Shaukat Ali Sabbat Ali v. State of Gujarat — 1987 DIGILAW 6 (GUJ)

JUDGMENT : M.B. Shah, J. The Commissioner of Police, Vadordara City, by his order dated 8th September, 1986 passed an order of detention against the petitioner under sub-section(2) of Section Act 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act) with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order covered under the PASA Act. The grounds of detention dated 8-9-86 were also served to the petitioner on the same day which are annexed to the petition at Anneuxre 'B'. 2. As per the grounds of detention the petitioner is detained on the grounds that : (1) he is a bootlegger within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the PASA Act; and (2) he is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PASA Act and that his activities as a bootlegger and dangerous person affect adversely the maintenance of the public order and to prevent him from acting pre-judicially to the maintenance of public order. For these activities as a bootlegger the authorities have relied upon the following grounds mentioned in the grounds of detention : 3. In ground No. 1 it has been mentioned that the detenu himself and through his wife Somiben and his associate Raju Motiram were selling liquor and denatured spirit at Pani Gate near his house and thereby were carrying on anti-social activities. After verification of city police record it is found that various offences are registered against him. Offences registered against the detenu from 17-2-83 to 11-5-86 under Section 66(1), 65(e) and 81 of the Bombay Prohibition Act are relied upon and narrated in the said ground. 4. Ground No. 2 mentioned that the petitioner was in the habit of consuming liquor and was behaving in a disorderly manner under the influence of alcohol for which also offences registered against him since 7-5-1986 to 30-8-86 are relied upon. 5. Ground No. 4 mentions that for preventing the petitioner from selling liquor, Chapter Case was registered against him under Section 93 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and in that case he was bound over for his good conduct. 6. Ground No. 6 mentions that the detenu was released on 10-8-85 and thereafter on 8-7-86 from his detention under PASA Act on technical grounds. 6. Ground No. 6 mentions that the detenu was released on 10-8-85 and thereafter on 8-7-86 from his detention under PASA Act on technical grounds. After his release from detention he has continued his illegal activities of consuming and selling liquor and of disturbing public peace. 7. Ground No. 7 mentions that with a view that the petitioner continues his illegal activities without any obstruction he is beating the persons who are residents of Pani Gate area and that he is threatening to kill them and thereby creating an atmosphere of fear and terror. Because of his fear witnesses are not prepared to give evidence in public and are afraid of him. Reliance is placed upon the statements of five witnesses and substances of what they have stated in the grounds of detention. The aforesaid grounds are with regard to his activities as bootlegger. 8. With regard to petitioner's activities as a dangerous person, ground No. 3 mentions that the petitioner was communalist and that at the time of communal riots he was taking a leading part. Reliance is placed upon an incident of 19th August, 1986 and the fact that offences under Sections 14-7, 148, 149, 152, 307, 427, 436 of Indian Penal Code and Section 136 of the Bombay Police Act were registered against him. 9. In ground No. 5 it has been mentioned that at the time of communal riots he was instigating the persons for which three Chapter Cases for taking action under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code were filed against him. 10. It has been further mentioned in ground No. 7 that on 10-7-1986, 2 or 3 persons came to his house for consumption of liquor and after consumption of liquor they were quarrelling. At that time the brother of the detenu along with 2 to 4 persons of Muslim community came and a quarrel took place between these two groups and the atmosphere of communal riot was created. 11. In ground No. 8 it has been mentioned that the petitioner was doing the activities which are prejudicial to public order and public safety. It has been further mentioned that the names of the persons who have given statements before the police are not disclosed to him because they are afraid that their life and property would be in danger if their names are disclosed to him. It has been further mentioned that the names of the persons who have given statements before the police are not disclosed to him because they are afraid that their life and property would be in danger if their names are disclosed to him. The detaining authority arrived at tire conclusion that disclosure of the names of the witnesses would be against the public interest under Section 9(2) of the Act. 12. Learned Advocate for the petitioner vehemently Submitted that the detention order against the petitioner is illegal and void on the following grounds: (1) The representation submitted by the wife of the detenu is not considered by the detaining authority or by the State Government. (2) There is total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority by arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner is a dangerous person under the provisions of the PASA Act because (a) there is no allegation against him which would show that the petitioner habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any offence punishable under Chapter XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 and Which would be covered under Section 2 (c) of the PASA Act; and (b) the detaining authority has taken into consideration irrelevant factors while considering him as a dangerous person inasmuch as in ground No. 5 reliance is placed upon Chapter Cases filed under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (3) Against the petitioner, on 10th August, 1985 the detention order under the provisions of PASA Act was passed and that order was set aside by this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 625/85 by the judgment and order dated October 17, 1985. Thereafter on the same grounds another detention order was passed on 18-7-86 which was revoked by the State Government on 7-8-86. He, therefore, submitted that (a) the third detention order was passed mala fide and (b) the third detention order on the Same grounds would not be passed once that Court has quashed and set aside the detention order. Thereafter on the same grounds another detention order was passed on 18-7-86 which was revoked by the State Government on 7-8-86. He, therefore, submitted that (a) the third detention order was passed mala fide and (b) the third detention order on the Same grounds would not be passed once that Court has quashed and set aside the detention order. (4) There is total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority in relying upon the cases filed against the petitioner for consumption of liquor as that is not the relevant factor for holding the petitioner to be a bootlegger within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the PASA Act. (5) In any case the ground No. 1 only shows that from the possession of the petitioner some liquor was found at some stage, but it cannot be said that the possession of liquor would in any way affect adversely or is likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. (6) The statements upon which the detaining authority has relied upon are absolutely stereo-type and the names of the witnesses are not disclosed. Re : Ground No. (1) 13. In our opinion, there is no basis for holding that the detaining authority has not considered the representation of the wife of the detenu. In the petition it is nowhere pointed out or mentioned that the wife of the petitioner submitted representation against the detention order on a particular date. Even the copy of the alleged representation nowhere mentions the date of representation made by the wife of the detenu. It nowhere mentions as to whom the representation was sent. As this matter pertains to the personal liberty of a citizen, we gave an opportunity to the learned advocate for the petitioner to file affidavit stating facts as to when and to whom the said representation was sent, but the learned advocate for the petitioner was not in a position to file an affidavit of the wife of the detenu to point out the aforesaid fact nor has he produced the registered A.D. slip or any other evidence to show that the representation was sent to the concerned authority. As against this, it has been stated on behalf of the State Government that the State Government had not received any representation which is alleged to have been made by the wife of the detenu against the impugned detention order dated 8-9-86. After verification of the file of the detention order, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor States that the Government has not received any representation. The Police Commissioner, Vadodara City, has also filed an affidavit-in-reply wherein it is mentioned that he has not received any representation against the impugned order dated 8-9-1986. In this view of the matter, in our view, it cannot be said that the State Govt, has not considered the representation against the detention order. Re : Ground No. (2) : 14. This contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner requires to be accepted because taking into consideration the grounds stated in the detention order it cannot be said that the petitioner should be considered to be a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PASA Act. The allegations against the petitioner are that because of the incident of 19th August, 1986 offences are registered against him under Sections 147, 148, 149, 152, 307, 427, 435 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. As per ground No. 5 at the time of communal riots he was instigating persons for which three Chapter Cases for taking action under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code were filed against him. Section 2(c) of the PASA Act which defines the word "dangerous person" reads as under: "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act 1959." From this definition it is abundantly clear that a person can be termed as a dangerous person if that person either by himself or as a member or leader of gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959. In the present case by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the detenu habitually commits the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVTI of Indian Penal Code or offences under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959. From one incident alleged against him it cannot be said that the petitioner is in the habit or habitually commits such offences. The word "habitually" means by force of the habit. From a single act it cannot be said that the person habitually or repeatedly commits the offences, or inference of habit cannot be drawn from an isolated act. In the case of Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1984 Supreme Court 1334, while considering the provisions of Section 12 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, the Supreme Court has observed that the expression 'habitually' means 'repeatedly' or 'persistently'. It supplies the thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts, are necessary to justify an inference of habit. The Court has further observed that the word 'habitually' connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in the Section. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, a single act of the petitioner cannot be characterised as a habitual act or omission referred to in sub-section 2(c) of the PASA Act which would empower the detaining authority to pass the detention order under Section 3 on the ground that the detenu is a dangerous person. Further, from the Chapter Cases filed against the detenu under Section 107 or Section 116(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code no inference can be drawn that the detenu is a dangerous person within the meaning of the PASA Act as it cannot be said that he has committed the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. Hence the detention order against the petitioner on the ground that he is a dangerous person is illegal and void. 15. Hence the detention order against the petitioner on the ground that he is a dangerous person is illegal and void. 15. In spite of the aforesaid fact, it cannot be said that the entire detention order against the detenu is vitiated as Section 6 of the PASA Act provides that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground and that such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant or not connected or not approximately connected with such person, or invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Therefore, if the ground of detention for detaining the detenu as a bootlegger is valid, then there is no question of setting aside the detention order merely because the detention order is invalid on the ground that the detenu cannot be termed as a "dangerous person" within the meaning of section 2(c) of the PASA Act. Re : Ground No. (3) : 16. It was contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the detention order passed against the detenu is a mala fide one as it is based on the same grounds on which previous detention orders were passed. He submitted that on these very grounds, the petitioner Was detained by the order dated 10th August, 1985 and that order was quashed by this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 625/85. Subsequently also by the order dated 18th July, 1986 the petitioner was detained on these very grounds and that order was revoked by the State Govt, on 7th August, 1986. He further submitted that in any set of circumstances once the detention order is quashed by this Court, unless there are fresh facts which are sufficient to detain the petitioner, the detaining authority has no jurisdiction to pass fresh order of detention. He also submitted, that once the High Court has quashed the detention order, the detaining authority could not pass the fresh order of detention by referring to the pre-existing grounds with some additional facts. He also submitted, that once the High Court has quashed the detention order, the detaining authority could not pass the fresh order of detention by referring to the pre-existing grounds with some additional facts. For appreciating these contentions of the learned Advocate, it would be necessary to consider the provisions of Section 15 of the PASA Act which reads as under : "15. (11) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, a detention order may, at any time for reasons to be recorded in writing, be revoked or modified by the State Government, notwithstanding that the order has been made by an authorised officer. (2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as "the earlier detention order" shall not bar the making of another detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as "the subsequent detention order") under Section 3 against the same person : Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall in no case extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order." Sub-section (1) of Section 15 empowers the State Government at any time, for reasons to be recorded, in writing to revoke or modify the detention order. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 in terms provides that the expiry or revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention order under Section 3 against the same person. The proviso to Sub-Section (2) restricts the maximum period of detention if another detention order is passed without there being any fresh facts after expiry or revocation of earlier detention order made against such person. This proviso abundantly makes it clear that the subsequent detention order could be passed on the same grounds, i.e. on the grounds on which the previous detention order was passed which has expired or is revoked. The legislative intent is, therefore, clear that even in those cases where earlier order has expired or is revoked, yet there is no bar on the power of the detaining authority to pass another detention order on the same grounds. 17. The legislative intent is, therefore, clear that even in those cases where earlier order has expired or is revoked, yet there is no bar on the power of the detaining authority to pass another detention order on the same grounds. 17. In this case it is an admitted fact that the detention order dated 18-7-1986 was revoked by the State Government. In affidavit-in-reply it has been pointed out that the State Government could not refer the matter to the Advisory Board within the period of three weeks from the date of detention as at the relevant time the Advisory Board was not in existence and, therefore, the Government has revoked the order of detention on 7-8-1986 on technical ground. In view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 15, in our opinion the State Government is entitled to pass another detention order after revoking the earlier detention order without there being fresh facts. The only limitation would be that the maximum period of detention should not extend beyond the expiry of period of 12 months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order. Therefore, it cannot be said that because previous detention order dated 18-7-1986 was revoked by the State Government, another detention order is either mala fide or that the State Government has no authority to pass it. 18. With regard to the first detention order dated 10-8-1985 it is true that the said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing Special Criminal Application No. 625/85 and it was quashed by this Court on October 17, 1985. The judgment and the order in the said Special Criminal Application is annexed with this petition at Anne-sure "D". The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the detention order dated 10-8-1985 was quashed by this Court solely on a technical ground that the State Government took 13 days in deciding the representation of the detenu and that there was no explanation regarding the said delay. Pie, therefore, submitted that even on the same ground fresh detention order could be passed, apart from the fact that in this case there arc fresh facts. In support of this contention he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 327. 19. Pie, therefore, submitted that even on the same ground fresh detention order could be passed, apart from the fact that in this case there arc fresh facts. In support of this contention he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 327. 19. In the aforesaid Jagdev Singh's Case the petitioners were detained under Rule 30(1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. There the contention was that the State Government had power to pass a fresh order of detention on the same facts. In that case the Court arrived at the conclusion that between September, 1965 and April, 1967 there was no proper review as required by Rule 30A(9) and the detention for all that period was illegal and could not be Saved by the original order of March, 1965 which must be deemed to have come to an end after six months, in the absence of a proper review under Rule 30A(9). It further held that there was no order which could be continued on April 1967, and therefore the petitioners were entitled to be released on that ground. However, the Court considered the question whether it is open to the State Government to pass a fresh order in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court after considering the decisions of Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 350 and Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964, SC 1123, held that fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts if for any reason the earlier order of detention has to be revoked by the Government. Further, the Court held that there was nothing in the Act or the Rules which will bar the Government from passing a fresh order of detention on the same facts, in case the earlier order of detention or its continuance is held to be defective for any reason. Normally a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts provided it is not mala fide, if for any reason the previous order of detention or its continuance is not legal on account of some technical defect. Normally a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts provided it is not mala fide, if for any reason the previous order of detention or its continuance is not legal on account of some technical defect. It would be pertinent to reproduce paragraphs (5) and (6) of the said judgment which are as under: "This brings us to the next question, namely, whether it is open to the State Government to pass a fresh order in the circumstances of the present cases. In this connection reliance is placed on behalf of the respondent on two cases of this Court Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1952) SCR 756 = ( AIR 1952 SC 350 ) and Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. State of Maharashtra (1964) 6 SCR 446 = (AIR 1964- SC 1123). The first case was under the Preventive Detention Act (4 of 1950). In that case it was held that "if the authority making an order is Satisfied that the ground on which a detenu Was detained on a former occasion is still available and that there was need for detention on its basis no mala fide can be attributed to the authority from the fact that the ground alleged for the second detention is the Same as that of the first detention." In the later case what has happened was that detenu were first detained under the Preventive Detention Act. Later that order was revoked and they were detained under Rule 30 of tire Rules and the order was served in jail. The second order of detention was apparently based on the same facts on which the first order of detention was passed. The Court held that the second order of detention was perfectly valid and its service in jail did not make the detention illegal. 20. These cases certainly show that a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts, if for any reason the earlier order of detention has to be revoked by the Government. Further we do not find anything in the Defence of India Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules which forbids the State Government to cancel one order of detention and pas? another in its place. Further we do not find anything in the Defence of India Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules which forbids the State Government to cancel one order of detention and pas? another in its place. Equally we do not find anything in the Act or the Rules which will bar the Government from passing a fresh order of detention on the same facts, in case the earlier order of detention on the same facts or its continuance is held to he defective for any reason. This is of course subject to the fact that the fresh order of detention is not vitiated by mala fides. So normally a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts provided it is not mala fide, if for any reason the previous order of detention or its continuance is not legal on account of some technical defect as in the present cases." (Emphasis added) After discussing the Judgment in the case of P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1507 , the Supreme Court observed that if the Government resorts to the device of a series of fresh orders after the expiry of specific period by circumventing the provisions of Rule 30-A for review, then it may amount to a mala fide action. But if the Government has power to pass a 'fresh order of detention on the same facts in case where the earlier order or its continuance fails for any defect, then there is no reason to hold why the Government cannot pass such fresh order curing that defect. This ratio is laid down in paragraph (g) the relevant part of which is as under: "Now there is no doubt that if the Government resorts to the device of a series of fresh orders after every six months and thus continues the detention of a detenu, circumventing the provisions of Rule 30-A for review, Which as interpreted by this Court in lakhanpal's W.P. No. 258/66, dated 1-3-1967 = ( AIR 1967 SC 1507 ) give me protection to the citizens of this country, it would certainly be acting mala fide. Such a fresh order would be liable to be struck down not on the ground that the Government has no power to pass it but on the ground that it is mala fide exercise of the power. Such a fresh order would be liable to be struck down not on the ground that the Government has no power to pass it but on the ground that it is mala fide exercise of the power. But if the Government has power to pass a fresh order of detention on the same facts in case where the earlier order or its continuance fails for any defect we cannot see why the Government cannot pass such fresh order curing that defect. In such a case it cannot be said that the fresh order is a mala fide order passed to circumvent hie 30-A." The Court further held that the ratio laid down in Avtar Singh's Case ( AIR 1967 SC 1797 ) in so far as it says that no fresh order can be passed even to correct any defect in an order continuing detention under Rule 30-A(9) is not correct. The relevant observation of the Court is as under: "we can see no reason to deny power to Government rectify the defect by passing a fresh order of detention. Such an order in such circumstances cannot be called mala fide, and if the Government has power to pass it which it undoubtedly has, for there is bar to a fresh order under the Act or the Rules-there is no reason why such a power should be denied to Government so that it can never correct a mistake or defect in the order once passed or in the continuation order once made." It should be noted that the aforesaid judgment is rendered by the Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges. Mr. Baxi appearing on behalf of the petitioner was not in a position to point out any decision wherein the ratio laid clown in the aforesaid judgment is doubted or is not approved by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decision. 21. In the case of Basante Chandra Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Federal Court 18, the Federal Court negatived the contention that once the detention order has been cancelled, there was bar to pass a fresh order of detention except on fresh materials. It held that if in view of possible defects a fresh order of detention is passed so as to avoid any argument based on Such defects, such a course will not justify any inference of fraud or abuse of power. It held that if in view of possible defects a fresh order of detention is passed so as to avoid any argument based on Such defects, such a course will not justify any inference of fraud or abuse of power. The Court relied upon the decision of Court of Appeal in the case of R. v. Home Secretary, Ex-parte Rule, (1942) 1 All. E.R. 373. The relevant discussion is as under: "It was next contended that the very fact of the cancellation of the order of 19th March 1942 by the order of 3rd July, 1944 and the passing of a fresh order of detention on 3rd July, 1944 showed mala fidcs. It was said that the orders of 3rd July, 1944 were passed pending the further hearing before the High Court, in order to brute an enquiry into the circumstances connected with the order of March 1942. We are unable to draw any such inference from the sequence of these orders. Reports of the decisions of this court and of the High Courts show that during 1943 and 1944 different views were held in different quarters as to the formalities necessary for a valid order of detention and as to the authority entitled to pass such an order. If in view of possible defects of this kind in connection with the order of 19th March, 1942 a fresh order of detention was passed in July 1944 so as to avoid any argument based on such defects, such a course will not justify any inference of fraud or abuse of power. 22. It was next argued as a matter of law that once the order of 19th March, 1942 had been cancelled, there was no power to pass a fresh order of detention except on fresh materials and it was contended that the learned Judges of the High Court were not justified in presuming that fresh materials must have existed when the order of July 1944 was made. The first step in this argument seems to us unwarranted. The observations of the court of Appeals in (1942) 1 All. E.R. 373 show that in this broad form the proposition is untenable. The first step in this argument seems to us unwarranted. The observations of the court of Appeals in (1942) 1 All. E.R. 373 show that in this broad form the proposition is untenable. It may be that in cases in which it is open to the Court to examine the validity of the grounds of detention a decision that certain alleged grounds did not warrant a detention will preclude further detention on the same grounds. But where the earlier order of detention is held defective merely on formal grounds there is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being based on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable by the Courts. There is equally no force in the contention that no order of detention can be passed against a person Who is already under detention. The decision of the Patna High Court in Pat. 252 cannot be understood as laying down any such proposition as a general proposition of law. The learned Judges seem to have drawn an inference of fact from the circumstances of the case that the order then in question was not one made in the bona fide exercise of the Governor's powers." 23. The aforesaid judgment of the Federal Court was considered, approved and relied upon by the Supreme Court in the case of Naranajan Singh Natkawan v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 . In that case the petitioner was detained on 5-7-1950 under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Thereafter a fresh detention order was issued on 17-5-1951 which was served on the petitioner in the prison. The detention order was challenged before the Supreme Court and the matter was pending before the Court. Meanwhile the State Government issued art order on 18-11-1951 revoking the order of detention dated 17-5-1951 and on the same day the District Magistrate issued another detention order. The last order was challenged on the ground that "it was only a device to defeat the Habeas Corpus petition of the petitioner in which a rule had already been issued." It was contended that the ratio laid down in the case of Basante Ckandre v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Federal Court 18, was no longer good law. The last order was challenged on the ground that "it was only a device to defeat the Habeas Corpus petition of the petitioner in which a rule had already been issued." It was contended that the ratio laid down in the case of Basante Ckandre v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Federal Court 18, was no longer good law. The Supreme Court held that on essentially similar facts, the Federal Court had laid down I two propositions which are as under: "(1) Where an earlier order of detention is defective merely on formal grounds, there is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being based on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable by the Courts, and (2) If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention but whether in the face of the later valid order the court can direct the release of the petitioner. The learned Judges pointed out that the analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceed-lings has no application to proceedings in the matter of Habeas Corpus where the Court is concerned solely with the question whether the applicant is being lawfully detained or not." The Supreme Court held that the aforesaid proposition applied with equal force to cases of preventive detention before the commencement of the Constitution and the Constitution made no difference in regard to the Said position of law. The Court further held as under: "Indeed, the position is now made more clear by the express previsions of Section 13 of the Act which provides that a detention order may at anytime be revoked or modified and that such revocation shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under Section against the Same person. The Court further held as under: "Indeed, the position is now made more clear by the express previsions of Section 13 of the Act which provides that a detention order may at anytime be revoked or modified and that such revocation shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under Section against the Same person. Once it is conceded that in Habeas Corpus proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceeding, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that the detaining authority cannot supersede an earlier order of detention challenged as illegal and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the requirements of the law in that behalf." (Emphasis added) This decision of the Supreme Court is referred to and relied upon in the case of Godavari S. Parulekar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1404. In that case the Government had passed repeated detention orders and it Was contended that the detention order was vitiated by malice in law. Negativing the said contention the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon the aforesaid Naranjan Singh Nathawan's Case. The Court held that the mere fact that the detention order is passed during the pendency of Habeas Corpus proceedings cannot by itself lead to the conclusion that the order is vitiated by malice in law. The Court further held that if the Government considers an order of detention, which is the subject-matter of challenge, to be invalid, there is no reason why it should not pass a valid order. This judgment of the Supreme Court is also rendered by a Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. 24. However, the learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 43. This judgment of the Supreme Court is also rendered by a Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. 24. However, the learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 43. In that case the court took into consideration the amended Sub-Section (2) of Section 13 of the Preventive Detention Act 4 of 1950 which read as under: "The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under Section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the Central Government or a State Government or an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made." This was considered along with the original Sub-Section (2) which was as under: "The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under Section 3 against the same person." In that case reliance was placed on the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Besanta Chandra Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Federal Court 18, and the following observations: "It may be that in cases in which it is open to the Court to examine the validity of the grounds did not warrant a detention will preclude further detention on the same grounds. But where the earlier order of detention is held defective merely on formal grounds there is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being based on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable by the Courts." Further reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 and in the case of Shibban Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 179 . After taking into consideration the ratio laid down in the aforesaid two cases and the decision of the Federal Court, the Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the language used by the Parliament in Section 13(2) (as amended by the Parliament) which supported the contention raised by the Solicitor General for contending that the fresh order on preexisting grounds could be passed by the detaining authority if the previous detention order is held defective merely on the formal grounds. The Court pertinently observed that the power of the detaining authority must be determined by reference to any predilections about the legislative intent and that there was nothing in Section 13 (2) which indicates that the expression "revocation" means only revocation of an order which is otherwise valid and operative apparently it includes cancellation of all orders invalid as well as valid. The Court further held that the very fact that a defective order has been passed, or that an order has become invalid because of default in strictly complying with the mandatory provisions of the law bespeaks negligence on the part of the detaining authority, and the principle underlying Section 13(2) is the outcome of the insistence by the Parliament that the detaining authority shall fully apply its mind to and comply with the requirements of the statute and of insistence upon refusal to countenance slipshod exercise of power. 25. In our view, in deciding the aforesaid case the Court took into consideration the plain language of Section 13(2) of the Preventive Detention Act after its amendment. Before amendment of Sub-Section (2) of Section 13 it was provided that the revocation of detention order was not a bar to making of a fresh detention order against the same person while after amendment it was in terms provided that the revocation of expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order against the same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry of the detention order. The Court has interpreted the language of the provision of Section 13(2) of the Preventive Detention Act. The Court has interpreted the language of the provision of Section 13(2) of the Preventive Detention Act. But it has not disapproved the law laid down in the cases of Basante Chandre Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1945, Federal Court 18, Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 , and Shibban Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 179 . 26. Mr. Baxi, learned Advocate for the petitioner, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chotta Hembram v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 432 , wherein the Court has held that under Section 14 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, the condition precedent to the making of the subsequent order of detention is that fresh facts as may warrant the making of an order of detention must come into being after the date of revocation or expiry of an earlier order. He also relied upon the similar judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradip Kumar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2151, and in the case of Bablu Hembram v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2279 . In these cases the Supreme Court considered the provision of Section 14(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act as it stood at the relevant time. The Court held that from the wording of Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 it would follow that if an order for the detention of a person had been made under the Act and that order was either subsequently revoked or the period for which the detention order was made has expired, the said order would not stand in the way of the making of a fresh order of detention under Section of the Act against the same person provided fresh facts arise after the date of the said revocation or expiry. If no fresh facts come into being after the date of revocation or expiry as may Warrant the making of an order of detention, the condition precedent to the making of the subsequent order would be non-existent and it would not be permissible to make a subsequent order of detention under Section 3 of the Act. 27. If no fresh facts come into being after the date of revocation or expiry as may Warrant the making of an order of detention, the condition precedent to the making of the subsequent order would be non-existent and it would not be permissible to make a subsequent order of detention under Section 3 of the Act. 27. In our view, Section 15 of the PASA Act is materially different from Section 14(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (as it stood at the relevant time) which is considered by the Supreme Court. This would become apparent if we comparatively consider the provisions of Section 14 (2) as it originally stood and its amendment in 1976 by Act 14 of 1976 and Section 15(2) of the PASA Act which are as under: The Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 The Gujarat Prevention Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 S. 14(2) as it originally stood S. 14 (2) as it stood after amendment by Act 14 of 1976 S. 15 (2) 1 2 3 14(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under Section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the Central Government or a State Government or an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made. 14 (2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not bar the making of another detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the subsequent detention order) under Section 3 against the same person: 15 (2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as "the earlier detention order") shall not bar the making of another detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as "the subsequent detention order") under Section 3 against the same person: Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall, in no case, extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order or the expiry of the Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971, whichever is later. Provided that in a case Where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall in no case extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 in terms provides that the expiry or revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention 1 order against the same person. Proviso to the said sub-section further contemplates that even where there being no fresh facts having arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier detention order, fresh detention order could be passed. It only limits the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order. Sub-Section m (2), therefore, does not lay down any fetter on the power of the detaining authority to detain a person afresh only on fresh facts as is found in Section 14 Sub-Section (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. Sub-Section m (2), therefore, does not lay down any fetter on the power of the detaining authority to detain a person afresh only on fresh facts as is found in Section 14 Sub-Section (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. It should be further noted that Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act was amended by Act 14 of 1976 and was exactly similar to Section 15(2) of the PASA Act. This clearly indicates that the Legislature intended to restore the original position of law as considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 327, and by the amendment of the Act the &Legislature gave power to the concerned authority to pass detention order without there being any fresh facts if the earlier order has expired or is revoked. Therefore the ratio laid down in Pradip Kumar's Case (Supra) and Bablu's Case (Supra) shall have no application but the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagdev Singh's Case (Supra) would be applicable and would hold the field while interpreting Section 15 of the PASA Act. In the case of Jayantilal Khetsi Gada v. The State of Gujarat, (1980) Criminal Law Reporter (Gujarat) 117, the Division Bench of this Court considered the provisions of Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and Section 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (as it was) and held that under Section 14(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act there was a specific fetter on the power of the detaining authority to detain a person afresh only on fresh facts while there was no such fetter under Section 11, Sub-Section (2) of the COFEPOSA Act. In this view or the matter, it cannot be said that the aforesaid three decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner would be in any way relevant for interpreting Section 15(2) of the PASA Act. 28. Further, the learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 697. In that case the court considered the provisions of Section 11(2) of the COFEPOSA Act. 28. Further, the learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 697. In that case the court considered the provisions of Section 11(2) of the COFEPOSA Act. In paragraph 5 the Court observed that there is judicial consensus that under the preventive detention law, before the Act in question came into the field, repeated orders of detention could not be made and that the Supreme Court had clearly indicated that more than one order of detention on the same grounds in succession would not be valid. In that case three orders of detention were made on the same grounds and the learned advocate for the respondents had conceded that as the law declared by the Supreme Court stood and but for the enabling provisions in Section 11 (2) of the Act, the impugned orders would not Stand a moment's scrutiny. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Vaidya submitted that the said judgment is based on concession given by the learned counsel who was appearing on behalf of the respondents and the matter is decided by the Bench consisting of 3 Hon'ble Judges and therefore it has not overruled the law laid down by the Supreme Court in cases of Jagdev Singh v. State of Jamnm and Kashmir, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 327, Naranjan Singh Mathwan v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952, SC 196, and Shibban Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 179 . On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that in the aforesaid Case of Ibrahim Bachu Bafan the Court further held that by issuing a high prerogative writ like Habeas Corpus or certiorari if the detention order is quashed by declaring the order to be void and is struck down, it cannot be said that the order is revoked or modified under Sub-Section (2) of Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and the said sub-section would not be applicable. In paragraph 10 of the Judgment the Court has held as under: "We are of the view that this seems to be the legislative scheme. The pronounced judicial view of this court was that repeated orders of detention are not to be made. In paragraph 10 of the Judgment the Court has held as under: "We are of the view that this seems to be the legislative scheme. The pronounced judicial view of this court was that repeated orders of detention are not to be made. Parliament while making provision in Section 11(2) of the Act, must be taken to have been aware of such view and in conferring the power of making repeated orders, safeguards have been provided under Sub-Section (1) by confining the exercise of power to limited situation. Clothing the prescribed authority to exercise power under Section 3 even in a situation where the Court has intervened to bring about nullification of the order of detention would give rise to complicated situations and keeping the scheme of the Section in view we are of the clear opinion that where an order is quashed by a Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the power of making a fresh order under Sub-Section (2) of Section 11 is not available to be exercised." From the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it can be said that once the order is quashed and set aside by the Court, the power of making a fresh order under Sub-Section (2) of Section 11 of COFEPOSA Act is not available to be exorcised by the concerned authority. 29. In this case for our purpose it is not necessary to decide whether the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 327 stands modified. It cannot be said that the following propositions of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 , Shibban Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 179 of Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 327, stand in any way modified: (1) Fresh order of detention can be passed on the Same facts if for any reason the earlier order of detention has to be revoked by the Government, unless there is some specific provision in the Act or rules which bars the Government from passing a fresh order of detention on the same facts. (2) Normally a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts provided it is not mala fide if for any reason the previous order of detention or its continuance is not legal on account of some technical defect, if the authority making the order is satisfied that the ground on which the detenu was detained on former occasion is still available and that there was need for detention on its basis. (3) Unless there is specific bar in the Act or rules, there is no reason why such a power should be denied to Government so that it can never correct a mistake or formal defect in the order once passed or in the continuation order once made. 30. In the present case we are concerned with Section 15 of the PASA Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of I the PASA Act in terms provides that even if the detention order has expired or is revoked, on same facts another [detention order could be passed. No doubt it does not make any provision with regard to the orders which arc quashed by the Court. If we accept the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, then Section 15 would be otiose. The object and purpose of this Section is to see that fresh detention order could be passed without there being fresh facts if the previous order has expired or is revoked. In the case of Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases 407, the Court has observed that preventive detention for the social protection of the community is a hard law but, it is a necessary evil in the modern society and must be pragmatically construed, so that it works. The law should be interpreted so that it serves the society but does not become an impotent agent and the havoc created by anti-social elements should be taken care of by law. It would be pertinent to reproduce paragraph 18 of the said judgment which reads as under: "Preventive detention for the social protection of the community is, as noted and observed in Vijay Narain Singh Case ( AIR 1984 SC 1334 ), a hard law but, it is a necessary evil in the modern society and must be pragmatically construed, so that it works. That is how law serves the society but does not become an impotent agent, anti-social elements creating havoc have to be taken care of by law. Lawless multitude bring democracy and constitution into disrepute. Bad facts bring hard laws, but these should be properly and legally applied. It should be so construed that it does not endanger social defence or the defence of the community, at the same time does not infringe the liberties of the citizens. A balance should always be struck." 31. Therefore, in our opinion, the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that because the Government had evoked the previous detention order, it was not competent for the authority to pass a fresh detention order on the same grounds or that it is mala fide cannot be accepted. 32. With regard to his contention that the order dated 9th August, 1985 was quashed and set aside by this High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 625/85 and, therefore, the fresh detention order could not be passed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Case of Ibrahim Bachu Bafan (Supra), it should be noted that after the said order was quashed by this Court on the ground of 13 days' delay in considering the representation of the detenu, the impugned order is passed not only on the grounds which are stated in the Said detention order but is based upon the fresh facts. This becomes abundantly clear if we refer to the grounds of detention and particularly the statements of three witnesses which are discussed by the detaining authority in detail in the grounds of detention. The aforesaid statements in terms reveal the activities of the detenu after the detention order was quashed by this Court. We are not narrating the said activities at this stage because they are already narrated in the earlier and subsequent paragraphs as well as in detail in the detention order. These statements clearly show that before 2½ months of the recording of the statements the detenu was selling or trying to sell liquor and was acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and which affects adversely the maintenance of public order. Therefore, the detaining authority has taken into consideration the incidents which have taken place after August, 1985. Therefore, the detaining authority has taken into consideration the incidents which have taken place after August, 1985. It cannot be said tit at if the previous order is quashed by the High Court on some technical ground, then the detaining authority cannot pass the fresh detention order if there are flesh facts justifying the detention order and that it cannot look into the previous incidents. Merely because the detention order is quashed on some formal or technical ground, the previous incidents, are not washed out or the detenu gets clean chit from the Court or that his previous record gets obliterated and that there is no bar on the detaining authority to consider the said incidents along with the additional facts, incidents or fresh facts for passing another detention order. Re: Ground No. (4): 33. It is next contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that there is non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority because the detaining authority in ground No. 4 has referred to the Chapter Case filed under Section 93 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and that the authority has referred to Chapter Cases filed against the detenu under Sections 107 and 116 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code in ground No. 5. In our view, ground No. 4 is relevant for taking into consideration the activities of the detenu as a bootlegger. With regard to ground No. 5, as we are holding that the detenu cannot be termed as a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PASA Act, it is not necessary for us to deal with the said aspect because even if that ground is irrelevant, it would not vitiate the detention order against the detenu with regard to his activities as a bootlegger. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, submitted that even in ground No. 2 it has been mentioned that the detenu is in the habit of consuming liquor and for that the detaining authority has relied upon some criminal cases filed against the detenu and, therefore, the authority has taken into consideration this irrelevant aspect before passing the detention order. In our view, with regard to this ground No. 2 also the learned Advocate conveniently omits the further statement wherein it is mentioned that after consuming the liquor the detenu was behaving in a disorderly manner under the influence of liquor. In our view, with regard to this ground No. 2 also the learned Advocate conveniently omits the further statement wherein it is mentioned that after consuming the liquor the detenu was behaving in a disorderly manner under the influence of liquor. This aspect has to be taken into consideration along with the statements of the witnesses who have stated that after consumption of liquor the detenu was behaving in a disorderly manner and that he was giving threats and creating atmosphere of terror. Therefore this cannot be said to be irrelevant. We agree that the consumption of liquor would not be a relevant factor for deciding Whether a person is a bootlegger or not. Therefore, to that extent part of ground No. 2 is irrelevant. In spite of the aforesaid infirmities as stated above, in view of Section 6 of the PASA Act, even if one or more grounds are not relevant, yet the detention order would not be vitiated if there is one or there are other grounds which arc relevant on which detention order could be passed. As discussed above, taking into consideration the ground No. 1, ground No. 5 and the ground No. 7 wherein the statements of the witnesses arc referred to, it can easily be said that on these grounds the detaining authority could have passed the detention order. It is a well-established law that if the appropriate authority on proper material arrives at reasonable and rational conclusions, then the High Court cannot sit in appeal and arrive at the conclusion that the material alleged against the detenu is not for the Court to put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that the detention order is justified or not. Re: Ground No. (5): 34. With regard to the grounds of detention that the detenu is involved in activities as a bootlegger as stated above, the main allegations against the detenu are that the detenu himself and through his associate Raju Motiram and his wife Somiben illegally sells liquor and denatured spirit. Further, for carrying on the aforesaid activities without any interference, he beats or gives threats to the persons residing in the Pani Gate area and thereby creates the atmosphere of fear and thereby his activities are Such as would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as required by the provisions of the Act. Further, for carrying on the aforesaid activities without any interference, he beats or gives threats to the persons residing in the Pani Gate area and thereby creates the atmosphere of fear and thereby his activities are Such as would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as required by the provisions of the Act. It is the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that merely because the detenu was prosecuted for possessing or for consumption of liquor, it cannot be inferred that the activity of the detenu is Such that it would pre-judicially affect the maintenance of public order. In our opinion, this contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner is without any substance because in the grounds of detention the detaining authority has referred to the statements of five witnesses. The said statements clearly indicate that the detenu is a headstrong person and that nobody is prepared to give evidence against him. In ground No. 7 while referring to the statement of witness No.1 it has been mentioned that because of the activities of the detenu residents of the locality were harassed, that detenu was headstrong person and was beating the people, the detenu was giving threats to the persons for committing murder by pointing out knife or creating atmosphere of terror and panic. The witness has specifically stated that before 2½ months prior to recording of his statement the detenu went near the shop of the witness for selling liquor. He abused the witness as the witness asked him not to sell liquor. At that time as the police came there, the detenu ran away. At night time the police carried out raid at his house, but the detenu was not found at his house. On the next day at about 2-00 p.m. after consuming liquor the detenu went there and beat the witness by alleging that he had informed the police. He also gave a threat of murdering him by putting a knife on his chest. The witness has further stated that on 10-7-1986 2 or 3 persons came to the detenu's house for consuming liquor. After consumption of liquor they had quarrelled. He also gave a threat of murdering him by putting a knife on his chest. The witness has further stated that on 10-7-1986 2 or 3 persons came to the detenu's house for consuming liquor. After consumption of liquor they had quarrelled. At that time the brother of the detenu along with 2 to 4 Muslims came there and a quarrel took place between the persons who were of Bhoi community and the aforesaid Muslim persons creating an atmosphere as if there was a communal riot between Hindus and Muslims. The witness has also narrated the incident of 19-8-1986. The detaining authority has also referred to the substance of the say of witness No. 2 in the grounds of detention. It is the say of the witness No. 2 that the detenu was in the habit of consuming and selling liquor and that he was exciting communal feelings. It is his say that before 1½ months when he was passing with his rickshaw nearby the house of the detenu, the detenu stopped his rickshaw and asked him to go to Sikandarpura for bringing liquor. As the witness refused, the detenu became angry and gave him 2 to 4 fist blows on his chest. He has also narrated the incident of 10-7-1986 and 19-8-1986 which we are not repeating. The detaining authority has also stated the substance of the say of witness No.3 along with other facts. This witness has stated that before months the detenu went near his shop at about 7-00 p.m. with a gunny bag containing liquor bags for selling liquor. When the witness told him not to sell liquor, lie has beaten and threatened that his shop would be burnt and pointed Rampuri knife. The incidents of 10-7-1986 and 19-8-1986 are also narrated. Witness No. 4 has stated that before 2½ months one Muslim person had gone to the house of detenu and after consumption of liquor that person while passing nearby the house of the witness tried to molest his daughter. When the witness went in inform about the said fact to the detenu, the detenu came out with a stick for beating. The witness also referred to the incidents of 10th July, 1986 and 19th July, 1986. Witness No. 5 who is a Head Constable has also narrated that the detenu is a bootlegger and a headstrong person, and stated other facts. Witnesses Nos. The witness also referred to the incidents of 10th July, 1986 and 19th July, 1986. Witness No. 5 who is a Head Constable has also narrated that the detenu is a bootlegger and a headstrong person, and stated other facts. Witnesses Nos. 1 to 4 have stated that at the place of business of vending illicit liquor, it results in disturbance of public order on the spot as the drunkards who are consuming liquor behave in disorderly manner and quarrel and abuse and that they try to molest or are molesting the women. Therefore, taking into consideration the grounds made out against the detenu, it cannot be said that the activities of the detenu are not such which would not fall within the definition of "bootlegger" as defined in Section 2(b) of the PASA Act or that there is no ground for holding that the activities of the detenu are not such which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Re: Ground No. (6): 35. Taking into consideration the statements of the witnesses and the facts stated therein, it cannot be said that the said statements are stereotype. Even the learned advocate for the petitioner agreed to this aspect after going through the same thoroughly. It is true that the names of the witnesses are not disclosed, but the names are not disclosed after taking into consideration the provision of Section 9(2) of the PASA Act. This is specifically stated in the last paragraph of the detention order. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in this ground. 36. In the result, there is no substance in all the contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. 37. In this view of the matter, this Special Criminal Application is rejected. Rule discharged.