JUDGMENT - G.D. KAMAT, J.:---This letters patent appeal by the landlady is against the order of single judge dated 12 April, 1984 rendered in Writ Petition No. 64 of 1983 challenging the validity of the order of the administrative Tribunal dated 10th March, 1983 in Eviction Appeal No. 24 of 1980 and the order of the Additional Rent Controller, South Goa, Margao, dated 30th September, 1980 in Case No. 53 of 1980. By the impugned order dated 12 April, 1984 in Writ Petition No. 64 of 1983 the two orders, one dated 10th March, 1983 made by Tribunal and the other of the Additional Rent Controller dated 30 September, 1980, whereby the tenant had been ordered to vacate the residential premises under his occupation and directed him to put the landlord in possession within 30 days were set aside. 2. The question posed in the Letters Patent Appeal turns on the interpretation of section 32 and section 22 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 hereinafter for brevity sake called the 'Rent Act'. For the purposes of appreciating the contention raised by Shri Dias, learned Counsel for the appellant -landlady, a few facts be stated. 3. The appellant filed proceedings for eviction of the tenant on 11th April, 1980 under section 22(2)(a) of the Rent Act for non-payment of the rents along with other grounds like damage to the premises and the nuisances. The respondent-tenant was served with the summons of these proceedings on 2nd May, 1980 which required him to attend the Court of the Additional Rent Controller on 5 June, 1980. However, on 5 June, 1980 nothing happened as the rent controller was not available and the matter stood posted for 10 July, 1980. On 10 July, 1980 the tenant presented his written statement which was taken on record and at the same time filed an application for deposit of the arrears of rent from November 1979 till the date of the filing of the application with a further prayer to allow him to continue to deposit the further rents till the culmination of the proceedings. 4. 4. On 14 July, 1980 the appellant-landlady moved an application praying therein to stop further proceedings averring therein that the tenant has no right to contest the proceedings as he has failed to pay arrears or deposit the same before the controller within 30 days from the date of service of the summons on him. Obviously this application was under section 32 of the Rent Act. On a notice of this application being given to the tenant, the tenant showed cause by his reply dated 1st September, 1980 bringing to the notice of the Rent Controller that he has already moved an application for deposit and so far no orders have been passed thereon with the result he was not able to deposit the arrears of rent. The Additional Rent Controller. However, on the same day, that is , 1st September, 1980 passed an order on tenant's application dated 10th July, 1980 permitting the tenant to deposit the arrears and recurring rents without prejudice to the right of the landlady and undisputably all the arrears of rent were deposited upto date on 6 September, 1980. 5. The appellant-landlady's application under section 32 for stop proceedings was thereafter taken up and an order was pass by the controller on 30 September, 1980 directing the tenant to vacate and hand over the possession of the promises to the appellant within one month thereof as the tenant had failed an neglected to deposit arrears within 30 days from the date of service of the summons of the proceedings on him. The Controller held that inasmuch as the tenant had been served with a notice of the proceedings of the eviction he ought to have moved an application for depositing the rents and ought to have deposited the rents within the prescribed time and in any case no sufficient cause was shown by the tenant for filing the application beyond the time prescribed. Being aggrieved by this order of the controller the tenant knocked the gates of the Administrative Tribunal in an appeal but however, that appeal was dismissed by the order of 10th March, 1983. 6. The tenant instituted the Writ Petition No. 64 of 1983 challenging these two orders. Being aggrieved by this order of the controller the tenant knocked the gates of the Administrative Tribunal in an appeal but however, that appeal was dismissed by the order of 10th March, 1983. 6. The tenant instituted the Writ Petition No. 64 of 1983 challenging these two orders. The petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge who by the Order dated 12th April, 1984 upset the two Orders of the Additional Controller and the Tribunal solely on one ground, namely, that once the Controller had allowed the respondent-tenant to file his written statement on 10th July, 1980 thereby permitting the tenant to contest proceedings, the stage for stopping the proceedings under sub-section (4) of section 32 of Rent Act is not available to the landlady. As a consequence of this order main proceedings against the tenant had to be decided by the Collector on its merits 7. What is challenge now by the landlady is her right to get the tenant evicted under sub-section (4) of section 32 of the Rent Act irrespective of the fact that the tenant had filled his written statement and the same was admitted and taken on a record on 10th July, 1980. The submission of Shri Dias, Counsel for the appellant, is that section 32 is all pervasive and applies at all the stages of the proceedings for eviction when pending until its culmination. He urges that section 32 can be invoked in every case of eviction on any of the grounds available under sections 22, 23 and 30 of the Rent Act and is an independent and distinct provision and comes into play only when a tenant want to contest the proceedings filed against him and that being so it enjoins upon the tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit not only arrears of rent but also the recurring rents falling due and payable until the termination of the proceedings. He further urges that the word 'contest' used in section 32 includes all the stages of the proceedings until finally adjudicated and viewed thus 'contest' will mean not merely filing of the written statement but also the cross-examination of the landlady and her witnesses, lending defences and final arguments on merits. He further urges that the word 'contest' used in section 32 includes all the stages of the proceedings until finally adjudicated and viewed thus 'contest' will mean not merely filing of the written statement but also the cross-examination of the landlady and her witnesses, lending defences and final arguments on merits. Secondly, according to him, sub-section (3) of section 22 operates on a different plan and covers a different field where the tenant wants to terminate the proceedings at its very inception and all that he has to do is to pay the arrears and cost irrespective of default or no default on his part, however, this provision is available only when eviction is sought on grounds of non-payment of rents and falling in arrears of rent under section 22(2)(a). 8. The learned Single Judge held that once the written statement is taken on record, the stage for not allowing the tenant to contest the proceedings goes off the board. In that he observed that when there is a failure on the part of the tenant to pay the arrears or deposit the same he is not permitted to contest the proceedings of eviction against him but, however, once the written statement is filed he is permitted to contest the proceedings and in this view of the matter he held that the appellant's application to stop proceedings under section 32(4) does not survive. What prevailed upon the learned single judge is that once the stage of section 22 sub-section (3) is crossed, the stage of filing written statement arises and when written statement is filed, that contest is over and the question of applicability of section 32(4) surpasses. 9. There is considerable merit in the submission of Shri Dias. In our view the learned Single Judge has clearly fallen in error in narrowly construing the word 'contest' appearing in sub-section (1) of section 32. To better appreciate the contentions, it may be advantageous to extract section 32 of the Rent Act which reads as under:- "32. 9. There is considerable merit in the submission of Shri Dias. In our view the learned Single Judge has clearly fallen in error in narrowly construing the word 'contest' appearing in sub-section (1) of section 32. To better appreciate the contentions, it may be advantageous to extract section 32 of the Rent Act which reads as under:- "32. payment or deposit of rent during pendency of proceedings for eviction.--- (1) No tenant against whom a proceeding for eviction has been instituted by a landlord under this Act shall be entitled to contest the proceeding before the Controller or any appellate or Revisional Authority or to prefer any appeal or revision under this Act, unless he had paid to landlord or deposits with the Controller or the appellate or Revisional Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the controller or the appellate or Revisional Authority (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) …………………………… (4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the controller or the appellate or Revisional Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. (5) ……………………………..". Taking section 32 as it is, it is clear to us that any proceedings for eviction of a tenant irrespective of whether it is under section 22 or under section 23 or under section 30 inasmuch as the proceedings are for eviction of the tenant the section must apply. Where the tenant desires to contest the proceedings filed against him for his eviction and in case he is in arrears of rent, a duty is cast on him to deposit not only the arrears of rent up to the date of the filing of the proceedings but further continue to deposit the rents till the proceedings are cultimated and/or pay and continue to pay the same to the landlord. Section 22 of the Rent Act provides for the otherwise abridged grounds for the eviction of the tenant by the landlord. Section 23 speaks of the right of the landlord to obtain possession from the tenant when the landlord himself requires the building for his own occupation or that of his family members. In addition section 30 also gives a ground in favour of the landlord to evict his tenant on the ground that the building is reasonably and bona fide required for carrying out the repairs, alterations and additions and when the building is bona fide required for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting a new building in its place, the right of the tenant to re-occupy notwithstanding. Therefore, when an eviction of the tenant is sought either on any of the grounds specified under section 22 or under sections 23 and/or 30, in the event the tenant is in arrears of rent, no sooner such proceedings are field against him, he is statutorily required to pay to the landlord or deposit before the controller all the arrears of rent and continue to pay or deposit the recurring rents till the cultimation of the proceedings under section 32 and that too in the case of arrears within 30 days from the date of the summons served on him and in cases of rent falling due during the pendency of the proceedings to pay the same in accordance with Rule 7 of the Goa, Daman, and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1969, that is to stay within 15 days from the date on which the rent becomes due and payable by him. On a true and proper reading of those section and the scheme of the Act it is explicit that it embraces all cases of eviction field against a tenant. A similar view had been already taken by the learned judicial Commissioner in the decision of (Leelali Javenbhai Mavany v. Smt. Maria e Bemvindada da Costa and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1973 Goa, Daman and Diu 41. In the case it was clearly held that it is the tenant's duty to deposit rent as envisaged under section 32 independent to the nature of the proceeding instituted by the landlord. In another decision of (Satchidananda S.S. Kakodkar v. Dr. In the case it was clearly held that it is the tenant's duty to deposit rent as envisaged under section 32 independent to the nature of the proceeding instituted by the landlord. In another decision of (Satchidananda S.S. Kakodkar v. Dr. Inacio Cruz doms Martires paes and others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1973 Goa, Daman and Diu 46 while answering a specific question raised that section 32 has no application when a proceeding is initiated by a landlord under section 30(2) of the Rent Act, it was rightly negatived by the learned Judicial Commissioner. 10. Section 22 of the Rent Act reads :- "22. Grounds of eviction.- (1) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the controller for a direction in that behalf. (2) If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied- (a) that the tenant is arrears in payment of rent due by him in respect of the building for a total period of three months and has failed to pay or tender such arrears of rent as are legally recoverable form him within thirty days of the receipt of or of the refusal of a registered notice served on him by the landlord for such arrears; or (b) that the tenant has without the written consent of the landlord- (i) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire building or any portion thereof, or (ii) used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased; or (c) that the tenant has committed such acts of damage as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building ; or (d) that the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conducts which are a nuisance to the occupiers of other portions of the same building or of buildings in the neighbourhood; (e) that the tenant of a dwelling house has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a residence; or (f) that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause; or (g) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide. the controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building; and if the controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application; (*). xx xx xx xx x (3) No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in Clause (a) of sub-section (2), if the tenant, within thirty days of the service of the summons of proceedings on him, pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits with the controller the arrears of rent due by him up to the date of such payment, tender or deposit together with the cost of application : Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any building he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that building for a total period of three months. (4) In any proceeding falling under Clause (a) of sub-section (2), if the Controller on an application made to it is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay, tender or deposit rent was not without reasonable cause, he may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) or in section 32 after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, give the tenant a reasonable time, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender the application shall be rejected." We will have seen that this section speaks of several grounds mentioned for the eviction of a tenant but, however, this section has been subjected to several constraints by itself. For instance no proceedings for eviction against a tenant would lie on grounds of non-payment of rent. Unless the tenant is in arrears of payment of rent due by him in respect of a building for a total period of three months and has failed to pay or tender such arrears of rent as are legally recoverable form him within 30 days of the receipt of or refusal of a registered notice served on him by the landlord for recovery of such arrears. The first constraint is that the notice of demand must be given by the landlord calling upon the tenant to pay the arrears of rent giving him 30 days time and it is only on failure of the tenant to comply with the demand that the proceedings can be initiated. The second constraint is that the tenant must be in arrears for a total period of three months. Sub-section (3) of section 22 gives a new lease of life to the tenant that if within 30 days of the service of summons on him he pays or tenders the landlords of deposits with the Controller the arrears of rent due by him up to date of such payment, tender or deposit together with the cost of application, then in the case no order for eviction of the tenant can arise and the proceedings come to an end with that. However it is available only once. Whereas under Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 22 a tenant is required to pay arrears of rent which are legally recoverable within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice served on him by the landlord, insofar as sub-section (3) of section 22 is concerned a duty is cast on the tenant to deposit all arrears of rent and not merely legally recoverable rent within 30 days from the service of the summons once the proceedings are instituted against him. This aspect of the matter is already decided in a letters patent appeal by this vary Bench vide Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1983. This Letters Patent Appeal also decided that the word 'legally recoverable' appearing in section 22(2)(a), cannot be telescoped in section 32 and that in order to contest the proceedings, the tenant has to deposit all the arrears of rent. 11. Coming to sub-section (4) of section 22 it must be held that this sub-section is entirely a distinct and separate provision in favour of the tenant to come before the controller at any time by an application saying that his default to pay and tender or deposit the rent was not without reasonable cause and that he is prepared to pay and tender the rents due on/or before such date as the Controller may fix and if such application is accepted by the Controller the proceedings for his eviction come to an end. Whereas in sub-section (3) of section 22 a limit of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the summons has been prescribed for a tenant to pay or deposit the arrears of rents together with the cost of the application, there is no such limit prescribed in sub-section (4) of section 22. The common feature of sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of section 22 is the acceptance of the position of being in arrears of rent but by their nature these two provisions are entirely different and operate on two different planes. Irrespective of whether the tenant is in default or not under sub-section (3) he merely indicates his willingness to deposit the rent and agrees to pay the cost and gets out of the eviction and the proceedings are terminated there and then only. But under sub-section (4) the tenant shows cause as to why his default should be condoned and it is for the controller in his judicial discretion to accept the cause shown by such tenant and reject the application of the landlord and the tenant is not even required to plead that he is paying the cost of the application. There is no time limit nor limit on number of application to be made sub-section (4), therefore, is entirely independent and again distinct from sub-section (3) of section 22. We accord with the view taken by a Bench of this Court in the decision of (Shaikh Ibrahim Shaikh Mohamed v. Joao Andrade e Souza)2, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 52 of 1983 decided on 5th December, 1984. In this case the tenant had made an application for deposit of arrears of rent and recurring rents. Later on applied for termination of the proceedings but, however that application filed to mention that he was agreeable to pay the cost secondly that application was filed beyond 30 days from the date of the service of the summons of the proceedings on him. The authorities did not grant relief to the tenant holding that it could not be held to be an application under sub-section (3) of section 22. The petitioner was ordered to be evicted on merits. The orders of the authorities were challenged in a writ petition which was dismissed in limine by a Single Judge. The authorities did not grant relief to the tenant holding that it could not be held to be an application under sub-section (3) of section 22. The petitioner was ordered to be evicted on merits. The orders of the authorities were challenged in a writ petition which was dismissed in limine by a Single Judge. Though his Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed on facts of the case, the letters patent bench held on interpretation of section 22 that firstly the purpose of deposit of arrears of rent under section 32 and under section 23(3) are quite distinct. Secondly it was held that sub-section (4) of section 22 and sub-section (3) of that section operate on different planes. It was so held because sub-section (4) of section 22 applies at any stage of the eviction proceedings notwithstanding sub-section (3) of section 22 or for that matter section 32 nor it sets out any time limit for making an application nor it prohibits filing of any number of applications. The arguments that sub-section (4) of section 22 would apply even to a defaulter in applying under sub-section (3) was rejected and it was clearly held that they are two independent sections. It is not possible to depart from this position. 12. What therefore emerges is that section 32 is independent of section 22. The same is to be invoked by the tenant in case he wants to contest the proceedings of eviction filed against him be that on any of the grounds under section 23 or under section 23 or 30. The beneficient facility provided to the tenant under sub-section (3) of section 22 is only available as against the ground spoken to under sub-section 22(2)(a) when invoked by the landlord and similar is the case to avail of the provision under section 22(4) but in two different circumstances. However in the former case the question of admitting fault or showing cause for default does not arise and in the latter case sufficient cause for default is required to be shown and there is no time limit prescribed. In any case, therefore, section 32 has no application at all. It, therefore, further transpires that section 22 is by itself a self contained code and affords added facility of protection against eviction sought on the ground of non-payment of rents and that too de hors section 32. In any case, therefore, section 32 has no application at all. It, therefore, further transpires that section 22 is by itself a self contained code and affords added facility of protection against eviction sought on the ground of non-payment of rents and that too de hors section 32. Section 22 therefore operates in the field created by itself and we, therefore, fully agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 52 of 1983. 13. We adverted to the above discussion with a view to better appreciate the controversy in this appeal. We also made reference to various decisions super referred to in order to show how different aspects of these two sections fell before the Court for consideration from time to time. Now coming to the main controversy that once the tenant is allowed to file his written statement and when permitted to deposit the rent, there is no longer default on the part of the tenant and the stage for stopping proceedings under section 32(4) does not arise cannot be accepted for every strong reasons. In this connection it must be seen that the right to file written statements or filing defences is not provided for under section 32 of the Rent Act. The right of the tenant to file his written statement or defend the proceedings is provided for by very sub-section (2) of section 22 for that sub-section reads :- "If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied…………" It is for the tenant to satisfy by showing cause against the application filed against him and showing cause can only mean filing the written statement or appropriate defence. All that section 32 mentions is that no tenant against whom proceeding for eviction has been instituted by a landlord under this Act shall be entitled to contest the proceedings before the controller or any appellate or Revisional Authority or to prefer any appeal or revision unless he has paid……… The word 'contest' here cannot be construed narrowly to hold merely filing a written statement or defences. The word 'contest' will have to be construed in a broad sense to mean every stage of the proceedings till its culmination. The word 'contest' will have to be construed in a broad sense to mean every stage of the proceedings till its culmination. For instances the word 'contest' would embrace in it filing of the written statement cross-examination of the landlord and his witnesses, leading defence evidence and arguments on merits before the final order is made by the controller. In our view if a restricted meaning is given to the word 'contest' to mean only filing of the written statement, it can bring about unforeseen difficulties in the way of the landlord and also undesirable results. 14. This section is envisaged by the legislature to protest the interests of the landlord to secure the rents from cantankerous tenants so that the landlord is not driven to file another proceeding for recovery of rents in another forum. 15. For instance in an eviction proceedings a tenant with a view to contest makes an application within 30 days of the date of service of summons on him and deposits the arrears and at some stage files his written statement and once having done that he thereafter refuses to pay or deposits the recurring rents due. Can he be permitted to say section 32(4) is not applicable as he has already filed the written statement and thereby permitted to contest the proceedings ? Obviously the answer is no having regard to the language and scheme of section 32. Therefore, the word 'contest' will have to be given its due meaning to include all the stages of the proceedings required to be taken by the contesting tenant till the proceedings are finally concluded. What therefore, applies to the proceedings before the controller would also apply before the appellate and also before the Revisional Authority and no tenant can be made to get away without depositing the arrears or recurring rents. In this view of the matter it is not possible to accept that once the tenant has filed his written statement and deposited the rents due, the stage of sub-section (4) of section surpasses. On the contrary it must be held that it is a statutory requirement on the part of a tenant to deposit if he is in arrears, within 30 days and continue to deposit the recurring rents due and payable until the proceedings are culminated. On the contrary it must be held that it is a statutory requirement on the part of a tenant to deposit if he is in arrears, within 30 days and continue to deposit the recurring rents due and payable until the proceedings are culminated. Equally a right is created in favour of the landlord to move the Controller or the appellate and or the revisional authority as the case may be by and application to stop further proceedings at any stage and obtain a direction to the tenant to put him in possession. This is, however, subject to tenant showing sufficient cause for not stopping further proceedings and in which case the authorities are given direction either to stop or not to stop the proceedings. 16. The stage of the option of the tenant to move the controller under section 23(3) within 30 days of the date of service of summons is for avoiding eviction and put an a end to the proceedings at its every inception. The tenant can equally apply at any time of the proceedings under section 22(4) by admitting his default and showing reasonable cause for such default. But in both the cases there is no theme of contesting the proceedings unlike section 32. The predominant vein in all the three sections is no doubt to secure the arrears of rents of the landlord, but at the same time added facilities to the tenant in different circumstances. Therefore, the stages spoken to in section 22 are entirely distinct from what is mentioned in section 32. 17. Now in the present case appellant-landlady though she succeeds on the main ground, it must be seen that the tenant on the first effective date of hearing on 10th July, 1980 moved an application for deposit of arreras of rents and in that he even mentioned that he is not in arrears of payment of rent for the month of November and December 1979. He further mentions that he had sent money order for the month of January 1980 but it was refused and for that matter even for the subsequent months. He was able to obtain an order for deposit only on 1st September, 1980. He further mentions that he had sent money order for the month of January 1980 but it was refused and for that matter even for the subsequent months. He was able to obtain an order for deposit only on 1st September, 1980. But it cab be again said in his favour that in that application he offered to deposit all the arrears of rent from November 1979 to February 1980 and in fact deposited them by challan issued to him by the Controller on 6th September, 1980 18. We have already held that section 22(4) applied at any stage of the proceedings, therefore, it is open to the respondent-tenant to move such application before the controller showing reasonable cause with regard to the default in payment of the rents. Section 22(4) enjoins upon the tenant to show the reasonable cause and if Controller is satisfied, the Controller can required the tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit in his Court all the amounts due up to the date and reject the application for eviction of the tenant. It is needless to mention that welfare statues must of necessity receive broad interpretation when legislation is designed to given relief, it is not open to the courts to run away from it by taking a stricter view of the matter. Judges ought to be more concerned with the context, colour and content of the statutes. The object of the Rent Act is to control eviction and thereby afford protection to the tenant. Section 22 was amended in 1976 to remove hardship that came in the way of the tenants. The amendment as contained in section 22(3) and 22(4) are designed to afford more and more chances to the tenant to stop his eviction. Viewed thus, the expression 'Reasonable cause' appearing in section 22(4) must be construed having regard to the object of the Act. While exercising discretion the Controller has to find out whether the tenant has defaulted for the first time or is it a persistent feature, whether it is bona fide or contumacious; whether it is done to harass the landlord or otherwise in short, what has to be found is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case there is reasonable cause for non-payment. 19. 19. It is true that the application dated 10th July, 1980 lacks specific prayer as required under section 22(4) but from the allegations made therein it is required to be found out whether there was reasonable cause on his part. In our view, therefore, taking all the facts and circumstances of the case, that application of the respondent-tenant could be treated as an application under section 22(4). We, therefore, direct the Rent Controller to decide this application and consider the facts disclosed and if necessary. Record evidence and decide whether there was reasonable cause on the part of the tenant not to pay the rents to the appellant-landlady. If the Controller accepts the application of the respondent-tenant then obviously the appellant-landlady cannot succeed on the ground under section 22(2)(a), in which case the Controller may proceed to decide the appellant-landlady's application for eviction on the ground of damage to the premises and nuisance. 20. For the reasons recorded above the impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated (12th April, 1983 in Writ Petition No. 64 of 1983)4 is set aside. But, however, we are not able to restore the orders of the Additional Rent Controller, South Goa, Margo, dated 30th September, 1980 in Case No. Building 53 of 1980 and the Administrative Tribunal dated 10th March, 1983 in Eviction Appeal No. 24 of 1980, in view of the direction that we have made for treating the tenant's application dated 10th July, 1980 as an application under section 22(4) subject to the aforesaid observations this appeal is accordingly partly allowed but, however, the parties are to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed partly. -----