Judgment :- 1. During the mid summer vacation in 1987. District Judge. Tellicherry heard arguments in a Rent Control Revision petition and pronounced order. The main ground on which the said order is challenged in this Original Petition under Art.227 of the Constitution is that the order is null and void as the District judge has no jurisdiction to hear cases. or to pass orders. other than as a vacation judge. 2. A short resume of facts would be beneficial to appreciate the rival contentions. A landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant before the Rent Control Court on two different grounds under S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1965. One of the grounds is that the tenant has sublet the building without the consent of the landlord. The Rent Control Court granted an order of eviction on that ground. but the Appellate Authority reversed the finding and dismissed the petition. The aggrieved landlord filed a revision petition under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. When the case was posted for 8-4-1987 counsel for the tenant was not ready. but he submitted that the case can be posted during vacation. As the other side bad no objection to the aforesaid course. the revision was posted to a date during mid summer vacation. On 18-4-1987 arguments on both sides were heard and the District Judge pronounced the order on 25-4-1987 by allowing the revision and restoring the Rent Control Court's order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) urged two points. The first is that the District Judge erred in exercising his jurisdiction by interfering with the finding of the Appellate Authority that there was no subletting. The second is that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear cases during vacation and to pass orders. There is no merit in the first point urged as the District Judge has only acted within the limits of his revisional powers. Therefore. no disturbance of the order need be made under Art.227 of the Constitution. On the second point counsel on both sides addressed detailed arguments. Therefore. I proceed to consider those arguments. 4. Government appoint a District Judge in accordance with S.3(2) of the Kerala Civil Courts Act. 1956 (for short 'the Act'). for each District Court. Therefore. no disturbance of the order need be made under Art.227 of the Constitution. On the second point counsel on both sides addressed detailed arguments. Therefore. I proceed to consider those arguments. 4. Government appoint a District Judge in accordance with S.3(2) of the Kerala Civil Courts Act. 1956 (for short 'the Act'). for each District Court. Additional District Judges are appointed under S.4(1) of the Act and sub-section (2) empowers an Additional District Judge to discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge in respect of matters assigned to him by the District Judge. While discharging those functions. an Additional District Judge shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. S.19(1) of the Act provides that the High Court may permit the civil courts under its control to adjourn from time to time for periods not exceeding in the aggregate sixty days in each year". Sub-section(2) empowers the High Court to make provisional orders in all urgent matters. The said sub-section stands amended by Act 33 of 1986. The sub-section now stands reads thus: "(2) During the adjournment of a civil court the High Court shall nominate a District Judge for each District. who shall have the power to make provisional orders on all urgent matters and for such purpose. appeals. plaints and petitions and other matters which would ordinarily be presented to such civil court shall be received in the District Court and any such order shall. except on matters to be presented in the District Court itself. remain in force until such matter has been beard and decided by the court having jurisdiction and in the case of orders passed on matters to be presented in the District Court itself. such order shall be an order passed by a court having jurisdiction". A reading of the said sub-section shows the following features: (1) The provisional orders made by the nominated District Judge on all urgent matters shall remain in force until such matters had been beard and decided by the court having jurisdiction. (2) The provisional duration of such orders has no application "on matters to be presented in the District Court itself". (3) On matters to be presented in the District Court as such. orders can be passed by the District Court having jurisdiction. (2) The provisional duration of such orders has no application "on matters to be presented in the District Court itself". (3) On matters to be presented in the District Court as such. orders can be passed by the District Court having jurisdiction. It means when a nominated District Judge exercises jurisdiction in respect of matters which may be presented to him in his capacity as a District Judge. and not as a nominated District Judge. orders passed by him do not have jurisdictional impairment. and hence such orders are not subject to provisional duration. S.19(1) of the Act does not take away the jurisdiction of any civil court during recessess. It only empowers the High Court to permit a civil court to adjourn cases during such recess. The permission so granted only enables the civil court to adjourn the cases. If the civil court does not adjourn cases. but proceeds to bear and dispose of cases. such disposals cannot be said to be without jurisdiction in any view of the matter. But if any civil court disposes of cases without bearing arguments of the parties or the counsel concerned. such disposals may be liable to be interfered with on that ground in appeal or in revision. but not on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to pass orders during vacation. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited a decision in Kolavan v. Allu Acha Menon (ILR 1961 (Vol. II) 224) in support of his contention that a judge is empowered only to make provisional orders during vacation. That was a case where a vacation judge of the High Court passed an order of temporary injunction during a vacation. Referring to S.19(2) of the Act. as it then stood. a learned single judge of this Court pointed out that such an order is provisional and is to remain in force only until the matter has been beard and decided by the subordinate court concerned. The said decision has no application here because the impugned order was passed by the District Judge not in his capacity as a vacation judge. but as District Judge itself. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had stated a century ago that on a closed holiday a judge might properly decline to proceed with any inquiry. trial. or other matter on the civil side. but as District Judge itself. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had stated a century ago that on a closed holiday a judge might properly decline to proceed with any inquiry. trial. or other matter on the civil side. but in the event of any such inquiry having been proceeded with in the absence of any party or his counsel and without his consent be would be entitled to have the proceeding set aside as irregular. On the other hand. a party who. on a closed holiday. does attend and without protest takes part in a judicial proceeding. cannot afterwards successfully dispute the jurisdiction of the judge to hear and determine such matter. (Vide R.D. Chakarbati v. The Official Liquidator. ILR. 1887 (Vol. IX) Allahabad 366). A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkatesa Iyengar v. Kamalammal (1912 MLJ (Vol. XXII) 212) held that the judgment pronounced on a holiday is not on that account a nullity. The Division Bench observed: "S. 30 of the Madras Courts Act of 1873 merely gives permission to adjourn. and there is no prohibition of the doing of all work of a judicial character during the time when the court is adjourned". In a later decision of the Madras High Court in Sivaraj v. Sadasivam Pillai (1968 (1) MLJ 195) the validity of an order pronounced during the summer recess of the civil court was challenged. The order was passed by a Sub Judge who was not the vacation Judge. The Sub Judge beard an application for appointment of a Receiver on the last working day and pronounced the order during summer vacation. Repelling the contention of the counsel that the order has no legal sanction. Venkataraman. J. observed. that "the provision vesting jurisdiction in the Vacation Civil Judge is not. in my opinion. intended to take away the jurisdiction which previously the Subordinate Judge bad. to dispose of a matter which was properly pending before him if he was inclined to work during the vacation and if the parties raised no objection thereto". The trend of judicial decisions as could be understood from the above discussion. is that judicial work done by civil courts during vacation is not castigated merely for the reason that such work was done during vacation. The trend of judicial decisions as could be understood from the above discussion. is that judicial work done by civil courts during vacation is not castigated merely for the reason that such work was done during vacation. In this case counsel has no contention that he was not heard in the matter though he complained that he was compelled to argue the case. The impugned order shows that both sides were heard on 18-4-1987. Therefore. the order does not suffer from any jurisdictional deficiency. In the result. I dismiss this Original Petition. No costs.