M.C. JAIN, J.—This petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is directed against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sriganganagar dated March 28, 1979 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge upheld the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Ganganagar, dated May 4, 1978. The learned Magistrate passed the order in proceedings u/s 125(3) Cr.P.C. 11 months amount of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 69/- was due from the husband present-petitioner. The learned Magistrate expressed that the husband can be punished to the extent of 11 months simple imprisonment. Thereafter, he stated that considering the circumstances of the case, he prescribed the punishment to the extent of 6 months, simple imprisonment. The warrant of arrest was ordered to be issued. 2. The only question that arises for consideration in the present petition is, as to whether the learned Magistrate was justified in passing the impugned order whereby sending the husband to six months simple imprisonment in connection with the enforcement of the maintenance order. For consideration of the above question I extract sub-section 3 of 125 Sec. Cr. P. C:— (3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that the warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation: If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wifes refusal to live with him. 3. Explanation: If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wifes refusal to live with him. 3. The relevant part of the old provision contained in Section 488(3) Cr. P. C. is also produced below: Enforcement of order (3). If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made......... 4. For the purpose of this petition the main provision of sub-section 3 is material. The following words occurring in sub-section need to be interpreted "and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extent to one month or until payment if sooner made." 5. On analysing the main provision contained in sub-section 3 it would appear that if compliance of the order has not been made without sufficient cause then the Magistrate is empowered to issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the mariner provided for levying fines for every breach of the order and he is also empowered to sentence such persons to imprisonment for each months allowance remains unpaid after execution of the warrant either wholly or in part and for such each months allowance whether wholly due or partly due, the Magistrate may sentence such person to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or if payment is made earlier, then to the extent of the date when payment is made. The term of imprisonment is one month for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after execution of the warrant. If warrant remains unexecuted, it does not mean that order of imprison-ment cannot be passed. Sub-section 3 confers both the powers on the Magistrate. He may issue warrant for levying the amount due and if warrant remains unexecuted pass an order for imprisonment to the extent as provided in sub-section 3. If warrant remains unexecuted, it does not mean that order of imprison-ment cannot be passed. Sub-section 3 confers both the powers on the Magistrate. He may issue warrant for levying the amount due and if warrant remains unexecuted pass an order for imprisonment to the extent as provided in sub-section 3. The maximum sentence that can be ordered under sub-section 3 is one month for each months allowance due or one month for a part of each months allowance. The maximum to the extent of one month is not provided under this provision. The maximum one month is with reference to each months or part of each months allowance. The term of imprisonment has a relation with the amount due in relation to a particular month whether the whole of the months allowance is due or part of the months allowance is due. In that situation the term of imprisonment may extent to one month. The question had come up for consideration before the various courts in India. 6. Reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Emperor vs. Beni(l). Provision of Sec. 488(3) Cr.P.C. 1898 analogous to section 125(3) Cr. P. C. 1973 came up for consideration. It was observed in this case as under:- We are satisfied after a consideration of the terms of the section that the intention of the Legislature was to empower the Magistrate after execution of one warrant only to sentence a person, who has defaulted in the payment of maintenance ordered under S. 488, Criminal P. C. to imprisonment for a period of one month in respect of each months default that the section does not enjoin that there should be a separate warrant in respect of each term of imprisonment for one month. In other words, where appears have been allowed to accumulate, the court can issue one warrant and impose a cumulative sentence of imprisonment. We would observe that the decision in 20 Mad, has been followed in a number of other cases in 25 Cal. 291 AIR 1935 Lah. 750 and 50 IC 847. We would remark further that the warrant of imprisonment under s. 488 Criminal P. C, the form of which is to be found in sec. We would observe that the decision in 20 Mad, has been followed in a number of other cases in 25 Cal. 291 AIR 1935 Lah. 750 and 50 IC 847. We would remark further that the warrant of imprisonment under s. 488 Criminal P. C, the form of which is to be found in sec. 5 No. XL contemplate a sentence of more than one months rigorous imprisonment in the case of a person who has defaulted in payment for more than one month. The warrant runs......and whereas it has been further proved that the said (name) in willful disregard of the said order has failed to pay rupees being the amount of the allowance for the month (or months) of and thereupon an order as made adjudging him to undergo simple (or rigorous) imprisonment in the said jail for the period of...... We, therefore, hold that in the case of a default in payment directed by an order under s. 488 Criminal P. C. the Magistrate seised with the case may issue one warrant and thereafter pass a sentence of imprisonment for one month in respect of each month or part of a month for which there has been default in payment. 7. In Ma Tin Tin vs. Maung Aye (2) the Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court observed as under:- "When a wife applies to enforce a maintenance order and in a single application includes arrears which cover several months, the Magistrate has power to sentence the defaulter to more than one months imprisonment. He may sentence the defaulter to one months imprisonment for each full months arrears of maintenance and to a further month for any broken period over and above that completed number of months arrears which falls short of another complete month." 8. In Karson Ramji Chawda v. The State of Bombay (3) it was observed as under: "Therefore, this sub-sec. confers upon the Magistrate two independent powers; one to issue a warrant which has to be executed in the manner laid down in the sub-section and the other to sentence the person also in the manner laid down in the sub-section. The fallacy under-lying Mr. Kotwals argument is that the sentence follows upon the issue of a warrant. That is not the section. The fallacy under-lying Mr. Kotwals argument is that the sentence follows upon the issue of a warrant. That is not the section. The power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant is not dependent upon the issue of the warrant, or in the other words the issue of the warrant is not a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant. Therefore, if we read the provision with regard to the power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant independently of the power to issue the warrant, it is clear that the power to sentence is for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term which may extent to one month or until payment if sooner made. Now these words clearly lay down the power of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is in respect of whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid to sentence the application for a term not exceeding one month." 9. In Kantappa v, Sharnanarma (4) relying on the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court and Bombay High Court referred to supra, it was held that the maximum imprisonment can be one month for each months arrears. The Magistrate has to compute term of imprisonment with reference to each months default and pass a cumulative sentence. 10. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Modderi Bin V. Sukhdeo Bin (5) also had an occasion to consider this question. Justice P.B. Mukbarji as he then was speaking for the court observed as under:— "The maximum punishment of one month provided under section 488 of the Code is reliable to a period of the arrear for one month. In other words, default of one month is punishable by one months imprisonment and no more. If the default is more than one month then the imprisonment can be for as many months of default subject to a maximum of 12 months. Since the second proviso to s. 488 (3) provides that no warrant can be issued for recovery of amount due unless an application has been made to the Court within one year from the date on which it became due, the arrears can be accumulated only for one year and no more. Since the second proviso to s. 488 (3) provides that no warrant can be issued for recovery of amount due unless an application has been made to the Court within one year from the date on which it became due, the arrears can be accumulated only for one year and no more. In such case, the Magistrate can give at most 12 months imprisonment and no more. Thus the Magistrates order sentencing a party to 6 months imprisonment for 9 months default in maintenance, is not bad in law." 11. It was also held that Section 488 (3) does not restrict sentence to simple imprisonment. Sentence to rigorous imprisonment is not bad in law. 12. Same view has been taken in Antha vs. Lakshmi (6), it was observed that "reading sub-section (3) of Section 488 as a whole it cannot be said that power to pass an order of sentence can be exercised only if the warrant of attachment and sale of movables proves abortive. The two powers are independent. It was held that since the wife had admitted that husband did not possess any property, the Magistrate did not err in ordering sentence of imprisonment. 13. There are two more decisions, one of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and other of the Gujarat High Court. In Rangaish Vs. Rukmini Bai (7) it was held that "the contention that whatever the arrears the maximum period of imprisonment that can be ordered is only one month is not tenable." 14. In Venkar Bhana Rama vs. Raj Labu (8) of the Gujarat High Court it was observed as under:— "The principle laid down by s. 488 (3) is that the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to award imprisonment to a defaulting husband in respect of default in payment of each months arrears. As long as that principle is not violated, the Magistrate has the power to deal with a consolidated application for recovery of arrears for more than one month in such reasonable and just manner as he thinks fit. Hence a Magistrate can pass independent orders one after another in respect of each months arrears on a single application for recovery of arrears of maintenance for more than one months." 15. Hence a Magistrate can pass independent orders one after another in respect of each months arrears on a single application for recovery of arrears of maintenance for more than one months." 15. Thus it would appear well settled that the Magistrate is empowered to exercise both the powers to the exclusion of each other as well as simultaneously and the maximum sentence that can be ordered is one month for each months default or default for any part of each month. So far as present case is concerned, the warrant of attachment was issued but was returned with a report that the husband had no property so on application, the learned Magistrate has ordered imprisonment only for six months although he could have ordered imprisonment to the extent of 11 months as 11 months maintenance was due. There does not appear any illegality or infirmity in the order of the learned Magistrate and in my opinion, the same has been rightly upheld by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, so the impugned orders call for no interference. 16. This petition, in my opinion, has, therefore, no force so, it is hereby dismissed.