K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is posted for orders. Having regard to the fact that it can be disposed of an a short point, by consent of learned Counsel appearing on both sides, it is treated as being on the list for hearing today, and heard for final disposal. ( 2 ) THIS appeal by the plaintiff is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 22-4-1978 passed by learned Civil judge, Uttara Kannada (Karwar) in R. A. No. 7 of 1977, reversing the judgment and decree dated 10-1-1977 passed by the learned Munsiff, Karwar in O. S. No. 22 of 1975. The respondents are defendants. The appellant in this judgment will be referred to as the plaintiff and the respondents as the defendants. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the case of the plaintiff, the suit schedule property is a shop premises forming part of the building bearing house No. 205/a of Boburwada village situated in Sy. No. 364/5. The original tenant was one Sri Mahableshwar ramachandra Shet. He died. Defendants 1 to 7 are the heirs of the original tenant-Mahableshwar Ramachandra Shet. Out of them, defendant-4 is using the premises for his sarafi business. Monthly rent of the premises is Rs. 10/. The tenancy was terminated by issuing a notice in accordance with law. ( 4 ) THE defendants contested the suit on various grounds. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues :-"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he requires the suit schedule premises and thus caused to issue legal notice ? 2. Whether the defendants prove that the provisions of Karnataka Rent control Act are applicable to the subject matter of this suit and hence, not maintainable in this form ? 3. Whether suit notice is legal and valid? 4. To what reliefs the parties are entitled ?"the trial court held issue No. 1 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff and issue No. 2 against the defendants. Accordingly, decreed the suit. ( 5 ) IN the appeal filed by the defendants, the learned Civil Judge has allowed the appeal mainly on the ground that the plaintiff has not terminated the tenancy in accordance with law. He has also held that the defendants being the l. Rs. of the Original tenant Mahable- shwar Ramachandra Shet have become the tenants of the suit property. He has also held that the defendants being the l. Rs. of the Original tenant Mahable- shwar Ramachandra Shet have become the tenants of the suit property. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the contentions urged the points that arise for consideration are :- r. 27 (1) Whether in view of the inclusion of R. S. No. 364/5 of Bobruwada village, wherein the suit property is situated, within the Municipal limits of Ankola, the provisions of the Karnataka Rent control Act 1961 are applicable without any further notification under Subsection (5) of Section 2 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. (ii) Whether the Judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate are sustainable. (iii) What Order. ( 7 ) IN this case, it is not necessary to decide the question as to whether the tenancy has been terminated in accordance with law, having regard to subsequent change in law. ( 8 ) POINT No. I :- It is brought to the notice of the Court by producing a copy of the Notification No. HUD TBL 77, dated 15-4-1985 published in the Karnataka Gazette (Extraordinary) Part IV-2c (ii) No 206 dated 17th April, 1985 issued under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 4 of the karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 including the village of Bobruwada and S. No. 364/5 of Bobruwada within the Municipal limits of Ankola. The court can take judicial notice of the Gazette Notification and rely upon it without further proof even though it is produced at the stage of second appeal having regard to the provisions contained in section 74, 78 and 81 of the Evidence Act. Schedule II of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been substituted by Karnataka Act 17 of 1983. According to Parts I and II of New schedule Il-Areas within the limits of cities under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act 1976 and the area within the radius of three Kilometers from the limits of the said cities, and areas within. the limits of City Municipalities, Town municipalities and Notified Areas constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, except the Notified Area Committee bhadravathi, are brought under the purview of parts IV and V of the Act. The other parts of Schedule 11 are not relevant for our purpose. The Karra?aka Act 17 of 1983 coma into force on 31-12-82. The other parts of Schedule 11 are not relevant for our purpose. The Karra?aka Act 17 of 1983 coma into force on 31-12-82. In addition to this, the Supreme Court in h. Shiva Rao v. Cecil a Pereira ( AIR 1987 sc 248 ) has held that the Act becomes applicable in respect of the area within the municipal limits included subsequent to the formation of the Municipality. Thus, with effect from 17th April 1985, the date on which Bobrawada village along with S. No. 364/5 was included in the municipal limits of Ankola, by the aforesaid Notification, the provisions of parts IV and V of the Act have become applicable to the areas so included within the Municipal limits. It is not in dispute that the R. S. No. 364/5 of Bobrawada village wherein the suit property is situated, is included within the municipal limits of Ankola. Once the area comes within the purview of Parts IV and V of the Act, the decree passed by a civil court for ejectment of the tenant becomes inexecutable in view of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the K. R. C. Act. Such a change in the operation of the Act, though prospective in form, nevertheless, operates to take away the right vested in the landlord by a decree of the court which has become final. Therefore, the change affects pending proceeding, even if, it is pending at the stage of execution. (See H. Shiva rao v. Cecila Pereira, AIR 1987 S. C. 248 ). 9 1. However, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that having regard to a Full Bench decision of this Court in dattarama N. Anvekar v. Shankar L prrulekar reported in ILR 1979 (2) Kar. 1886 unless a notification is issued under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 2 of the Act, the provisions of the Act will not be applicable to the areas newly included in the municipal limits. It is not possible to accept this contention. Firstly, the full Bench decision in Dattarama Anver- kar's case was rendered at the time when schedule II to the Act as on today was not in existence. At that time, Schedule ii to the Act contained only the names of certain municipalities and Corporations. In the old Schedule II areas were not specified. Firstly, the full Bench decision in Dattarama Anver- kar's case was rendered at the time when schedule II to the Act as on today was not in existence. At that time, Schedule ii to the Act contained only the names of certain municipalities and Corporations. In the old Schedule II areas were not specified. Only the names of Municipal boroughs, Municipalities, Town and villages were specified. Subsequently, by karnataka Act 17 of 1983 the entire schedule II has been subsituted and it does not now contain the names of municipalities. The Schedule II as sub. Tituted by karnataka Act 17 of 83 is in general terms. It includes among other areas, the areas of all the municipalities, governed by the karnataka Municipalities Act 1964. Parts iv and V of the Act are applicable to the areas specified in Schedule II In this regard, the Supreme Court in H Shiva- rao's case (AIR 1987 S. C. 248) while considering the very provisions of the Act has held that provisions of the Act are applicable to the area which is subsequently included within the municipal limits. In that case at the time when the suit was filed the village Padavu was outside the municipal limits of Mangalore City corporation. During the course of execution of the decree passed by the court "under The general law and not under the act, Padavu village came to be included within Mangalore City Corporation on 27-10-1983 by virtue of the Notification issued u/s. 4 (1) r/w Sec. 501 of Karnataka municipal Corporations Act 1976. The supreme Court while considering this aspect of the matter has held as follows ;-"the appellant was a tenant in the premises where he was residing and was also running a tea shop. The only short question which arises in this appeal is whether in view of sub section (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act the decree was executable, because subsequent to the decree for possession the Act has been made applicable to the area in question. The facts are noted before. The provisions of sub-sec. The only short question which arises in this appeal is whether in view of sub section (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act the decree was executable, because subsequent to the decree for possession the Act has been made applicable to the area in question. The facts are noted before. The provisions of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 upon which arguments were advanced before us are as follows :- "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant". Thereafter the provision of subsection enumerates the grounds upon which an order might be made for recovery of possession, inter alia, including arrears of rent, bona fide requirement of the landlord etc. , being the usual grounds upon which such applications were permissible in various rent Acts in the country. It was contended that the order under revision should not have directed the petitioners to deliver possession because the decree vested certain rights upon the landlord. It is, therefore, necessary to appreciate the significance of the effect of Sec. 21 of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary to appreciate the significance of the effect of Sec. 21 of the Act. It is therefore, necessary to properly construe sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act. In this connection one has to bear in mind the definition of tenant, sub-sec. It is, therefore, necessary to appreciate the significance of the effect of Sec. 21 of the Act. It is therefore, necessary to properly construe sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act. In this connection one has to bear in mind the definition of tenant, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 provides that no order or decree shall be made in favour of the landlord against the tenant Sec. 3 (r) defines the tenant as a person by whom on whose account rent is payable for a premises and includes the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living wish the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been formed out or leased by a local authority it has to be brone in mind that the definition of tenant under the Act does not include any person against whom a decree for possession has been passed or against whom the decree for execution lor possession has been executed. The High Court was of the view that sub sec. (I) of Sec. 21 prohibits the court from making any order or decree for recovery of possession in favour of landlord irrespective of any other law or contract between the parties. The high Court cohcluced that any order of eviction passed before the coming into operation of the Act does not become inoperative after coming into operation of the sub-section. It only prevented passing of any order or decree for eviction after coming into operation of the act except on the specified grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S 21 of the Act. The sub-section does not prevent the execution of the order after coming into operation of the Act, of any order or decree passed before the coming into operation of the Act. 4. It is well settled legal principle that Rent Control legislations being beneficial to the tenant have to be given a liberal interpretation. The sub-section does not prevent the execution of the order after coming into operation of the Act, of any order or decree passed before the coming into operation of the Act. 4. It is well settled legal principle that Rent Control legislations being beneficial to the tenant have to be given a liberal interpretation. While ordinary substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision, or clear implication in the case of Rent Control Act it being a beneficial legislation the provision which confers immunity to the tenant against eviction by the landlord though prospective in form operates to take away the right vested in the landlord by a decree of a court which has become final, unless there is express provision or clear implication to the contrary". 9. 2. It is now fairly well settled, that subsequent development in law can be taken into account by the appellate court while deciding the appeal See lakshminarayan v. Niranjan Modak ( AIR 1985 SC 111 ). Therefore it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that having regard to a Full Bench decision in Anve- kar's case, the Act cannot be. held to be applicable to Bobrawada village as there is no separate notification issued under the Act. There is no doubt that a Single judge is bound by a Full Bench decision. But, when there is a change in the statute and the statute that was considered by the Full Bench is amended and the amended statute has been interpreted by the supreme Court in a particular manner, the Full Bench decision rendered under the old statute cannot be held to govern the amended statute. Therefore, I am of the view that the Full Bench decision in anvekar's case cannot be held to govern schedule II of the Act as substituted by karnataka Act 17 of 83. Therefore, I am of the view that the Full Bench decision in anvekar's case cannot be held to govern schedule II of the Act as substituted by karnataka Act 17 of 83. Having regard to the wordings of Schedule II of the Act as substituted by Karnataka Act 17 of 83 and the decision of the Supreme Court in h. Shiva Rao's case it is not possible to hold that unless a separate Notification is issued under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Act, the provisions of parts IV and V of the Act are not applicable to area/areas newly included in the municipal or corporation limits under the provisions of the relevant enactments governing Municipalities and Corporations. Schedule II of the Act as substituted by karnataka Act 17 of 83 is very widely worded and takes into its fold and makes the provisions of Parts IV and V of the act applicable to the areas brought within the Municipal or Corporation limits as per the provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Act 1964 and Karnataka Municipal corporations Act, 1976 from time to time without any further Notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Act. ( 9 ) 3. However, Sri Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing for the defendants, on the basis of a decision of the Supreme court in Nandalal v. Motifal (A. I. R. 1977 s. C 2143) submits that the notification in Nandalal's case and the substituted schedule II of the Act are similar, therefore, when the decision in Nandalal's case has been understood by the Full bence in Anvekar's case in a particular manner, irrespective of substitution of schedule II of the Act by Karnataka Act 17 of 1983, the decision of the Full Bench in Anvekar's case still governs schedule II of the Act as substituted by Karnataka act 17 of 1983. The submission appears to proceed on an incorrect understanding of the decision of the Full Bench in Anvekar's case. In fact in Anvekar's case, the Full Bench distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandalal's case. The reasons given by the Full Bench for distinguishing the decision in Nandalal's case support the conclusion reached by me that the decision of the Full Bench in anvekar's case does not hold good for interpreting Schedule II to the Act as substituted by Karnataka Act 17/1983. The reasons given by the Full Bench for distinguishing the decision in Nandalal's case support the conclusion reached by me that the decision of the Full Bench in anvekar's case does not hold good for interpreting Schedule II to the Act as substituted by Karnataka Act 17/1983. The view taken by me as to the applicability of the Act to the area included in the municipal Limitsalso receives support from the decision of the Supreme Court in nandalal's case. The Full Bench has distinguished the decision in Nandalal's case on the following grounds : "one thing that becomes clear from a close reading of the judgment of the supreme Court ts that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not laid down a general proposition of law to the effect that if the Act is made applicable on a particular date to a specified area of a particular description that Act will automatically become applicable to further areas that may be added to the originally specified area under some other provision of law. The decision of the Supreme Court is only on the construction of the relevant portion of the notification issued on the 26th of july 1949 under Section 2 of the C P. Act. The notification which the Supreme Court examined provided that chapters II and IV of the Rent Control order shall extend to all the municipalities in the Central Provinces in berar. As Chapters II and IV were made applicable to all the municipalities, the Supreme Court construed the said notification as having the effect of making Chapters II and IV applicable not only to the municipalities that were in existence on the date of the order but also to municipalities that came into existence after the issue of the order. The Supreme Court came to that conclusion because the notification provided that Chapters II and IV shall extend to all the municipalities in the state. The Supreme Court has pointedout that the wordings of the notification are quite unambiguous and there is no reoson why they should not be given their simple and natural meaning to the expression all the municipalities' in the State. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June 12, 1956 the supreme Court held that the provisions of these chapters became applicable from that date. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June 12, 1956 the supreme Court held that the provisions of these chapters became applicable from that date. Schedule II to the Act with which we are concerned does not provide that Parts IV and V of the Act are applicable to all the Municipalities in the State. Whereas, the notification issued under the C. P. Act makes the provisions of Chapters II and IV of the rent Control Order applicable to all the Municipalities, Schedule II of the act with which we are concerned, makes it clear that Parts IV and V are not applicable to all the Municipalities in the States. Schedule II enumerates 61 items of areas to which Parts IV and v of the Act are made applicable and reads as follows :"schedule II ah the 61 items are not described with reference to the areas of the respective Municipalities, A bare reading of Schedule II clearly indigates that parts IV and V are made Rapplicable to some of the municipal areas in the state to which Parts IV and V of the act have not been made applicable. Schedule II shows that Parts IV and V of the Act have been made applicable to areas of different description such as Municipal areas, revenue villages, panchayat areas, notified areas. Sanitary Board areas, towns and cities and the City of Bangalore and an area within a radius of two miles from the municipal limits of the City. All the areas included in Schedule il are not municipal areas. !t is therefore, clear that the scheme of the II Schedule of the act with which we are concerned is not similar to the scheme of the Rent Control Order dated 26-7-1949 issued under Section 2 of the C. P. Act. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot. therefore, be applied for construing schedule II to the Act with which we are concerned. "thus from the aforesaid reasoning of the full Court, it is clear that if the substituted Schedule II to the Act which is in question would have been the subject for decision before the Full Bench, the decision of the Full Bench would have been the same as the one I have arrived at. Therefore, the submission of Sri Kulkarni cannot at all be accepted, it is accordingly rejected. 9. 4. Therefore, the submission of Sri Kulkarni cannot at all be accepted, it is accordingly rejected. 9. 4. Accordingly Point No. (i) is answered in the affirmative. 95. Point (ii) In view of the affirmative finding on Point No. (i) no decree for ejectment can be passed by a court except in accordance with the provisions of Part V of the Act by the court empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the act. The lower appellate court has dismissed the suit, though on a different ground, but it is not necessary to set aside the decree of the lower appellate court as on applying the finding recorded on Point No. (i) also the suit is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, it is held that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are upheld and are affirmed not on the findings recorded by the lower appellate court, but on the finding recorded on Point No. (i ). Point No. (ii) is answered accordingly. ( 10 ) POINT No. (iii) :- For the reasons stated above the appeal fails and the same is dismissed reserving liberty to the plaintiff to seek eviction under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Contro! act. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .