Bijli Cotton Mills, Hathras v. Labour Court, Agra — 1987 DIGILAW 583 (ALL)

ORDER Amarendra Nath Varma, J. : - These two petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as they arise out of six identical awards dated Oct. 13, 1979. Writ Petition No. 1221 of 1980 has been filed by the employers while the connected petition No. 2421 of 1980 is by the six concerned workmen. 2. At the instance of the six workmen identical industrial disputes had been referred by the State Government under S. 10(t)(6 of the Industrial Disputes Act which gave rise to six adjudication cases which have been disposed of by the Labour Court. Agra by an award which is the subject of challenge in these two petitions. The employers are aggrieved by that part of the award whereby the Labour Court has directed reinstatement with the benefit of continuity of service of some of the workmen while the workmen are assailing the award to the extent that it fails to give them the reliefs claimed by them. 3. These are the essential facts about which there does not seem to be any controversy and indeed may be taken as established on the record. Messrs. Bijli Cotton Mills was a private limited company in which the six workmen were admittedly employed when the working of the mills stopped on May 13, 1970. A lay-off was declared for a short period to start with but by subsequent notices the period of lay off was extended of the six workmen, only Rameshwar Dayal and Nanak Chand Gupta were laid off while the remaining four workmen continued on duty till the mills was declared sick and brought under the purview of an ordinance promulgated on Oct. 31, 1972 called the Sick Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Managements) Ord. No. 9 of 1972.. Under this Ordinance the management of the mills was taken over and vested in the Central Government with effect from Oct. 31, 1972. The Ordinance was replaced by an enactment bearing the same name which came into force on Dec. 23, 1972. The National Textile Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. (hereinafter the Corporation' for short) was appointed the custodian under the aforesaid statutes which nominated the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hathras to take possession and seal the premises of the mills which was done on Nov. 20.1972. On Feb. 23. 23, 1972. The National Textile Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. (hereinafter the Corporation' for short) was appointed the custodian under the aforesaid statutes which nominated the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hathras to take possession and seal the premises of the mills which was done on Nov. 20.1972. On Feb. 23. 1972 the Chief Executive of that undertaking put up a notice at the mills gate requiring the employees of the mills who were working on May 13, 1970 to furnish certain information which was furnished by the employees including the six workmen. Thereafter it appears that some of the erstwhile workmen were re-employed while the others were not. The six workmen before me were amongst those whom the Corporation declined to take back in service. The workmen took recourse to conciliation proceedings but to no avail. Meanwhile Ordinance No. 12 of 1974 nationalising the sick mills including the present mills was promulgated and was soon thereafter replaced by the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 which provided for transfer and ownership of the undertaking in the Central Government. Under Ordinance No. 9 of 1972 only the management had vested in the Central Government but under Act No. 57 of 1974 the ownership itself of the company vested in the Central Government. 4. The conciliation proceedings having failed to bear any result, the aforesaid disputes were referred by the State Government for the adjudication of the Labour Court. 5. The case of the workmen was that they are the employees of the Undertaking and their services not having been retrenched or otherwise terminated, they continued to retain the right of employment not- withstanding the change of hands in the Management. The Corporation as the successor management of the earst while Bijli Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., was liable to take them back in service when the mills resumed production on April 11, 1973. It was further asserted that the workmen having been in service of the Undertaking throughout became the employees of the Corporation with effect from April 1, 1974 under S. 14(1) of Act No. 57 of 1974 upon the vesting of the ownership in it under the said Act. In this view they were entitled to reinstatement with all the benefits of continuity of service and interest at the rate of 12%. In this view they were entitled to reinstatement with all the benefits of continuity of service and interest at the rate of 12%. The Corporation was wholly unjustified in taking back in service employees who were junior to these workmen while refusing the same benefit to them. 6. The defence of the Corporation was that the State Government was not the appropriate Government entitled to make reference because the management of the Mills had with effect from Oct. 31, 1972 vested in the Central Government and so was the ownership with effect from April 1, 1974 under Act No. 57 of 1974. No claim for wages, etc. for the period prior to the said date was enforceable against the Central Government. The old undertaking had been lying closed for the last more than two years before its management vested in the Central Government and they had, therefore, no right to be taken into service by the new Management. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following two preliminary issues were framed : "1. Is the referece bad in law for reasons pleaded in employer's written statement? 2. Has this court got no jurisdiction to hear these references?" These two issues were answered against the employers by an order dated Dec. 8, 1978. It was held that the court did have jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes referred to it by the State Government add that the reference was not bad in law. 8. In support of their respective cases the Management as well as the individual workmen led evidence. On a consideration of the entire material on the record and the relevant provisions the Labour Court has disposed of the six adjudication cases holding that the concerned workmen continued to retain the right of employment notwithstanding the change in the hands of the Management and they were, therefore, entitled to be reinstated in service in the corporation with benefit of continuity of service._In the case of some of the workmen, however, full back wages and allowances were not granted as a result of which five workmen have challenged the award, namely, Rameshwar Dayal, Bishambher Dayal, Nanak Chand Gupta and Jagdish Prasad Gupta, on the ground that full back wages have not been granted to them while Gajadhar Singh Verma has assailed the award on the ground that no relief whatever has been granted to him. 9. 9. The main contention of Sri V.B. Singh, learned counsel for the Management. was that the workmen in question were employees of the old Management and inasmuch as the mills was lying closed when its management. was taken over under Ordinance No. 9 of 1972, their services stood automatically terminated and the liability in respect of such employees could not in view of S. 5 of Act No. 57 of 1974 be enforced against the Corporation. He submitted that the liability of the Corporation was limited to the various wages, salaries and other dues of the employees of the sick textile undertaking only for the period after the management of such undertaking had been taken over by the Central Government. The claim of the workmen concerned being clearly in respect of a liability other than mentioned in sub-s. (2) of S. 5 was enforceable only against the erstwhile management. 10. The submission of the learned counsel is, in my opinion, squarely covered by a Division Bench decision of this court which is directly in point in the case of National Textile Corporation, U.P. v. Labour Court, Kanpur and others delivered on March 15, 1982. That decision dealt with an identical situation. There also the question was whether a workman who was in the employment of the Undertaking when it closed down on Dec. 23. 1967 had a right to claim reinstatement against the Corporation which has been authorised by the Central Government to run that undertaking under provisions which were identical to those with which I am concerned. In that case also the New Victoria Mills Limited, in which the workman was employed had been declared sick and an Authorised Controller had been appointed under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The company was subsequently taken over by the Central Government under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974. When the company resumed production the workman reported on duty but the Corporation refused to take him back in service on the same plea as is being raised by the Management in the present case. The dispute gave rise to a reference which was answered in favour of the workman, the Labour Court directing the reinstatement of the workman with the benefit of continuity of service. The Management had filed petition in this Court which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The dispute gave rise to a reference which was answered in favour of the workman, the Labour Court directing the reinstatement of the workman with the benefit of continuity of service. The Management had filed petition in this Court which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench examined the question at considerable length relying on leading decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and thereafter stated the law thus : "The modern concept of law in regard to the employees of an industrial unit vis-a-vis the employers has undergone a substantial change. The old concept of master and servant is for all practical purposes given a good-bye. If an industry or an industrial unit has changed hands, or has been taken under new management and control it does not mean, ipso facto, the cessation of the industry or the industrial unit so as to enable the new management to recruit new hands altogether. The employees have a right to continue in the same establishment although its management and control may have undergone a change. They have, therefore. an association with the industry or the industrial unit notwithstanding its merger, transfer, change of hands or change of control and management. The relationship is principally between the workman and the industrial unit and this relationship subsists." Again, the Bench observed as follows "It is, therefore, clear that the employees in an industrial establishment even though the latter has undergone a change of ownership, management or control, retain rights accrued to them under the Industrial Employees Standing Orders Act or the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. These benefits are not done away with when ever an industrial establishment is taken over or whenever there is a change of management or control. We are satisfied that Ram Lai who was an erstwhile employee of the Company (New Victoria Mills) continued to retain a right vis-a-vis the industrial establishment. A question, therefore, arises whether Ram Lal was a workman or not. Undoubtedly, Ram Lal was a workman employed by the Company. He retained his rights to be re- employed when the Company went into business again in 1970 under the Authorised Controller. He was not called upon to join the Company. He did not lose his right and the rights would be deemed to continue even after the management of the company vested in the National Textiles Corporation Ltd.". He retained his rights to be re- employed when the Company went into business again in 1970 under the Authorised Controller. He was not called upon to join the Company. He did not lose his right and the rights would be deemed to continue even after the management of the company vested in the National Textiles Corporation Ltd.". 11. The above dictum provides a complete answer to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner the right of employment which the workmen are claiming. vis-a-vis the Corporation is a right arising out of a relationship with the undertaking in which they were working and that relationship continues notwithstanding the change of hands in the Management or control or even ownership of the Undertaking. 12. 1 have reached the above conclusion on the general principle that the right of employment of a workman continues notwithstanding the change of hands in the management or even ownership of the Undertaking without the aid of express statutory provisions contained in Act No. 57 of 1974. S. 14(1) of the said Act provides : "14. Employment of certain employees to continue (1) Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), and has been. immediately before the appointed day. in the employment of a sick textile undertaking shall become, on and from the appointed day, an employee of the National Textile Corporation, and shall hold office or service in the National Textile Corporation with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if the rights in relation to such sick textile undertaking had not been transferred to, and vested in, the National Textile Corporation and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment in the National Textile Corporation is duly terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered by the National Textile Corporation." 13. This provision, in my opinion, puts the controversy beyond any debate, for it confers on the employees of the erstwhile company an undoubted right to claim continuance of their employment and fastens upon the Corporation a corresponding duty to take back such employees and treat them as their own. This provision, in my opinion, puts the controversy beyond any debate, for it confers on the employees of the erstwhile company an undoubted right to claim continuance of their employment and fastens upon the Corporation a corresponding duty to take back such employees and treat them as their own. It is however unnecessary to dilate on this point as an identical provision insofar as is material for our purpose came up for scrutiny before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. 1978 (37) Fac LR 144: AIR 1978 SC 979 . The Supreme Court was construing analogous provisions appearing in Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972 dealing with an identical situation, namely, the transfer and vesting in the Central Government of certain coking coal companies and the rights of employees of the erstwhile companies vis-a-vis the Bharat Coking Coal Co. Ltd. The question was whether employees of an erstwhile company, namely, the New Dharmabhand Colliery whose services were wrongfully terminated could claim reinstatement in the Bharat Coking Coal Co. Ltd. The provisions which were extensively commented upon and construed by the Supreme Court were Sections 9 and 17 of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972. Section 9 of that Act was in pari materia with section 5 of Act 57 of 1974 with which we are concerned and S. 17(1$ of that Act was in the same terms as S. 14(1) of Act 57 of 1974. Section 17(l) reads as follows : "17(1) Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and has been, immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant. Section 17(l) reads as follows : "17(1) Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and has been, immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant. shall become on and from the appointed day, an employee of the Central Government, or, as the case may be of the Government company in which the right, title and interest of such mine or plant have vested under this Act, and shall hold office or service in the coking coal mine or coke oven plant, as the case may be, on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if the rights in relation to such coking coal mine or coke oven plant had not been transferred to and vested in the Central Government or Government company. as the case may be, and continue to do so unless and until his employment in such coking coal mine or coke oven plant is duly terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered, by the Central Government or the Government Company." 14. Repelling the submission advanced on behalf of the Bharat Coking Coal Co. Ltd. that inasmuch as the services of the concerned workmen had already been terminated prior to the vesting of the erstwhile company in the Bharat Coking Coal Co. Ltd. they had ceased to be on the rolls of the company on the appointed date and consequently it could not be validly argued that the said workmen were the employees of the erstwhile company on the appointed date within the meaning of S. 17(1) of the Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows : "Section 17 is a special provision relating to workmen and their continuance in service notwithstanding the transfer from private ownership to the Central Government or Government company. This is a statutory protection for the workmen and is express, explicit and mandatory. Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, and had been immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of a mine, shall become an employee of the Government or the Government company and continue to do so as laid down in S. 17. Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, and had been immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of a mine, shall become an employee of the Government or the Government company and continue to do so as laid down in S. 17. A 'workman' is defined in the Industrial Disputes Act to mean any person employed in any industry (we omit the unnecessary words) and includes any such person who has been dismissed and whose dismissal has led to a dispute. It is perfectly plain that the 40 workmen who were dismissed and whose dismissal led to the industrial dispute are 'workmen' within the meaning of S. 17(1) of the Act. Irrefutably follows the inference that they are workmen entitled to continuance in service as provided for in S. 17. It is not open to any one to contend that because they had been wrongfully dismissed and, therefore, are not physically on the rolls on the date of the takeover, they are not legally workmen under the new owner. The subtle eye of the law transcends existence on the gross level. The statutory continuity of service cannot be breached by the wrongful dismissal of the prior employer. It is important that the dismissal has been set aside and the award expressly directs reinstatement with continuity of service by the management for the time being, namely. the Bharat Coking Coal Company Ltd. The finding that the dismissal was wrongful has not been challenged and, therefore, must stand. The Court in Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, (1970) 21 Fac LR 11 : (1970) 3 SCR 708 at p. 714 : (1970 Lab IC 1040 at p. 1044) had to deal with a wrongful dismissal, a direction for reinstatement by an award and a transfer of ownership from a private operator to a State Transport Corporation, Shelat, J. observed : "The argument, however, was that the true meaning of the said averment was that only those of the employees of the Rajya Transport Authority who were actually in its rolls were taken over and not those who were deemed to be on its rolls. It is difficult to understand the distinction sought to be made between those whose names were actually on the rolls and those whose names, though not physically on the rolls, were deemed in law to be on the rolls. It is difficult to understand the distinction sought to be made between those whose names were actually on the rolls and those whose names, though not physically on the rolls, were deemed in law to be on the rolls. I f respondent 3 continues in law to be in the service, it makes little difference whether his name actually figured in the rolls or not. The expression 'on the rolls' must mean those who were on May 1, 1959 in the service of the Rajya Transport Authority. By reason of the order discharging him from service being illegal, respondent 3 was and must be regarded to be in the service of the said Authority, and therefore, he would be one of those whose services were taken over by the..appellant corporation." The present.one is afortiori case. We have not the slightest doubt that what matters is not the physical presence on the rolls but the continuance it 'service in law because the dismissal is non est." (emphasis supplied) 15. In the present case the finding of the Labour Court is that the concerned workmen were in lawful employment of the sick mills and the Corporation had wrongfully declined to take them back in service. In substance, the finding is that the services of the concerned workmen were wrongfully terminated. The right of such employees on the ratio of the workmen of Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (1978 Lab IC 709) (supra) to claim reinstatement and continuity of service in terms of S. 14(1) of 1974 Act, therefore. cannot be seriously challenged. The dictum of the Supreme Court in the above decision applies on all fours to the problem at hand. 16. The controversy as regards the true scope of S. 5 of the 1974 Act and its various clauses also squarely stands concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihar Colliery's case construing S. 9 of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972. Section 9(1) of the said Act provides that every liability of the owner of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant, in relation to any period prior to the appointed day. shall be the liability of such owner and shall be enforceable against him and not against the Central Government or the Government Company. Sub-sec. Section 9(1) of the said Act provides that every liability of the owner of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant, in relation to any period prior to the appointed day. shall be the liability of such owner and shall be enforceable against him and not against the Central Government or the Government Company. Sub-sec. (24 of S. 9 provides for removal of doubts as to the scope of sub-s. (1) of S. 9 which declares : "(a) save as otherwise provided else where in this Act, no claim for wages, bonus, royalty, rate, rent, taxes. provident fund, pension. gratuity or any other dues in relation to a coking coal mine or coke oven plant in respect of any period prior to the appointed day. shall be enforceable against the Central or the Government Company. (b) & (c) ...................... 17. Construing sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 9 of the 1972 Act, their Lordships ruled that sub-s. (1) of S. 9 has nothing to do with the wrongful dismissals and awards or reinstatement. Those are subjects dealt with exclusively by S. 17(1) (corresponding to S. 14(1) of the 1974 Act). Their Lordships said. "employees are not a liability" within the meaning of S. 9(1). Section 9(l) deals with pecuniary and other liabilities like arrears of wages or other contractual, statutory and tortious liabilities. In regard to S. 9(2) the Supreme Court said its only purpose was to remove doubts as regards the scope of S. 9(1). It is not an independent clause but must necessarily be held to deal with the subject- matter of sub-s. (1) of S. 9. Finally. their Lordships held that S. 9(2)(b) does not nullify S. 17(1) nor has i t a large operation. In regard to S. 9 the law was summed up thus : "We are clear that the whole provision confers immunity against the liability, not a right to jettison workmen under the employ of the previous owner in the eye of law." 18. The submission of the learned counsel that S. 5 of the 1974 Act has the effect of leaving the workmen wrongfully dismissed from service with a remedy enforceable only against the company and not against the Corporation must, therefore, be rejected on the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case :)f Bihar Colliery, (1978 Lab IC 709) (supra). The submission of the learned counsel that S. 5 of the 1974 Act has the effect of leaving the workmen wrongfully dismissed from service with a remedy enforceable only against the company and not against the Corporation must, therefore, be rejected on the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case :)f Bihar Colliery, (1978 Lab IC 709) (supra). The appropriate provision governing the case in hand is S. 14(1) and not S. 5 of the 1974 Act. The workman who was in the employment of the sick mills and whose services were wrongfully terminated has a right of reinstatement enforceable under S. 14(1) against the Corporation. S. 5 of the 1974 Act does not and cannot curb that right. Further, the right of a workman whose services have been wrongfully terminated is a continuing right and is not a past crystallised pecuniary liability covered by S. 5 of the 1974 Act. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner. however, relied on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court (S. K. Dhaon. J.) in the case of Smt. Sukh Devi v. The Industrial Tribunal and others (Writ Petition No. 4570 of 1977) decided on Sept. 26, 1983 in which the learned Judge took the view that a dismissed employee of an Undertaking declared sick under the 1974 Act could not enforce his claim for reinstatement against the Corporation because in the view of the learned Judge the right claimed by the employee was a liability which not being covered by S. 5(1) could be enforced against the erstwhile owner of the Undertaking and not against the Corporation. 20. The decision of the learned single Judge is based on the assumption that such a right claimed by an employee is a liability the enforceability of which is governed by S. 5 of the Act. That this assumption is not correct has been clearly held by the Supreme Court in Bihar Colliery's case (supra). According to the ratio of the Supreme Court in Bihar Colliery's case the relevant provision would be a provision corresponding to S. 14(1) which deals with the rights of the employees of the erstwhile owner of the Undertaking and such employees include both the employees actually on the rolls on the appointed date as well as those wrongfully removed by the former owner. It is apparent that the attention of the learned single Judge was not invited to S. 14(1) nor the Supreme Court decision in Bihar Colliery's case nor even to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of National Textile Corporation (supra). In this view, following the Supreme Court decision as well as the Division Bench decision of our own Court, I hold that the right claimed by the concerned workmen in the present case was undoubtedly enforceable against the Corporation. 21. I am fortified in the view that I am taking by a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dina Nath Amba Das Udhare v. P. S. Malvankar, (1981) 42 Fac LR 304. Their Lordships of the Bombay High Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bihar Colliery's case (1978 Lab IC 709) and held that Sections 5 and 14 of the Act 57 of 1974 were in pari materia with Sections 9 and 17 of the 1972 Act and. therefore, a person in employment of the former owner whose services were wrongfully terminated prior to the appointed date. that is, April 1. 1974, could enforce his claim of reinstatement under S. 14(1) against the Corporation. 22. Another decision by the same learned Judge in the case of Sundar Lal and others v. The Labour Court (Writ Petri. No. 238 of 1978) decided on Oct. 5, 1983 cited for the petitioner is distinguishable as that was a case where the concerned workmen were claiming certain pecuniary benefits which they had earned against the erstwhile company prior to the appointed date. Such a pecuniary liability was clearly covered by section 5(l) of the 1974 Act and. therefore. enforceable only against the erstwhile company. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the services of the concerned workmen should be deemed to have automatically ceased prior to the appointed date by operation of law as a result of the transfer and vesting of the Undertaking in the National Textile Corporation and consequently all that the workmen were entitled to under S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act was compensation computed in accordance with the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. In support learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (1974) 4 SCC 696 . In support learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (1974) 4 SCC 696 . para 17: (1974 Lab IC 1018, para 18) and AIR 1963 SC 1489 , paras 16, 17 and 18. 24. lam unable to agree. Section 14(1) of the 1974 Act which is a special provision which deals specifically with the subject of rights of the workmen who were and had been in the employment of such Undertakings on the appointed date on their transfer and vesting in the National Textile Corporation. The present is undeniably a case of transfer of the ownership and management of an Undertaking by operation of law. What will he the effect on the rights of workmen upon transfer will, therefore, be governed entirely by this special provision, namely, S. 14(1) and not by S. 25-FF which is indisputably a general provision. It is settled law that when a law generally deals with a subject and another dealing particularly with one of the topics comprised therein. the general law is to be construed yielding the special (See AIR 1955 SC 661 ). Section 14(1) was clearly designed to keep the interests of the employees alive notwithstanding the transfer of the Undertaking. 25. In this connection it is noteworthy that admittedly compensation as provided under S. 25-F was not paid to the workmen. Consequently they would be deemed in law to continue in service entitled to enforce their claim against the Corporation under S. 14(1) on the ratio of Bihar Colliery's case (1978 Lab IC 709). 26. Finally, the petitioner's counsel made a feeble attempt to challenge the correctness of the finding of the Labour Court that the present is not a case where the erstwhile company could be said to have applied the closure of the business. 27. The challenge is devoid of any merit. The Labour Court has discussed this question at some length and has observed that there was no evidence whatever to indicate that the erstwhile management had taken any step to give any notice necessary to effect a valid closure of the business. 27. The challenge is devoid of any merit. The Labour Court has discussed this question at some length and has observed that there was no evidence whatever to indicate that the erstwhile management had taken any step to give any notice necessary to effect a valid closure of the business. It has observed that it was admitted to the Management that the old employers had not issued any notice of closure of the business and that from the mere fact that the factory was lying closed from May, 1970 to April 1973 it could not be inferred that a valid closure had been applied by the Management. Lochan Singh Verma (E.W. 1) appearing for the Management professed ignorance that any closure notice was given by the Management. The Management led evidence only to show that lay off notices had been given. The Labour Court has rightly observed that there was a clear distinction between a closure and a lock out. In the former, the employer does not merely close down the place of business but he closes the business itself indicating a final and irrevocable termination of the business itself. At the end of the discussion, the Labour Court has recorded a finding as follows : "In view of the facts of the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that the old employers had not closed their business although for all practical purposes the business of the Undertaking was lying closed from May. 1970 to Oct. 1972." 28. The conclusion reached by the lower appellate court that the services of the concerned employee had not been validly terminated by the erstwhile mills is perfectly sound and not having been demonstrated to have been vitiated by any error of law cannot be reviewed in these proceedings. 29. This brings me to the last submission of the learned counsel which was that the appropriate Government in the present case was the Central Government and not the State Government which has referred the dispute. Learned counsel, however, did not pursue this submission when confronted by the other side by a decision of this Court in the case of National Textile Corporation Limited, U.P. (supra). In that case, the issue was considered in depth and a finding was recorded that the appropriate Government on such facts is the State Government and not the Central Government. I respectfully agree with this opinion. 30. In that case, the issue was considered in depth and a finding was recorded that the appropriate Government on such facts is the State Government and not the Central Government. I respectfully agree with this opinion. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion. I find no merit in the employer's petition t Writ No. 1221 of 1980) which must be dismissed. 31. I now pass on to the workmen's petition which appears to have been filed more as a counter blast to the employers' petition rather than to voice any real grievance. For, the learned counsel for the petitioners was hardly able to advance or raise any state able issue or to point out any error in the award of the Labour Court. A very feeble attempt was made to submit generally that the Labour Court should have awarded full back wages to some of the workmen. Counsel was, however, entirely unable to point out any error whether in the approach or appreciation of the evidence by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has given valid reasons for not granting full wages to some of the workmen and in not granting the relief of reinstatement to the workmen who had attained the age of superannuation. In fact, the submissions made by the counsel for the workmen were half-hearted and no serious attempt was made to point out any illegality in the impugned award in so far as the workmen's grievance was concerned. 32. In the result. both the petitions fail and are dismissed. The parties in both the petitions shall, however. hear their own costs.