ORDER: The petitioner in tile instant writ petition has challenged the order imposing efficiency bar on him as well as the order retiring him compulsorily from the service. 2. The petitioner started his service career as an Overseer in the Irrigation and Waterways Directorate of the Government of West Bengal in January, 1943 and in the year 1967 was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer Throughout tile service career he had an unblemished record in the sense that no adverse report was ever communicated to him. 3. Trouble, however, started when the petitioner was due on 1st April, 1973 to cross the efficiency bar. His representation dated March 16, 1973 (Annexure 'A’) had the effect of moving the file from one authority to another but ultimately he was informed by the Superintending Engineer concerned by his Memo No. 5701 dated December 23, 1975 that he could not be allowed to cross the efficiency bar since his performances during the previous years starting from 1968-69 were very bad (Annexure 'I') 4. This was a surprise to the petitioner since no such ad verse reports were ever communicated to him. He, however, made a representation to the Chief Engineer under whole orders be was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar (Annexure 'J'), but to no affect Consequently; subsequent increments in the time scale of pay were refused to him. 5. On January 16, 1976 the petitioner applied for leave for 120 days preparatory to retirement, which was due to his credit, with effect from May 5, 1976 since ho was due to retire from service on September 1, 1976. But Instead of the leave being granted the petitioner was served with an order dated March 13, 1976 issued by the Engineer-in- Chief and Ex Officio Secretary to the Government of West Bengal to the effect that the Governor had been pleased to retire him from service in the public interest under sub-rule (aa) of Rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part 1 with effect from the date on which the order was served on the petitioner on payment of three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice (Auuexure ‘K’). 6. Representations made against the said order by the petitioner having failed to yield any result, he has come up before this Court for redress under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. 6. Representations made against the said order by the petitioner having failed to yield any result, he has come up before this Court for redress under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. None having appeared on behalf of the respondents in spite of due service of notice, the Rule was taken up for exparte disposal. 8. As already stated earlier, the petitioner in the instant Rule has besides challenging the order of compulsory retirement (Annexure ‘K’), has also challenged the earlier order imposing efficiency bar on him (Annexure ‘I’) 9. The petitioner, as it appears, was promoted to the post of an Assistant Engineer on October 27, 1967 and was due to cross the efficiency bar at the eighth stage on April 1, 1973. In this regard the petitioner himself set the ball rolling by making a representation to the Chief Engineer on March 16, 1973 (Annexure ‘A’). The file thereafter moved from one authority to the other and ultimately when more than 2½ years had elapsed from the due date of crossing the efficiency bar, the petitioner on December 23, 1975 was served with an order of the Chief Engineer by the Superintending Engineer to the effect that “the officer’s performances during the year 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72 have been very bad and for the year 1972-73 it is just an ordinary report. Hence it has not been possible to allow him to cross the efficiency bar from the due date from 1.4.1973. The officer must improve his performance in future” 10. The petitioner has specifically averred in the writ petition that he had an unblemished record of service in the sense that no adverse confidential report was ever communicated to him. Since the respondents have not entered appearance, the said averment of the petitioner goes uncontroverted. 11. It need not be emphasized that it is the duty of the concerned authorities to communicate an adverse confidential report to the employee against whom the adverse comments have been made, the object obviously being to give the said employee an opportunity to improve his future performance. But here, as already seen, no adverse confidential report was ever communicated to the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner had no opportunity to get apprised of the fact that his performance since 1968-69 was ‘very bad’ Normally, no employee who cares for future service prospects would be impervious to such adverse report. But here, as already seen, no adverse confidential report was ever communicated to the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner had no opportunity to get apprised of the fact that his performance since 1968-69 was ‘very bad’ Normally, no employee who cares for future service prospects would be impervious to such adverse report. He would either make an all out attempt to improve his performance or try to get the report expunged in case he has a fair opinion about his performance. But going by the relevant order of the Chief Engineer (Annexure ‘1’) it appears that the petitioner continued to suffer such bad reports for successive years and in spite of that ventured to write to the Chief Engineer (Annexure ‘A’) that he should be allowed to cross the efficiency bar. Such, obviously, cannot be the conduct of an employee having to his knowledge four successively ‘very bad’ reports to his credit. This confirms the petitioner’s averment in the writ petition that no adverse report was ever communicated to him. Thus, assuming that his performance was ‘very bad’ for the year 1968-69, the petitioner was left absolutely in the dark about it and consequently did not consider it necessary to boost his performance for inviting better reports during the coming years. He, obviously, remained complacent about his performance since no adverse report was communicated to him knowing little what was in store for him in future. Thus, even assuming that the petitioner’s performance was bad during the years just previous to April 1, 1973 when he was due to cross the efficiency bar, he became a party to it unwittingly. After having served as an Overseer for long 13 years before being promoted as an Assistant Engineer in 1967, it is at the outset difficult to presume that his performance as such, would be ‘very bad’ from the beginning or that given an opportunity he could not have improved his performance. So, if the petitioner’s performance as an Assistant Engineer was ‘very bad’ for successive years, he could not possibly be victimised for that by not allowing him to cross the efficiency bar because there always remained the possibility of his having improved the performance as an experienced. Overseer had he ever the inkling of an idea that his performance which might have had given him a complacency, was ‘very bad’ in the estimation of his superiors, the assessing authorities. 12. Overseer had he ever the inkling of an idea that his performance which might have had given him a complacency, was ‘very bad’ in the estimation of his superiors, the assessing authorities. 12. Incidentally, the impugned order (Annexure ‘1’) shows that the petitioner’s performance for the year 1972-73 was not bad. It was ‘just ordinary’. This means that he had at least started improving. Significantly, though the impugned order is dated December 23, 1975, the concerned authority did not think it necessary to look into his last report for the year 1973-74 to ascertain whether the improvement shown during the year 1972-73 was being maintained or whether he had improved further. Had it been so done the result might possibly have been otherwise. 13. In the above circumstances I do not think that it was proper for the concerned authority not to allow the petitioner to cross the efficiency bar which he was due to cross on April 1, 1973. It the petitioner had performed badly during some of the previous years the entire blame could not be laid at his door since he was denied the opportunity to improve his performance by not communicating to him the adverse reports. The petitioner should, therefore, be deemed to have crossed the efficiency bar (8th stage) on April 1, 1973 and thereby became entitled to earn the subsequent incremental benefits in the time-scale. 14. Coming to the order of compulsory retirement (Annexure 'K') it appears that this was made in exercise of the power of the Governor under Rule 75 (aa)(i) of the West Bengal Service Rules (Part I) which is as hereunder: "(aa) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the appointing authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 month’s pay and allowances in lieu of such notice: (i) if he is in Class I or Class II service or post, and had entered Government service before attaining the age 35 years, after he has attained the age of 50 years; and (ii) .............................. 15. In this connection it may be useful at the outset to lay down the peculiar facts of this case. 16. The petitioner's normal dale of superannuation was September 1, 1976. 15. In this connection it may be useful at the outset to lay down the peculiar facts of this case. 16. The petitioner's normal dale of superannuation was September 1, 1976. On March 16, 1973 he made a representation (Annexure 'A') for allowing him to cross the efficiency bar. The matter was ultimately disposed of by the order dated December 23, 1975 (Annexure 'I') whereby the petitioner’s prayer was turned down on the ground of his bad performance during the previous years. In paragraph 28 of the writ petition the petitioner has specifically averred that on January 16, 1976 he had applied for 120 days leave preparatory to retirement with effect from May 5, 1976, which was due to him. But when the leave was due to commence within about one and a half months, he was served with the order of compulsory retirement dated March 18, 1976 (Annexure ‘K’) which is as hereunder: Government of West Bengal Irrigation and Waterways Department ORDER No. 733-IE Dated, Calcutta, the 13th March, 1976 WHEREAS Shri Bharat Chandra Das, Assistant Engineer, Irrigation and Waterways Directorate, Government of West Bengal had entered Government Service before attaining the age of 35 years. AND WHEREAS he has already attained the age of 50 years ; AND WHEREAS the Governor being the appointing authority in respect of his post is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do ; NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the power conferred by sub rule (aa) of Rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part I, the Governor is plea lied hereby to retire the said Shri Bharat Chandra Das from service with effect from the date on which this order is served on him on payment of three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice." 17. Significantly, the order does not disclose what public interest was sought to be served by compulsorily retiring the petitioner who, if the leave prayed for was granted to him, had only about one and a half months of effective service before his normal superannuation with effect from September 1, 1976. 18. In this connection it may be made clear that the action was not taken on account of the alleged bad performance of the petitioner since he was allowed to work from 1973 onwards. In spite of four successively bad reports. 18. In this connection it may be made clear that the action was not taken on account of the alleged bad performance of the petitioner since he was allowed to work from 1973 onwards. In spite of four successively bad reports. To the contrary, it was directed by the Chief Engineer in his order dated December 23, 1975 that "the Officer must improve his performance in future" (Annexure 'I'). 19. Thus, even though the petitioner was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar due to his previous bad performance, the authority did not think it necessary to retire him compulsorily on that ground and allowed him further opportunity to improve his performance. The impugned order (Annexure 'K') does not say that the petitioner's performance continued to be bad thereafter. 20. Coming now to the legal aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M. E. Reddy. AIR 1980 SC 563 , observed that "an order of compulsory retirement on one hand causes no prejudice to the Government Servant who is made to lead a restful life enjoying full pensionary and other benefits and on the other gives a new animation and equanimity to the services. The employees should try to understand the true spirit behind the rule which ii not to penalise them but amounts just to a fruitful incident of the Service made in the larger interest of the country. Even if the employee feels that he has suffered, he should derive sufficient solace and consolation from the fact that this is his small contribution to his country, for every good cause claims its martyr" 21. As regards to ‘public interest', the Court observed that "the safety valve of public interest is the most powerful and the strongest safeguard against any abuse or colourable exercise of power. Moreover, when the Court is satisfied that the exercise of power under the rule amounts to a colourable exercise of jurisdiction or is arbitrary or mala fide it can always be struck down". 22. Thus though an order of compulsory retirement in public interest is an administrative order, the Court is not without jurisdiction to enquire whether the impugned order was made in colourable exercise of jurisdiction or is arbitrary or mala fide. 23. 22. Thus though an order of compulsory retirement in public interest is an administrative order, the Court is not without jurisdiction to enquire whether the impugned order was made in colourable exercise of jurisdiction or is arbitrary or mala fide. 23. In Swami Saran Saksena v. Slate of U. P. AIR 1980 SC 269 the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily the Supreme Court does not interfere with the judgment of the relevant authority on the point and whether it is public interest to compulsorily retire a Government Servant but such interference may be made in the peculiar circumstances of any particular case in the case before the Supreme Court the entries in the personal file and character roll of the appellant did not indicate that there was any deterioration in the quality of his work or integrity after his crossing the second efficiency bar so as to deserve compulsory retirement. On such grounds the impugned order was quashed. 24. The same point again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Baldev Raj v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 70 . There the Supreme Court took a more pragmatic view of the matter and held that the exercise of power must be bona finde and promote public interest. The court observed that "when an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest, the State must disclose material so that the Court may be satisfied that the order is not bad fur want of any material whatever which to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient, to sustain the grounds of ‘public interest’ Justifying forced retirement of the public servant Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the administrator but they are nut absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrator law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well known and we art confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest" 25. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well known and we art confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest" 25. In the instant case, as already seen, the impugned order does oat disclose what public interest was sought to be achieved by retiring the petitioner compulsorily who was practically on the verge of normal retirement and would have had only one and a half months of effective service to his credit in case leave for 120 days preparatory to retirement, as prayed for, was granted to him. 26. The matter might possibly have been otherwise had the petitioner been retired on the ground of his bad performance for four consecutive years, but as already seen, ha was allowed to work for a few years after the last bad report and was subsequently given a chance to improve his performance. It is no where indicated that the petitioner could not prove himself worthy of the favour thus shown to him. 27. The impugned order of compulsory retirement (Annexure ‘K’) therefore, does not seem to be bona fide since it does not satisfy a rational mind that the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was necessary in public interest. 28. The Rule issued is, accordingly, made absolute and the impugned orders of not allowing the petitioner to cross the efficiency bar (Annexure 'I') and compulsory retirement of the petitioner (Annexure 'K') ale hereby quashed. 29. The petitioner should be deemed to have crossed the efficiency bar an April 1, 1973 (8th stage) and should be deemed to have continued in service till the dale of his normal retirement on September 1, 1976. 30. The respondents are directed by the issue of a writ in the nature of Mandamus to calculate the arrears due to the petitioner an the basis of his having crossed the efficiency bar on April 1, 1973 taking thereby into consideration the increments which he would have earned in the time-scale up to his normal date of retirement on September 1, 1976 and to pay him all the arrears that might be found due to him including pensionary and other benefits in accordance with law and the relevant Rules within a period of ninety days from the date of the communication of this order. No order is however, made far casts. Let copies of this order be communicated to the respondents as expeditiously as possible at the cast of the petitioner. The petitioner to deposit such costs as expeditiously as possible. Rule made absolute.