ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - The second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 13-2-1975 passed by Sri K.C. Jain Civil Judge, Deona dismissing the appeal preferred by the State of U.P. and another against the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1974 by which Sri K.D. Rai, the then Munsif, Deoria had decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent. Facts in brief giving rise to the instant controversy are that the plaintiff-respondent was appointed as a Money Tester in the Government Treasury in August 1953. He was appointed as a collection Tahvildar on 2-2-1954 temporarily but continued to work on this post till 20-6-1960 when his services were dispensed with. However, he was again appointed to the said post on 19-10-1965 and again his services were terminated w.e.f. 8-2-1969 Aggrieved by the order dated 8-2-1969 by which his services were terminated and which was communicated to the plaintiff respondent, on 27-3-1969 a suit for declaration was filed which was decreed by the learned Munsif and the appeal against such judgment and decree dated 14-2-1974 was dismissed by the Civil Judge Deoria vide judgment and decree dated 13-2-1975, thus giving rise to this second appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. 3. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for appellant State of U.P. and another has urged that the courts below erred in law in holding that the termination of the plaintiff-respondent was illegal. It has been urged that the appointing authority of the plaintiff-respondent was the Collector who had exercised his powers in dispensing with the services of the petitioner. 4. It has further been urged on behalf of the appellant that the Collector was the competent authority to terminate the services of the respondent. 5. The courts below have found as a fact that the Tahvildars are appointed by the Government Treasurer and such appointment is to be approved by the Collector. It has also been found that the termination order passed by the Collector is without jurisdiction as he was not the appointing authority of the respondent. The appointment of the respondent was admittedly made by the Government Treasurer, Deoria though to be approved by the Collector. The appointment and the approval are two distinct acts. It has also been found that the termination order passed by the Collector is without jurisdiction as he was not the appointing authority of the respondent. The appointment of the respondent was admittedly made by the Government Treasurer, Deoria though to be approved by the Collector. The appointment and the approval are two distinct acts. It is on the basis of the approval that the authority empowered to approve is geared into action and unless approval is sought for the authority vested with such powers ceases to exercise with this jurisdiction. Till the Government Treasurer had proposed for the termination of the services of the respondent the Collector was incompetent to pass any order particularly that of the termination of the services of the respondent. This view finds support in the case of Mohammad Ali v. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1958 All. 681. At the time of the appointment of the respondent the Collector had approved such appointment. Prior to the grant of the approval it was fully within the competence of the Collector not to grant such an approval or to disapprove the appointment. No doubt the appointing authority, the Government Treasurer had a right to rescind the appointment order but not till the approval had been granted. As the Collector had approved such appointment, the Government Treasurer who was the appointing authority could not have rescinded such an order unless the fresh approval was sought for in regard to the termination of the respondent. It is thus clear that the Collector was not competent nor had he jurisdiction to terminate the services of the respondent. 6. Another aspect which requires consideration is that the Tahvildars are appointed to perform the duties of the Cashier in Government Treasury. It was made for the performance of the public duties and remuneration was paid to them by the State. The Tahvildar who is appointed by the Government Treasurer acts not on behalf of the Treasurer in performing his duties but on behalf of the State. The appointment of Tahvildars though made by the Treasurer is controlled by the Collector. The Tahvildar is remunerated by the State and his method of working is controlled by the State. The State exercises the power to suspend, dismiss and reinstate him. Payment of remuneration to the Tahvildars is for the services rendered in the cash department of the District Treasury of the State. The Tahvildar is remunerated by the State and his method of working is controlled by the State. The State exercises the power to suspend, dismiss and reinstate him. Payment of remuneration to the Tahvildars is for the services rendered in the cash department of the District Treasury of the State. Employment of Tahvildars is for the purpose of carrying out the work of the State though control is exercised by the Government Treasurer in their working. In the case of State of U.P. and another v. Audh Narain and another, 1964 (9) F.L.R. 238 (S.C.) it has been held that the Tahvildars are entitled to the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India as he is deemed to be a civil servant. The respondent is thus entitled to protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 7. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant then urged that the appointment of the respondent was temporary thus giving him no right or protection and his services could be terminated at any time. It is very difficult to accept such a fallacious plea. More so when it is found that the impugned order of termination was the outcome of bad faith merely to accommodate another person as has been found as a fact by the courts below. From the findings of the courts below on record it is apparent that the respondent was not the junior most. The respondent had categorically stated attributing mala fides to the appellant and particularly the Collector. The Collector would have been the best person to contradict such allegations of the respondent but he preferred not to come in the witness box. It was the bounden duty of the Collector who was personally knowing the fact as he was clothed with the circumstances to give evidence and subject himself to cross-examination. However, the non-appearance of the Collector as a witness would be the strongest circumstance which would lead to an adverse inference and would necessarily support the contention of the respondent that the termination order was the outcome of bad faith and mala fides of the Collector. This view finds adequate support in the case of Harmandil Pathak and others v. Sankatha Singh and another 1966 A.L.J. 904. 8. This view finds adequate support in the case of Harmandil Pathak and others v. Sankatha Singh and another 1966 A.L.J. 904. 8. In the case of S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 72 it was held that where allegations of mala fides have been attributed and the person against whom such allegations have been made has not come forward to deny them, it would be clear that mala fides stand proved. No doubt no reasons have been assigned while terminating the services of the respondent. It has thus been contended that the order of termination is discharge simpliciter without attaching any stigma attributable to the conduct of the respondent. But the surrounding circumstances attending on the impugned order clearly reveal that the order of termination is not a discharge simpliciter but is the outcome of mala fide design resulting in the passing of the termination order. The form of order is not conclusive of its true nature. It may be a cloak or camouflage while passing the impugned order. Howsoever innocuous the order may appear at its face and may not contain any stigma still the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order has to be examined. In the absence of a denial that the impugned order had been manifestly passed with mala fide intentions it has to be adjudged that the order was punitive. 9. In the case of State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1011 it was held that the entirety of circumstance preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the over-riding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order. 10. In the case of Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 1985 (50) F.L.R. 77 it has been held that employer cannot resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order of a temporary Government servant. 11. Even if it is sought for consideration that the termination order was discharge simpliciter it would be a vicious exercise and abuse of power while arbitrarily dispensing with the service of a civil servant on the plain edifice that it is discharge simpliciter . The order dispensing with the service of the respondent is unconscionable and was rightly declared illegal. 12. The order dispensing with the service of the respondent is unconscionable and was rightly declared illegal. 12. In view of the above discussions there is no error of law apparent on the face of record nor any substantial question of law is involved warranting interference in the judgment and decree passed by the court below. The appeal, therefore, fails and deserves to be dismissed. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.