JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J. - This second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff Hari Ram Arya against the judgment and decree dated 24-9-1983 passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dismissing Civil Appeal No. 567 of 1983 and confirming the decree dated 18-5-1983 passed by the Munsif (West), Allahabad, in Suit No. 699 of 1971. 2. The facts in brief are that the appellant filed a suit for the demolition of the constructions shown by letters ABCD, EXDEF and EFGH and also for possession over that portion and for Rs. 400/- as damages besides pendente lite and future damages on the allegations that the plaintiff is a tenant of plot No. 107 in village Subedarganj Kadeem, Pargana and Tahsil Chail, district Allahabad, over which he has been in possession for more than 30 years, that the land was cultivated and crops earning more than Rs. 400/- were grown, that sometime in 1958 Mohammad Husain, Arshad Husain, Dost Mohammad, Noor Mohammad and Wali Mohammad and Shamshuddin Bibi disputed the right of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff filed a suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and obtained a decree with a declaration that the plaintiff was a tenant of the disputed plot, that ever since then the plaintiff was paying rent to the Government Estate who was the zamindar of the plot in dispute, that the name of the plaintiff is recorded in the village papers over an area of 8 Biswas of the disputed plot, that the defendant Hub Lal surreptitiously got his name recorded in the records and on being informed about it the plaintiff protested against it to the Nagar Mahapalika but to no avail, that the defendant has illegally constructed 3 lime kilns of temporary nature and a store room thereon, that on account of such illegal possession of the defendant the plaintiff is losing about Rs. 400/- annually compelling him to file the suit on 26-10-1971. 3. The respondent contested the suit alleging that the appellant is neither a tenant nor in possession of the disputed plot No. 107. The plaint allegations were denied being incorrect. It was contended by the respondent that Mumtaz Husain was the original zamindar of the impugned plot and he had let it out to the respondent on 5-5-1952. The respondent had been paying rent regularly to the zamindar. The plaint allegations were denied being incorrect. It was contended by the respondent that Mumtaz Husain was the original zamindar of the impugned plot and he had let it out to the respondent on 5-5-1952. The respondent had been paying rent regularly to the zamindar. The Choona Bhatti (kiln) and the Godown (room) had been in existence since 1951. It was further alleged by the respondent that the decree referred to by the appellant had been obtained fictitiously and collusively and is not binding on the respondent as he was in possession over the suit land much prior to the decree in favour of the appellant. It was also alleged that the Government Estate was never the zamindar and in any case the State of U.P. was a necessary party to the suit. It was, however, alleged that the respondent had acquired right by adverse possession as well. It was also alleged that the appellant has no right, title or interest as alleged by him and as such has no right to maintain the suit or to claim any relief. 4. On the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues 1. Whether the plaintiff is tenant as alleged? 2. Whether the decree dated 1-7-1958 is collusive and not binding upon the defendant? 3. Whether the constructions in dispute are in the disputed land'? If so its effect? 4. Whether Government Estate was owner of this plot? 5. Whether the suit is defective for non- joinder of Uttar Pradesh State? 6. Whether the suit is barred by time? 7. Whether the suit is barred by estoppel? 8. Whether the suit has not been properly valued and court fee paid is insufficient? 5. After scanning the documents on record and the oral evidence adduced the trial court found that the decree dated 1-7-58 which had been obtained by the plaintiff was collusive and was not binding on the defendant. The constructions on the suit land were found to be on the disputed land. The trial court further found that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party i.e., the State of U.P. The trial court further found that the suit is barred by estoppel. As regards the fact whether the plaintiff is a tenant as alleged by him the trial court found that the plaintiff is not a tenant and decided the issue in the negative. As regards the fact whether the plaintiff is a tenant as alleged by him the trial court found that the plaintiff is not a tenant and decided the issue in the negative. The trial court further found that the Government Estate was not the owner of the suit plot. The suit was also found to be barred by time. The suit was dismissed and feeling aggrieved the plaintiff filed an appeal before the lower appellate court. 6. The lower appellate court held that the Government Estate was never the zamindar of the suit land as the appellant has not filed a single document to maintain his contention. Even no official of the State of U.P. was produced and examined. No document much less a relevant one was filed by the appellant which may show that any settlement was arrived at between the State of U.P. and the appellant in writing which is necessary as all the Government transactions are executed in writing. The lower appellate court further found that mere payment of rent to the Government Estate would not make the appellant a tenant of the impugned plot. Mere payment of rent would also not establish that the State of U.P. was the zamindar of the suit land. The contract of tenancy had to be specifically proved which was not done by the appellant. The findings recorded by the trial court that the State of U.P. was never the owner of the property or that it settled the disputed property with the appellant were upheld by the lower appellate court. On the basis of the relevant documents and the oral testimony the lower appellate court found that the respondent had been paying rent to the Nagar Mahapalika from much before the alleged decree dated 1-7-58. The lower appellate court also found that the then zamindar Mumtaz Husain had granted a Patta in favour of the respondent and a receipt was granted showing the name of the respondent. These documents made it clear that from much before the decree dated 1-7- 58 the respondent had been paying licence fee to the Municipal Board and was carrying on the business of burning lime. A licence was granted in favour of the respondent who had paid licence fee to the Nagar Mahapalika from the year 1954. These documents made it clear that from much before the decree dated 1-7- 58 the respondent had been paying licence fee to the Municipal Board and was carrying on the business of burning lime. A licence was granted in favour of the respondent who had paid licence fee to the Nagar Mahapalika from the year 1954. The lower appellate court found the name of the respondent having been entered in the Khasra of the Nagar Mahapalika as evidence by the documents filed by the respondent. The respondent was shown as the owner of the plot in suit with lime Bhatti. The possession of the respondent over the land in suit was found to be continuous since 1952. 7. P.W. 2 Abdul Samad admitted that Mumtaz Husain was the zamindar of the village. The appellant himself appearing as P. W 3 also admitted that no Patta was ever granted by the State Government in his favour. The lower appellate court on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence recorded a finding that Mumtaz Husain was the zamindar and had a right to grant Patta. The appellant appearing as P. W. 3 also admitted that in the suit filed by him in the revenue courts neither the Collector, Allahabad, nor the zamindar Mumtaz Husain were impleaded. The lower appellate court also held that the decree passed in favour of the appellant is of no avail to him nor it is binding on the respondent. 8. The lower appellate court found that the defendant was in continues U.P. session of the disputed plot and which fact was in the knowledge of the appellant but no effort whatsoever was made by the appellant either to get the name of the respondent expunged from the record of the Nagar Mahapalika or to take appropriate steps for the wrong of U.P. session of the respondent. The appellant had admitted that the respondent continued in possession without any force which would clearly show that the possession of the respondent over the suit plot was peaceful as well as continuous. 9. Another interesting feature of this case is that the plaint allegations revealed the appellant only as a tenant while in his statement recorded on oath on 29-7-1982 he has contended that he is the owner of the property. There is thus no reconciliation between the plaint allegations and the evidence on oath of the appellant. 10. 9. Another interesting feature of this case is that the plaint allegations revealed the appellant only as a tenant while in his statement recorded on oath on 29-7-1982 he has contended that he is the owner of the property. There is thus no reconciliation between the plaint allegations and the evidence on oath of the appellant. 10. The lower appellate court found that the entries in the revenue records on the basis of an ex parte decree obtained by the appellant against the sons of Mumtaz Husain would not help the appellant. It was found, that the sons of Mumtaz Husain had migrated' to Pakistan in the year 1953-54. The name of the appellant has been recorded in the chief column of the revenue on the basis of this ex parte decree, but in view of the continusession of the respondent over the plot in suit and more so on account of the fact that peither Mumtaz Husain nor his sons had dislodged the respondent from the impugned land, his possession was found to be continuous and undisturbed. The continuous possession of the respondent would thus confer a title upon him by adverse possession. The lower appellate court on the basis of the documentary as well as oral evidence found the possession of the respondent being continuous from 1952. 11. Another significant fact which cannot be lost sight of and as has been found by the lower appellate court is that the sons of Mumtaz Husain migrated to Pakistan in the year 193-54 and consequent to their migration the property would have vested in the Custodian, Evacuee Property, who was not impleaded in the suit filed by the appellant in the revenue court which was found to be fatal by the lower appellate court. 12. The possession of the respondent was found to be peaceful and significantly the appellant had allowed and tolerated such possession of the respondent. The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the lower appellate court. Hence this second appeal. 13. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court as well as the lower appellate court illegally ignored the Khewat Ex. 20 which was filed by the appellant. The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the lower appellate court. Hence this second appeal. 13. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court as well as the lower appellate court illegally ignored the Khewat Ex. 20 which was filed by the appellant. In order to prove the fact that the Government is the owner of this land this can be evidenced only by Khewat and by no other document or material. Khataunis Exts, 5, 7 and 21 show that the appellant is a tenant of the suit land. Khasaras Exts. 6 and 19 show the possession of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is no evidence, documentary or oral, to show that Mumtaz Husain was the zamindar, and thus it would be clear that the Government was the owner of the suit land. It has been urged that no doubt the appellant has admitted that no Patta was ever granted in his favour by the Government but still the Khatauni records would show that the appellant is a tenant. Lastly it has been submitted that the lower appellate court did riot consider the evidence that the Government is the zamindar. The finding of the lower appellate court has also been challenged that the Collector was a party to Suit No. 8/1958, a decree whereof was granted in favour of the appellant on 1-7-1958. Learned counsel for the appellant has thus submitted that the court below did not record finding as to whether the Government was zamindar or not and such non-consideration vitiates the entire findings and this would be a substantial question of law. The courts below have held that the Government is not a zamindar on the basis of documentary as well as oral evidence but the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is ample evidence to this effect. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. It has been submitted by him that the appellant came forward with a case that he was in possession for more than 30 years and it was sometime in 1971 that the respondent had constructed Bhattis and a room. The appellant is trying to show that it was sometime in 1971 that he was dispossessed and the constructions were raised consequently. The appellant is trying to show that it was sometime in 1971 that he was dispossessed and the constructions were raised consequently. It has further been submitted that the trial court considered all the issues and gave its findings which were upheld by the lower appellate court. Evidently the constructions were raised sometime in 1971 and were more than 12 years old. A suit, if any, ought to have been filed within three years of the raising of such constructions. It has further been urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that both the courts below have not found the appellant to be a tenant and as such the appellant has no right to dispossess the respondent. In such a situation whether the Government is a zamindar or not becomes insignificant and immaterial. The respondent has further brought to my notice that plot No. 107 has not been included in the decree dated 1-7-58. It is in fact in respect of five plots Nos. 39, 102, 105, 106 and then again 106 which has been wrongly shown as it is No. 108. 16. In view of the above rival contention it has be seen whether there was the non consideration of the fact as to the title of the land vesting in the Government which would vitiate the entire findings thus involving a substantial question of law. The trial court framed an issue in regard to the fact whether the Government was the owner of the impugned plot and gave a finding on the basis of the material documentary as well as oral that the Government was not the owner of the impugned land. The lower appellate court also found that the Government is not the owner of the impugned land. Such a finding has been recorded by the courts below on the basis of the material on record. It has further been found by the courts below that the entry in the revenue records has been introduced on the basis of the decree dated 1-7-1958 which was passed- ex parte. On the basis of the evidence on record it has further been found that this decree is not binding on the respondent. It has further been found by the courts below that the entry in the revenue records has been introduced on the basis of the decree dated 1-7-1958 which was passed- ex parte. On the basis of the evidence on record it has further been found that this decree is not binding on the respondent. Further it has been found by the courts below that the sons of Mumtaz Husain had migrated to Pakistan sometime in the year 1953-54 and the property on such migration would vest in the Custodian Evacuee Property who was not impleaded in the suit. The appellant was found having not been recorded as an owner over plot No. 107 as per his own statement. His statement also showed that no Patta was ever granted in his favour. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100 the Supreme Court held that an admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon. It may not be conclusive but is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. The appellant has admitted that prior to 1958 his name was not recorded over plot No. 107. The appellant has further admitted that no Patta was ever granted in his favour. Nothing has been shown as to how the appellant can withdraw from such admission. Moreover the appellant has made these admissions and such admissions are binding on him. In such circumstances it is very difficult to hold otherwise permitting the appellant to resile from his admissions. Another aspect of this controversy is that the appellant has alleged himself, as shown in the plaint, to be a tenant. In his statement on oath he has described himself as owner. If In view of the above rival contentions the appellant has been in continuous session for more than 30 years and was dispossessed in 1971 as impliedly brought out then no effort was made by him to seek redress so as to undo the dispossession. The trial court has found that the appellant has failed to prove that he was in possession for more than 30 years and that the Government was the zamindar of the land in suit. The lower appellate court agreed with the finding as recorded by the trial Court. The trial court has found that the appellant has failed to prove that he was in possession for more than 30 years and that the Government was the zamindar of the land in suit. The lower appellate court agreed with the finding as recorded by the trial Court. It was not necessary for the lower appellate Court to re- state the facts and the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court. It is sufficient for the lower appellate court to have expressed general agreement with the reasons given by the trial Court. In Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain, AIR 1976 SC 1124 it has been held as under : "It is not the duty of the appellate court when it agree with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." The trial court as well as the lower appellate court further found that the suit is barred by time and the respondent has perfected his right by adverse possession. The constructions were found to be more than 12 years old. If the appellant was dispossessed and certain constructions were raised after such dispossession by the respondent then it was open to the appellant to have filed a suit within 3 years. Another significant fact is that the appellant has not been found to be a tenant of the impugned land. Apparently if that be so the appellant has no right to dispossess the respondent. The controversy as to whether the Government is zamindar or not may not be then of much significance. 17. In V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettier, AIR 1963 SC 302 it has been held. Apparently if that be so the appellant has no right to dispossess the respondent. The controversy as to whether the Government is zamindar or not may not be then of much significance. 17. In V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettier, AIR 1963 SC 302 it has been held. by the Supreme Court that the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining second appeals is that if the High Court is satisfied that the decision is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law or that the decision has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law or if there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code or by any other law which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits, it can interfere with the conclusions of the lower appellate court. However, it does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate court. All that it would mean is that it should be a case where the evidence which is accepted by the lower appellate court no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all. In the instant case the courts below have recorded findings of fact on the basis of oral as well as documentary evidence and it would be very difficult to say that those findings are perverse or not supported by any evidence. 18. In view of the above discussions it is clear that there was consideration of the fact that the land neither vested in the Government nor was the Government zamindar of the said land. The trial court as well as the appellate court have found that the decree dated 1-7-1958 was obtained fraudulently and collusively and as such was not binding on the respondent. No doubt it was only after the passing of the decree that the name of the appellant was entered in the records and Khewat and Khasra etc. were prepared accordingly. The trial court as well as the appellate court have found that the decree dated 1-7-1958 was obtained fraudulently and collusively and as such was not binding on the respondent. No doubt it was only after the passing of the decree that the name of the appellant was entered in the records and Khewat and Khasra etc. were prepared accordingly. Both the courts below have found that the decree dated 1-7-58 being a nullity having been obtained by fraud and collusion is not binding on the respondent. Even plot No. 107 does not appear to be including in the decree dated 1-7-58. Once it has been found that the decree so obtained on 1-7-58 is of no avail to the appellant it cannot be said that there was non-consideration of the fact regarding the title of the land vesting in the Government. There was sufficient consideration by both the courts below of this fact that the Government was neither the zamindar nor the land vested in it. No substantial question of law thus arises in this appeal. 19. In view of the above the no merit and deserves to be dis 20. In the result the appeal hereby dismissed with costs.