JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---The petitioner landlord has challenged the order of the learned Rent Control authorities dismissing its application under Clause 13(3) of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, (for short the Rent Control Order) as barred by the principles of res judicata. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioner landlord previously filed an application on or about 21-10-1963 seeking permission to give quit notice to the non applicant No. 1 in that case under Clauses 13(3)(iii), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order and the case of the landlord in that case was that non applicant No. 1 in the said case viz. Velji Pachubai Gujarathi was its tenant and that the non-applicant No. 2 in that case viz. Radhakisan Badridas Bajaj, the respondent in the instant writ petition, was a sub-lessee, who was inducted by the aforesaid tenant without permission in writing of the petitioner. The said application was registered as Revenue Case No. 113/71(2)/63-64. The learned Rent Controller, Akola, dismissed the said application by his order dated 21-12-1968. An Appeal was preferred by the petitioner landlord registered as Appeal No. 140/71/68-69, which was also dismissed by the learned Appellate Court by the order dated 27-12-1969. the writ petition preferred by the petitioner in the said case registered as Special Civil Application No. 831 of 1975 was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 15-11-1978. 2. Thereafter the petitioner has filed on or about 9-1-1979 the instant application under Clauses 13(3)(ii), (v), (vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order. Originally the petitioner had joined the said Velji Pachubai Gujarathi as a party in the instant Rent Control case but later on got his name deleted presumably because there was a finding in the previous proceedings that from 1955 it was the respondent who was the tenant of the petitioner in regard to the suit premises. The respondent raised a preliminary objection in the instant case that it was barred by res judicata in view of the orders in the previous case referred to above. He also filed an application dated 19-9-1979 praying that the question of res judicata should be decided as a preliminary point. It appears from the contents of the said application that he had also called upon the landlord to give certain particulars as specified in the said application. He also filed an application dated 19-9-1979 praying that the question of res judicata should be decided as a preliminary point. It appears from the contents of the said application that he had also called upon the landlord to give certain particulars as specified in the said application. In reply to the said application, the petitioner stated that the demand for particulars was an attempt to fish out evidence and that it would adduce appropriate evidence at an appropriate state of the proceeding. According to it, the respondent was thus trying to protect the proceeding and the application for deciding the preliminary issue should be dismissed. 3. It appears that the respondent filed his written statement also thereafter. The petitioner then filed an application on 12-12-1979 that the case should be proceeded with and the parties should be called upon to lead evidence on all the points raised by them. The learned Rent Controller rejected the said application by his order dated 12-12-1979. He then proceeded to decided the question of res judicata and by his order dated 20-1-1980, he held that the order in the previous case was res judicata in the present proceedings. Hence he dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. An appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order of the learned Rent Controller was dismissed by the learned Appellant Court. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition in this Court. 4. The short question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the decision in the previous case preferred by the petitioner would operate as res judicata in the instant case. For deciding the said question, one has to bear in mind the provisions of Clause 13(9) of the Rent Control Order, which, to a certain extent, incorporate the principles of res judicata. Clause 13(9) of the Rent Control Order reads thus : “The Controller shall summarily reject any application made under sub-clause (2) which raises substantially the same issues as have been finally decided under the provisions of this order in a former proceeding between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim.” In application of the principles underlying Clause 13(9) it has, therefore, to be seen whether the issues raised in the instant case are substantially the same as were raised in the pervious case. 5. 5. It is not in dispute that the permission was not sought in the previous case under Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Control Order. However, as regards the issue about Clause 13(3)(ii) of Rent Control Order, the reasoning of the learned Rent Control authorities is that the same ought to have been raised in the previous case and since it was not raised, the instant application regarding the same would be barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. It may be seen that the various sub-clauses of Clause 13(3) deal with separate and independent grounds on which the permission to give quit notice can be asked for by the landlord. It is thus into necessary for the landlord to ask for permission upon all the grounds under Clause 13(3) simultaneously in the same application. It is material to see that all the grounds in Clause 13(3) may or may not simultaneously exist or may not be available at the same time to the landlord when he wants to file an application under Clause 13(3). On some grounds which are available. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that because the ground under Clause 13(3)(ii) is into raised in the previous case the instant application is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. 6. It is made clear that it is not necessary to decide in the instant writ petition the question whether the principles of constructive res judicata are applicable, in the Rent Control proceedings or not. Even assuming that the principles of contructive res judicata are applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Control Order, it cannot be said that the facts upon which the case is sought to be made out in the instant case under Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Control Order were available to the petitioner on the date of the application in the previous case. It is clear form the schedule of defaults filed along with the instant application that the period of default therein is after the filing of the previous application on 21-10-1963. It is well settled that in the case of permission for habitual default under Clause 13(3)(ii), the habitual default has to be proved as on the date of the application. It is clear form the schedule of defaults filed along with the instant application that the period of default therein is after the filing of the previous application on 21-10-1963. It is well settled that in the case of permission for habitual default under Clause 13(3)(ii), the habitual default has to be proved as on the date of the application. The subsequent defaults in payments of rent were not thus material or relevant for adjudicating in the previous case whether the tenant was a habitual defaulter or not. The facts pleaded by the petitioner in the instant application for its case under Clause 13(3)(ii) could not, therefore, be the subject matter of the previous application. There is, therefore, no question of application of even the principles of constructive res judicata in the instant case. At any rate, as already pointed out, since each ground under Claluse 13(3) is a separate and independent ground and since no supermission was asked for under Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Control Order in the previous case there would be no question of application of the principles of res judicata whether constructive or otherwise in regard to the ground raise under Clause 13(3)(ii) in the instant case. The finding of the learned Rent Control Authorities that the instant application in regard to Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Control Order is also barred by the principles of res judicata is clearly illegal and perverse and is liable to be set aside. It is thus necessary for the learned Rent Control Authorities to enquire into the merits of the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Control Order and render a finding in regard to the same on merits. 7. Turning to the question whether the order in the previous case would operate as res judicata in regard to the permission sought by the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(v) of the Rent Control Order in the instant case, it is necessary to see what the case of the petitioner was in the previous case and what the case of the petitioner is in the instant case. As already stated, in the previous case, according to the petitioner, the non-applicant No. 1 Velji in that case was his tenant, who according to the petitioner, had sub-let the suit premises to the respondent i.e. the non applicant No. 2 in the said case and hence the permission was also asked for under Clause 13(3)(iii) in the previous case on the ground that sub-lease was created by the non-applicant No. 1 in the above case without obtaining the permission in writing from the petitioner. From para 4 of the previous application, the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(v) was that the said non-applicant No. 1 in that case who, according to the petitioner, was his tenant had left the area for a period of more than four months and, therefore, did not reasonably need the suit premises himself. 8. It may be seen that the learned Rent Control Authorities in the previous case held that there was no sub-letting as alleged by the petitioner in that case but that the respondent in the instant writ petition was himself a tenant from 1955 of the suit premises. It is clear from the allegations in the previous application that no facts were pleaded in that case to show that the respondent was within the mischief of Clause 13(3)(v) of the Rent Control Order. 9. Perusing now the allegations of the petitioner in the instant case about permission sought under Clause 13(3)(v), it can be seen from para 9 of the application in the instant case that according to the petitioner, the respondent has purchased a house on or about 2-2-1976 which is located in front of the suit premises and that the said house has been purchased by him in the name of his son who is joint with him in mess, residence and business. It is because of the purchase of the house by the respondent that it is claimed that the respondent has secured an alternate accommodation and that he therefore, does not reasonably need the suit premises. 10. It is clear that the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(v) in the instant case is entirely different. It is because of the purchase of the house by the respondent that it is claimed that the respondent has secured an alternate accommodation and that he therefore, does not reasonably need the suit premises. 10. It is clear that the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(v) in the instant case is entirely different. He has in the first place pleaded his case under Clause 13(3)(v) against the respondent who is adjudged as a tenant in the previous proceeding and not against the non-applicant No. 1 in the previous case against whom he had pleaded a case under Clause 13(3)(v) in the said previous case. It cannot, therefore, be said that the issues under Clause 13(3)(v) of the Rent Control Order in the previous case and in the instant case are substantially the same. The principles of res judicata or for that matter the provisions of Clause 13(9) of the Rent Control Order are not, therefore, attracted as regards the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(v) in the instant case. The learned Rent Control Authorities have mechanically made applicable the principles of res judicata only because according to them the petitioner did not give particulars about the changed circumstances. The petitioner had stated by his application dated 12-12-1979 that all the particulars are contained in the original application under Clause 13(3) and, therefore, the parties should be required to lead evidence on merits in the instant case. As is shown above, it appears that the above stand taken by the petitioner was correct or at any rate all the facts relating to the case under Clause 13(3)(v) in both the cases were on record which the learned Rent Control authorities unfortunately failed to appreciate. The finding of the learned Rent Control Authorities in this regard clearly suffers from non-application of mind and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. The decision in the previous case on Clause 13(3)(v) does not thus operate as res judicata in the instant case. 11. As regards Clauses 13(3)(vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order the case of the petitioner in its previous application was that it was carrying on the business of ginning factory and that it wanted to carry on the business of sale of tiles for which it needed additional suitable accommodation. 11. As regards Clauses 13(3)(vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order the case of the petitioner in its previous application was that it was carrying on the business of ginning factory and that it wanted to carry on the business of sale of tiles for which it needed additional suitable accommodation. Further, according to the petitioner, the suit premises were suitable and, therefore, needed by it for the aforesaid purpose. It was further its case that the existing structure was an old structure which it wanted to demolish and then construct an office as well as a suitable shop for carrying on the aforesaid proposed business. There were independent allegations also made in para 5 of the previous application for claiming permission under Clause 13(3)(vii). It was pleaded therein by the petitioner that the existing structure upon the suit premises was made of a tin structure which had become very old and was in a dilapidated worn out and rotten condition and, therefore, needed essential repairs and alterations which could not be carried out without demolition of the existing structure. 12. Perusal of the instant application would show that the petitioner is carrying on various businesses including the business of the ginning factory. It may be seen that the petitioner is a partnership firm comprising of the partners Nathmal Khetan, Shankarlal Khetan and Shriram Khetan and that there are other sister partnership concerns known as Khetan Industries and Khetan Plastics of which the partners of the petitioner partnership firm viz. Nathamal Khetan and Shankarlal Khetan are the partners. It is the case of the petitioner that the said Khetan Industries and Khetan Plastics which carried on the business of manufacturing tiles, had recently acquired dealership in cement from the reputed producer manufacturer viz. A.C.C. and also dealership of polyethelene bags, ropes and canes. According to the petitioner, it wants to construct office and shop for the business of the firm Khetan Industries as well as Khetan Plastics which are the sister concerns of the partners of the petitioner firm. It also wants to have a good, convenient and proper office for its ginning factory which can only be done by demolishing the existing structure upon the suit premises as the same is in its existing position cannot be used for the said purpose. It also wants to have a good, convenient and proper office for its ginning factory which can only be done by demolishing the existing structure upon the suit premises as the same is in its existing position cannot be used for the said purpose. It is on the basis of these facts that the permission is sought in the case under Clauses 13(3)(vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order. 12-A. The permission is also sought under Clause 13(3)(vii) independently, as is clear from the allegations in para 5, on the ground that there is change in the circumstances now because the permission is already granted against the other tenants under Clause 13(3)(vii) for the demolition of the portions in their occupation shown in the map by letters B, C, and D and, therefore, the permission is needed for this portion 'A' i.e. the suit premises in occupation of the respondent. 13. As regards Clause 13(3)(vi) it is clear that the case of the petitioner /landlord is different in the instant application, because in the instant case it has pleaded for additional accommodation for the business of its partners, whereas in the previous case it had pleaded additional accommodation for locating its office and show-case for the business of said of cotton and other commodities which it wanted to start. It is a different thing as to what the effect of the previous case is upon the question whether the case now pleaded by the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(vi) is bona fide or not. However, the principle of res judicata cannot surely apply because the need pleaded in the instant case is different and therefore, the issue under Clause 13(3)(vi) cannot be said to be substantially the same in both these cases. The learned Rent Control Authorities have, however, as shown above, mechanically made applicable the principle of res judicata only because the petitioner did not furnish the better particulars which clearly shows their non application of mind to the contents of these two applications. Their findings on the question of res judicata as regards the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(vi) in the instant case is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 14. As regards Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order, there are two aspects of the same. Their findings on the question of res judicata as regards the case of the petitioner under Clause 13(3)(vi) in the instant case is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 14. As regards Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order, there are two aspects of the same. In the previous application as well as in the instant application permission under Clause 13(3)(vii) is sought independently as well as for the need pleaded under Clause 13(3)(vi). As regards the claim of the petitioner that he wants to demolish the present structure and to erect a new one so as to suit its present needs, which is implicit in the permission under Clause 13(3)(vi) itself, since as shown above the finding under Clause 13(3)(vi) in the previous case does not operate as res judicata in the instant case, for the same reasons the previous decision under Clause 13(3)(vii) cannot operate as res judicata in the instant case. 15. However, as regards the question of independent permission sought under Clause 13(3)(vii), it has to be seen that the averments in both the cases are similar as regards the condition of the existing structure. However, the changed circumstance, which is pleaded by the petitioner in para 5 of the instant application is as regards the portions shown in the map by letters B, C and D of the same house. It is averred that since the petitioner has secured permission against the tenants occupying the said portions, therefore, for building a new construction by demolishing the old one, permission is also necessary in regard to portion A, i.e. the suit premises of the respondent which have become dilapidated. 15-A. It may be seen that the above change in circumstances is pleaded in the application itself and, therefore, there is no question of giving any better particulars in regard thereto. The learned Rent Control authorities failed to notice the said circumstance. However, the question that still remains is whether the said circumstance is proved by evidence or not by the petitioner and secondly, whether the said circumstance is such which would prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. However, the said question has to be judged after allowing the parties to lead evidence and after appreciating the said evidence on record in the instant case. The said question is, therefore, kept open. However, the said question has to be judged after allowing the parties to lead evidence and after appreciating the said evidence on record in the instant case. The said question is, therefore, kept open. The Rent Control authorities will have to render a finding in regard to that question after appreciation of evidence on record. 16. In the result, the instant Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Rent Control authorities on the question of res judicata is wholly set aside in regard to the case of the petitioner under Clauses 13(3)(ii), (v) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order. As regards Clause 13(3)(vii) in so far as the ground therein is implicit Clause 13(3)(vi) as pleaded by the petitioner, the finding in regard to the principle of res judicata would stand set aside. However, so far as the permission sought independently under Clause 13(3)(vii) is concerned, the learned Rent Controller is directed to consider the said question afresh after the evidence is led by the parties in that regard. He should also record a finding on merits upon independent allegation under Clause 13(3)(vii) so as to prevent remand solely for that purpose. The proceedings are thus remanded in the light of the observations made in this judgment to the learned Rent Controller for a decision on all the issues on merits and on the question of res judicata in so far as independent allegations under Clause 13(3)(vii) in both the cases are concerned. There would, however, be no order as to costs in this writ petition. Petition allowed. -----