The total land involved in this appeal is 12 bighas 3 kathas 12 lechas, but the fight is confined to abut 6 bighas of Government waste land and the disputants are headed by the two sons of deceased Ratnakar, namely, Dhiru Dutta and Gouri Datta. The sons and grand sons of Gouri Dutta filed the present suit against the two sons of Dhiru Dutta. Initially Ratnakar had about 6 bighas of ancestral land and his two sons got about 3 bighas each. There is no dispute between the parties regar­ding this share of the ancestral land. The whole dispute is relatable to the Government waste land measuring about 6 bighas. The case of the each of the parties is that this waste land was reclaimed by it. The dispute between the parties first found them in criminal court when a proceeding u/s. 145, Cr. P.C. was drawn. As in that proceeding possession of the defendants was declared, the present suit was filed seeking in the main declaration of the Plaintiffs' title over 9 bighas and odd land. Both the courts below have found in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence this appeal by the defendants. 2. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that in deciding the case in favour of the plaintiffs strong reliance was pranced on document marked Ext. 7, which has been taken by the courts below as a deed of family arrangement. This apart, some reliance has been placed on Ext. 6, a deed of partition executed by the three sons of Gouri Dutta dividing inter alia the aforesaid 9 bighas and odd land equally along them, which was attested by Lakhi Dutta, Defendant No. 1. Objection was taken to the admissibity of Ext. 7 on the ground that it was a deed of relinquishment and the same not being registered could not have been admitted in evidence. This objection has been over-ruled by regarding Ext. 7 as a deed of family arrangement. Insofar as the attestation of Ext. 6 by Lakhi Dutta is concerned, the stand of the appellants is that Lakhi Dutta was not estopped from denying the contents of the documents as he was merely an attesting witness. 3. Two questions which, therefore, arise for determination in this appeal are : (1) whether Ext. 7 is an admissible docu­ment ? and (2) whether attestation of Ext. 6 by Lakhi Dutta is concerned, the stand of the appellants is that Lakhi Dutta was not estopped from denying the contents of the documents as he was merely an attesting witness. 3. Two questions which, therefore, arise for determination in this appeal are : (1) whether Ext. 7 is an admissible docu­ment ? and (2) whether attestation of Ext. 6 by Lakhi Dutta operates as an estoppel ? 4. To decide whether Ext. 7 is an admissible document or not, it is first to be seen whether Ext. 7 is a deed of family arrangement. The law relating to such a document has been the subject matter of a number of decisions of the Apex Court,. but it would be enough to refer to two decisions in this regard, to which my attention has been invited by Shri Goswami. Men­tion may be first made of Shambhu Praiad vs. Phool Kumari, AIR 1971 SC 1337 wherein it was stated that it is not nece­ssary that there must exist a dispute, actual or possible, in every item of property and amongst all members arrayed one against the other. It would be sufficient if it is shown that there were actual or possible claims and counter-claims by parties in settle­ment whereof the arrangement as a whole had been arrived at, thereby acknowledging title in one to whom a particular pro­perty falls on the assumption that he had an anterior title in it. Reference was made in this decision to Pullaiah vs. Naramham, AIR 1956 SC 1836, wherein it was stated inter alia that even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice to record a document as a deed of family arrangement. It was farther stated that members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. Further observation in this regard was that if such an arrange­ment is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, Courts will more readily give assent to such arrangement than to avoid it. 5. Further observation in this regard was that if such an arrange­ment is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, Courts will more readily give assent to such arrangement than to avoid it. 5. The following observations of Sahu Madho Das vs. Mukund Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481 , which were noted in para 9 of Shambhu Prasad are of particular importance for a case at hand : "It is well stetted that a compromise or family arran­gement is based on the assumption that there is an antece­dent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than they had previously asserted, to the portions allotted to them res­pectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arran­gement, it is assumed that the title claimed by the per­son receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned aid therefore no convey and is necessary". 6. From what has been stated above it is clear that for a document to be regarded as a deed of family arrangement there must exist an antecedent title of some sort in the par­ties to the document. Insofar as the case at hand is concerned, there is nothing to show the title of the plaintiffs in the entire I bighas and odd land. Though Shri Sarma has stated in this connection that there are a large number of receipts showing payment of revenue for the land in question, it is well known that these receipts cannot be regarded as documents of title. Shri Das submits that the appellants had also paid reve­nue and refers to Jamabandi of the concerned land which shows that the entire 12 Bighas and odd land stood initially in the name of Muhi Dutta and Lakhi Dutta, who are the heads of the two branches of the family of Ratnakar. Ext. 7 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a document of family arran­gement because antecedent title of the plaintiffs is not to be found for the claimed land in any document de hors this deed. Moreover, Ext. Ext. 7 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a document of family arran­gement because antecedent title of the plaintiffs is not to be found for the claimed land in any document de hors this deed. Moreover, Ext. 7 has been singed only by the two sons of Dhiro Dutta. Nobody from the side of Gouri Dutta has exe­cuted this exhibit. The terms cannot also be regarded as fair. 7. Let reference be now made to another decision of the Supreme Court relating to family arrangement : Kale & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 807 . The binding effect and essentials of a family settlement have been reduced to the following propositions in this decision : (1) The family settlement must be a bonafide one so-as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family : (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence : (3) The family arrangements may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary : (4) It is well settled that registration would be nece­ssary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrange­ment had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making nece­ssary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself docs not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of section 17(2) (sic.) Sec. 17 (1) (b) of the Registra­tion Act and is therefore not compulsorily register able; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or in­terest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledge him to be the sole owner, than the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same : (6) Even if bonafide disputes, present or possible which may not involve legal claims are settled by bonafide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrange­ment is final and binding on the parties to the settle­ment." 8. Keeping in view of the above propositions, it may be stated that as in Ext. 7 there is no reference of any earlier family arrangement of which this exhibit could be said to be a mere memorandum there can be no doubt that right was sought to be acquired by the plaintiffs on the strength of his docu­ment which was therefore compulsorily register able. Further, as already alluded, there is nothing to show the antecedent title of the plaintiffs de hors this document as regards the whole of the suit property. A reading of Ext. 7 does not also show that it had been executed to put quietus to any dispute between the parties. It does not also evince equitable division of the involved property. 9. In view of all the above, it cannot be held that Ext, 7 was a deed of family settlement. In fact, it was a deed of relinquishment and indeed it opens by saying that the signatories have given up their claims over 9 don, 1 katha 13 lechas of land which would indicate that the executants took it to be a deed of relinquishment. There is no dispute at the bar that if Ext. 7 were to be regarded as a deed of relinquishment the same could not have been admitted in evidence as it was not registered. I therefore, hold that Ext. 7 was wrongly admitted in evidence and no reliance can be placed on it by the plaintiffs to confer right, title and interest on them over 9 don, and odd land. 10. This leaves for consideration the effect of attestation of Ext. I therefore, hold that Ext. 7 was wrongly admitted in evidence and no reliance can be placed on it by the plaintiffs to confer right, title and interest on them over 9 don, and odd land. 10. This leaves for consideration the effect of attestation of Ext. 6 by Lakhi Dutta, The law in this regard can be culled from to decision of the Privy Council namely, Pandurang Krishnaji vs. Markaideya Tukaram, AIR 1922 P.C. 20 : and Bliagawan Singh vs. Ujagar Singh AIR 1928 P.C. 20. In Pandurang (Supra) it has been stated that the attestation of a deed by itself estops a man from denying nothing whatsoever excepting that he has witnessed the execution of the deed. It conveys neither directly nor by implication, any knowledge of the contents of the document and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of esta­blishing that a man consented to the transaction which the docu­ment effects. It has however been pointed out that it is of course possible that an attestation may take place in circumstances, which would show that the witness did in fact know of the contents of the document, but no such knowledge ought to be inferred from the mere facts of the attestation. In Bhagwan Singh (supra) it was elucidated that where in addition to the Fact of attestation there was evidence to show that the at testator consented to and acquiesced in the execution of the docu­ment in question, the attestation may operate as an estoppel. It is stated by Shri Sarma that Lakhi Dutta must have had knowledge about the contents of Ext. 6 dated 2.11.41 by which the three sons of Gouri Dutta had divided inter alia 9 bighas and odd of the land in question equally among them in as much as he was himself a signatory of Ext. 7 which was executed in 1932 and by which the self same land had been relinquished in favour of the three sons of Gouri Dutta. It cannot, how­ever, be forgotten that Priya Nath, the other son of Dhiru Dutta had no part to play insofar as Ext. 6 is concerned. More­over. Ext. 7 having been held as an inadmissible document, it would not be permissible in law to rely on it to estop Lakhi Dutta from challenging the contents finding place in Ext. 6. 11. It cannot, how­ever, be forgotten that Priya Nath, the other son of Dhiru Dutta had no part to play insofar as Ext. 6 is concerned. More­over. Ext. 7 having been held as an inadmissible document, it would not be permissible in law to rely on it to estop Lakhi Dutta from challenging the contents finding place in Ext. 6. 11. Placed in the above predicament, the ultimate submi­ssion of Shti Sarma is that as in the Jamabandi the entire 12 Bighas and odd lands were shown, to start with, in the names of Muhi Dutta and Lakhi Dutta, who are heads of the two branches of the family of Ratnakar, these two sets of parties should get 12 bighas and odd land in equal share. The force of the submission has been recognised by Shri Das also. The concerned Jamabandi shows that the two branches of Ratnakar had owned the land equally. It would be useful to point out that this Jamabandi reflected the position which was found during 30 years survey operations carried on in 1923-28. 12. In view of all the above, and in view of fair stand taken by the learned counsel for both the parties towards the end of the argument, the appeal is disposed of by declaring the right, title and interest of the appellants over 6 bighas 1 katha 16 lechas of land, which is hilf of the total concerned land which measures 12 bighas 3 kathas 12 lechas. The title on the remaining 6 bighas 1 katha and 16 lechas apparently vests in the defendants. The parties shall be entitled to get the aforesaid total land partitioned between them equally.