Judgment :- 1. The respondents in an application for shifting the kudikidappu under S 75(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, for short the Act, are the revision petitioners. The 1st respondent in this revision petition claimed shifting of the kudikidappu on the ground that he required the land for running an automobile workshop. He filed an application in 1972 as O.A. 985 of 1972. That application was dismissed. Thereafter, he filed an appeal as LRAS 2149 of 1977. During the pendency of the appeal, the counsel for the applicant (1st respondent herein) fried a petition to the effect that he may be allowed to withdraw the appeal as well as O.A. 2591 of 1975 (this is the renumbered O.A originally filed as O.A 985 of 1972.) The petition for withdrawal was made in view of a decision of this Court wherein this Court said that the alternate site offered to the kudikidappukars must be owned by the land-owner even at the time when the application for shifting is filed. In this case, the landowner had only an agreement to purchase the land offered as the alternate site and so, he felt that even if he establishes his case of bona fides and other requirements of law, the court may not grant him the relief he sought for. So, he wanted the appeal as well as the O.A. to be withdrawn in order to enable him to file a fresh application after obtaining the title to the alternate site. This petition was not opposed by the revision petitioners herein and so, the petition for withdrawal was allowed and the appeal was dismissed. 2. Thereafter, in 1982, the 1st respondent herein filed an application, O.A. 60 of 1982, of course on the same ground that be required the plot of land for running a workshop. It is in evidence that the land in question is only a small bit of land measuring about 51/2 cents and the 1st respondent, owner of the plot, was working as a mechanic in a company and be wanted to have a workshop started by himself and for that purpose he sought the shifting of the kudikidappu. The alternate site offered was also very near to the land where the kudikidappu is situated, but it was a little interior, not facing the same road. 3. The alternate site offered was also very near to the land where the kudikidappu is situated, but it was a little interior, not facing the same road. 3. The Tribunal, after an elaborate enquiry into the questions of bona fides and suitability of the alternate site offered, came to the conclusion that the 1st respondent herein is entitled to claim the shifting of the kudikidappu. The application was allowed. The kudikidappukars filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority also re-assessed the evidence elaborately and concurred with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal. 4. As far as the question of bona fides and other factual requirements required under the provisions of the Act are concerned, they are matters which I cannot examine exercising my revisional power under S.103 of the Act. The section only provides an examination of matters relating to questions of law. The section reads thus: "103. Revision by High Court. (1) Any person aggrieved by (i) any final order passed in an appeal against the order of the Land Tribunal or; (ii) any final order passed by the Land Board under this Act; or (iii)any final order of the Taluk Land Board under this Act, may, within such time as may be prescribed, prefer a petition to the High Court against the order on the ground that the appellate authority or the Land Board, or the Taluk Land Board, as the case may be, has either decided erroneously, or failed to decide, any question of law. 5. Though affirmation by the first appellate authority of a crucial fact found by the Land Tribunal insulates the verdict with no inerrablity, but since absolute objective certainty is impossible in the decision process is this imperfect world, there is plain and perfect justification on practical reasons to unopen the pylon when the first two authorities concur in the factual conclusion at separate levels, particularly in view of the restricted jurisdiction under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Court's prime devoir is to avoid miscarriage and failure of justice. Miscarriage and failure of justice may assume different forms; a re-evaluation of the evidence or a re-appreciation of the evidence at the third tier of the litigation and a finding of fact different from that of the lower authorities may constitute a plain injustice in law to one of the parties. 6. Miscarriage and failure of justice may assume different forms; a re-evaluation of the evidence or a re-appreciation of the evidence at the third tier of the litigation and a finding of fact different from that of the lower authorities may constitute a plain injustice in law to one of the parties. 6. Though the counsel for the revision petitioners submitted before me that the findings of fact arrived at by the lower authorities are incorrect, I feel that the lower authorities have not gone wrong in their appreciation of the evidence. Further, as I said earlier, in fact,1 am not competent and not expected to re-appreciate the factual situation emerged in the case. 7. Counsel then pointed out a question of law. He submitted before me that since the earlier application, O.A. 985 of 1972, was dismissed and an appeal therefrom also was dismissed, an application for the same purpose and on the same ground would not lie before the Land Tribunal. He expanded bis arguments saying that no permission was obtained by the first respondent herein from the Appellate Authority for filing a second application. Counsel for the first respondent submitted before me that in fact, the appeal was withdrawn only for the purpose of filing a fresh application and the records would reveal that fact very clearly. The 1st respondent herein had filed an elaborate affidavit for withdrawing the appeal and the O.A. In the affidavit it is stated by the 1st respondent herein that he may be allowed to withdraw the appeal as well as the OA. in order to enable him to file a fresh application for shifting after carrying out the formalities as enjoined by the provisions of S.75 of the Act. The Appellate Authority passed an order on 5-9-1981. "The counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no objection in allowing the petition is (sic) withdrawn. In view of the withdrawal of the application, the appeal is dismissed. Detail order will follow". in the detailed order also, the Appellate Authority has said that the 1st respondent herein wanted the application as welt as the appeal to be withdrawn for the obvious purpose of enabling him to file a fresh application in conformity with the provisions of law and that there was no objection on the part of the revision petitioners herein. in the detailed order also, the Appellate Authority has said that the 1st respondent herein wanted the application as welt as the appeal to be withdrawn for the obvious purpose of enabling him to file a fresh application in conformity with the provisions of law and that there was no objection on the part of the revision petitioners herein. In these circumstances, the fact that there was no specific permission granted to the H respondent to file a fresh application is not a vital defect to the present proceedings. 8. Counsel for the revision petitioners referred me to a decision reported in Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T. (1987) 1 S C.C. 5) wherein the Supreme Court has said that "where a petitioner withdraws a petition filed by him in the High Court under Art.226/227 without permission to institute a fresh petition, remedy under Art.226/227 should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition and it would not be open to him to file a fresh petition in the High Court under the same article, though other remedies like suit or writ petition before Supreme Court under Art.32 would remain open to him. The principle underlying R.1 of Order XXIII of the C.P.C. should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also." Further, in this decision, Venkataramiah J. has given the rational basis of R.1 of Order XXIII. CPC. His Lordship, said, quoting a maxim Invito beneficium non dater. "The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire". Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason, the Code insists that be should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in R.1(3) of Order XXIII". From what I have quoted above, it is clear that the principle is founded on waiver and abandonment or disclaiming of a right. In this case, we have to examine whether the 1st respondent has waived or abandoned his claim. From what I have quoted above, it is clear that the principle is founded on waiver and abandonment or disclaiming of a right. In this case, we have to examine whether the 1st respondent has waived or abandoned his claim. In fact, in the affidavit he has said that be is not abandoning or waiving his claim. He wanted to file a fresh application and to enable him to file a proper application, the application he has filed (O.A. 985 of 1972) has to be withdrawn and that was allowed by the court after satisfying itself that there was good reason for allowing it besides the fact that there was no objection by the revision petitioners. I do not think that the principles stated in (1987) 1 SCC. 5 can be applied to this case. 9. Counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the Appellate Authority has no power to grant permission to withdraw the application filed before the Land Tribunal. I do not think that proposition is correct It is well settled principle that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and if the suit is pending on the principle that the appeal is a continuation of suit before the appellate court, the appellate court has got ample power to grant permission for withdrawal of the suit. S.107(2) of the Code read with 0.33 R.1, CPC., certainly permits an appellate court to grant permission to withdraw not only the appeal but also the suit. 10. The defect that no specific permission is granted for filing a fresh application when allowing an application for withdrawal for the purpose of enabling the applicant to file a fresh application, is not a defect at all which can be raised in the subsequent proceedings. The position has been clearly stated in a decision reported in Sukumar Banerjee v. Dilip Kumar (AIR. 1982 Calcutta 17): The court observed thus: "Where the plaintiff files an application to withdraw from the suit with liberty to sue afresh and the court passes an order giving permission to withdraw the suit but nothing is said in the order regarding plaintiff's liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, the order has to be read along with the plaintiff's application on which the order is passed. As the plaintiff's prayer is not refused, the order has the effect of granting permission to the plaintiff with liberty to sue afresh on the same cause of action. The effect of withdrawal from the suit is that the parties are left to the position which they occupied before the suit was filed". I do not think that the revision petitioners can validly contend that a second application is not maintainable. Now both the authorities below have found that the second application is maintainable and on facts they have decided the case against the revision petitioners. I do not see any merit in this civil revision petition. It is only to be dismissed. I do so.