1982. After remands the Assistant Director held that the said building consists of five separate units and levied tax. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1, Smt. Kauahlya Devi moved an application for refund of the tax deposited earlier. The respondent No. 1 forwarded the application to the respondent No. 3 who, instead of passing order for the refund of the amount, directed him to assess the said property under Section 15-B of the Act by his letter dated October 6, 1985 (Anx. 6). In compliance thereof, notice (Anx. 7) was issued to all petitioners. The respondents admitted in their reply that the respondent No. 3 issued latter (Anx. 6) to the respondent No. 1, directing him to re-assess the said building under Section 15-B of the Act. It has also been stated in the reply that there was no question of refund of the exceas amount of tax deposited earlier when the case was remanded for the enquiry and directions were issued to the respondent No. 1 to move the respondent No. 2 for the review of his order in the light of the decision of the Revenue Board given in Ramesh Chand Hoda v. Assistant Director, Lands and Buildings Tax Ajmer, 1985 RRD 557 . It has also been stated that the writ petition is premature and the petitioners have an alternative remedy of filing objections before the Assistant Director (respondent No. 1) and appeals before the Deputy Director (respondent No. 2). 2. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that Section 15B of the Act permits an assessing authority to re-assess building or land if he has reason to believe that for any reason the land or building has escaped assessment or has been wrongly or incorrectly assessed. The assessing Authority, according to him, had no reason to believe. He himself did not apply his mind while issuing notice (Anx. 7) as he acted in pursuance of the direction (Anx. 6) of the respondent No. 3 and as such the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to proceed with the re-assessment of the said building under Section 15B of the Act. 3. In reply, the learned Deputy Government Advocate contended that the notice (Anx. 1) was issued under Section 15B of the Act by the respondent No. 1 after applying his mind and the respondent No. 3 being Head of Department, could issue the letter (Anx. 6) to the respondent No. 1. He also contended that the writ petition is premature and the assessee had alternative remedies by way of filing objections against the notice (Anx. 7) and also appeal against the re-assessment order. 4. The first question for consideration in this case is whether the notice (Anx. 7) has validly been issued to the petitioners by the respondent No. 1. Section 15B of the Act runs as under: "15B. land and Building Tax escaping assessment--If the Assessing Authority has reason to believe, that for any reason any land or building has escapted assessment or has been wrongly or incorrectly assessed, he may, within such period and after following such procedure as may be prescribed proceed to assess or re-assess such land or building and the provisions of this Act shall, as far as may be, apply to such assessment or re-assessment." It is clear from the above quoted provisions that the respondent No. 1 could proceed to re-assess the said building and for this purpose could issue notice (Anx. 7) if he had reason to believe that the building has been wrongly or incorrectly assessed. 7) if he had reason to believe that the building has been wrongly or incorrectly assessed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the Assessing Authority (respondent No. 1) had such a reason to believe. It may be mentioned here that the respondent No. 1 passed his order dated 12-8-1983 (Anx. 4) holding that the said building consisted of five separate units on the basis of the registered partition-deed and the attornment by the various tenants including schedule Bank in favour of individual petitioners. It is not disputed that the respondent No. 1 issued notice (Anx. 1) in compliance with the letter (Anx. 6) of the respondent No. 3. It runs as under: funs'kd] uxj Hkwfe ,oa Hkod dj] jktLFkku] t;iqj ,Q 4 ( 60 ) ys[kk@uHkwed@85@7237 t;iqj izsf"kr% lgk;d funs'kd] uxj Hkwfe ,oa Hkou dj] tks/kiqj fo"k; % izR;iZ.k Jherh dkS'kY;k nsoh ,oa vU; tks/kiqj lanHkZ % vkidk i= la[;k 565 fnukad 23&9&1985 vkids iz'ukafdr i= ds dze esa ys[k gS fd mDr ekeys esa jktLo e.My] vtesj dk ,ech0 ttesaV iwjh rjg ykxw gSaA pwWafd la;qDr fgUnw ifjokj dk foHkktu ugha gqvk gSA 2- vr% funsZ'k fn;s tkrs gSa fd ekeys dks /kkjk 15&ch esa lkjh lEifRr dk dj fu/kkZj.k fd;k tkosA layXu% ewy i=koyh gLrk{kj funs'kd It has been observed in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, ( AIR 1961 SC 372 ) para 39 of follows: "The dispute in the appeal relates merely to the fulfilment of the two branches of the first condition and that immediately raises the question about the import of the expression "has reason to believe" in Section 34(1)(a). The expression "reason to believe" postulates belief and the existence of reasons for that behalf. The belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely a pretence. The expression does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction of the Income Tax Officer; the form of decision as to the existence of reasons and the belief is not in the mind of the Income Tax Officer. If it be asserted that the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that income had been under-assessed by reason of failure to disclose fully and truly the facts material for assessment, the existence of the belief and the reasons for the belief, but not the sufficiency of the reasons, will be justiciable. If it be asserted that the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that income had been under-assessed by reason of failure to disclose fully and truly the facts material for assessment, the existence of the belief and the reasons for the belief, but not the sufficiency of the reasons, will be justiciable. The expression therefore predicates that the Income Tax Officer holds the belief induced by the existence of reasons for holding such belief. It contemplates existence of reasons on which the belief is founded, and not merely a belief in the existence of reasons inducing the belief; in other words the Income Tax Officer must on information at his disposal believe that income has been under-assessed by reason of failure fully and truly to disclose all material facts necessary for assessment. Such a belief, be it said, may not be based on mere suspicion; it must be founded upon information." 5. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It is clear that the notice (Anx. 7) was issued in compliance with the said letter (Anx. 6) of the respondent No. 3. The power exercisable under Section 15-B of the Act by the Assessing Authority is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power, he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone. There is no provision in the Act empowering the respondent No. 3 to issue such a direction as contained in his letter (Anx 6). He had no jurisdiction to issue such directions. After the order dated 20-18-1987 of the appellate authority (respondent No. 2), the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to proceed under Section 15B of the Act. It may be mentioned here that prior to issuing letter (Anx. 6), the respondent No. 3 issued letter (Anx. R/1) to the respondent No. 1 for moving the respondent No. 2 to review his order dated 20-10-1982 (Anx. 3) in the light of the decision of the Larger Bench of the Revenue Board given in Ramesh Chandra Hora v. Assistant Director, Lands and Buildings Tax, Ajmer 1985 RRD 557) . It was observed in Partabpur Co. v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar, ( AIR 1970 SC 1896 ) at Page 1901-1902, in paras 13, 14 and 15 as follows: 13. 3) in the light of the decision of the Larger Bench of the Revenue Board given in Ramesh Chandra Hora v. Assistant Director, Lands and Buildings Tax, Ajmer 1985 RRD 557) . It was observed in Partabpur Co. v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar, ( AIR 1970 SC 1896 ) at Page 1901-1902, in paras 13, 14 and 15 as follows: 13. "We have earlier seen that the Cane Commissioner was definitely of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed but the Chief Minister did not agree with that view. It is clear from the documents before us that the Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the reserved area into two portions and allot one portion to the 5th respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists 'Ka' and 'Kha'. Under the orders of the Chief Minister, the villages contained in list 'Ka' were allotted to the appellant and in list 'Kha' to the 5th respondent. The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister. It is true that the impugned orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. He merely obeyed the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Chagle that though the Cane Commissioner was intitially of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed, he changed his opinion after discussion with the Chief Minister. From the material before us, the only conclusion possible is that the Chief Minister imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner Under clause 6(1) is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone--not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister, an authority not recognised by Clause (6) read with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner. 14. In this case what has happened is that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister, an authority not recognised by Clause (6) read with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner. 14. The executive officers entrusted with statutory discretions may in some cases be obliged take into account considerations of public policy and in some context the policy of a Minister or the Government as a whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy but this will not absolve them from their duty to exercise their personal judjement in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for them to be given binding instructions by a superior. 15. In Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhanaas Bhanji, ( 1952 SCR 135 : AIR 1952 SC 16 this Court struck down the order purported have been passed by the Commissioner of Police in the exercise of his powers under the Bombay Police Act and the rules made there under as the order in question was, in fact, that of the Government. The rule laid down in that decision governs the question under consideration. This Court reiterated that rule in State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan Sharma, ( AIR 1966 SC 1081 ) . Therein this Court held that the State Government was not justified in assuming jurisdiction which had been conferred on the licensing authority by Section 5(1) and (2) of the Punjab Cinema (Regulation) Act. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the impugned orders are liable to be struck down as they were not made by the prescribed authority." 6. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case and the above authoritative observations, we have no hesitation to held that the notice (Anx. 7) is void and the respondent No. 1 had no authority to proceed to re-assess the said building. The writ petition deserves to be allowed. 7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The direction of the respondent No. 3 contaned in letter (Anx. 6) and the notice (Anx. 7) of the respondent No. 1 are quashed. The respondent No. 1 is directed to refund the amount of excess tax deposited earlier to the petitioner No. 1 within two months from today in accordance with law.\Petition allowed. *******