FAIZAN UDDIN, J. ( 1 ) IN this Criminal Appeal, the appellant has challenged his conviction under section 366 of the Penal Code, for which he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 2 months, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur in Sessions Trial No. 113/31, decided on 5-1-1983. ( 2 ) ON a report (Ex. P-i) having been lodged by the prosecutrix Nenchhuwa (P. W. 1), the appellant was prosecuted and tried for offence punishable under sections 376 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution, the prosecutrix Mst. Nenchhuwa (P. W. i) wife of Bhansai (P. W. 10) was at her parental house in village Keshonagar. The appellant and Bhansai (P. W. 10) went to house of prosecutrix and on il-2-1981 at about 3 P. M. the prosecutrix along with her husband Bhansai -and the appellant Gopalram started from Keshonagar to her husbands house. It was alleged that they went to Punjab Hotel in Vishrampur and thereafter they proceeded towards the quarry of Jainagar. On the way, they set under a tree. At about 5 P. M. the appellant asked Bhansai (P. W. 10) to go and bring liquor. Bhansai proceeded to bring liquor. It is said that thereafter the appellant took the prosecutrix to a nearby nala where he committed rape on Mst. Nanchhuwa (P. W. 1) and after that he took her to a hotel in Vishrampur at about ii P. M. where they took their dinner. After the dinner, the appellant took the prosecutrix back to village Keshonagar to the house of Han (P. W. 8) where they stayed that night. Next day, the prosecutrix went to her parental house in Keshonagar itself where she found her mother. The next evening her husband also came when she informed him all about the incident. The report (Ex. P-i) was lodged in the Police Station Jainagar after six days that is on 18-2-i96i, on the basis of which an offence under sections 376 and 366 was registered against the appellant and he was prosecuted for the same. ( 3 ) AT the trial, the appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication. The report (Ex. P-i) was lodged in the Police Station Jainagar after six days that is on 18-2-i96i, on the basis of which an offence under sections 376 and 366 was registered against the appellant and he was prosecuted for the same. ( 3 ) AT the trial, the appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication. On evaluation of evidence the learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecutrix was above the age of 16 years but below 18 years and that if any intercourse and, therefore, no offence under section 376 was made out. The learned trial Judge, however, took the view that though the prosecutrix was a consenting party, she was below 18 years of age and, therefore, the appellant had committed an offence under section 366 of the Penal Code and as such convicted and sentenced him accordingly, against this appeal has been preferred. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that according to the verification test the age of the prosecutrix was not in any case below i9 years and, therefore, the question of kidnapping will not arise. He, therefore, submitted that there was no justification in convicting the appellant under section 366 of the Penal Code. Be that as it may, the learned trial Judge on evaluation of evidence came to a definite conclusion that the prosecutrix on the date of incident was definitely above the age of 16 years and therefore, she had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority. Admittedly, she is a married woman. She had also proceeded along with her husband and the appellant from her parental house to the house of her husband. She was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant on the way and the learned trial Judge has found that the prosecutrix herself was a consenting party. According to the evidence on record, the appellant took the prosecutrix to a hotel in Vishrampur where they took meals and then proceeded towards quarry of Jainagar. Even after, she was subjected to a sexual intercourse, the appellant took her on a by-cycle back to Vishrampur where they again took their dinner in hotel and thereafter went to Keshonagar where the parental house of the prosecutrix is situated. Even after, she was subjected to a sexual intercourse, the appellant took her on a by-cycle back to Vishrampur where they again took their dinner in hotel and thereafter went to Keshonagar where the parental house of the prosecutrix is situated. The prosecutrix stayed at the house of Han (P. W. 8) that night, but she did not disclose or complain against the appellant for the alleged acts. Although mother of Han was in the house and in the night she slept along with mother of Han. Next day, she went to the house of her mother. It is also note-worthy that no report was immediately lodged but it was lodged after six days on 18-2-1981. In the face of all these facts and circumstances, even if it is assumed that she was below 18 years of age, it is difficult to accept the keeping of her lawful guardian that is her husband. The above narrated facts clearly indicated that the prosecutrix had herself accompanied the appellant all along without any force, inducement or persuation on the part of the appellant. Under these circumstances no inference can be drawn that the appellant was guilty of taking away the prosecutrix out of the keeping of her husband so as to incur the liability for punishment under section 366 of the Penal Code. It appears that the prosecutrix had herself accompanied the appellant willingly and the law does not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her husbands house or even of telling her not to accompany him because there is a clear distinction between the word taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person. In this view of the matter I am supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Veradarajan v. State of Madras. ( 5 ) IN the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The conviction of the appellant under section 366 of the Penal Code with sentences there under is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offence charged with. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are, therefore, cancelled. Appeal allowed. .