B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) THIS application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (For short the Code) has been filed by the applicants with a prayer to quash the proceedings in Criminal case No. 4078 of 1985 (Stale of U. P. through Rajveer Singh Yaduvanshi v. Harish Chandra Goyal and others) pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur, for an offence under section 29 (1) (a) of Insecticides Act 1968. Act No. 46 of 1958. (For short the Act ). ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the present application lie in a narrow compass and they are these. On 24. 3. 1985 the opposite party No. 1, the Insecticides Inspector, Saharanpur approached the film M/s. Annpurna Agro Chemicals, Saharanpur (not a party to this application) and found the pesticides Tara 909 (Dimethoate 30) Ec. Batch No. K-5/84, stocked for sale. and requested for its sample from Sri Harish Chandra Goyal not a party ). The Opposite party No. 1, the complainant. took! 3 samples of the said pesticides in its original packing of 250 Ml. in form XII which obviously indicates that the samples of the said pesticides were taken for testing, analysis and if necessary for initiating proceedings for the offence committed, in case the said insecticide was found misbranded as provided under section 3 (k) of the Act. One of the samples was handed over to Harish Chandra Goyal the Proprietor of the shop and the other 2 samples were kept by the complainant for getting the same tested and analysed. The samples sent by the complainant for analysis to Fertilisers and Pesticides Analytical Laboratory, Alan Bagh, Lucknow (For short the State Laboratory) were received on 20. 4. 1985. As a result of the testing in the State Laboratory sample was declared misbranded, vide report No. 353 dated 15. 6. 1985 (Annexure 3 to the affidavit ). The active ingredient of the pesticide was determined as 22. 86. The State Laboratorys report was received by the complainant on 1. 7. 1985, which was forwarded to Sri Harish Chandra Goyal the same day. After receipt of the report the complainant filed a complaint (Annexure 2) against the applicants, who are Manufacturer, Director and Chairman etc. of the company. The active ingredient of the pesticide was determined as 22. 86. The State Laboratorys report was received by the complainant on 1. 7. 1985, which was forwarded to Sri Harish Chandra Goyal the same day. After receipt of the report the complainant filed a complaint (Annexure 2) against the applicants, who are Manufacturer, Director and Chairman etc. of the company. The applicant No. 1 is M/s. Shaw Wallace and Company Ltd. (For short the Company), the applicant No. 2 is the Chairman of the Company, the applicant No. 3 is Ex-Marketing Manager and the applicant No. 4 is Ex-Regional Manager of the Company. The present application has however, not been filed by Harish Chandra Goyal and Annapurna Agro Chemicals. The complaint was filed with prayer that the opposite parties (including present applicants and Mr. Goel and Annapurna Chemicals) may be punished as they have committed an offence under section 29 (1) (a) of the Act. ( 3 ) AFTER the receipt of that complaint the Chief Judicial Magistrate being prima facie judicially satisfied passed an order on 19. 11. 1985 (Annexure 1) directing process to be issued against the opposite parties (including the present applicants) and fixing 24. 2. 86 for appearance of the accused. The order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate issuing process is sought to be quashed by the present applications under section 482 of the Code. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant surged that prima facie no offence as contemplated by Section 29 (1) (a) was disclosed in the, complaint. There were no allegations against the applicants as required by section 33, the report of the State Laboratory (Annexure 3) was not in accordance with rules on the prescribed form. The procedure provided under sections 200 and 202 of the Code was not followed. It was urged that the complaint and the order issuing process may be quashed. Reliance was placed on A. R. Antulay v. Ram Das Sriniwas1, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others2. Union of India v. Prafull Kumar Samal3 State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others4, Devarapally Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and others v. V. Narayana Reddy and others5. Nirmal Jit Singh Hoom v. State of West Belngal6, Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. N. Mehtra and others7 and Bihar Electricity Board and another v. Nand Kishore Tamakuwala8. Union of India v. Prafull Kumar Samal3 State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others4, Devarapally Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and others v. V. Narayana Reddy and others5. Nirmal Jit Singh Hoom v. State of West Belngal6, Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. N. Mehtra and others7 and Bihar Electricity Board and another v. Nand Kishore Tamakuwala8. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand urged that prima facie offence under section 29 (1) (a) of the Act was disclosed in the complaint. Under para 3 of the complaint the offence as required by Section 33 of the Act was disclosed hence that was prima facie sufficient for taking cognizance of the offence. After looking into the report of the State Laboratory and the contents of the complaint, the Magistrate was prima facie satisfied hence he issued process against the applicants. There was substantial compliance of Form 9 of the Rules framed under the Act. Even though column 7 of Form 9 was left blank by an oversight but the contents of that column were furnished in other columns. As the complainant was a public servant hence he need not be examined in view of proviso to Section 200 and as the Magistrate did not postpone the issue of process consequently there was no necessity for following the procedure provided under section 202 of the Code. On being satisfied prima facie cognizance was taken and process has been issued, the applicant has got sufficient remedy under the Code, this court would not be justified in interfering with the said order taking cognizance and issuing process against the applicants, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. Reliance was placed on J. P. Sharma v. Vinod Kumar and others9 and Smt. Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar10. ( 5 ) HAVING heared learned counsel for the parties first point for determination is as to whether prima facie an offence under section 29 (1) (a) of the Act was disclosed in the complaint, whether there were allegations against the applicants as required by Section 33? Whether order issuing process was correct? Whether the report of the State Laboratory was legally obtained? ( 6 ) READING the complaint (Annexure 2) as whole it is evident that the offence under section 29 (1 (a) was disclosed. The sample was found to be misbranded according to the report of State Laboratory. Whether order issuing process was correct? Whether the report of the State Laboratory was legally obtained? ( 6 ) READING the complaint (Annexure 2) as whole it is evident that the offence under section 29 (1 (a) was disclosed. The sample was found to be misbranded according to the report of State Laboratory. The relevant, statutory provision of Section 29 (1) (a) can fruitfully be set out below: Section 29. Offences and punishment. (1) Whoever, (a) imports, manufactures, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes any insecticides deemed to be misbranded under sub-clause (1) or sub-clause (Hi) or sub-clause (viii) of clause (K) of section 3. . . , shall be punishable. (i) for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. TI Just a bare reading of the complaint makes it manifest that the offence under section 29 (1) (a) was disclosed in it. ( 7 ) AS regards the next submission that all the applicants were neither in-charge of, nor responsible to the conduct of business of the company, hence cognizance could not be taken against them. Relevant portion of section 33 of the Act reads thus: Section 33: Offences by Company: (1) Whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a Company every person who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of, or was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of Company, as well as the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Under section 33 every person who is in charge of or responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business on the relevant date when the offence was committed would be guilty for the offence committed and shall be liable for punishment. At this stage the Magistrate has just taken cognizance of the offence and issued process. In fact the cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the accused. At this stage the Magistrate has just taken cognizance of the offence and issued process. In fact the cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the accused. The word Cognizance has not been defined under section 2 of the Code but generally the clause taking cognizance of an offence means the point of time when the Magistrate or a judge, specially empowered for the purpose takes judicial notice of an offence, when he is prima facie satisfied on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or other material on record. As regards the liability of the applicants individually, under para 3 of the complaint brief averments of facts have been made that applicant No. I was the firm and the rest of the applicants were alleged to be its manufactures who were supervising and were responsible to the Company at the time of manufacturing, the insecticides. In view of these allegations under para 3 of the complaint the conditions under section 33 of the Act were satisfied. ( 8 ) NOW adverting to the submission that no sufficient ground for issuing process under section 204 of the Code were made out and procedure under sections 200 and 202 of the Code were not followed. In order to appreciate this submission sections 190. 200, 202. 203 and 204 of the Code may be read together. The submission was that the complainant and the witnesses present were not examined before issuing process as required under section 200 of the Code. Section 190 occurs under Chapter XIV (Fourteen of the Code), which deals with conditions requisite for initiating proceedings. Further section 190 opens with the words, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, Section 190 is however, not subject to chapter XV (Fifteen) which contains section 200. For taking cognizance section 190 (1) (a) confers unfettered powers on the Magistrate. For taking cognizance of an offence examination of complainant or witnesses present was not necessary. Section 200 provides that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine on oath the complainant etc. Proviso to section 202 provides that the Magistrate need not examine the complainant if he is a public servant. In the present case complainant was a public servant hence he need not be examined. Section 200 provides that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine on oath the complainant etc. Proviso to section 202 provides that the Magistrate need not examine the complainant if he is a public servant. In the present case complainant was a public servant hence he need not be examined. In case the Magistrate does not want to postpone issue of the process, there is no limitation on his power to issue process straightway. It is only, if the Magistrate feels some doubt about his prima facie satisfaction only then he can direct police officer to make an investigation or he can enquire into the case himself. Section 202 is captioned by the words, postponment of the issue of processtt. This connotes that in case the Magistrate does not feel prima facie satisfied only then he can postpone issue of process, and follow the procedure provided under section 202 otherwise he can issue process straightway. As the report of the State Laboratory has already been received indicating the pesticides to be misbranded, and after looking into the complaint the Magistrate was of the view that there is prima facie sufficient ground for issuing process against the accused, consequently the impugned order issuing process has been passed under section 203 of the Code. In view of Section 203 the complaint could have been dismissed by the Magistrate only if he was of the view that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding. Instant case was not a case in which the complaint could have been dismissed hence the process was issued. Under the circumstances. I am of the view that the process has correctly been issued. As regards the scope of interference by this Court against an order issuing process, under section 482 of the Code would be decided a little later. ( 9 ) REVERTING to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants. A. R. Antuley v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another (supra) was a case in which scope of sections 190. 200, 202, 238 and 250 of the Code was considered and Their Lordships of Supreme Court held. ( 9 ) REVERTING to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants. A. R. Antuley v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another (supra) was a case in which scope of sections 190. 200, 202, 238 and 250 of the Code was considered and Their Lordships of Supreme Court held. As has been distinctly made clear that a court of special Judge is a Court of original criminal Jurisdiction and that it can take cognizance of an offence in the manner hereinbefore indicated, it may be that in order to test whether the complaint disclosed a serious offence or that there is any frivolity involved in it, the judge May insist upon holding an enquiry by postponing the, issue of process. When a private complaint is filed, the court has to examine the complainant on oath save in the cases set out in the proviso to section 200, Cr. P. C. After examining the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses persent, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would be open to the Court to judicially determine whether a case is made out for issuing process. When it is said that Court issues process, it means the Court has taken cognizance of the offence and has decided to initiate the proceeding and as a visible manifestation of taking cognizance, process is issued which means that the accused is called upon to appear before the Court. This may either take the form of a summons or a warrant, as the case may be. In the instant case as it was a case in which the complaint was filed by a public servant acting in discharge of his official duties hence the proviso to section 200 of the Code was applicable and neither the complainant was required to be examined nor the witnesses. Further as the process has been issued, it means that the Court has taken cognizance of the offence and has decided to initiate the proceedings. In A. R. Antulays case (supra) Page 737, Supreme Court observed: Upon a complaint being received and the Court records the verification, it is open to the Court to apply its mind to the facts disclosed and to judicially determine whether process should or should not be issued. In A. R. Antulays case (supra) Page 737, Supreme Court observed: Upon a complaint being received and the Court records the verification, it is open to the Court to apply its mind to the facts disclosed and to judicially determine whether process should or should not be issued. It is not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the Court, of necessity must hold the inquiry as invisaged by section 202 or direct investigation as therein contemplated. The powers to take cognizance without holding inquiry or directing investigation is implicit in section 202 when it says that the Magistrate may if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. It is thus obvious that in the instant case after receipt of the complaint and the report of the State Laboratory, the Magistrate Judicially determined whether process should or should not be issued and he decided to issue the process. There was no question of following procedure provided under section 202 of the Code. In case immediately after the receipt of the complaint and looking into the report of the State Laboratory, the Magistrate immediately decided to issue process or he did not withhold the issue of process, it was not at all necessary for him to follow the procedure provided for holding an enquiry or directing investigation under section 202 of the Code. I am of the view that A. R. Antulays case (supra) does not help the applicants. Nirmal Jit Singh Hoom v. State of West Bengal, (supra) was a case in which their Lordship of Supreme Court have explained the words Sufficient Groundt used in section 203 of the Code. The words Sufficient ground mean satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the persons, accused by the evidence of the witnesses, entitled to a reasonable decree of the credibility, and do not mean sufficient ground for the purpose of the conviction. As in the instant case the Magistrate did not choose to withheld the process hence there was no question of applying the provisions of section 202 of the Code. As such this case is also of no help to the applicants. As in the instant case the Magistrate did not choose to withheld the process hence there was no question of applying the provisions of section 202 of the Code. As such this case is also of no help to the applicants. Davarapally Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and others v. Narayana Reddy and others (supra) was a case in which scope of sections 190, 202 and 156 of the Code has been considered. In this case it was held that under section 190 of the Code expression taking cognizance of an offencet has been used but this expression was not a defined term in the Code. Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend upon the circumstances of a particular case. In case be applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under section 202 of the Code or in case he takes action by issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, it cannot be said that he has not taken the cognizance. It was further held that under section 202 (1) of the Code the Magistrate can send the case to police for further investigation under section 156 (2) of the Code. This case also does not appear to be relevant in as much as neither any search warrant was issued nor any investigation by police was ordered rather cognizance was immediately taken and process was issued. Union of India v. Prafull Kumar Samal (supra) was a case in which Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering scope of section 227 of the Code, the question regarding discharge. In the instant case no question of discharge was involved hence that was a case, which could be said to be of no assistance to the applicant. State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others (supra), was a case where considering the provisions of section 227 of the Code it was held that if on the hasis of material available no charge could be framed under section 227 of the Code and the High Court was of the view that allowing the proceedings to be continued would be abuse of the process of court, in that event it can exercise the power under section 482 of the Code. In the instant case, learned Magistrate was prima facie satisfied that the complainant disclosed the offence hence he has taken the cognizance and issued process and it can not be said that those proceedings were abuse of the process of the court as such this case was also of no assistance to the applicants. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Krishan Rohtagi and others (supra) was a case where distinction between revisional power and inherent power of the High Court was pointed out and it was held that power under section 482 of the Code was a separate and independent power on the High Court but that can be exercised and an order can be passed ex-debito jestitiae in a case where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the court has been seriously abused. In the instant case I am of the view that by issuing process against the applicants no grave and substantial injustice has been done to them as such this case is also of no help to the applicants. Bihar Electricity Board and-another v. Nand Kishore Tamakuwala (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant was a case where question was whether offence of mischief was made out and in fact in the complaint there were no allegations hence complaint was quashed. On para 155, it was held as follows: In order to make out an offence of mischief it has to be alleged that the person caused the destruction of any property or any change in property or in the situation thereof. From the persual of the complaint it is clear that no acts are alleged against anyone of the accused persons which could bring any of their actions within the definition of mischief. Apparently therefore, the offence under this section is not even prima facie alleged. But in the instant case allegations have been made out about the accused and also disclosing the offence hence the case of Bihar State Electricity Board (supra) is not relevant. Apparently therefore, the offence under this section is not even prima facie alleged. But in the instant case allegations have been made out about the accused and also disclosing the offence hence the case of Bihar State Electricity Board (supra) is not relevant. Expression every person who at the time of offence was committed was in-charge of under section 33 of the Act was parameteria with section 23 C (1) (2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, hence Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. N. Mehta and another (supra) was relied upon on behalf of the applicants and the expression persion-in-chage was explained to connote a person who is in over all control of day to day business of the company. Similarly in R. K. Khandelwal v. State11, Hontble D. S. Mathur, J. as he then was, explained this expression as follows: There can be Directors who merely lay-down the policy and are not concerned with day to day working of the company. But in the instant case allegations under para 3 of the complaint are precise and consistent with the expression who at the time when the offence, was committed was in charge of hence Girdhari Lal Guptas case (supra) and R. K. Khandelwals are of no help to the applicants. Scope of section 482 of the Code has been pointed out in Smt. Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (supra ). In this case it was pointed out by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that where the complaint prima facie discloses the offence criminal breach of trust as defined under sections 405/406 of the Indian Penal Code the High Court would not be justified in quashing the complaint under section 482 of the Code. In J. P. Sharma v. Vinod Kumar Jam (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the State in an offence under section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947, and section 120b of Indian Penal Code process was issued but that was quashed by the High Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code when I matter was taken to the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court providing out the scope of section 482 (on page 842, paras 51 and 52) held as follows:51. The grounds; upon which the learned Judge seems to have quashed the complaint in the instant case was the subsequent report by the C. B. I. which had not yet been proved and considered in the background of the allegations made and secondly that some of the parties alleged to be in the conspiracy were not made parties. These, in our opinion, ate two grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings where on prima facie being satisfied the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had taken cognizance. Taking all the allegations in the complaint to be true, without adding or substracting anything at this stage it cannot be said that no prima facie case for trial had been made out. That is the limit of the power to be exercised by the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court in the instant case has exceeded that jurisdiction. 52. We are not concerned with the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint, that would be investigated at the time of the trial. In that view of the matter we are unable to sustain the order under appeal. We make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merit of the charge and the complaint would be investigated in accordance with law and the accused persons would be entitled to prove before the court that no charges has been made out against them and they should be acquitted of the charges. But at this stage under inherent power of section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, in our opinion, in the background and circumstances of this case the Court should not have used the extraordinary power. In the premises, the appeal is allowed. The order and judgment quashing the proceeding are set aside. ( 10 ) COMING to other aspect as to whether this Court exercised the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code against an order of issuing process under the circumstances of the present case. In the present case after receipt, of the State Laboratory to the effect that the sample of the pesticides Tara 909 was misbranded cognizance was taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate and as a result thereof process was issued by the impugned order dated 19. 11. 85. That order could not be said to be abuse of process of the Court. In the present case after receipt, of the State Laboratory to the effect that the sample of the pesticides Tara 909 was misbranded cognizance was taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate and as a result thereof process was issued by the impugned order dated 19. 11. 85. That order could not be said to be abuse of process of the Court. ( 11 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter also. In 2 cases of this Court, Sultan Singh Jam v. State12 and also in 5 Judges full bench case, Mahesh v. State13 while discussing scope of section 561-A of the old Code (corresponding to New Section 482), it was held that in case some other remedy was available under the Code inherent power of this Court need not be exercised. In the instant case after issuing process the applicant has got his sufficient remedy under the Code to prove his innocence, rather than to invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court. ( 12 ) ADVERTING to the last point that the report of the State Laboratory (Annexure 3) was not in the prescribed form i. e. Form 9 of the Rules framed under the Act as column 7 of Form 9 was left blank and its effect. I have perused the report of the State Laboratory (Annexure 3) no doubt column 7 of Form 9 was given below it, in a space available there. The applicant was concerned with the result of the analysis and it was given there indicating that the pesticides was misbranded and hence it was an offence under section 29 (i) (a) of the Act. It cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the applicant I, accordingly, do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel of the applicant. complaint and report of the State Laboratory and the learned Magistrate was prima facie satisfied and has taken cognizance of the offence under section 29 (1) (a) of the Act and issued process by impugned order dated 19/11/1985, therefore, it could not be said that the impugned order was passed as an abuse of process of the Court and this Court may exercise its power under section 482 of the Code. Consequently present application is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. ( 13 ) IN view of the discussions made hereinbefore present application is dismissed. Consequently present application is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. ( 13 ) IN view of the discussions made hereinbefore present application is dismissed. Interim stay order dated 25/11/1986 as extended from time to time is vacated. Office is directed to inform the Chief Judicial Magistrate and Distt. Magistrate Saharanpur about the result of this application within a week. Record, if received would be sent back immediately. Application dismissed. .